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ABSTRACT 
'Food for Thought: Ethics and Artificial Nutritional Support' 
• A narrative ethics analysis is utilised to explore the nature and practice of the provision of 
artificial nutritional support. This technology is utilised in a variety of settings, with 
increasing acceptance of its efficacy and utility in health care. The administration of 
artificial nutritional support was originally intended as a transitory measure to allow for the 
restoration of a patient's normal digestive functioning. It is now, however, often provided to 
those who have irretrievably lost all higher brain functioning, people with terminal illness, 
and those with critical illness. Accordingly, the ethical analysis which is pursued embraces 
the multidisciplinary nature of the socio-political space which is artificial nutritional support. 
This modality of treatment has emerged as a site of contested ethics. Some commentators 
argue that providing nutrition regardless of route is a basic human function, symbolic of 
care, and constituting 'ordinary means' that should never be forgone. They also suggest 
that forgoing these techniques directly causes death, and are concerned about the social 
implications of depriving vulnerable people of basic human attention. Other authors 
suggest that the burdens of life with pain, discomfort, immobility, impaired consciousness, 
and loss of communication so overwhelm the benefits of life that there is no obligation to 
assist in sustaining life. Thus, a dichotomy of views exists. Different perspectives 
regarding the ethics of artificial nutritional support often depend on the model of health 
service delivery within which the author operates. Accordingly, research is undertaken 
which includes data from two distinct health service delivery systems. This research draws 
upon experience and literature within Australia, the United Kingdom and The United States 
of America, markedly different health care delivery systems that have been described as 
either 'socialised' or 'privatised'. 
This thesis is informed by interviews with 32 participants from diverse heath care 
disciplines, ranging from Intensivist to Chaplain. Drawing upon the richness of narrative, 
these interviews utilise the informants as experts from Australia, the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America. The findings from this research move well beyond the 
sphere of artificial nutritional support to encompass the practice of medicine and end-of-life 
care in general. Specifically the case is made for a cycle of care and communication 
practices, which assist us to debunk death myths regarding the inevitable painful tragedy 
of death, myths that inform the discursive shaping of contemporary health care. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ethical issues continue to loom large in the international health care arena, as the 
paradigm of physician-driven health care shifts to the multidisciplinary health care team, 
and patient-driven care. Since its birth in the early 1970's, contemporary bioethics has 
developed to become a major academic and service oriented discipline with its own 
research centres, journals, conferences and degree programs. A major reason for this 
marked expansion has been the unremitting pace of technological development and the 
challenge of an increasingly secular society seeking moral direction and certainty. As 
researchers and clinicians discover new and improved methods of medical treatment, we 
discover that each development has its own attendant ethical issues, which are 
discovered and defined as we interrogate and utilise the technology. The nature and 
practice of the provision of artificial nutritional support is an excellent example of a 
technology which is being utilised in a variety of settings, and with increasing acceptance 
of its efficacy and utility in modern medicine. The administration of artificial nutrition was 
originally intended as a transitory measure to allow for the restoration of a patient's 
normal digestive functioning. It is now, however, often provided to many patients who 
have irretrievably lost all higher brain functioning, those patients diagnosed with a 
terminal illness, and those who are critically ill. Dunlop eta! (1995) raise an issue that 
deserves delineation when discussing artificial nutritional support in this context: 
Nutritional support should be considered as a separate issue 
from hydration. The administration of conventional dextrose 
solutions via peripheral veins does not constitute nutritional 
support. This can only be achieved by enteral feeding 
(nasogastric tube or gastrostomy) or by pare nteral 
administration into a central vein (Dunlop eta! 1995:141). 
Accordingly, hydration is not the focus of this thesis. It is a strange paradox that, as 
Macfie (1997:850) states, 'society and many members of the medical profession have no 
hesitation in recommending long-term nutritional support in these vegetative patients, but 
at the same time fail to recognise or treat malnutrition in hospitalised patients'. There is, 
of course, more to the issue of providing nourishment than biological integrity. An 
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analysis therefore, of the ethical issues surrounding the provision of artificial nutritional 
support, serves to emphasise not only the changing face of bioethics but also 
demonstrates how naming and exploring of ethical issues have influenced the clinical 
application of nutritional support therapies. 
Health care professionals have an ethical obligation to respect human life and to provide 
relief from suffering. The so-called Georgetown mantral of beneficence, nonmaleficence, 
autonomy, and justice are accepted moral principles governing the behaviour of health 
care professionals within society. Technological developments have seen particular 
tensions in applying such principles in particular areas of medical treatment. For 
example, in clearly delineating disproportionately burdensome treatment in end-of-life 
care where limits need to be applied. 
Health care ethics include the study of obligations, rights and values in patient care. 
Nutrition is a fundamental part of life and, even when withheld for short periods, can have 
profound detrimental effects on the body (Taylor and Goodinson 1992). The provision of 
various types of artificial nutritional support carries an assortment of ethical implications. 
Many theories defend the use of artificial nutritional support on ethical rather than 
scientific grounds (Phillips 1992). One of these regards artificial nutrition as a symbolic 
message to a helpless person. Such a theory contends that withholding such a support 
hastens the person's death, resulting in loss of integrity for the health care services and 
the destruction of a symbol of human interdependence and caring. 
There has been considerable conflict on this subject matter. As discussed in Chapter 
One, some commentators argue that providing nutrition regardless of route is so basic a 
human function and so symbolic of care that it constitutes 'ordinary means' and should 
never be forgone. They also suggest that forgoing these techniques is a direct cause of 
death, and wonder about the social implications of a policy that would deprive the most 
helpless of basic human attention. Other authors on the subject consider that the 
As Ronald Bailey notes, this is the colloquial expression for the principlist account which has emerged from this American 
University. See Reason Magazine: Uncommon Morality: Can Bioethics Bring Us All Together?' (www.reason.coml 
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burdens of a continual life of pain, discomfort, immobility, blurred consciousness, and 
loss of communication would not be desired by any human, and those burdens so 
overwhelm benefits of life that there is no obligation to assist in sustaining life. 
Thus, a dichotomy of views exists. Interestingly, variance often depends on the model of 
health service delivery within which the author operates. Accordingly, it was decided to 
undertake research that included data from two distinct health service delivery systems in 
three different countries. Consequently, this research draws upon experience and 
literature within socialised and privatised health delivery systems as experienced by 
various practising health professionals in Australia, The United Kingdom and The United 
States of America. 
Accordingly, this thesis commences in Chapter One with an in-depth exploration of the 
relevant literature. This literature and the interviews discussed in Chapters Three to Ten 
establish a need for alternative ways for problem solving and meaning-making in the 
area of ethics and nutritional support research. Our contemporary Western lifestyles offer 
few avenues for the exploration of meaning-making, the pursuit of ethics and values as 
ends in themselves, or even for the quest for personal understanding (Kegan 1994; Lifton 
1993; Taylor 1989). Given this reality, in this research project opportunities were created 
for meaningful, ethical dialogue regarding the provision of artificial nutritional support. 
This involved the use of narrative and a dialectic between research participants, health 
care colleagues and the researcher as mediator. Hence, narrative research as a method 
underpinned by what has come to be known as narrative ethics research, was chosen as 
the most appropriate methodology for this project. An in-depth discussion in defence of 
this method is provided in Chapter Two. In the chapters which follow the methodology 
chapter we encounter a series of interpretation chapters (Three to Ten) that explore, 
examine and theorise on the ethical issues associated with the provision of artificial 
nutritional support. These eight chapters form the empirical foundation of the research. 
Then in chapters Eleven and Twelve we discuss the implications for practice and the 
relevance of the research for the health care professions. In the final chapter we arrive at 
some conclusions which move well beyond the sphere of artificial nutritional support to 
encompass the practice of medicine and end-of-life care in general. Specifically the case 
is made for a cycle of care and communication which assists us to debunk the death 
myths discussed by Meyer (1997) regarding the inevitable painful tragedy of death that 
plague both the practice and construction of ethical health care. 
This thesis constitutes more than a mere contribution to the literature. It may also be 
considered as a political challenge to the dominant medical and principlist approach to 
clinical practice and medical education across various health systems and regions. 
Within such a context, it is now worth exploring the 'received wisdom' of the ethics and 
artificial nutritional support literature, which is the subject of Chapter One. 
4 
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CHAPTER ONE 
REVIEWING THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature concerning the ethical issues in artificial nutritional 
support. Artificial nutritional support is abbreviated throughout this thesis as either enteral 
nutrition (EN), parenteral nutrition (PN) and/or total parenteral nutrition (TPN). These 
abbreviations are commonly used throughout the literature and are embraced by all the 
informants participating in this research. An introduction to the dominant issues drawn 
from this literature as well as the popular arguments is also offered. This includes a 
synopsis of those areas including medico-legal decisions whereby a case-by-case 
explanation is provided on those cases that are considered as landmark cases. The 
question of medical intervention or basic care is explored within the context of artificial 
nutritional support, as are those popular and dominant views held regarding withholding 
and/or withdrawing such treatment Ordinary versus extraordinary care is examined in 
detail including the issues of medical killing, self-determination and suicide, benefits 
versus burdens of treatment, medical futility, quality-of-life, and the issue of justice as it 
pertains to resources, access and economic considerations. Finally, the gaps identified 
within the literature are discussed. Consequently, an explanation into the relevance of 
the ensuing research is provided. More specifically, the lack of multidisciplinary 
qualitative research is discussed therefore providing some indication of the identified 
gaps in the related literature. This is also discussed as an introduction to the research 
methodology underpinning this thesis. 
The Dominant Issues and Popular Dichotomies 
The ethical issues involved in the provision of artificial nutritional support in patients with 
chronic, serious, and/or terminal illness are difficult. Yet within the literature, this patient 
group is invested with the overwhelming majority of related discussion. This discussion 
is predominantly authored by ethicists and clinicians specialised in the fields of palliative 
care and gerontology. The other patient population considered in this research rates 
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very little mention, if any, that is, the critically ill and/or perioperative patient. In fact, only 
one author, a consultant surgeon in a combined gastroenterology unit in the UK, Dr. John 
Macfie, offers any specific exploration of ethical provision of artificial nutritional support in 
these areas. The shortfall of any specific exploration in these areas not only shows the 
importance the ensuing research, but also identifies the 'placement' of artificial nutritional 
support into the convenient category of all those therapies that are considered complex 
medical treatments in the acute care setting, despite the overwhelming 'non-complex' 
emphasis that artificial nutrition has attracted over the past 20 years. The symbolism of 
food, its nurturing provision and its life-sustaining necessity is a context afforded much 
discussion and exploration in the chronically or terminally ill. However, this symbolism is 
completely overlooked and not even mentioned in the critical care literature. It is this 
concentration that renders these aspects of the literature devoid of any discussion on 
ethical appropriateness. This literature review discusses the common themes arising out 
of the associated literature, as well as justifying an ongoing exploration into the area of 
ethics and artificial nutritional support. This exploration is of a discursive nature which is 
truly multidisciplinary and multinational. 
When it comes to decisions about feeding and withholding or withdrawing artificial 
nutritional support, dilemmas abound. According to Burk (1996) some ethicists have 
sought to resolve these dilemmas by formulating dichotomies, such as, withholding 
versus withdrawing treatment, ordinary versus extraordinary care, killing versus letting 
the patient die, and heroic versus basic care. These dichotomies have become 
traditional in health care ethics, and are therefore worthy of interpretation via an 
expansive review of the literature for the purpose of this research. 
Interpretations 
The interpretation of ethical issues in artificial nutritional support can be accomplished 
through several means. This review is a synthesis of the current literature on the ethics 
of the provision of the technology of artificial nutritional support. When patients lose the 
ability to ingest adequate amounts of food and fluids necessary to sustain life, the health 
care team may be faced with two questions. The most difficult question of the two is, 
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should artificial nutritional support be provided or discontinued? If it is to be provided, 
what form of artificial nutritional support, and by what route, is in the patient's best 
interest? The decision of whether or not to institute aggressive nutritional support, 
especially in those patients who are judged incompetent to understand the risks and/or 
benefits of therapy, in whom such support is of questionable value, and in those with 
irreversible or severely debilitating illness who are judged to be competent yet refuse 
nutritional intervention, is particularly troublesome. How one comes to formulating 
rational decisions for the provision of artificial nutritional support for these patients and 
their families crosses the intersection of individual and societal morals, ethics and 
precedents in law. 
Medico-Legal Decisions 
The assumption that specialised nutritional support should be used to sustain life for all 
patients unable to ingest adequate amounts of nutrition has been the subject of much 
medico-legal and ethical debate. More specifically, the potential withholding or 
withdrawal of the same from patients has become one of the most controversial and 
intensely debated issues in modern biomedical ethics and law (Ahronheim and Gasner 
1990; Boisaubin 1993; Dresser and Boisaubin 1985; Lynn and Childress 1983; Nelson 
1987; Siegler and Weisbard 1985). The outset of this, and other medical and legal 
issues that have surfaced in the past two decades are primarily in the scientific and 
technological advances that permit essential life processes to be maintained during 
critical and even in chronic illnesses (Boisaubin 1993). The provision of adequate 
nutrition is, unequivocally, a critical priority for a majority of patients, especially for those 
who are considered to be critically ill. According to Knox (1993) it is generally agreed 
that no patient with a disease process benefits from total or partial starvation. The 
medico-legal literature provides numerous examples of cases where patients may not be 
best served by artificial nutritional support (Luce 1990; Oley Foundation in McCamish 
and Crocker 1993; Smedira et a! 1990). Nevertheless, one of the most controversial legal 
and ethical debates concerns the provision of nutrition through artificial means. A major 
public policy issue of the past decades has revolved around the question, under what 
conditions, if any, is it acceptable to withhold or withdraw nutritional support. 
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Meisel (1991) claims that there are a number of myths about what law permits the 
termination of life support, some of which spring from a fundamental misconception of 
what law is. He is concerned that serious misunderstanding of the law can lead to tragic 
results for physicians, health care institutions, and families. These misunderstandings 
are: (1) anything that is not specifically permitted by law is prohibited; (2) termination of 
life support is murder or suicide; (3) a patient must be terminally ill for life support to be 
stopped; (4) it is permissible to terminate extraordinary treatments, but not ordinary ones; 
(5) it is permissible to withhold treatment, but once started, it must be continued; (6) tube 
feeding is legally different from other treatments; (7) termination of life support requires 
going to court; and (8) living wills/advance directives are not legal (Meisel 1991:1497). 
The following examples summarise the prominent legal cases concerning artificial 
nutritional support that clearly expose the myths described above. 
Karen Quinlan 
The history of legal cases involving withdrawal of medical care is a short one, spanning 
only 25 years. The first important case to achieve both widespread public awareness 
and legal precedent, that of Karen Ann Quinlan, was decided in 1976 (In re Quinlan 1976 
cited in Boisaubin 1993). Miss Quinlan lapsed into a persistent vegetative state 2 (PVS) 
after a drug overdose and subsequently her family requested, and permission was 
granted, to discontinue ventilatory support. Interestingly, withdrawal of tube feeding was 
not an issue in the decision since the family did not request it. With artificial nutritional 
support, Ms Quinlan lived for more than ten additional years until her death in 1981. Her 
somewhat tragic life provided not only a legal landmark, but also evidence of how long 
life can be continued when excellent medical care, including artificial nutritional support, 
is maintained. 
Paul Brophy 
The case of Paul E. Brophy was also a significant legal decision in the use of artificial 
nutritional support. Mr. Brophy, a former fire fighter and emergency technician had 
2  The potential derogatory interpretations of the term 'PVS' are acknowledged, as explained by Chris Borthwick (1995) in The Proof of 
the Vegetable: A Comment on Medical Futility', Journal of Medical Ethics; 21:205-8. 
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unsuccessfully undergone surgery in 1983 for a ruptured basilar artery aneurysm and 
never regained consciousness (Steinbrook and Lo 1988). He remained in PVS for three 
years. During this time his wife sought consultation with clergy, an ethicist, and a lawyer, 
requesting that artificial nutritional support be stopped. The couple's children and other 
family members were supportive of the decision, yet Mr. Brophy's personal physician and 
the hospital administration were opposed. Mrs. Brophy asked a probate court to allow 
her husband's tube feeding to be discontinued yet the judge ruled against her. Following 
an appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Mr. Brophy's enteral feeding 
was discontinued. On October 23, 1986, eight days after the withdrawal of artificial 
nutritional support, Paul Brophy died of pneumonia with his wife and children at his 
bedside (Boisaubin 1993). 
The Brophy case was a significant decision in a number of ways. The state court 
majority upheld the common law rights of individuals and assumed the constitutional 
rights of refusal of medical treatments including artificial feeding. The right of refusal was 
given precedence over other competing claims, including the state's interest in 
preserving life and the disapproval of some of the health care providers involved in the 
case. The case was also remarkable in the reliance of the justices upon the authority of 
a number of medical professional groups, such as the American Medical Association, the 
American Academy of Neurology, and the Massachusetts Medical Society, all of which 
deemed removal of artificial nutritional support from such patients as ethical (Ahronheim 
and Gasner 1990). 
Nancy Beth Cruzan 
The case of Nancy Beth Cruzan has become the single most important decision (in 
American law at least) addressing the general issue of withdrawal of medical care, and 
specifically the issue of termination of artificial nutritional support. This case has been 
exhaustively discussed in the medico-legal literature. In summary, Nancy Cruzan was 33 
when she was severely injured in a car accident in Missouri in 1983. Despite being 
resuscitated, she never regained consciousness and remained in PVS being nutritionally 
supported via a gastrostomy. Five years later, her parents requested that their 
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daughters feeding tube be removed on the basis of her statement that she would not 
want to continue to live if she could not be 'at least half normal' (Boisaubin 1993:140). A 
trial judge agreed with her parents' requests, but the Missouri Supreme Court overturned 
the decision by stating that the patient's right to refuse treatment was hers' alone and no 
one could exercise it for her. Ms Cruzan's parents appealed the decision to the United 
States Supreme Court in 1990. The court stated that incompetent patients did not have 
the same right as autonomous patients because they cannot directly exercise it. The 
majority opinion declared that the individual's right to refuse treatment must be balanced 
against relevant state interests, including the protection and preservation of human life. 
After the Supreme Court ruling, the Cruzan's petitioned the trial court of Missouri to 
rehear their request to discontinue feeding, arguing that new witnesses had come 
forward who had had specific discussions with Nancy before her accident about her 
statements about not wanting to be kept alive as a 'vegetable'. In December 1990, a 
state judge authorised Cruzan's parents to 'cause the removal' of artificial nutritional 
support, arguing that Cruzan's intent, if medically able, would be to terminate her nutrition 
and hydration. The tube feedings were stopped and Nancy Beth Cruzan died 12 days 
later. 
Tony Bland 
Tony Bland was a 21-year-old English football fan who was crushed in the Hillsborough 
football stadium disaster in the United Kingdom on April 15, 1985. Mr. Bland suffered 
massive anoxic brain damage and was subsequently confirmed as being in PVS. 
Artificial nutritional support was maintained by nasogastric tube feeding. After some 
months in this condition his attending physicians approached the local coroner to 
examine as to the legality of withdrawing artificial nutritional support. They were advised 
that this would constitute judicial murder. The case was ultimately heard by the House of 
Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, and on February 4th, 1993, they 
authorised the removal of the feeding tube. Tony Bland died 11 days later (Dyer 1993). 
. 	The prevailing clinical (American Academy of Neurology 1989; American Dietetic 
Association 1992; American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
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1989; American Nurses Association 1992), ethical (Hastings Center 1987; President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research 1983), and judicial (Cruzan versus Director, Missouri Department of 
Health in Knox 1993; Paris and Reardon 1985) positions are that the provision of 
nutrition through artificial means is an invasive medical intervention. As such, medical 
procedures for supplying nutrition impose burdens as well as provide benefits, and may 
under certain circumstances, be forgone. 
Within the North American literature, in general, the courts have held that a competent 
person maintains the right to refuse any medical treatment, including artificial feeding. 
The courts and other medical bodies have supported the notion that artificial nutritional 
supportas a mode of therapy that supports basic physiological processes is to be 
considered no different from the provision of ventilatory support (President's Commission 
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
1983; American Medical Association 1986). Both forms of treatment are to be 
considered extraordinary if the medical risks of providing such treatment outweigh the 
benefits, that is, reduce the patient's overall quality-of-life by causing undue pain and 
suffering, directly from the therapy or by the prolongation of terminal illness. However, 
the legal discussions within the literature have left considerable doubt regarding the 
specific guidelines that are to be applied for either withholding or withdrawing artificial 
nutritional support. 
While these generalisations have been upheld in most cases for competent persons, 
they have varied considerably in situations in which the patient's judgement was in 
question, or in cases in which the patient's wishes prior to irreversible illness were not 
clear. These variations are exemplified in the case of Paul Brophy (Brophy versus New 
England Sinai Hospital 1986), in which the judge ruled that the feeding tube had to 
remain, choosing to note that without it the patient would suffer; in the case of Conroy (In 
re: Conroy, New Jersey 1985 cited in Groher 1990), who had to be tube fed before dying 
because her self-removal of the tube was judged not to constitute refusal; in the case of 
Browning (In re: Guardianship of Estelle M. Browning, Florida 1989 cited in Groher 
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1990), and Hazleton (In re: Hazleton, Virginia 1987 cited in Groher 1990), the tube was 
not withdrawn because it could not be shown that death was imminent; and in the case of 
O'Connor (Annas 1988), who in spite of her well-known oral protestations regarding her 
desire not to be tube fed, was denied removal because her wishes were not in writing. 
Hence, the inception of advance care planning that is variably known as advance 
directives, living wills, and/or durable power of attorney for health care. 
By 1990 in the USA, forty-one states and the District of Columbia had enacted natural 
death acts authorising the use of living wills (Orentlicher 1990). These legal documents 
allow competent adults to give legally binding instructions that, in case they are 
diagnosed as terminally ill and are unable to give directions concerning their care, no 
extraordinary treatments shall be employed that will simply prolong the act of dying 
(Mishkin 1986). Twenty-five USA living will statutes make some mention of artificial 
feeding, and some testify that artificial feeding can be withdrawn under certain 
circumstances (Schiller eta! 1999). Others consider artificial feeding as comfort care 
and stipulate that it may not be rejected under the law (Society for the Right to Die cited 
in Schiller eta! 1999). Despite clear directives from patients, some hospitals and 
physicians refuse to honour living wills and advanced directives for fear of litigation from 
opposing family members (McLeod 1990). Similarly, it must be acknowledged that one 
reason physicians might use for employing artificial nutritional support for the dying is to 
avoid a lawsuit. Thomasma et al (1986) argue that the fear of a lawsuit or even murder 
charges is understandable considering the events surrounding the Kaiser Permanente 
case in California where two physicians (Barber and Nejdl) were indicted for murder 
when they withdrew intravenous feeding from a comatose patient. In the UK, the House 
of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics (1994) supported the development of 
advance directives on the basis that they enable expression of individual preferences 
and stimulate discussion between doctor and patient. In Australia, no formal 
implementation of such advance care planning strategies were legislated at the time of 
data collection, however in a subsequent review of the literature 3, Bielger and colleagues 
3 This subsequent review of the literature has been termed a last minute review and is discussed in Chapter 12 'Reflections', p. 293 
of this thesis. 
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(2000) explain that three Australian states and two territories now have legislation which 
provides for advance directives. 
Medical Intervention or Basic Care? 
The associated medico-legal literature by and large grapples with the issue of whether 
artificial nutritional support should be considered medical treatment or obligatory care, 
that is, the routine and mandatory care as part of any hospitalisation. This distinction is 
important, because if one accepts the fact that artificial feeding is a medical treatment, 
the decision to implement such a treatment should be subjected to a risk/benefit analysis 
that generally is a fundamental part of any medical decision. While most decisions have 
held that artificial nutritional support is considered a medical treatment (Cohen and 
Cohen 1988), few courts have focused their attention on the risk/benefit analysis as it 
related to the decision of whether or not to initiate or withdraw artificial nutritional support. 
One reason may be that there are very few data that detail the risks or benefits in well 
described populations over specified periods of time. This concept of risk/benefit 
analysis is examined in more detail under the separate subheading 'burdens and 
benefits' later in this chapter. 
Ethicists generally agree that, when a patient is under the care of a physician, nurse, or 
other health care provider, basic care such as food and shelter must be provided to the 
patient (Goldstein and Fuller 1994). The ethical question of artificial nutritional support 
may be framed as the problem of deciding whether the use of feeding tubes and vascular 
access devices is basic care (and therefore ethically obligatory) or medical care (and 
therefore required only in certain situations, depending on the medical indications). 
Although the majority of opinion among ethicists at present, according to the above 
authors, is that artificial nutritional support is a medical intervention, a substantial minority 
holds otherwise. A brief discussion of each viewpoint follows. 
Artificial Nutritional Support as Basic Care 
Dolan (1991) presents several arguments for considering any form of feeding as basic 
care. He considers the withdrawal of artificial feeding as murder. Dolan (1991) 
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considers a case in which a man in PVS is fed via enteral feeding tube and his concerns 
focus on the disabled, but nonterminal, state of the patient. Dolan is concerned that a 
society that authorises the withdrawal of tube feeding from a patient devalues the 
personhood of the patient. He contends that withholding treatment based on quality-of-
life is the path that led hospitals under the Nazi regime from euthanasia of the severely 
disabled to murder of those society believed were undesirable. This concern is shared 
by other people, and it is one of a class of arguments sometimes called the 'slippery 
slope' (Goldstein and Fuller 1994:192). In this case, the argument is that, once we start 
to allow some patients to die by withholding nutrition, we will be unable to decide where 
to draw the line and will ultimately lose our respect for all patients and for the value of 
human life. 
Artificial Nutritional Support as Medical Care 
The emerging ethical consensus appears to be that artificial nutritional support via the 
enteral or parenteral route are medical interventions and are subject to the same 
considerations of risk versus benefit that govern other medical decisions (American 
College of Physicians 1992; American Thoracic Society 1991; Callahan 1988; Lynn and 
Childress 1983). In several USA states however, feeding tubes are specifically excluded 
from the list of interventions that a patient may refuse in an advance directive. The 
California Second District Court of Appeals permitted the removal of a nasogastric tube 
from a competent patient who requested this action on her own behalf (Bouvia v. 
Superior Court in Goldstein and Fuller 1994). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court approved the removal of a feeding tube from a man in PVS (Brophy versus New 
England Sinai Hospital in Goldstein and Fuller 1994); and the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, based on its conclusion that there is no distinction between artificial nutritional 
support and other forms of life-sustaining therapy, permitted the withdrawal of both a 
nasogastric tube (case of Peter) and a jejunostomy tube (case of Jobes) (Steinbrook and 
Lo 1988). Justice O'Connor, writing in a concurring opinion for the United States 
Supreme Court in the Cruzan case, stated unequivocally that artificial nutritional support 
should be considered as a form of medical intervention (Cruzan versus Director in 
Goldstein and Fuller 1994). 
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Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment 
As recently as seventeen years ago, the idea that artificial nutrition might be withdrawn 
from dying patients without moral or legal impunity, was a notion that would have been 
repudiated, if not condemned, by most health professionals (Siegler et al 1985): 
They would have regarded such an idea as morally and 
psychologically objectionable, legally problematic, and medically 
wrong. The notion would have gone 'against the stream' of 
medical standards of care (Siegler et al 1985:129). 
Bernat et al (1993) also explains that throughout the 1980's, many thinkers expressed 
serious reservations about allowing such withdrawal of artificial nutritional support to 
become accepted medical practice. Yet, as illustrated in numerous publications since 
within both the medical and bioethics literature, this practice has received increased 
support from both medical practitioners and bioethicists. Siegler et al (1985) argue that 
this opinion is typically couched in the discourse of caution and compassion, yet the 
underlying analysis suggests: 
...that for an increasing number of patients, the benefits of 
continued life are perceived as insufficient to justify the burden 
and cost of care; that death is the desired outcome, and - 
critically - that the role of the physician is to participate in 
bringing this about (Siegler et al 1985:129). 
Likewise, Bernat et al (1993) explain that the reservations regarding withdrawal and 
withholding were not based on any information about the discomfort or suffering 
experienced by patients under such circumstances. Rather, caregivers experienced 
psychological distress due in part to the failure to understand the distinction between 
killing and letting die, and the social implications of withdrawing or withholding food and 
fluids, particularly because of its symbolism as communicating lack of caring (Derr 1986; 
Callahan 1983). Hence, the morally vexing question has been repeatedly asked, as 
phrased by Holt (1991:5), 'is it ever in a patient's best interests to become malnourished 
and dehydrated through the removal of artificial supports'? Such a question resurrects 
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some old issues that are involved in the cessation of any life-maintaining treatment, while 
simultaneously raising some new issues. 
The withholding or withdrawing of artificial nutrition is an emotionally charged issue and, 
as Callahan (1983) argues, the removal of food and fluid strikes a chord in us all. He 
suggests that denying these comfort measures challenges human decency and one's 
sense of community. The act of feeding has an emotional and symbolic significance 
derived from our culture (Miles 1985). Food has a significant role in ethnic traditions and 
has evolved as a symbol of caring, commitment and comfort (Knox 1993). Some 
consider the relationship involved in feeding as the most fundamental of all human 
relationships and see no distinction between oral feeding and feeding through artificial 
means (Callahan 1983; Derr 1986; Meilaender 1984). Indeed, feeding, unlike other 
medical treatment, has a moral and emotional significance derived from culture. Cox 
(1998) explains that from breast-feeding to wedding feasts to food brought to families in 
mourning, feeding is integral to the experience of passage. In the Judaic and Christian 
traditions, the shared meal is an important representation of the faith's 'corporate' life and 
its moral significance (ibid.). In North American society, Thanksgiving and potluck 
dinners acknowledge mutual interdependence. Bernat et al (1993) argue that because 
feeding is integral to relationships, decision-making authority concerning feeding is 
shared between patient and caregiver. 
Wurzbach (1990) explains that food and fluid symbolise nurturing, warmth and a 
minimum commitment to the well being of another. Starvation and dehydration 
symbolise neglect and abuse. Priester (in Wurzbach 1990) however, believes that 
focusing on the symbolic value of providing food and fluids may mask important 
distinguishing characteristics of this treatment. He stresses that artificial nutritional 
support is provided to prevent or treat malnutrition and dehydration; they may or may not 
relieve hunger or thirst. Conversely, hunger and thirst may be treated without resorting 
to artificial nutrition and hydration, for example, moistening a patient's lips with mouth 
toilets or ice chips. 
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Many articles have outlined the competing ethical factors and the positions taken on this 
issue. Some authors come to certain conclusions whilst others discuss the issue as a 
dilemma fraught with uncertainty (Annas 1983, 1985, 1986; Green et al 1994; Meilaender 
1984). Sometimes the literature sends mixed messages, that is, support for the self-
determination of the patient but concern that we are stepping onto a 'slippery slope' 
(Hospital Ethics Editorial 1988:14). In contrast to termination of treatment decisions in 
general, there is no consensus on withholding or withdrawing artificial nutritional support. 
Articles by Meyers (1985) and Dresser and Boisaubin (1985) review legal and clinical 
thinking on the issue of withdrawing artificial nutritional support from terminally ill or 
permanently unconscious patients. The conclusions by Meyers is one that finds support 
in a number of court decisions in the 1980's and in the majority of scholarly comments on 
this subject in the medical and bioethics literature: 
Certainly, we are talking about relatively few cases. 
Nourishment should be provided in the vast majority of cases as 
long as physically possible. If the patient can be fed manually, 
he or she of course should be. However, in those rare cases 
where nourishment can only be provided through invasive 
means and cannot improve the patient's hopeless prognosis, it 
seems the law should not mandate medically provided 
nourishment (Meyers 1985:125). 
Dresser and Boisaubin (1985) explicitly limit their argument to cases of permanently 
unconscious patients, suggesting their approval of the New Jersey appellate court's 
decision in the Conroy case, which refused to endorse withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration support from a severely demented but conscious patient. Meyers (1985) 
goes further, arguing that artificial nutrition and hydration support may be withdrawn from 
the terminally ill and the nonterminally, yet seriously ill, as in the Conroy case, as well as 
from the permanently unconscious. Others go further still. A group of distinguished 
clinicians published an article advocating the withholding of parenteral nutritional support 
from severely and irreversibly demented patients and perhaps, at times, from elderly 
patients with permanent mild impairment of competence (Wanzer et al 1984). 
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Many health care providers consider withholding or never initiating a treatment as morally 
permissible but regard withdrawing a treatment as wrong. Although it is psychologically 
more difficult to withdraw a treatment, there is no ethical requirement that, once 
employed, a treatment must be continued (Hasting's Center 1987). A major dilemma 
with making a moral distinction between withholding and withdrawing a treatment is that 
it may lead to misgivings on the part of the health care providers to begin a potentially 
beneficial treatment for fear of being forced to continue the treatment, even if it proves to 
be of no benefit (Knox 1993). For many treatments, not just artificial nutritional support, 
there is scepticism as to actual burdens and benefits. 
Several sources do raise the question of whether is it justifiable to withdraw artificial 
means of nutritional life support when its removal hastens rather than causes death? 
Curtin (1994) suggests that in situations in which sentient life is a reasonable 
expectation, nutritional life support measures, once started, generally should be 
continued unless a rational adult patient refuses them. When permanent 
unconsciousness can reliably be predicted, artificial life support can be terminated. The 
President's Commission on Deciding to Forego Life Sustaining Treatment (1983) 
explains this argument as follows: 
Most patients with permanent unconsciousness cannot be 
sustained for long without an array of increasingly artificial 
feeding interventions - naso gastric tubes, gastrostomy tubes, 
or intravenous nutrition. Since permanently unconscious 
patients will never be aware of nutrition, the only benefit to the 
patient of providing such burdensome interventions is 
sustaining the body for a remote possibility of recovery. The 
sensitivities of the family and of care giving professionals ought 
to determine whether such interventions are made... When all 
remedial attempts have failed to bring the patient out of chronic 
coma, but where the patient is able to sustain respiration and 
circulation, it would seem to be a matter between physician and 
family as to whether or not other, more mundane care would 
continue.. .if the family feels the emotions or financial drain too 
great and the physicians in attendance indicate not reasonable 
possibility of any recovery, then it can be anticipated that the 
courts, when presented with petitions for appointment of a 
conservator with power to refuse consent to further treatment 
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of any kind, including I. V. drip.. .can be expected to grant such 
requests (Report of the President's Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research 1983:288). 
Fletcher et al (1993) argue that there is no ethical or legal difference between withholding 
and withdrawing treatment if the intent is to provide the greatest degree of comfort and 
optimal life for the dying patient. Although from an emotional standpoint it is often more 
difficult to withdraw technological interventions like artificial nutritional support, patients 
have a right to trials of therapeutic procedures without a commitment to indefinite use of 
such procedures (ibid.). Artificial nutritional support is considered a minimal standard of 
care for hospitalised patients (Jett 1995:59), yet it is difficult to dispel the notion that this 
therapy is 'the least that can be done' - when, in fact, the procedures are invasive and 
uncomfortable (that is attaining parenteral and/or enteral access), and may be harmful to 
the patient. 
In the case of the dying patient, Jett (1995) explains that decreased nutritional intake and 
dehydration are the natural state of the dying organism. There is ample evidence that 
this decrease in intake may enhance the comfort of the dying patient by decreasing 
secretions, oedema, pain, incontinence, cardiac load, and pulmonary distress (Andrews 
et al 1993; Billings 1985; Musgrave 1990; Stone 1993). In a USA study of 32 terminally 
ill patients admitted to a palliative care unit, hunger and thirst were found to be either 
non-existent or minimal. Those patients who did experience hunger or thirst were 
satisfied with small amounts of food and liquids (McCann et a! 1994). In a UK hospice, 13 
of 31 amyotrophic lateral sclerosis patients with severe dysphagia were tube fed while 
the remaining 18 were managed conservatively with assisted oral intake. Retrospective 
analysis showed the patients with nasogastric tube feeding had significantly more 
problems with oropharyngeal secretions and required suctioning more often than patients 
without tubes. There was no difference in survival time after onset of swallowing 
difficulties in the two groups (Scott and Austin 1994). 
Even when artificial provision of food and fluids is begun there is controversy over 
whether it can be done on a trial basis or whether once begun it can be stopped. In fact, 
20 
the President's Commission makes no moral distinction between withholding and 
withdrawing artificial nutrition. There may, however, be psychological differences. 
Withholding treatment, according to Wurzbach (1990) does not allow for the possibility of 
improvement in the patient's condition and may leave the family wondering if they made 
the correct choice: 
Withdrawing nutrition and hydration has a psychological impact 
on family and practitioner because it may be seen as 
abandoning hope or deliberately removing a requirement for 
the survival of the family member (Wurzbach 1990:227-228). 
Furthermore, the President's Commission suggested that greater moral justification may 
be required for withholding treatment because the positive effects of treatment are at that 
time unknown (Fry 1990). Thus, although withholding and withdrawing foods and fluids 
are morally equivalent, each has its own distinct consequences psychologically. This 
notion, however, is not explored in further detail in the literature reviewed for this 
research. 
There is a marked division in the literature, in the way in which withholding/withdrawing 
debates are generated, and that difference depends on the mode of feeding. It appears 
that EN via feeding tubes generates ethical discussion around quality-of-life issues and 
the right-to-die controversy. On the other hand PN via central venous access generates 
discussion around clinical appropriateness and cost. It is here that a certain demarcation 
is observed between the two modes of feeding that seem to fall into either the ordinary or 
extraordinary classification. There is some crossover observed, but for the purpose of 
clarification, this ordinary/extraordinary classification is discussed in more detail. 
Ordinary versus Extraordinary Care 
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care also creates controversy. Paris 
(1986) contends that the argument is that 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' refer not 
exclusively to the technique or means employed to preserve life but to these means in 
relation to the condition not the patient. Historically, even the most simple, basic and 
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easily available remedy, if offering no hope or benefit to the patient, was considered 
'extraordinary' (Wurzbach 1990): 
There was no obligation to accept a remedy unless it offered 
reasonable hope of checking or curing a disease. No one was 
obliged to use "useless" remedies (Wutzbach 1990:227). 
Underlying the social and cultural implications of feeding is the ethical concern implicated 
by the previously mentioned 'slippery slope' theory. Put simply, in situations where 
patients have not provided advanced directives, any decision to terminate their medical 
therapy including artificial feeding would tend to be subjective. In such cases, a 
surrogate decision maker cannot presume that treatment decisions made by a third party 
on a patient's behalf will further the patient's right to self determination, because, 
according to Cox (1998) effectuating another person's right to self-determination 
presupposes that the substitute decisions maker knows what the person would have 
wanted. Underpinning this ethical concern is the fundamental issue of whether artificial 
nutrition is regarded as 'ordinary' or 'extraordinary' measures. Katz and Kane (1995) 
offer this distinction: 
Ordinary means of preserving life are all medicines, treatments, 
and operations which offer reasonable hope of benefit for the 
patient and which can be obtained and used without excessive 
expense, pain, or other inconvenience. Extraordinary means of 
preserving life are all medicines, treatments, and operations, 
which cannot be obtained or used without excessive expense, 
pain or other inconvenience, or if used, would not offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit (Katz and Kane 1995: 28) 
The ordinary or extraordinary distinction has also been discussed in terms of the benefits 
and burdens of treatment for the patient. If the benefits of the treatment outweigh the 
burdens imposed on the patient, it is characterised as ordinary and therefore ethically 
required. If not, it is characterised as extraordinary and therefore optional (Matter of 
Conroy in Cox 1998). If the patient is not comatose and does not face imminent death, 
nourishment accomplishes the substantial benefit of sustaining life until the illness takes 
it natural course (Cox 1998). Under such circumstances, nutrition will always be an 
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essential element of ordinary care that health care providers are ethically obligated to 
offer (ibid.). 
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care has historically been used to 
distinguish care that is morally required from that which is volitional (Paris 1986). Some 
regard ordinary care as that which is common, regardless of the complexity, and 
extraordinary care as that which is rare or unusual. Others define ordinary care as simple 
and extraordinary care as complex, elaborate or artificial. According to the Hasting's 
Center's guidelines (1987), no treatment is intrinsically ordinary or extraordinary. All 
treatments, regardless of complexity, have benefits and burdens. Any treatment that 
imposes an undue burden or that provides no benefit may ethically be withheld or 
withdrawn. 
Cox (1998) argues that ordinary or extraordinary appellations are passé. She explains 
that 'in this fast-paced world of medical technology, what today may be an extraordinary 
procedure will be ordinary tomorrow' (Cox 1999:9). Furthermore, she maintains that 
ethicists argue against the ordinary and extraordinary distinction for deciding which 
treatments may be abated morally, or on the grounds that it is not the treatments that 
tend to be so characterised but the recipients of such treatments. It is this distinction 
which allows subjective standards to be applied under the guise of objectivity (Craig 
1994). 
The President's Commission (1983) reviewed the ordinary/extraordinary analysis to 
reach a conclusion of its usefulness in defining what care is obligatory for the patient to 
accept and others to provide, and what is volitional. It found a variety of usages: the 
most natural understanding of the distinction, the difference between ordinary and 
extraordinary care as applied to a patient in a particular condition; a technological 
distinction between simple (ordinary) and complex, elaborate, or artificial (extraordinary) 
care; and, an inquiry into the benefits and burdens of a treatment. The President's 
Commission concluded as follows: 
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Despite its long history of frequent use, the distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary treatments has now become so 
confused that its continued use in the formulation of public 
policy is no longer desirable (President's Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research 1983:88). 
Remarkably, the President's Commission found 'no particular treatments, including such 
'ordinary' hospital interventions as PN or IV hydration, antibiotics, and transfusions of 
blood products to be universally warranted and thus obligatory for a patient to accept' 
(ibid: 90). It is within this framework that an ethical distinction begins to emerge. Jett 
(1995) provides an example of even when full parenteral or enteral feeding is not 
warranted, there still may exist a duty to make food available, perhaps as an expression 
of ongoing fidelity to the patient or to ensure that some amount of nourishment is 
ingested, perhaps to alleviate the suffering of hunger or thirst. Several other articles 
about life-sustaining nutrition (Hall 1994; Hodgson 1995; Sullivan 1993) reason that 
ethically, artificial nutritional support is optional, not mandatory, if it is not practicable, is 
of no medical benefit, or is disproportionately burdensome. In rare cases, as with 
patients with complete intestinal infarction, artificial nutritional support may be technically 
impossible and thus, is not required. Dunlop et al (1995) argue that artificial nutritional 
support is of no benefit when, combined with other treatments, it cannot change a 
patient's condition or course. However, when artificial nutritional support is practicable, 
as is the case in most situations, it is best evaluated by taking the patient's perspective. 
Self-Determination and Suicide 
According to Daly (1995) a patient, in deciding whether artificial nutritional support is 
disproportionately and unacceptably burdensome, would weigh those burdens against 
the benefits of extended life. The notion of self-determination or autonomy is one that is 
deeply rooted in our culture (Boisaubin 1993). In general, this is the moral right to 
choose and follow one's own plan of life and action (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). 
Legally, these preferences are significant as certain legal systems recognise that 
individuals have a fundamental right to control their own bodies, and the right to be 
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protected from unwanted interventions. An important judicial opinion, that of Natanson 
versus Kline maintains: 
Anglo American law starts with the premise of thoroughgoing 
self-determination. It follows that each man is considered to be 
master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, 
prohibit the performance of life saving surgery or other medical 
treatment (Jonsen et al 1992:39). 
There is much in the literature regarding the right of the patient to refuse nutrition. 
Kleinman (1991) describes the patient's right to determine his or her treatment as 
fundamental and reflecting our respect for the autonomy of the individual. He warns that 
a strict adherence to the principle of autonomy can be problematic when patients appear 
to be cognitively competent but unable to make use of the information because of their 
emotional state. None of these reports, however, considers the right of competent 
patients to insist on a therapeutic modality that does not have clear benefit. The 
fundamental question posed here seems to be the extent to which any individual owns 
his or her own death. Rosner (1993:1892) asks 'Does a person have the right to select 
how and when to die? Is such a decision by the patient akin to suicide?' Dominant 
Judeo-Christian teaching is that life is a gift of God to be held in trust. One is duty bound 
to care for one's life and health. Only God gives life and, hence, only God can take it 
away. Secular ethics however, according to Rosner (1993) teaches that a patient has 
the right to determine what shall and shall not be done to preserve his/her health or 
prolong his/her life. Therefore, the patient has an absolute right to request the 
withdrawing or withholding of life-sustaining therapy such as artificial nutritional support. 
Does Withdrawal Constitute Killing? 
Complex questions cannot be answered simplistically, and this question is far more 
complex than it looks. Nonetheless, many clinicians categorise this question under the 
general rubric of withdrawal of medical life support measures - which, according to Curtin 
(1994) only adds to the confusion. As Curtin explains, it is one thing to decide not to 
resuscitate a terminally ill patient, it is quite another to starve a person to death whether 
or not the patient has some hope of survival (1994). Holt (1991) suggests that since 
25 
death always results from the removal of nutrition/hydration supports, is it not 
euthanasia? In a sense, the question is partially deceptive. While it is true that the 
cessation of artificial nutritional support is inevitably fatal, so is the cessation of such 
other treatment procedures such as renal dialysis, mechanical ventilation, inotropic 
infusions, and chemotherapy, for those whose lives depend upon them. However, the 
crux of the question here is what really kills the patient? Is it the withdrawal of medical 
supports or the underlying disease process that rendered the supports necessary - or 
more simply, is death due to natural causes or a volitional act? This question remains 
unanswered within the available literature. 
While maintaining adequate nutrition is a part of any medical regimen, adequate 
nourishment itself is not solely within the medical prerogative. As Curtin (1994) explains, 
a physician may prescribe a special diet, or provide nutrition through artificial means, or 
even order a temporary suspension of a nutritional regimen, yet the permanent 
suspension of a nutritional regimen is not a medical option in the ordinary sense of that 
term. Although the use of drugs, equipment, treatments including the use of ventilators 
and defibrillators, is initiated and discontinued by medical prescription as patient need 
dictates, the patients need for nourishment continues regardless of his or her health 
state (ibid.). 
Several writers including Callahan (1988) and Sielger and Wiesbard (1985) firmly uphold 
their positions of why artificial nutritional support should never be withheld or withdrawn. 
Rosner (1993) maintains this view yet accepts that his 'personal position' differs from that 
of most of the medical community. He resolutely claims that doctors are required to do 
everything in their power to alleviate suffering, cure sickness and disease, and prolong 
useful and productive life: 
...I firmly believe that a physician is obligated to provide 
handicapped newborns, including anecephalics, as well as 
dying patients supportive care, including psychosocial and 
emotional care, to the very end. Fluids and nutrition, whether 
given by mouth or 'artificially' by feeding tube or intravenous 
infusion, are part and parcel of that supportive care - no different 
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from walking, turning, talking, singing, reading, or just listening 
to the dying patient. There are times when specific medical 
and/or surgical therapy is neither indicated nor appropriate or 
desirable for a newborn with a lethal defect or a terminally, 
irreversibly ill, dying patient. There is no time, however, when 
general supportive measures can be abandoned, thereby 
hastening the patient's demise, unless the patient specifically 
requests such withholding or withdrawal because of severe pain 
and/or suffering. Patients in a coma or a persistent vegetative 
state are not suffering. Their families, friends, caregivers, and 
society may suffer emotionally and financially. But it is wrong to 
relieve the suffering of others by shortening the life of the 
patient. Withdrawing and/or withholding fluids and nutrition is a 
direct and proximate cause of death (Rosner 1993:1894). 
Rosner (1993) claims that the physician is given divine license to heal but not to shorten 
life by hastening death. Even if the courts legally sanction the withdrawal or withholding 
of artificial nutritional support from terminally ill and chronic PVS patients, and sanction 
the actions of those who choose to starve themselves to death, Rosner explains that 
what is 'legal' is not always 'moral' (1993:1894). 
Withholding or withdrawing medical life support measures, as a rule, is justified on the 
basis of futility or human rights (patient's right to refuse treatment) or both. It is difficult to 
argue that feeding is futile or that deliberate starvation is a humanitarian endeavour. 
Ordinarily, to deprive a person of basic sustenance is 'to kill' (Curtin 1994:14). However, 
as the means of providing sustenance have become more sophisticated, who is included 
in this duty has become less clear. While few among us would consider bottle-feeding 
an infant or spoon-feeding a debilitated adult to be morally optional, each could be 
perceived as being an artificial means of feeding. Furthermore, a premature infant may 
not have sufficient strength or sucking reflex to feed efficiently thus necessitating the use 
of a special teat for his or her bottle. Similarly, a debilitated adult may require his or her 
food to be pureed. Do such adjustments in the feeding process (albeit not via tubes) 
justify a refusal to feed? From these examples, it is only a short step to the use of tube 
feeding in infant without a sucking reflex or for adults too debilitated to chew their food. 
The question is then raised as to whether or not artificial nutritional support (EN in this 
example) is a medical option or moral imperative? Similarly, if digestion is impaired, be it 
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temporarily or permanently, PN is the most effective means of feeding, yet is PN morally 
or legally required in all instances? These questions do not appear in the clinical/ethical 
literature reviewed for this project. 
Here at least, some broad though reasonably clear distinctions are possible with regard 
to the distortions of artificial feeding as demonstrated by Curtin (1994) above. When 
feeding could be accomplished by mouth (e.g. bottle-feedings with or without a special 
teat or spoon feeding of pureed or nonpureed food), to deliberately withhold or withdraw 
is to kill. From an ethical and legal perspective, Curtin offers this explanation: 
From an ethical perspective, whether or not feedings ought to 
be forced would depend directly on the condition as well as the 
competence of the person refusing to eat. From a legal 
perspective, the safest course would be to consult the courts 
when in doubt - and perhaps even when not in doubt (Curtin 
1994:15). 
Another related question regarding death which Curtin raises, is whether artificial 
nutritional support measures, or more specifically, artificial nutritional life support 
measures constitutes an inhumane prolongation of death in certain circumstances? 
Curtin (1994) believes that it does. She explains that in situations where death is 
inevitable and the condition of living is intolerable (extensive technological isolation from 
human touch, futile pain and pointless extensions of dying), highly sophisticated means 
of feeding not only are not in the patient's best interests, they may even be more risky to 
his or her suffering: 
In fact, even feeding by mouth may be more risky and/or more 
irritation than it is worth. Forced feeding in such circumstances 
is morally repugnant (Curtin 1994:15). 
Similarly, Bernat et al (1993) explain that physicians may educate patients in that they 
may refuse artificial nutritional support in a way that minimises suffering. Chronically or 
terminally ill patients who wish to gain more control over their deaths can then refuse 
nutrition and hydration. However, this assumption is somewhat thwarted by another 
28 
assumption that thirst and hunger remain strong drives in terminal illness, and the 
misconception that failing to satisfy these drives causes intractable suffering. The 
stereotypical image of a parched person crawling in the desert toward an oasis mirage of 
lush water pools, plus the images beamed onto millions of lounge room televisions of 
famine, as well as the narrative accounts of shipwrecked victims adrift without water, 
have contributed to the general assumption that life-threatening starvation and 
dehydration is unbearable. Although this is true in the above circumstances, according 
to Bernat et al (1993) it is the consensus of experienced physicians and nurses that 
terminally ill patients dying of dehydration or lack of nutrition do not suffer if treated 
properly. In fact, they go further to explain that maintaining physiologic hydration and 
adequate nutrition is difficult in most seriously ill patients because intrinsic thirst and 
hunger are usually diminished or absent. Physicians, and particularly nurses, have 
written many observational pieces describing peaceful deaths by starvation and 
dehydration (Andrews and Levine 1989; Zerweck 1983; Printz 1992). The scientific and 
clinical literature on this matter is scant. Systematic studies of the symptoms preceding 
death are hard to find, and those that do exist commonly do not separate suffering 
attributable to the underlying disease process from suffering attributable to starvation and 
dehydration (Mogielnicki et al 1990; Billings 1985; Morris et al 1986). 
Burdens and Benefits 
Another ethical and legal issue that has been drawn into the feeding debate is the 
balancing of benefit versus burden. For example, would the implementation of PN be of 
overall benefit to a terminally ill patient when the risks (central venous catheter 4 
placement, sepsis, metabolic complications) are weighed against the potential benefit of 
improved nutritional status and perhaps prolongation of life? The powerful rhetoric of 
'death with dignity' has gained, according to Siegler and Weisbard (1985:129) 'intellectual 
currency and practical importance'. Initially, this rhetoric was a plea for more humane 
and individualised treatment in the face of the sometimes cold and impersonal 
technological imperatives of modern medicine. Hence the burdens versus benefits 
arguments began to appear in the literature around the late 1980's. The arguments 
4 Commonly referred to as 'CVC' or 'central line. 
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regarding burdens and benefits of artificial nutritional support, by and large, rest on the 
dual propositions that the provision of artificial nutritional support is a medical intervention 
guided by consideration similar to those governing other treatment methods and that 
judgements concerning the withdrawal of such interventions should be based on a 
reckoning of benefits and burdens associated with their intervention. 
Placement of nasogastric or intravenous tubes requires medical training, and the use of 
such tubes has a nontrivial risk of iatrogenic illness; placement of a gastrostomy tube 
requires further medical training in endoscopy or surgery, and the risks of placement are 
the more serious risks of haemorrhage, infection, and peritoneal leakage (Meyers and 
Grodin 1991). For some patients, there are further burdens of treatment. For patients 
with terminal disease who are close to the end of life, the result may be a prolongation of 
suffering (Goldstein and Fuller 1994). For demented patients who cannot comprehend 
the purpose of the feeding tube, the burden of incessant irritation from a foreign device 
may be more severe. For patients in PVS who previously expressed a wish to be 
allowed to die, this burden may represent an insult to their dignity in such refusal to follow 
their prior instructions (ibid.). 
Dorner eta! (1997) maintain that the health care team may overestimate the benefits of 
medical intervention and prolonging life while underestimating the burdens. They provide 
a concise list of points when considering whether the patient will regain useful function 
and improved quality-of-life as a result of artificial nutritional support: 
Benefits may include: 
• Increased life span 
• Increased ability to recover 
• Increased possibility of returning to useful functioning 
• Improved quality-of-life 
• Improved psychological and physiologic state 
• Increased resistance to infection 
• Improved healing of skin and wounds 
Burdens may include: 
• Physical pain 
• Spiritual and emotional pain and suffering 
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• Invasive procedures 
• Indignity 
• Emotional and financial burden on the family (Darner et 
al 1997:S176) 
Groher (1990) offers more definitive examples of the burdens associated with artificial 
nutritional support, yet does not concentrate on the associated benefits. With enteral 
feeding, he postulates that the known medical risks include but are not limited to: 
....nasal alar ulceration, sinus infection, bleeding, fistula, 
intolerance of fluid volume, pulmonary oedema, reflux and 
regurgitation, diarrhoea and gastrointestinal distress, and 
aspiration pneumonia. Aspiration is particularly prevalent in the 
elderly hospitalised population and needs to be considered a 
major risk in those with known oropharyngeal incompetence 
and/or history of prior reflux disease (Groher 1990:104). 
Ciocon et al (1988) found a 47% incidence of aspiration in patients who were fed by 
nasogastric tube in a chronic care setting. In addition, the placement of nasogastric 
tubes in some patients required that they must be restrained, putting them at a greater 
risk for decubitus ulcers. The risks associated with the placement of an enteral feeding 
tube in the gut, that is gastrostomy or jejunostomy tube placement include bleeding, 
infection at the tube insertion site, gastrointestinal distress, diarrhoea, and peritonitis 
(Groher 1990). Associated risks of feeding via the parenteral route, according to the 
same author, include pneumothorax, haemothorax, catheter embolus, sepsis, and 
electrolyte imbalance (ibid.). 
Another related area of risk that deserves discussion is whether the provision of life-
sustaining nutrients via PN or EN in those with terminal diseases causes the patient to 
continue to suffer by allowing him or her to survive longer than if the feeding was 
withheld. In other words, by maintaining physiological function through artificial 
nutritional support, is it fair to allow the patient to experience the pain that could be 
associated with end-stage disease? Lo et al (1986) argue that the assumption that most 
people would choose to forego artificial nutritional support if they understood that the 
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institution of 'feeding' would not improve their chances for recovery. Miscovitz et al 
(1988) argue that the maintenance of physiological function alone is not sufficient reason 
for prolonging life. Providing artificial nutritional support in these instances also may put 
the patient at psychological risk by providing the false hope of improvement, and the 
family at risk because they may come to feel that a feeding tube, be it enteral or 
parenteral, compromises the patient's dignity (Groher 1990). Furthermore, does the 
maintenance of physiological function by feeding put the patient at risk for another 
possibly more debilitating illness? There are few data within the literature to help the 
heath care professional answer these questions. However, it is clear that these issues 
should be part of the decision to employ artificial nutritional support. 
Concomitant to the burden encountered by letting a patient live and possibly suffer from 
terminal or irreversible illness is the issue that the act of withholding artificial feeding may 
cause the patient additional pain and suffering, having a negative impact on their quality-
of-life. It is not an uncommon notion among health care providers, (Groher 1990), and 
supported in some court decisions (Dresser and Boisaubin 1985), that withholding 
artificial nutritional support induces pain and suffering beyond the disease that 
precipitated the need for intervention. According to Groher (1990) the courts have failed 
to focus on the data contrary to this view, even in patients in PVS and coma: 
Some testimony has centred on those patients in the persistent 
vegetative state who have normal wake/sleep cycles and exhibit 
abnormal reflexes, facial expressions, and movement patterns 
interpreted as an expression of pain. Unfortunately, the data on 
both sides of the issue are largely anecdotal (Groher 1990:104). 
In her experience with terminally ill patients, Zerwekh (1983) observed that those who 
were not 'fed' during the end of their illness seemed to experience less pain than those 
who did. Her observations are supported by Printz (1988), and by Dresser and 
Boisaubin (1985), both of whom provide somewhat more than anecdotal support for their 
claim. Dresser and Boisaubin (1985) note that dehydration will lead to death as a 
consequence of azotaemia, hypernatraemia, and hypercalcaemia, all of which produce a 
sedative, and therefore, an anaesthetic effect on the body. They also point out that by 
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drying secretions and excretions secondary to dehydration, the patient is more 
comfortable because there are fewer instances of congestion with apnoea, vomiting, and 
incontinence. Printz (1988) reviewed the literature pertaining to pain secondary to 
dehydration, noting that in her dying patients all appeared to be in less distress and pain 
than those who were artificially hydrated and nourished until death. She noted that even 
those patients who remain in metabolic balance produce ketones during calorie 
deprivation together with opioid peptides, both of which have an anaesthetic effect on the 
central nervous system. In a related animal study, Quill (1989) demonstrated that 
nutritional deprivation increases the opiate dynorphin, which acts as a strong anaesthetic 
to the central nervous system. 
The prevalent argument for the institution of artificial feeding is that it may benefit the 
patient by reversing malnutrition and prolonging life, neither of which have been 
supported scientifically for patients in a chronic care setting. In a study relating to the 
benefits of artificial nutritional support (EN specifically), Quill (1989) found nasogastric 
tubes to be of limited value. In a retrospective review of 59 patients 70 years or older 
who were admitted to a community hospital with irreversible illness (severe 
cerebrovascular accident, 5 dementia, metastatic neoplastic disease), Quill (1989) found 
that 64% died whilst hospitalised. In only two percent of the 55 was the feeding tube 
removed because of improvement. In 55% of the patients, restraints had to be utilised, 
causing the author to conclude that feeding tube insertion in the group of patients 
severely compromised their quality-of-life. Quill also found that most of the physicians 
who inserted the tube did so for therapeutic reasons, even though the outcome did not 
suggest that this goal was met. Although it was not measured directly, Quill concluded 
that the insertion of a feeding tube in this patient population did not prevent death but 
seemed only to defer it (1989). 
The benefits-and-burdens argument, albeit useful in a number of contexts, is not 
routinely accepted favourably. Meyers (1985) and Dresser and Boisaubin (1985) 
demonstrate the value of the argument and how it marks a clear analytic improvement 
5 Commonly referred to as either CVA or 'stroke'. 
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over earlier references to extraordinary measures or artificial means which are terms that 
have brought much confusion into such discussion. However, as Siegler and Weisbard 
(1985) explain, the benefits-and-burdens argument is rendered problematic when the 
assertion that physicians, families, courts, or other third parties can properly conclude 
that the burdens of withdrawal of artificial nutritional support - an unconvincing catalogue 
of potential complications or side effects - outweigh the benefits, that is, sustaining life: 
We recognise that in rare cases, the provision of fluids and, 
particularly, nutritional support may be medically futile or even 
counterproductive in sustaining life. We do not recommend that 
such futile or counterproductive steps be mandated (Siegler and 
Weisbard 1985:130). 
Generally, the numerous 'compassionate calls' within the literature for the withdrawal of 
artificial nutritional support do so in the context of a few selected cases, which, if 
considered critically, could predispose to considerable abuse. The concept of medical 
futility, hinted on in the above passage, therefore deserves further exploration. 
Medical Futility 
Considering the literature on medical futility is essential in such discussions on ethics and 
artificial nutritional support. The Hippocratic Corpus encourages physicians to recognise 
when medicine has reached its limit of usefulness. Mitchell and Lawson (1999: 1705) 
note that Plato emphasised the 'inappropriateness of persisting with treatments which 
leave the surviving patient with a useless life'. Today, ethics and the law give primacy to 
patient autonomy, defined as the right to be a fully informed participant in all aspects of 
medical decision-making and the right to refuse unwanted, even recommended and life-
saving medical care. So powerful has this notion of autonomy become that its 'glare', as 
defined by Scheiderman et al (1990:3942), often blinds the physicians and bioethicists to 
the legitimacy of other ethical accounts that, for many years has shaped the range of 
physicians' obligations towards patients. Among these doctrines was the belief that futile 
treatment is not obligatory. Similarly, no ethical principle or law has ever required 
physicians to offer or accede to demands for treatments that are futile (Presidents 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
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Behavioral Research 1983). However, even when this doctrine is accepted in theory, 
Blackhall (1987) and Tomlinson and Brody (1988) argue that physicians frequently 
practice as though every available medical measure must be used to prolong life unless 
patients give definitive directions to the contrary. 
A discussion regarding medical futility that appears in the American Journal of Medicine 
(Lantos eta! 1989), highlights that therapy might be effective, in a limited sense, yet the 
goals that are achieved are not desirable, for example, when considering prolonged 
artificial nutritional support of a patient in PVS. The authors suggest that physicians 
should acknowledge that, in such situations, potentially achievable goals exists and 
therefore therapy is not futile. However, Schneiderman et al (1990) argue that the aim of 
medical treatment is not simply to cause an effect on some part of the patient's anatomy, 
physiology, or chemistry, but to benefit the patient as a whole: 
No physician would feel obligated to yield to a patient's demand 
to treat pneumonia with insulin. The physician would rightly 
argue that (in the absence of insulin-requiring diabetes) such 
treatment is inappropriate; insulin might have a physiologic 
effect on the patient's blood sugar, but would offer no benefit to 
the patient with respect to pneumonia. Similarly, nutritional 
support could effectively preserve a host of organ systems in a 
patient in persistent vegetative state, but fail to restore a 
conscious and salient life (Scheiderman et al 1990:950). 
In keeping with a qualitative notion of futility the same authors propose that any treatment 
that merely preserves permanent unconsciousness or that fails to end total dependence 
on intensive medical care should be regarded as nonbeneficial and, therefore, futile. 
Also, if survival requires the patient's entire preoccupation with intensive medical 
treatment, such as total parenteral nutrition, to the extent that he or she cannot achieve 
any other life goals, the treatment is effective but not beneficial, and according to 
Scheiderman eta! (1990) need not be offered to the patient, and the patient's family has 
no right to demand it. 
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Regarding PN, Morse (1991) suggests that the ethics of offering this form of nutritional 
therapy when treating a terminally ill patient has some parallels with the debate over 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in terminally ill patients. Dickens (1990) argues 
that care which appears unlikely to be of assistance may be offered, such as life support 
for a terminally ill patient, but it may legitimately be withheld if it is considered futile. 
Brown and Chekryn (in De Ridder and Gastmans 1996) claim, via respect for the dying 
person and dignified process of death, that PN or EN must be progressively reduced 
when the patient has been determined to have reached the terminal stage or an 
irreversible decaying process. 
The concept of futility according to Singer and Siegler (1991) and Stanley (1989) should 
however, be applied cautiously, since a possibly helpful medical therapy such as artificial 
nutrition may not be offered and might even be withheld if it is not beneficial. The way in 
which a clinician defines futility, therefore, is important, and is of paramount importance 
to this research. 
Achieving Life Goals 
Specifically excluded from the above notions of futility is the medical care that offers the 
opportunity to achieve life goals, however limited. Thus, patients whose illnesses are 
severe enough to require frequent hospitalisation, patients confined to nursing homes, or 
patients with severe physical or mental handicaps are not, in themselves, recipients of 
futile treatments. Scheiderman et al (1990) argue that such patients have the right to 
receive or reject any medical treatment according to their own perceptions of benefits 
compared with burdens. The notion of achieving life goals appears in the literature under 
the subject of 'achieving life goals' yet appears infrequently. Scheiderman et a! (1990) 
clearly define this notion by explaining that physicians are required only to provide 
medical benefits to patients, yet are permitted to offer other non-medical benefits. For 
example, a physician is not obligated to keep a patient alive in an irreversible vegetative 
state, because doing so does not medically benefit the patient, yet may do so on 
compassionate grounds, when continuance of biologic life achieved goals for the patient 
or family. The same authors provide another example: 
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An exception could well be made out of compassion for the 
patient with terminal metastatic cancer who requires 
resuscitation in the event of cardiac arrest to survive long 
enough to see a son or daughter who has not yet anived from 
afar to pay last respects (Schneiderman 1990:953). 
Bozzetti (1989) agrees that at least for a limited time, artificial nutritional support can 
prevent further nutritional deterioration in cancer patients. Since most cancer patients 
die from causes other than cachexia alone, nutritional support could have an impact that 
is limited with time. Fawcett (1993) similarly explains that prolonging artificial nutritional 
support has been used to enable patients with terminal acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), to go home for the short period of time left before they die. In such 
instances, PN gave patients the strength to finalise any legal and personal matters that 
needed to be dealt with before they died. In such cases, Fawcett claims that quality and 
not quantity of life is paramount (1993). No other descriptions or discussions of the 
concept of achieving life goals was located in the literature, and poses as a significant 
gap in knowledge which is addressed later in the interpretation chapters of this thesis 
under the heading of 'Buying Time'. 
Symbolic Treatment 
The use of artificial nutritional support carries an assortment of ethical implications. 
Many theories defend the use of artificial nutritional support on ethical rather than on 
scientific grounds (Seedhouse 1990). One of these theories regards artificial nutritional 
support as a symbolic message to a person, especially one who is 'vulnerable' 
(explained by Cox (1998:8) and Kayser-Jones (1990:399) as being the elderly, patients 
who are mentally impaired, comatose or terminally ill). It holds that withholding such 
support hastens the person's death, resulting in loss of integrity for the health service and 
the destruction of a symbol of human interdependence and caring (Wurzbach 1990). It is 
within this paradigm that others argue for the provision of artificial nutritional support for 
all vulnerable populations. 
The most compelling argument in favour of providing artificial nutritional support is that 
this action is a symbolic expression of caring and compassion. The symbolism of food 
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cannot be ignored, and the meaning of feeding must be explored with each patient and 
family. However, the provision of enteral and parenteral nutritional support is 
qualitatively different from the provision of food and water by mouth (American Nurses 
Association 1992). Ahronheim and Gasner (1990) argue that medical procedures for 
supplying nutrients should not be invested with social, religious, or symbolic meanings 
normally associated with food or with the acts of eating or feeding. Holt (1991) asserts 
that it is virtually impossible for us to consider artificial feeding devices with the same 
emotional detachment as a respirator or a dialysis machine claiming that nourishment is 
not a simple action, rather a transaction consisting of reciprocal actions - the offering and 
taking of food. Miles (1987) claims that though physicians may prescribe artificial 
nutritional support as a medical therapy, families are much more likely to view it as eating 
and drinking, as a communal act that maintains solidarity and affirms dignity. Such 
distortions require further synthesis. 
Distortions 
The use of artificial nutritional support, like other decisions facing the health care team, 
should have a sound justification. The decision of whether to start, to continue, or to stop 
PN/EN is justified by a common reasoning (Presidents Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1982). Hammes 
(1990) argues that good ethical decisions begin with pertinent data. This data includes 
not merely the information about diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment, but also 
psychological outlook, and personal values. Yet information is not always 
straightforward. What we refer to as 'facts' are shaped by our culture and concepts. In 
the case of PN specifically, some of these 'facts' are easily misunderstood or distorted 
(Caspar 1988) when PN is called food. Another distortion my ensue when the use of 
PN is justified by virtue of the symbolism of feeding and eating. There is little doubt that 
food and drink are significant symbols that evoke important emotions in humans. As 
discussed earlier in this review, from the earliest care of infants to our family and 
religious rituals, food and drink play a central role in the meaning of our social behaviour. 
As Hammes (1988:402) explains, 'when we share or give food and drink, we nurture, we 
deepen relationships, we celebrate, and we commemorate'. There is a problem, 
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however, when these meanings are applied to a new technology like PN. Like other 
medical treatments, PN is a form of caring for an ill individual, but is should not be 
employed to symbolise our values of nurturing in the same way as food is (ibid.). 
There is little within the related literature to be found on this confusion of the social 
meanings of food and drink with the medical use of nutritional support. This confusion 
however, can seriously distort our actions, attitudes, and decisions. Hammes (1990) 
however, does make up for this deficit by exploring this confusion with veracity. He 
explores the problems of when family members might demand that a patient be led' by 
artificial means (PN specifically), citing reasons of love, or as a symbol of nurturing. In 
this instance an appeal is made to a powerful symbol; yet the action, rather than 
conveying the meaning of love or nurturing, could impart a sense of disrespect, isolation, 
or a denial of death. 
Hammes (1990) offers another distortion of when an appeal is made to the sanctity of 
human life. He argues that it is clear that the medical tradition views the individual life as 
a value in itself. This recognition, however, does not tell us that we must always provide 
nutritional support. If we were always required to provide it, we would end up 
disregarding human life by showing no respect for individual values or by making mere 
biological existence a central purpose of human life (ibid.). 
A final distortion can arise when we are faced with charges like: 'You are starving the 
patient to death!' (Ahronheim and Gasner 1990:278). It is important that we recognise 
that this verb, 'to starve', has several meanings. These include (firstly) to be 
malnourished; (secondly) to experience hunger; (thirdly) to kill or be killed by withholding 
food. Plainly, all three meanings apply to some individuals who go without food. In 
contrast, many ill or injured individuals may become malnourished and dehydrated and 
even die, but as Cox (1987), Billings (1985) and Schmitz and O'Brien (1986) remind us, 
they may neither experience discomfort, nor have they been 'killed'. Hammes (1990) 
maintains that the arguments and descriptions that use the concept of 'starvation' are 
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often effective because of the multiple meanings of the word. We, therefore, must look 
carefully at our use of this concept and perhaps be careful in our choice of wording. 
Holt (1991) clarifies the distortion of symbolic eating and medical feeding simply by 
explaining that artificial feeding devices require the supervision of highly trained 
personnel, are bodily invasive and contain inherent risks and side effects. Also, such 
devices are more akin to other mechanical supports than they are to a sip of cold water 
or a spoon of broth. When seen this way, nutrition by such means, like other life-
sustaining treatment, is not ethically mandated to be universally warranted for every 
patient. Holt (1991) further explains that as treatment modalities, they are subject to 
indications and counter-indications and must be continually evaluated regarding their 
proportionate value to accepted therapeutic goals. 
Getting the facts straight, an important beginning for ethically justified decisions, must 
include a clear understanding of what PN and EN are, and what they are not. Hammes 
(1990) argues that the appeals to ordinary care, to the meanings of food and drink, to the 
sanctity of life, and to the horrors of starvation often confuse the facts rather than clarify 
them. These distortions must be eliminated without either destroying important, 
traditional values and meaning or investing PN and EN with value and meaning that they 
should not have. Although exploration of such distortions is not provided by the 
literature, and such a deficiency is addressed in the empirical body of this thesis. 
The Sloganism of Starvation 
The debate about the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments has acquired a discourse 
of its own. The use of the word 'starvation' is especially provocative when it is applied to 
the clinical consequences of withholding or withdrawing artificial nutritional support from 
patients with terminal illnesses or profound neurological impairment. The picture it 
conjures up is a powerful one, associated with wasting, cracked and ulcerated skin, 
impaired wound healing, infection, ascites, and a '...listlessness of protracted protein-
calorie malnutrition in the third world so vividly portrayed on television' (Ahronheim and 
Gasner 1990:278). Likewise, as Holt (1991) explains, television pictures of bread and 
soup lines, refugee camps, famine victims with gaunt marasmic bodies evoke powerful 
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emotions. These negative symbols remind us of the proportionate discomfort we have all 
experienced at relatively low levels of hunger and thirst. Based on those brief transitory 
states, we can easily conjure up images of unremitting agony caused by severe 
malnutrition and dehydration. Rightly so, such images are disturbing to the well-fed 
population in the developed western world, yet according to the above authors, they are 
irrelevant to discussions of feeding patients who are hopelessly ill (Ahronheim and 
Gasner 1990). In all such images however, we need to keep in mind that we are not 
talking about food or water, rather suspended flasks, polyurethane, silicone and plastic 
tubes inserted into noses, stomachs, small intestines, and veins of patients who often are 
unconscious or semiconconscious, confused and/or noncommunicative. 
Holt (1991:10) who writes from the perspective of hospital based pastoral care reminds 
us that we cannot and should not dismiss the symbolism of eating and drinking which 
vividly reminds us that as humans 'we are not only embodied, but embedded in a 
network of caring relationships'. He does, however, go on to explain that despite this, we 
cannot use this symbolism to mandate the provision of artificial nutritional support for 
every patient. Hence, the question arises as to whether or not such feeding procedures 
and treatment modalities are common standards of care? If we believe that they are 
rudimentary standards of care along with hygiene, safety and comfort, then the debate 
ends here. The conflicting assumptions within the literature however, do not dismiss the 
debate so easily. 
It is probably useful to briefly explain the consequences of withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
in these vulnerable patient populations. The patient with PVS or comatose is without 
cognitive function and according to Cranford (1984), incapable of experiencing pain and 
suffering. Patients with end-stage dementia are neurologically not far from this state 
(Cranford 1984; American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs and Council 
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 1989), but find themselves in a devastating, terminal state 
that has long been recognised as common to a variety of severe neurological 
impairments (Walshe and Leonard 1985). Ahronheim and Gasner (1990) argue that 
when such patients do not quite satisfy the criteria of PVS, they are not technically 
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unconscious. Nor, however, are they alert as is often asserted in court arguments 
(Rhoden 1988). Deprivation of hydration promptly results in further depression of 
consciousness and then coma (Rowe 1985). The experience of observers is that this 
process is not painful (Billings 1985; Printz 1988; Schmitz and O'Brien 1986). Also, there 
is some evidence for impaired thirst in the setting of advanced age or neurological 
impairment (Billings 1985; Miller eta! 1982; Phillips et al 1984), and for endogenous 
production of substances producing natural analgesia (Printz 1988; Schmitz et al 1986; 
Miller et al 1982; Phillips et 81 1984). It is this endogenous production of natural 
analgesia which is thwarted in the instigation of providing artificial nutrition and hydration 
(Printz 1992; Billings 1985). 
The Decision-Making Process 
One of the ethical issues relating to artificial nutritional support within the literature arises 
in the process of deciding whether to prescribe PN or EN for a patient. Ethical concerns 
in the decision-making process encompass identifying and integrating relevant human 
values, identifying the decision makers, implementing the decision to use either/or EN 
and PN, and in some cases, deciding to withdraw the same. The capacity of the patient 
to make decisions with regards to artificial nutritional support can be problematic when 
the health status of the patient is seriously impaired by poor nutrition or debilitating 
disease. 
Once the decision to use artificial nutritional support has been made, ethical issues arise 
in the interpretation of the benefits and costs of the therapy. Pain, suffering, cost, 
hardships imposed on loved ones, and the undermining of purposefulness have been 
cited as factors in the assessment of benefits and costs of therapy (Jonsen 1979; 
Hastings Center 1987). One ethicist points out that a patient survives on home PN, not 
merely by organic function, but by having control over the essential activities of life 
(Jonsen 1979). Having primary control of the technology and supporting activities 
restores purposefulness to the patient, thus may enhance the quality of the patient's life 
and increase the benefits from the technology. Consequently, there are important ethical 
considerations in the manner in which PN for instance, is initiated and administered to 
42 
the patient, especially in home treatment and long term care. If a time-limited trial of EN 
and/or PN is not beneficial to the patient, or if the costs of continuing treatment are too 
high, withdrawal of artificial nutritional support may be considered. Little appears to be 
known about the circumstances that influence this decision by individual patients and 
health professionals. 
One of the most significant predicaments of the decision-making process involves the 
meaning of starvation and the symbolic and psychological significance of feeding to 
patients, family members, and caregivers. Some clinicians claim that seriously 
debilitated patients seldom experience the symptoms of dehydration beyond a dry mouth 
and slight thirst (Billings 1985). Therefore, in their view, maintaining fluids and 
nourishment is not morally required in patient care. Other clinicians and ethicists argue 
for continued feeding for symbolic significance, for legal reasons, or for reasons of 
compassion or professional conscience (Callahan 1983; Meyers 1985; Seigler and 
Weisbard 1985). Others consider nutrition as one form of treatment that may be initiated 
or withdrawn under the same conditions as any other medical treatment (Dresser and 
Boisaubin 1985; Micetch et al 1983; Wanzer eta! 1984; Wanzer 1989). Theoretical 
considerations of withdrawing treatment in the form of artificial nutrition have not been 
studied adequately and deserve further investigation. 
Although numerous ethical issues have been identified with the use of artificial nutritional 
support, the most compelling issues include equitable access to the technology; potential 
injustices toward other members of society because of the cost of the technology; 
quality-of-life issues, including prolongation of life; and decision-making of the use of 
artificial nutritional support. Adequate ethical assessment of any technology relies partly, 
on empirical studies in the field, the sophistication of the ethical literature, and the careful 
delineation of the conceptual and methodological issues associated with a particular 
technology's employment. To the extent that these aspects can be addressed in the use 
of enteral and parenteral feeding, there is reason to believe that an adequate ethical 
assessment can be made, but such an assessment is not yet available, hence this 
research project. 
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The decision-making process nevertheless, does appear to be reflected in the many 
guidelines on nutritional support in the non-critical/perioperative environment. In 
reviewing these guidelines concerning artificial nutritional support (American Academy of 
Neurology 1989; American Dietetic Association 1987; American Medical Association 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 1989; American Nurses Association 1988; 
American Society of Enteral and Parenteral Nutrition 1986) three points seem to be 
central. The ethical guidelines concerning artificial nutrition and its withholding or refusal 
can be summarised as follows: 
1. There is a strong presumption to provide food and water. 
2. Agreement that nutrition may be forgone when (a) it is biologically ineffective in 
prolonging life, enhancing recovery, or providing comfort; or (b) it will cause more 
physical harm than good; e.g. shorten life or prolong the suffering of a dying patient. 
3. There is consensus that nutrition may be forgone when the patient's values and wishes 
are reliably known and consider nutritional support to be either of no benefit or of 
excessive burden. 
Generally speaking, from the associated literature, this analysis is relatively simple. 
Difficulties occur however when the scientific research has conflicting or no information 
about the benefits or burdens of a particular use of a treatment. Also, the particular facts 
of a case (e.g. diagnosis, patient wishes) are difficult to interpret, plus, the physician's 
obligations to the patient may seem to conflict with social responsibilities. Such ethical 
guidelines therefore do appear to have their limitations. 
Justice: Resources, Access and Economic Considerations 
The other issue of relevance is that of justice, which according to Fainsinger eta! (1992) 
define what patients are legitimately entitled to and what they may claim. The question of 
whether cost should be a factor in clinical ethical decision-making is intensifying as 
resources become more scarce. No articles were found dealing with justice issues 
pertaining to the provision of artificial nutritional support generally, apart from broad 
reviews of the concept of justice in the terminally ill. Parenteral nutritional support 
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specifically, however, attracted more literary attention - of cost analysis that is. 
According to Goel (1990) and Bruera and MacDonald (1988) PN is generally regarded as 
a costly medical intervention. Substantial costs can be attributed to the solutions, the 
equipment needed to deliver them, and the human resources involved in the preparation 
of the materials by pharmacists and in the selection and monitoring by physicians and 
nurses. Additional costs are generated by many other services required, for example 
maintenance of durable medical equipment, pathology monitoring, and medical 
consumables. Because PN is not an inexpensive modality, this is a factor that has to be 
considered, although as Latimer (1991) warns, life-prolonging care should not be denied, 
cut short, or grudgingly continued on the basis of policy, protocol, or generalisations 
about age and diagnosis. Callahan (1983) warns that the denial of nutritional support 
may in the long run become the only effective way to ensure that a large number of 
biologically tenacious patients actually die. This is a legitimate concern which is shared 
by Knox (1989) and Sanstead (1990). 
Ofman and Koretz (1997) review the economics of nutritional support and conclude that it 
currently accounts for approximately one percent of the total health care costs in the 
USA. They concluded that preoperative PN may produce a small absolute reduction in 
post-operative morbidity, but its cost becomes prohibitive. Similarly, Eisenberg et al 
(1993), in an economic analysis of perioperative PN concluded that on the basis of the 
hospital-based method of administering PN that was used in the clinical trial (Department 
of Veterans Affairs Study 1991), perioperative PN did not result in decreased costs for 
any subgroup of patients. Preoperative EN on the contrary, especially if carried out in the 
home, may be of benefit and therefore is an economically defensible intervention (ibid.). 
However these authors maintain that nutritional support generally, is one area of 
medicine in which there has been far more enthusiasm than the data justify: 
Disease-associated malnutrition probably is a secondary 
phenomenon, not an important cause of morbidity. The 
widespread use of this modality cannot be justified in a cost-
constrained health care system (Ofrnan and Koretz 1997:453). 
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May (cited in Schiller and O'Sullivan-Maillet 1999) mentions several types of ethical 
issues facing dietitians that have fiscal implications, those being nutritional support for 
the terminally ill; use of costly specialised nutritional support for the uninsured; early 
discharge of patients who need specialised nutritional support; and reductions in quality 
care due to staff shortages and budget cuts. Veatch (1988:34-35) writes in detail 
regarding the justice and economics of terminal illness and the concept of 'useless 
versus marginally beneficial care', yet does not explore the specifics of particular 
treatment(s). This represents a significant deficit within the associated literature that 
warrants in-depth analysis. In fact, the entire withdrawal and withholding debate(s) does 
not explore the justice/economic issues within any notable 'ethical' context. This is 
representative of the extent of controversy associated with the issue of cost and justice 
and nutritional support. Another possible difficulty associated with general discussion 
regarding this issue is the enormous differences in health economics and prospective 
payment systems versus reimbursement between the USA and the rest of the world. 
The concept of justice and nutrition is however, discussed specifically by Macfie (1997) 
albeit briefly. He maintains that some would argue that the availability of resources 
should not be considered as part of the ethical debate over the instigation or cessation of 
any given medical therapy, citing Levinsky (1977). Macfie claims that this must be 
wrong, as justice, which is the fair and equitable provision of resources to all, is vital to 
any ethical debate (1997). With regards to artificial nutritional support it is noteworthy 
that recent guidelines on parenteral and enteral nutritional support, published by the 
American Society of Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition (ASPEN) in 1996 stated that 'health 
care providers should not make unilateral decisions to provide, withhold or withdraw 
nutritional support on the basis of limiting costs or of rationing scarce resources for the 
benefit of society unless required by law' (ASPEN 1996: www.clinnutr.org ). 
Once again, Macfie stands out as being the exclusive contributor of a particular ethical 
issue (being justice) regarding artificial feeding. In his article published in the Wien 
Klinische Wochenschrift (1997), Macfie discloses this somewhat controversial notion of 
cost-containment: 
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Whilst it is an attractive proposition that doctors should be able 
to work in the best interests of their patients, paying scant 
regard to resource implications, in reality this is a naive and 
unacceptable abrogation of a doctor's responsibilities... The 
moral question is no longer whether to participate in cost-
containment but how to do so in a morally creditable way. 
Although economic constraints may force physicians to weigh 
more carefully the cost of each benefit they do not require that 
the physician appraises the value of the patient himself or weigh 
his benefit to society (Mac fie 1997:853). 
Macfie maintains that the application of the ethical principle of justice as this applies to 
the treatment of malnutrition or the provision of artificial nutritional support necessitates 
that physicians carefully appraise these treatments for each and every individual (1996). 
He offers simple explanations of how physicians can help control costs by choosing the 
most economic way of delivering optimal care: 
Why use parenteral nutrition if enteral nutrition will do? Why use 
percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy 6 if short-term enteral 
nutrition or sip feeding will suffice? Further doctors should be 
obligated to take on board those aspects of research, which 
have clearly shown to reduce costs (Mac fie 1997: 853). 
Evidence exists to show that the use of a nutrition team provides substantial savings in 
the costs of artificial nutritional support (Elia 1993). Despite this, only 30% of hospitals in 
the United Kingdom where this evidence was generated had a properly established 
nutrition support team in 1995 (Payne-James et al 1995). 
When life-sustaining technologies are expensive, the issue of equitable access to them is 
a concern. The End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) program of Medicare in the USA is a 
good example of how concern for access resulted in federal funding to make costly 
technology available and accessible to citizens in an equitable fashion (Caplan 1981), yet 
federal funding alone does not eliminate potential injustice in the distribution of a 
technology. If technologies are expensive, continued injustices occur in three ways: 
needy patients will not be served because the technology is not easily available to them; 
6 Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy, commonly abbreviated and referred to as a PEG and/or G-Tube (Gastrostomy Tube). 
47 
patients, even though they are able to pay or may qualify for public assistance, will do so 
at a prohibitive cost in the form of burdens to themselves and the family (Fry 1990); and 
patients who might benefit from the technology will not fit the therapeutic criteria and 
therefore will not be eligible to receive it (Jonsen 1979). The issue of potential injustices 
because of the high price of a technology has been well addressed in the ethical 
literature (Churchill 1987; Daniels 1985; President's Commission or the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1983; Veatch 1986), yet 
the potential injustices in artificial nutritional support use among certain individuals are 
not well defined, possibly because it is still considered an emerging technology. 
Continued analysis and evaluation are therefore needed on the impact of cost and 
equitable access to this form of medical therapy. 
Quality-of-Life Issues 
Quality-of-life is a concept that 'focused on the good of the individual what kind of life if 
possible given the person's condition, and whether that condition will allow the individual 
to have a life that he or she views as worth living' (Hastings Center in Fry 1990:330). It is 
a subjective evaluation of individual worth made by the individual himself or herself and 
not by anyone else. Goodhall (1997) claims that the term 'quality-of-life' is frequently 
used by health care professionals, but it is a complex concept that lacks a common 
definition, resulting in inconsistencies in its interpretation. Whereas the term supports the 
notion that a worthwhile life can be a life with the most serious illness or an extremely 
disabling condition, it also suggests that an assessment of life can differ from one person 
to the next and defies a singular description or claim to universal experience (Fry 1990). 
Monzon (1998) claims that if quality-of-life is defined as being the social, physiological, 
mental, spiritual, intellectual, and general well-being of people, we realise that there is no 
known health care system that is able to guarantee that well-being in all its possible 
aspects. A decision to limit nutritional therapy raises difficult questions about the value of 
life (Singer cited in Watts and Cassel 1984). Where such questions arise, the conditions 
of living have generally reached extreme debility or misery. Standards of human life 
such as intelligence (Fletcher 1982), or potential for interaction (McCormick 1974) have 
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been applied to justify the decision to allow death without heroic medical interventions. 
Such standards reflect the subjective values of each particular author. 
Questions of quality-of-life for patients present an ethical challenge to health 
professionals, who often are tempted to make decisions that they believe enhance the 
patient's quality-of-life and who, in any event, judge the patient's quality-of-life by their 
own standards. A health care professional can scarcely avoid making quality-of-life 
judgements to some extent if the goal of health care is the good of the patients. The 
mere determination of good - even the desire to create good - encompasses a subjective 
evaluation of a particular quality-of-life. However, this is not necessarily an ethical 
problem unless the decisions are made without consulting the patient. In the case of 
artificial nutritional support, the technology may enable an individual to maintain and 
prolong life, even though this life is not considered worth living by the individual. Fry 
(1990) explains that the decision to implement artificial nutritional support needs to be as 
free as possible of quality-of-life judgements on the behalf of the care provider. 
The issue of quality-of-life has periodically been addressed by the courts (Boisaubin 
1993) and appears throughout the literature in terms of those patients deemed either 
terminally ill or in PVS. This concept of quality-of-life, is fraught with problems because 
of the subjectivity and human variability involved in its determination, as Boisaubin (1993) 
explains: 
For example, may people while healthy, when questioned, 
would reject the prospect of continued life with a profound 
disability such as quadriplegia. On the other hand, the majority 
living with this condition desire to go on living rather than 
request death (Boisaubin 1993:136). 
The extent to which quality-of-life judgements enter into health care decisions and 
patients' choices of treatment is hard to determine accurately. This topic is of primary 
concern in the use of artificial nutritional support for patients who are terminally ill, 
permanently unconscious, cognitively impaired (Norberg and Hirschfield 1987), elderly 
(Norberg eta! 1980), or who are receiving long-term support at home (Detsky eta! 1987; 
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Herrindal eta! 1989). One study reported decreased quality-of-life assessments by 
patients on PN (Herfindal eta! 1989) whereas another suggested increased levels of 
patient-reported quality-of-life while receiving PN in comparison with alternative 
approaches (Detsky eta! 1987). However, the designs of these studies and the 
difficulties in developing quality-of-life measures indicate the need for more extensive 
study of the technology before conclusive statements are made about quality-of-life 
factors in the decision to use artificial nutritional support. 
The limitations and compromise in quality-of-life that unwarranted artificial nutritional 
support and access for the same imposes on patients, especially if they are restrained to 
prevent removing the devices, are unacceptable according to Scofield (1991). Tube 
feeding regimens in the elderly specifically, increase the patient's isolation from family, 
friends and residents (for example in a nursing home environment), and can lead to 
psychosocial deterioration and withdrawal. Medically unwarranted artificial feeding 
makes it more difficult for patients to regain lost function, assuming they are ever offered 
this chance (ibid.). 
A Natural Death is a Peaceful Death 
Whilst considering the previously mentioned sloganism of starvation and revisiting some 
of the established palliative medicine arguments, it is important to consider the notion of 
a natural death when discussing withdrawal (of nutrition and hydration) issues at the end 
of life. According to Ahronheim and Gasner, since time began, until very recently, 
'people who grew too old, too disabled, too weak, or too sick to eat and drink died without 
a feeding tube in place (1990:279). Although superimposed medical illness in such 
people can now frequently be cured, it is logical to assume that rejection of food is a 
physiological component of the illness and the active process of dying. Oral intake is 
volitional, and subject to rejection in the presence of anorexia of whatever origin. 
Artificial nutritional support, on the contrary, is provided in amounts calculated to satisfy 
nutritional requirements. The body cannot block its entry but can only reject it by 
malabsorption and regurgitation which are well-known complications of tube feeding 
(Bastow 1986; Campbell-Taylor and Fischer 1987). 
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For those who cannot accept a negative answer to the question 'is withdrawal of artificial 
nutritional support painful?' we must pose the question differently, and ask 'do the 
benefits of artificial feeding in hopelessly ill patients outweigh the burdens?' This 
question, and similar questions with regard to the provision of artificial nutritional support 
in hopelessly ill patients has been explored in detail by ethicists, health professionals and 
lawyers (Carson 1986; Derr 1986; Lo and Dornbrand 1984; Siegler and Wiesbard 1985). 
Artificial nutritional support itself may cause pain. Central venous catheterisation 
necessary for parenteral feeding, even with the administration of local anaesthesia is still 
a surgical procedure that is uncomfortable and for some patients, painful. Howard (1990) 
argues that PN, for example, is not an innocuous treatment, with complications relating to 
catheter placement, infection, metabolic abnormalities, hepatic abnormalities, and other 
complications stemming from long term treatment. This is also supported by Maki (1992) 
and Lipman (1998). Enteral feeding itself may produce pain. Erosions or haemorrhage 
of the nasal septum, oesophagus, and gastric mucosa have been reported (Bastow 
1986; Campbell-Taylor and Fisher 1987; Ciocon et a! 1988), and nasogastric feeding as 
well as gastrostomy feeding has been associated with aspiration pneumonia (Campbell-
Taylor and Fisher 1987; Ciocon et al 1988; Metheny et al 1986). According to 
Ahronheim and Gasner (1990:279) the provision of artificial nutrition may become an act 
of forced feeding, resisted through the 'primitive mode of expression that remains - 
struggling to pull the tube out'. The image of physical restraint is one that follows a 
patient struggling to pull out their own feeding tube. The same authors confront us with 
the thought-provoking concept of a patient who is tied down to a bed, intubated with 
enteral feeding devices. It is this image of physical restraint and forced feeding which, in 
a patient who is immobile and travelling a downhill journey, is just as disturbing as that of 
'starvation'. Jett (1995) encourages us to similarly confront this issue of unnecessary 
suffering associated with burdensome feeding. She explains that pointless suffering may 
in fact be alleviated by a thoughtful look at our assumptions and biases about proper 
medical care during the terminal phase of life - and acting to change care that does not 
contribute to a peaceful death. This essentially introduces us to discussions on the 
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recognition of appropriate end-of-life care, which is especially relevant when withholding 
and withdrawing treatments are discussed within the context of critical care. 
Withholding and Withdrawing Issues in the Critically III 
A decision to withdraw life support, according to the overwhelming bulk of the literature, 
is best made by patients themselves, and the right of competent adults (or their proxies) 
to make such decisions is well established. The manner by which critically ill patients 
should die, however, is usually entrusted to physicians. Christakis and Asch (1993) 
claim that since most physicians are uncomfortable with euthanasia, such patients are 
usually allowed to die by physicians tempering efforts to prolong life and withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining therapy. Little has also been written within the critical care 
nursing literature that specifically deals with ethics and artificial nutritional support. Daly 
(1990) utilised the exploration of narrative to determine critical care nurses' 
understandings of withdrawing and withholding nutrition. The outcome of this qualitative 
study was that the general consensus of critical care nurses maintained that there is no 
absolute obligation to provide artificial nutrition in all cases. However, once again there 
was not clear delineation between artificial nutritional support and other critical care 
modalities as the participants gave conflicting views on whether it was extraordinary 
medical care or ordinary comfort care. 
Malnutrition, Ethics and Artificial Nutritional Support 
What of artificial nutritional support under other circumstances — the perioperative 
patient, the cancer patient and the chronically ill? As previously mentioned there is a 
wealth of literature available on the potential benefits of artificial nutritional support using 
different means and in a wide variety of patient groups. Some have shown obvious 
benefit, others have produced ambiguous results, and in some groups, such as 
parenteral feeding in perioperative patients without severe malnutrition, positive harm. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that a consensus regarding the value of artificial nutritional 
support does not exist and that many clinicians remain confused. One problem 
assessing the benefit as opposed to the burden of nutritional support in these types of 
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studies is that they do not separate the benefits of treating the underlying illness from the 
consequences of mitigating the effects of starvation. 
Death from protein-energy malnutrition occurs within 60-70 days of total starvation in 
normal adults. Functional metabolic deficits occur after some 10-15 days of semi-
starvation in previously healthy adults and after shorter periods in those already 
compromised by disease (Meguid et al 1988). The consequences of starvation are well 
known and, apart from weight loss, include impairment of the immune response, 
alterations in organ function, malaise, lethargy, and changes in cognitive function (Elia 
1993). Against this background of information on the causes and consequences of 
malnutrition, it is a relatively elementary matter to make recommendations for treatment. 
For instance, in 1993, ASPEN published guidelines for the use of parenteral and enteral 
nutritional support and recommended that a maximum period of seven days of a severely 
limited nutrient intake is the empirical absolute most investigators set for hospitalised 
patients (ASPEN 1993). Macfie (1995) maintains that most would add that a weight 
loss of 10-15% recalled pre-illness weight was also an indication for nutritional support. 
In spite of this wealth of data indicating the deleterious effects of malnutrition and worthy 
evidence demonstrating that we can reverse this, Macfie (1995) specifically maintains 
that nutritional therapy is underused. 
Why then is starvation not treated and is it unethical not to do so? Macfie (1995) gives 
three primary reasons for this: first, inadequate education of health care professionals; 
second, inadequate education of the general public; and third, resource implications. 
The fact that many health care professionals still do not recognise the significance of 
malnutrition is a reflection on medical and postgraduate education (ibid.). Until recently 
most patients have remained ignorant of developments in medical technology that 
ensures that starvation need not occur. Finally, as we are all aware during these days of 
financial restraint, health service managers exert an ever-increasing influence on medical 
treatment in an attempt to contain costs. It is Macfie's view that the influence of ethical 
debate will radically change our practice with regard to the provision of artificial nutritional 
support. He states: 
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We should not and cannot underestimate the influence of 
patient demand in our clinical practice. With regard to ethics it is 
axiomatic that the rights of the patient must be upheld and as 
there is an increasing awareness as to the consequences of 
starvation then an increasing number of patients will seek from 
their medical attendants reassurance that this will be avoided in 
their case (Macfie 1995:215). 
With regard to resource implications, Macfie (1995) recognises that these are colossal 
particularly if all patients with a 10-15% weight loss or with seven days inadequate oral 
intake are to receive nutritional support. He concedes that this will inevitably lead to 
some conflicts within the professions and with management. Nonetheless, from the 
ethical standpoint, there is no precedent that resources should be seen as a reason not 
to treat (ibid.) This is succinctly summarised in the guidelines for parenteral and enteral 
nutritional support published by ASPEN in 1999. To quote, 'Health care providers should 
not make unilateral decisions to provide, withhold or withdraw nutrition support on the 
basis of limiting costs or rationing scarce resources for the benefit of society unless 
required by the law. No such laws exist at this time' (ASPEN 1999:wwwclinnutri.orq). 
Macfie (1995) responds to this by suggesting that the inability of clinicians to provide 
nutritional support either because of personal beliefs or institutional policy will necessitate 
the clinician making reasonable efforts to arrange for the timely transfer of the patient's 
care to a practitioner or facility willing to implement appropriate treatment. 
The application of the ethical principle of justice as this applies to the treatment of 
malnutrition or the provision of artificial nutritional support necessitates that physicians 
carefully appraise these treatments for each and every individual. The question arises 
therefore of whether or not physicians can help contain costs by choosing the most 
economic way of delivering optimal care, for example, why use PN if EN will do? 
Multidisciplinary Interpretations 
Only one article was identified that offered a multidisciplinary interpretation of issues in 
nutritional support. Srp et al (1989) provide a psychosocial interpretation of nutrition 
support related issues with a clear emphasis on the long-term home PN patient. 
Perspectives of long term home PN are given by the physician, dietitian, liaison 
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psychiatrist, social worker, nutrition support nurse, pharmacist, and patient. Interestingly, 
the least amount of emphasis in this article is placed on the patient. As this was the only 
article retrieved from an exhaustive literature search across all health care professions, 
there is a demonstrable deficit in multidisciplinary interpretations of artificial nutritional 
support. This article did not reflect on any ethical issues per se. Consequently, this 
deficiency justifies a multidisciplinary inquiry, such as the nature of this project. 
Another lone author distinctly describes a short fall in interdisciplinary decision-making, 
suggesting that families confronted with difficult choices will turn to the physician for 
guidance. Sanstead (1990) suggests that those people, be they family members, 
caregivers, physicians, who do not have essential experience and insights for decision-
making related to the withdrawal/withholding issues surrounding artificial nutritional 
support, obtain counsel and guidance from clergy and other scholars of ethics and 
morality. He stipulates that the use of such expertise can help in planning management. 
This concept brings us back to the clinical versus ethical argument of what is deemed 
appropriate. Sanstead (1990) possibly introduces another variable to this dichotomy, 
that is, what is economically appropriate. Sanstead frames an issue which, despite being 
extremely controversial and ripe for contemporary debate, is not reflected in the rest of 
the associated literature. He expresses concern that withholding or withdrawing artificial 
nutritional support measures could be abused by those who are more concerned with the 
economics of health care than with the patient care. Through vigilance, Sanstead claims 
that physicians and other health care providers must prevent economic considerations 
from influencing decisions that determine care: 
Appeals to society regarding the cost of health care by planners 
and budget-conscious officials must be countered by 
emphasising the humanitarian dimensions of medicine and by 
making society at large aware of the sometimes inhumane 
outcomes that occur when the welfare of patients becomes 
secondary (Sanstead 1990:768). 
GilIon (1994) warns that there is no obvious reason however, that doctors and medical 
teams are always right regarding the provision or non-provision of artificial nutritional 
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support - if indeed there is a right answer. Again, this shortfall in multidisciplinary 
interpretation and collaboration regarding difficult decision-making as suggested by the 
above author does well to justify further inquiry of a multidisciplinary nature. 
Liaschenko and Davis (1991:271) discuss the similarities and differences between the 
practices of medicine and nursing where nutritional support is concerned. Their analysis 
of the medical and nursing literature indicates that the 'practices of both professions 
share a similar tension'. No specific information however, is provided regarding the 
distinct ethical issues as they pertain to the provision of artificial nutritional support. One 
area however, that is explored by these authors that warrants mention here is that a 
formal and rational approach to ethics is inadequate to the demands of medicine and 
nursing. Carson (cited in Liaschenko and Davis 1991) claims that an overemphasis on 
obligation, or what he calls the morality system is only part of our ethical lives. Similarly, 
Williams (cited in Liaschenko and Davis 1991) suggests that thick descriptions of our 
ethical language as it is used in practice may be a much more fruitful approach. This 
leads to the question of how we might best explore the ethical issues of artificial 
nutritional support, from a multidisciplinary perspective, without being hindered by such 
formal and rational approaches to ethics. Such a multidisciplinary approach to ethics 
research is therefore warranted. 
Conclusion 
The ethical issues and questions that surround the various issues of artificial nutritional 
support are obviously multifaceted. Professional viewpoints may vary, and include 
diverse philosophical, religious, cultural, and political perspectives. The implications of 
recognising artificial nutritional support as a medical therapy and thus assessing its 
appropriate provision on the basis of accepted ethical principles are far reaching. The 
application of ethical principles in the use of artificial nutritional support is likely to have a 
significant impact on the clinical practice particularly in Western society where the 
morality of different treatment strategies are increasingly being subjected to public 
scrutiny. Application of the ethical themes discussed in this review do however give very 
different recommendations for the actual provision of artificial nutritional support, thereby 
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providing no consensus whatsoever. The duty-based moralist who would invariably feed 
the patient whatever the anticipated outcome (because to do otherwise would be murder) 
on the basis that this was the right and responsibility of the doctor. The goal-based or 
utilitarian doctor would feed the patient when appropriate in their health care setting and 
if the results of such intervention were merited on the basis of scientific evidence. The 
rights-based moralist would maintain that the patient should always be offered artificial 
nutritional support and if requested by the patient, then the moral responsibility must be 
to provide it. By the same token, if the patient or their surrogate(s) refuses artificial 
nutritional support then the patient's wishes must be respected. Evidently, there is 
conflict between these three themes as well as with the fundamental moral obligations of 
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice. These conflicts help to emphasise 
that ethics is a process of reasoning whereby a respectable and defensible position is 
sought, which protects the interests of the patient. We are perpetually reminded in the 
ethics literature that there are no absolutely satisfactory resolutions of ethical dilemmas 
and that the most one can hope to achieve is a balance between the conflicting interests 
and goals of different individuals involved in patient care. Thus, pursuing a 
multidisciplinary approach toward ethics and artificial nutritional support seems to be one 
way of reaching some kind of resolution, by way of accommodating those different 
individuals. 
It must be recognised that there is no such thing as a single and absolute ethical rule that 
can be applied in every conceivable situation. The literature teaches us that almost 
every ethical dilemma will necessarily pose the problem of competing and conflicting 
ethical obligations. It is because of this that an alternative method of inquiry should be 
sought to accommodate the variables that the application of the ethical principles are 
unable to because they do not allow for the idiosyncratic realities of complex clinical 
situations in multitudinous health care settings. By way of employing a qualitative 
method of inquiry, it is hoped that the gaps identified within this review of the literature 
will be explored, examined and theorised. The theoretical and practical explanations of 
such a methodology are discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This inquiry will be of a qualitative nature thereby excluding the quantitative necessities 
of a control group, and statistical analysis. A methodology of narrative and knowledge 
development in bioethics has been chosen which will be referred to hereinafter as 
narrative ethics. This method is discussed in detail with a certain emphasis afforded to 
the art and method of qualitative interview studies, as well a synopsis of the computer 
software application utilised in the management and interpretation of the qualitative data 
in this project. Methodological considerations including the determinants of rigor and 
ethical considerations are also discussed. 
Narrative Ethics 
Drawing on such theorists as Lyotard (1984), who argues for narrative as an alternative 
mode of knowledge to science, and Bruner (1986) who demonstrates that narrative is a 
universal mode of cognition, narrative is currently enjoying unprecedented prestige as an 
avenue through which substantive meaning and working knowledge can be developed. 
Two central assumptions which underpin qualitative approaches are: That ideological 
positions are revealed which propose that reality can be apprehended by capturing the 
individual's point of view (subjectivity); and that qualitative researchers can directly 
represent this experience in language (linguistic representation). These assumptions 
suggest that subjectivity and language are not natural yet rather cultural, therefore 
providing such research with the possibility of challenging existing assumptions and 
power structures which shape the individual's experience of health and illness (Crowe 
1998). In the case of this research project, the method of employing a narrative 
approach exposed certain challenges both personally and professionally to the 
researcher. The confronting and controversial ventures were also challenging to the 
existing structures, theories and literary perceptions that had so far shaped the 
researcher's experiences and assumptions of the ethical provision of artificial nutritional 
support. 
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Crowe (1998) maintains that the power of the word in both its written and spoken form is 
a primary determinant in how we experience ourselves and others within the world, and 
how we interpret those experiences. Roof (1993:304) considers narrative approaches to 
research as holding the potential to move researchers beyond 'methodological 
individualism' and 'attention to simply individual attributes', and to push them to look at 
cultural narratives more broadly: 
Peoples' stories are never just their stories. Stories connect us 
with larger stories, with cultural narratives that shape our shared 
meanings (Roof 1993:304). 
Personal narratives are ways of expressing experience, and as reality can only manifest 
itself in us as experience, narratives are fundamental to human existence (Steffen 1997). 
As Oliver Sacks claimed, 'I've never been very good at learning from texts or lectures. 
My only texts have been individuals, have been patients' (1993:127). Consequently, 
people are central to narrative research, yet peoples' experiences may seem insignificant 
to them as they think of them as simply part of living their lives. However, narrative has 
an interest in commonplace experiences and points of view. It encourages people to 
delve into these, and to realise that it is through their accounts that personal and practical 
knowledge may be generated for themselves and others (Roberts and Taylor 1998). 
Theoretical Framework 
Medical ethics has been dominated by the four principles approach (autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice), and by the application of these general 
normative principles to concrete cases (Beauchamp and Childress 2001) including those 
discussed in the preceding chapter. There is little doubt that this has provided us with 
some useful tools for analysis of situations, and a common language that names 
important issues. The four principles operate as an ethical grid, which structures the 
presentation of a case and guides the discussion. Its wide level of acceptance 
demonstrates its application and accessibility. The emphasis is on preferences, risks, 
and rational decision-making. Ethical reasoning is considered as following a calculus, 
which ideally results in one good solution. However, the limitations of principles are now 
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becoming apparent (Nicholas and Gillett 1997). Clouser and Gert (1990) also claim that 
there is unease amongst practitioners emerging from the realisation that the realities and 
practicalities of clinical practice are not paid sufficient attention. Criticism of the principle-
based approach (or what Baker (1998) refers to as 'principlisf; and what Loewy and 
Loewy (2001) term 'principlism') is that the approach is abstract in that it originates from 
general principles, attempts to eliminate emotional issues, and aims at a universally valid 
conclusion. Tomlinson (1997) explains that the immediate criticism lodged against 
principlism is that ethical principles are too removed from, and insensitive to, the 
specifics of the very particular living cases to which they are applied. Widdershoven and 
Smits (1996) argue that ethical issues cannot be solved by an act of reason, and that 
they require involvement and intuition. This intuition can be sustained, according to 
Nussbaum (1986) by stories, or narrative. Nussbaum (1986) contends that people 
should read stories, and analyse narratives to learn about conflicts, and to become 
engaged in ethical practices. The limitations of the principle-based method of ethical 
analysis will be further demonstrated in the interpretation chapters in this thesis whereby 
surprising omissions and inclusions in the ethical discussions are highlighted and 
explored. 
Narratives tell us more about ethics than any other philosophical treatise can, and show 
us the tragic character of life and make us aware of the subtle tensions within ethical 
practice (Chase 1996). Similarly, Benner (1991) tells us that ethics is in need of narrative 
about real people because narrative provides the room for doubt, anxiety, and hope as 
elements of human interactions. Tomlinson (1997) maintains that narrative places a part 
in moral and professional development. The reading and study of narratives has salutary 
effects on moral development through the enhancement of perceptiveness, sensitivity, 
sympathy, or other virtues. Narrative serves a pivotal function in the discovery, 
justification, or application of ethical knowledge - a role that fills the gaps inherent in any 
analytic-principle based method. It can expand our understandings of other people and 
perhaps ourselves so that our ethical judgements become more realistically informed. 
Tomlinson (1997) also claims that narrative may awaken ethical sensibilities so that we 
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are more sensitive to the wrongfulness of circumstances we had become hardened to. 
And so 'narrative ethics' is born. 
The narrative turn in medical ethics is based on the conviction that we need stories to get 
to a more elaborate view on ethical issues in health care. Tomlinson (1997:123) asks 
'what might stories provide for us besides the pleasure of reading them and telling them?' 
Could narratives deepen our understanding of ethical problems and choices? 
Widdershoven and Smits (1996) claim that general normative principles are too abstract 
and crude to come to grips with practical problems. Consequently, as a theoretical tenet 
shaping this research, the researcher wanted to understand the ethical issues in 
providing artificial nutritional support. The researcher therefore needed to start from the 
way in which participants gave meaning to the situation by sharing narratives that 
expressed concrete commitments, emotions, and doubts. As Widdershoven and Smits 
(1996:278) declare 'we can only hope to find adequate ways of dealing with ethical 
problems if we are prepared to listen to the stories of the people involved'. This 
approach to ethics recognises that our understanding is socially situated, that we develop 
our sense of what is right and appropriate, what is good or to be avoided, out of total life 
experiences - and not necessarily an abstract set of principles (Nicholas and Gillett 
1997). This was the essential impetus for utilising a narrative approach to inquiry of an 
ethical nature. 
Reference to narrative in regard to medical ethics characteristically occurs in relation to 
what has been described as 'narrative ethics' (Brody 1994:207). A substantial literature 
has been established on a magnitude of issues relating to narrative ethics including 
discussion of: the meaning(s) of the term itself (Newton 1995); its relationship with 
phenomenology (Ellos 1994); its relationship with Christian ethics (McClendon 1986); the 
relevance of post-modernist analysis (McKinney 1995); and, of course, its relationship 
with literature (Hudson-Jones 1996). There is therefore some resemblance between the 
essentially philosophical approach (narrative ethics); the fundamentally sociological one 
(life-story); and the lived experience (phenomenology). Throughout this thesis the 
primary reference is to those phenomenological underpinnings of the personal narrative 
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that fundamentally inform the methodology. It is imperative at this point to recognise the 
possible interpretation of this method as what has been referred to by Rose et al 
(1995:556) as 'method slurring'. Remaining true to a methodology ensures academic 
rigor in this respect, however as narrative ethics research (as a method) draws heavily 
from phenomenology, the application of phenomenological intent is highly appropriate. 
Polkinghorne (1988) points to the congruence between narrative analysis and 
phenomenological analysis. A narrative research approach thus meets the condition of 
congruity with the researcher's basic phenomenological research interests, and 
established skills. 
Four elements of narrative ethics form the basis of the methodology employed in this 
study. First, the personal narrative rather than a re-identified framework is central to the 
analysis. Second, this narrative is central in the decision-making/dilemma-resolution 
process. Third, the approach is all about the achievement of an understanding of the 
meaning of the situation for those involved. And fourth, there is identification that it is 
only through knowledge of the personal, cultural and social context that the most befitting 
ethical resolution can be reached. As Hunter (1991) explains, narrative structures the 
conversation between health professionals and provides a major vehicle for the 
transmission of knowledge and information of the profession. It is this latter point that 
underpins the primary aim of the narrative process in this research project. 
Hunsaker-Hawkins (1997) argues that physicians are mindful of the breach between 
ethical discourse and ethical practice whereby in reality, decisions are usually not made 
exclusively through a process of skilled deductive reasoning: 
Many other factors are also involved whenever we make 
important decisions about our own lives or the lives of others — 
and in this medical decisions are no different from any others. 
Furthermore, it would seem that this is the way we should make 
decisions. Moral choice is an act of the whole person: It should 
involve all our mental faculties — reason, intuition, emotion, 
imagination — working in concert. Epiphanic knowledge does, 
and should, coexist with the kind of knowledge that is arrived at 
through deductive reasoning (Hunsaker-Hawkins 1997). 
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The role of individual life accounts has been recommended as important to the practice 
of bioethics for a number of years (Tovey 1998). Despite being a relatively contemporary 
concept in health research, narrative ethics represents a valuable method for researching 
ethical dilemmas and the settings in which these dilemmas are played out. Personal 
accounts need not simply provide an impetus to scientific research yet can in themselves 
yield intellectually robust evidence on the general as well as the particular. By drawing 
on the rigorous methods developed elsewhere in qualitative research (primarily 
phenomenology), personal accounts not only allow us to enter the world of the sick 
person, but allow us to do so in such a way as to contribute to empirical and theoretical 
knowledge. Tovey (1998) maintains that the integration of narrative ethics with rigorous 
methods formulated within sociology provides the capacity for narrative to be a valuable 
component of academic inquiry in what are frequently complex and sensitive areas. The 
area of artificial nutritional support is by no means an exception. 
It is important to note that narrative ethics research does not replace other approaches to 
medical ethics. Principle-based ethics can provide some important tools of analysis, 
however a narrative ethic adds to the discussion of the ethics of health care. It creates 
an opportunity for critical reflection upon our theoretical frameworks and taken-for-
granted assumptions that are grounded in our professional lives. As Nicholas and Gillett 
(1997:299) remind us, 'We are talking about actual lives, real people.' Narrative ethics 
reminds us of this and alerts us to how our institutional and professional practices are 
experienced by both health care provider and health care recipient. 
The aim of utilising this approach, then, is not in itself to solve the ethical dilemmas 
surrounding artificial nutritional support, or to promote 'appropriate' values and 
consequent action. The approach is instead a means to expand knowledge about 'patient 
worlds' and 'provider worlds', in order to enter those worlds empirically and thereby 
contribute to a multidisciplinary and multifaceted approach to the complex issues of 
artificial feeding which is simultaneously incorporating qualitative data. 
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Sample 
An alternative approach, often found in qualitative research and often misunderstood in 
medical circles (May and Pope 1995) is to use systematic, non-probabilistic sampling. 
The purpose is not to establish a random or representative sample drawn from a 
population but rather to identify specific groups of people who either possess 
characteristics or live in circumstances relevant to the social phenomenon being studied. 
Participants are identified because they will enable exploration of a particular aspect of 
behaviour relevant to the research (May and Pope 1995). This approach to sampling 
allows the researcher deliberately to include a wide range of types of participants, and 
also to select key participants with access to important sources of knowledge. One of the 
major differences between qualitative and quantitative research is that qualitative 
approaches typically involve purposeful sampling, while qualitative approaches usually 
involve probability sampling (Kuzel 1995; Morse 1989; Patton 1990). Patton (1990:169) 
described 14 different types of purposeful sampling involving the selection for in-depth 
study of typical, atypical, or 'information rich cases'. When qualitative researchers decide 
to seek out people because of their vocation and anticipated experience, it is because 
they consider them good sources of information that will advance them toward an 
analytic goal. While the sample is statistically nonrepresentative, it is informationally 
representative in that data will be obtained from persons who can stand for other persons 
with similar characteristics (Sandelowski 1995). 
Using 'purposive' or purposeful sampling as described by Appleton (1995), the 
researcher approached selected health professionals who consented to take part in this 
study. Participants from the following multidisciplinary spectrum within Australia, the UK 
and the USA were approached: 
• Bioethics 
• Surgery — general, trauma, neurosurgery 
• Medicine — internal medicine, critical care, gerontology, oncology, palliative care 
• Pastoral Care 
• Nursing - palliative care, oncology, clinical nutrition, critical care, gerontology 
• Pharmacy 
• Social Work 
• Occupational Therapy 
• Law 
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• Health Service Management/Administration 
The sampling approach employed in this research was determined by the purpose of the 
project as statistical representativeness is not normally sought for qualitative research 
(Field and Morse 1989). Similarly, the sample size was not determined by hard and fast 
rules, but by other factors such as depth and duration of the interview and what is 
deemed feasible for a single interviewer. Taking into account the scope of the research 
and its in-depth/multidisciplinary nature, a sample size of approximately 30 participants 
was sought. This number was deemed more than adequate for appropriate deliberation 
within the confines of a Ph.D. thesis after expert consultation from two renowned 
qualitative researchers — one in Australia and one in the USA. 
Concerns about sample size were also addressed via the related literature. Inadequate 
sample size can undermine the credibility of research findings (Sandelowski 1995) or too 
small to support claims of having achieved either information redundancy (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985) or theoretical saturation (Strauss and Corbin 1990). On the contrary, 
sample sizes may be too large to support claims of having completed detailed analysis of 
the data, especially the microanalysis necessitated by narrative research (Sandelowski 
1995). 
Sandelowski (1995) claims that purposeful sampling for selected phenomenological 
variation is a way a researcher working alone with limited resources can reduce the 
minimum number of sampling units required within the confines of a single research 
project, yet still produce credible and analytically significant findings. Determining an 
adequate sample size in qualitative research is ultimately a matter of judgement and 
experience in evaluating the quality of information collected against the uses to which it 
will be put. The following principle was therefore utilised in determining both an 
adequate and appropriate sample size for the research: 
An adequate sample size in qualitative research is one that 
permits — by virtue of not being too large — the deep, case 
oriented analysis that is the hallmark of all qualitative inquiry, 
and that results in — by virtue of not being too small — a new and 
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richly textured understanding of experience (Sandelowski 
1995:183). 
The total of 32 participants was deemed both adequate and appropriate, having reached 
'saturation point' of data and recurring themes by approximately the 28th interview. Tovey 
(1998) explains this saturation as a stage at which new narratives make sense within 
existing narratives and therefore do not require those propositions to be modified further. 
Data Collection: The In - Depth Interview 
The focus of the qualitative researcher's concern when using narrative is to discover 
knowledge through the grasping of the individual's subjective experience employing a 
diverse range of strategies — case study, personal experience, observation, and 
interviews (Crowe 1998). The latter was chosen as the strategy for discovering 
knowledge in this project. This was the primary means of data collection, that is, the in-
depth interview. These interviews were of a semi-structured nature thereby granting a 
notable level of autonomy to the participant in order to shape the nature of the analysis. 
The in-depth interview context allows for more than a rigid exchange of questions and 
answers, and becomes an interactive process of telling, listening, clarifying, and 
understanding (Chase and Bell 1994). Although qualitative interviews are often 
described as being unstructured in order to distinguish them with formalised quantitative 
interviews, the term 'unstructured' is misleading as no interview is completely devoid of 
structure. Britten (1995) explains that if it were, there would be no guarantee that the 
data gathered would be appropriate to the research question. The semi-structured 
interviews were conducted on the basis of a loose structure incorporating open-ended 
questions that outlined the area being explored, at least initially, and from which the 
interviewer or interviewee deviated in order to pursue an idea in more detail. Appleton 
(1995) suggests that by using open-ended questions, participants are encouraged to 
expand on their own experiences. Consequently, a wealth of information was 
contributed by the various participants in this study. Sorrell and Redmond (1995) 
maintain that open-ended questioning elicits a narrative directly related to an important 
experience of the respondent, who then becomes engrossed in the unfolding narrative, 
as the vividness of the original experience returns. 
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A semi-structured interview schedule was employed to facilitate in-depth exploration of 
the multidisciplinary participants' perspectives of the ethics of artificial nutritional support. 
The aim of the interview was to discover the interviewee's own framework of meanings. 
The research obligation was to avoid imposing the researcher's structures and 
assumptions as far as possible. During the course of the research the researcher needed 
to remain open to the possibility that the concepts and variables that emerged may be 
very different from those that might have been predicted at the outset (Britten 1995). 
This resulted in both surprising omissions and interesting inclusions in the overall data 
that are discussed in detail throughout the interpretation chapters. 
Britten (1995) suggests that most qualitative interviewers should have a list of core 
questions that define the areas to be covered. Unlike quantitative interviews based on 
highly structured questionnaires, the order in which questions were asked varied, as did 
the questions designed to probe the participant's meaning. Wording cannot be 
standardised in the narrative approach because the researcher will try to use the 
participant's own vocabulary when framing supplementary questions. Also, during the 
course of the interview, the researcher may introduce further questions as she becomes 
more familiar with the topic being discussed (Britten 1995). Thoughtful probes by the 
researcher may assist the participant to bring forth contextual details important to 
meanings embedded in the narrative. Questions such as the following can help the 
participant reflect on the experience of interest (Van Manen 1990): 'How were you feeling 
at that time?' What else was going on?' and 'Can you tell me more about that?' — were 
often utilised during the interviews. 
Periods of silence were used to establish a comfortable pace during the interviews, which 
encouraged the participants to follow their own path of associations by telling their story 
their own way. Some ideas or feelings of the participants were not able to be captured in 
words, for example, certain nuances and tones of speech. It was important for the 
researcher, in these situations, to be comfortable with silence in order to listen to the 
powerful silence that may speak more than words. 
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In the initial data analysis phase of the research, the opportunity existed to explore 
unanticipated themes. While the participants were offered broad themes in the interview 
which they addressed, it should be clarified that the interpretation of what was important 
rested ultimately with them. An essential component of the interview process was to 
ensure that the researcher checked that she understood the participants' meanings 
instead of depending on her own assumptions. This was particularly significant if there 
was obvious potential for misunderstanding — for example, when interviewing a 
participant who may be unfamiliar with medical terminology. It was the researcher's 
objective to ask questions that were open-ended, neutral, sensitive, and clear to the 
participant. This started with questions that the participant could answer easily and then 
proceeded to more difficult or sensitive topics. 
Participants were met at a mutually agreed location, usually in the participant's 'natural 
setting'. As Denzin and Lincoln (1994) argue, qualitative research is multi-method in 
focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means 
that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings participants give to them. 
Information for participants and informed consent were discussed at this time. If 
informed consent was obtained, a return visit was arranged to conduct the initial in-depth 
interview. This was then followed up by second meeting for confirmation of the interview 
transcript and the opportunity to discuss/reflect on the researcher's interpretation of 
themes arising from the initial interview. This meeting also provided the opportunity for 
the participant for 'debriefing'. It was anticipated that these interviews would take 
between half an hour to one hour. Overall, this assumption proved correct with the 
shortest interview lasting 28 minutes, and the longest 72 minutes. A cautioning from 
Weiss (1994) regarding the time consuming and labour intensive nature of qualitative 
interviewing was taken on board: 
Indeed, if undertaken as a Ph.D. thesis, where there are likely to 
be large ambitions and limited resources, a qualitative study can 
stretch on and on. Several months may be required for the 
interviewing, and the analysis of the interview can take even 
longer (Weiss 1994:11). 
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The data collection phase lasted approximately four months, and the interpretation was 
ongoing for the following 12 months as a reflexive activity. The investment of time was 
not of concern to the researcher as it was clear from the related literature (primarily 
Weiss 1994 and Emerson 1987) that time required by qualitative interview studies tends 
to be well invested. 
The interviews between the participants and the researcher were recorded verbatim and 
preserved as text through the use of a dictaphone and interview transcripts. By this 
method the narrative ethics of artificial nutritional support were captured in the text and 
preserved for interpretation. According to Gadamer (1975), text is located within a world 
that embodies historical, social and cultural dimensions as a segment of time. It is by 
way of language that understanding occurs, through the process of interpretation. 
Phenomenological Questioning 
Questioning in the research was essentially phenomenological in nature. Sorrel and 
Redmond (1995) explain that phenomenological questioning is concerned with 
uncovering knowledge related to a specific phenomena. The interviewer shapes the 
interview yet is also shaped by the process, thus they are not conducted but rather they 
are participated in by the interviewer and interviewee (ibid.). The questions used to 
trigger the conversation were not planned or executed rigidly, yet included propositions 
such as: 
• Thank you for agreeing to be part of this research. I am interested in your perceptions of 
artificial nutritional support, and the ethical issues in the provision of such treatment. 
Think of an instance that you have been involved in, in which you were confronted with 
ethical issues such as: withholding or withdrawing of artificial nutritional support; related 
complications; provision of artificial nutritional support in a terminally ill patient; persistent 
vegetative state patient. Tell me about it please. 
• What was your part in this/these situations? What else was happening? How did that 
make you feel? 
• Do you consider artificial nutritional support as the same as food and drink? Can you tell 
me why you think that? 
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• Do you consider artificial nutritional support as being different from other forms of 
medical treatment? 
• If you could give advice to health care professionals on what you thought was ethical 
provision of artificial nutritional support, what would it be? 
Ensuring A Quality Interview 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1981) the quality of data to be generated will be 
predominantly dependent on the skills and expertise of the interviewer. The researcher 
was masters-prepared having facilitated phenomenological interviews to research 
participants previously and considered herself to possess valuable first hand experience 
in the sound facilitation of quality in-depth interviews. Some common pitfalls for 
researchers that have been identified by qualitative researchers, namely Field and Morse 
(1989) were taken into account in order to facilitate only the highest quality interview. 
The following factors were addressed with utmost consideration: 
• Ensuring an interruption free environment, that is, no outside interruptions such as 
telephones, pagers, people entering the room, public address announcements; 
• Ensuring no competing distractions, for example, children, radio, television; 
• Refraining from asking the participant embarrassing or awkward questions; 
• Refraining from jumping from one question to another; 
• Refraining from giving the participant medical advice or leaching'; 
• Refraining from counselling, for example, summarising responses too early; 
• Refraining from presenting one's own perspective, thus potentially biasing the interview; 
• Ensuring accuracy of the interview by way of a translator if needed. 
Analysis and Interpretation 
The approach to data analysis in this research has similarities with that used in other 
qualitative methodologies such as case studies, ethnography and phenomenology 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). However, in the 1980's Bertaux (1981) adapted these 
principles specifically for the analysis of personal accounts, and these have since been 
modified and extended for use in settings beyond those originally identified (Tovey 1993; 
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Tovey 1992). The analysis and interpretation of the data became a reflective narrative in 
itself — one that avoided the split between mind and body which, according to Price 
(1994), is imposed by medical training. With each narrative the objective was to subject 
that narrative to rigorous inquiry, and to a constant search for themes. Tovey (1998) 
suggests that if this is appropriately performed, what results is not a 'yes/no' response to 
a simple hypothesis but a complex narrative or set of related narratives, which 
incorporate and account for the range of actions relating to each theme. The aim of this 
procedure is to reach saturation (Tovey 1998). Reflecting on the previously mentioned 
concern of sample size, saturation point was being reached between the 28th and 30th 
interview. 
The audiotaped conversations were transcribed verbatim, and/or notes were transferred 
to a computer disk copy. It was decided that quotations, or excerpts of narratives would 
not be edited, thus presenting the original speech in such a way to reproduce the sounds 
of the tape as much as possible. Weiss (1994:192) terms this as a 'preservationist' 
philosophy in the treatment of interview transcripts. An argument in support of this 
preservationist approach is that speech communicates not only the dictionary meaning of 
its words but also the speaker's feelings, passions and uncertainties (De Vault 1990). 
The rationale for utilising this approach is that every element in a participant's expression 
— hesitancies, colloquialisms and pronunciations — has value in communication. As 
Riessman (1987:189) explains, speech that has been 'cleaned up' to be more readable 
loses important information. Both these arguments hold only that the original speech, 
pristine and without editorial change, can adequately represent the participant's meaning 
and self. Anything else is a distortion (Weiss 1994). 
After reading and re-reading the transcriptions, analysis proceeded using a combination 
of manual thematic analysis and a computer-assisted analysis program. After reviewing 
several of the currently available computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
packages, it was decided that the most appropriate program to employ was 'ATLAS/tr. 
This program was deemed highly appropriate in the management and subsequent 
analysis of the vast amounts of textual data that was anticipated in the research. Added 
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to this, a manual method of thematic analysis was also used, which allowed for the 
researcher to find the finer nuances of human communication that were not conveyed in 
verbally explicit ways. That is, some meanings came forward as the result of an 
interpretation of the full context of what was said, rather than by the discrete words used. 
Each interview transcript was read through carefully prior to coding to gain 'a feel' for the 
participants' responses to questions or spontaneous offerings of information. These 
responses or 'offerings' were based on the individual participants' experiences, basic 
assumptions, views, thoughts, biases, and preconceived ideas. Passages of text 
(quotations) that signified a distinct theme were 'selected' electronically and assigned an 
according code. 7 Code titles were chosen according to the nature of the contribution. 
For example, if a participant was talking about the distortion of artificial nutritional support 
being compared to simple food and water, then that passage of text was selected and 
coded as 'food and water'. Code titles were named according to the participants' 
explanations therefore giving the participants a certain ownership of the interpretation. 
The ATLAS/ti program allowed this naming of the codes via a function called in-vivo' 
coding, that is, when the text itself contains a good name for the code. 
By the end of the 32nd interview coding process, a total of 49 codes were identified. 
These were: Advance Directives; Autonomy; Autonomy - Patient Empowerment; Basic 
Care; Benefits and Burdens; Buying Time; Cancer; Complications from Feeding; Conflict 
Regarding Feeding; Consent; Convenience; Critical Care; Curing and Caring; Decision-
Making; Do No Harm; Education Issues; Elderly; EN versus PN; Equity of Access; Ethical 
Dilemma; Ethics Consults/Committees; Extraordinary versus Ordinary Care; Family; 
Food And Water; Futility; Generating Revenue; Guilt; Health System Differences; 
Inappropriate Treatment; Legal Issues; Malnutrition in Hospital; Multicultural Differences; 
Nutrition Not Sexy Enough; Overtreatment; Palliative Care; Paternity; Payment Issues; 
Possible Abuses; Process Of Dying — Death; Quality-of-life; Racial Differences; 
Reluctance to Change Practice; Research Regarding Nutrition; Responsibility for 
7 A note on the use of quotations from the interviews is in order. These quotations or excerpts from narratives that appear throughout 
the interpretation chapters of this thesis are direct transcriptions and capture all figures of speech, pauses, and colloquialisms 
(including those considered vulgar) thus maintaining true narrative and participant ownership of the data. 
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Nutrition; Sloganism of Starvation; Tube Feeding; Using the Gut; Who Pays? — 
Resources; and Withdrawal of Nutrition. 
Essentially, these 49 codes arose as the main repetitive themes arising from the 
interview discussions. A list of all codes was generated, as was a list of all individual 
codes with their corresponding quotations. This latter document was extensive in itself 
(in excess of 80 000 words), yet it clearly demonstrated an obvious 'overlapping' of 
codes which assisted in the next methodological process, that being the merging of 
codes into major themes. This process of merging codes was also aided by the 
application of the ATLAS/ti program. Through this overlapping, eight major themes were 
formed. These major themes became the foundation of the interpretation chapters of this 
thesis and have been entitled according to their subject matter and emphasis as afforded 
by the participants in this research. The major themes are: Principles, Money, Death, 
Culture, Dilemmas, Futility, Technology and Responsibility. 
Codes and major themes derived from the narratives were identified that gave insights 
into the essence of what was being communicated about the experiences of ethical 
issues of artificial nutritional support. A code was included as informative if it made a 
unique contribution to the total description of the experience. The codes were defined 
according to the meanings they reflected in the research, and they were set out clearly 
for validation by each participant. Following validation of the codes and major themes by 
the participants, the research report was electronically generated, which displayed the 
connections between the participant's narratives and the interpretations made by the 
researcher. A detailed synopsis of this process is explained in the following segment on 
computer assisted qualitative data analysis. 
Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) 
Computers in research are seen by many to support the principles upheld by the 
positivist/quantitative tradition. It is only relatively recently that computers have been 
available to assist qualitative researchers in their work, and have yet to be accepted as 
an essential tool (Pateman 1998). This is surprising considering the vast amount of data 
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that the qualitative researcher has to keep track of. As mentioned previously, the output 
of all coded quotations in this project alone culminated in an 80, 000-word document 
The use of computers in qualitative research, according to Aljunid (1996) results from the 
increase in sample sizes for qualitative study and from efforts by researchers to dismiss 
scepticism on the validity and reliability of results from manual processing of the data. 
Computers certainly possess great potential for easing the researcher's workload when 
collating, indexing and analysing large amounts of textual data — as in the case of this 
research project. Yet, the actual interpretation of the data still resides with the 
researcher. As Morse and Field (1996) explain, the meaning of text cannot be analysed 
by computer. Consequently it is still necessary for the researcher to read cognitively, 
engage with and code the text, although it is possible to set up an automatic coding and 
retrieval system. 
The main criticism of CAQDAS is that it can alienate researchers from their data. This 
criticism is also expressed as a fear that the context of the data will be lost if the 
researcher begins to work exclusively on the codes in isolation from the text, so that the 
codes appear as things in themselves (Seidel and Kelle 1995). Richards and Richards 
(1991) suggest that CAQDAS may be more rigorous and that computerisation removes 
the constraints associated with large amounts of data and the complexities of demanding 
analyses. Despite the debate, there is general agreement that textual analysis packages 
can ease the researcher's workload, save time and generally enhance the power of 
qualitative analysis that far exceeds manual methods in terms of efficiency, consistency, 
and rigor. This occurs with the provision that the burden of interpretation still rests on the 
researcher (Webb 1999; Weitzman 1999; Pateman 1998; Morison and Moir 1998). 
Introduction to ATLAS/ti 
ATLAS/ti is a software application developed in Berlin by Thomas Muhr of Scientific 
Software Development in 1993. It is an effective workbench for the qualitative analysis of 
large bodies of textual, graphical and audio data. It offers a variety of tools for 
accomplishing the tasks associated with any systematic approach to 'soft' data, for 
example, material which cannot be analysed by formal, statistical approaches in 
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meaningful ways. In the course of such qualitative analysis as the chosen methodology, 
ATLAS/ti helped to uncover the complex phenomena hidden in the vast amounts of 
textual data in an exploratory way. For coping with the inherent complexity of the 
interpretive tasks at hand, ATLAS/ti offered a powerful and intuitive environment that 
provided a continuous focus on the research materials. It offered tools to manage, 
extract, compare, explore, and reassemble meaningful pieces from the data in a creative, 
yet systematic way. Fortunately, this program imposed no restriction on the size of, or 
amount of data, the number of entities created, or the complexity of the structures and 
themes derived. 
The VISE Principle 
The main principle of the ATLAS/ti method is termed VISE: Visualisation, Integration, 
Serendipity, and Exploration. 
Visualisation means the direct support of the way human beings think, arrange and 
approach solutions in creative, yet methodical ways. Tools are offered to visualise 
complex properties and relations between the objects (quotations, codes and memos), 
which accumulate during the process of eliciting meaning and structure from the data. 
Integration describes the analytical operations needed especially in the early stages of 
interpretation. The main 'container object integrating all the other entities of the research 
is the 'Hermeneutic Unit'. Only one Hermeneutic Unit was created for the research and 
was aptly named 'Interview Analysis'. 
Serendipity is defined in Collins Dictionary as 'a seeming gift for making fortunate 
discoveries accidentally' (1996:549). The term 'serendipity' describes the intuitive 
approach to data. A common operation making use of the serendipitous effect was 
'browsing' which occurred during the reading, re-reading and subsequent coding of all 
the interview transcripts. 
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Exploration is achieved through an exploratory yet methodical approach to the data as 
opposed to a more bureaucratic handling of the data, assuming that the generation of 
themes and theories will greatly benefit the overall process. The conception of the 
ATLAS/ti program, including getting acquainted with its own idiosyncrasies, is aimed 
towards an exploratory, discovery-oriented approach (Muhr 1997). 
Why ATLAS/ti? 
The fundamental design objective utilised in the creation of ATLAS/ti was to develop a 
tool, which effectively supports the human interpreter, particularly in dealing with 
relatively large amounts of research information (Muhr 1997). Although this program 
facilitates many of the activities involved in qualitative data analysis and interpretation 
(particularly selecting, coding and annotating), its purpose is not to automatise these 
methods. As the software developer cautions, automatic interpretation of text cannot 
succeed in grasping the complexity, lack of explicitness, and contextuality of everyday or 
scientific knowledge (Muhr 1997). Thus, the main objective of employing such a program 
is fundamentally to do with data management. Data management was essentially 
accomplished via two basic concepts: textual level work and conceptual level work. The 
textual level included activities like segmentation of data, coding of text, audio passages 
and the writing of memos. The conceptual level focused on model building activities 
such as linking codes to form semantic networks and the merging of codes to form major 
themes. These are further explained as follows: 
Textual Level Work 
Textual research activities included the breaking down, or segmenting of the interview 
transcripts into passages, the adding of comments to respective passages (note-making, 
annotating), as well as the filing or indexing of all selected transcript passages, 
secondary text materials (such as topical newspaper articles and lecture notes from 
presentations and grand rounds attended during the data collection phase), annotations, 
and memos to expedite their retrieval. 
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Conceptual Level Work 
Beyond mere code and retrieval functions, ATLAS/ti's networking feature allowed for the 
visual correlation of selected passages, memos, and codes, into diagrams which 
graphically outlined complex relations. This feature virtually transforms the text-based 
workspace into a graphical 'playground' for constructing concepts and relations apparent 
from within the data. 
General Steps 
The following sequence of steps, although not mandatory, describes in brief terms the 
process of employing ATLAS/ti for the management of data in this research project: 
1. Project creation (a 'container') which was to enclose the data, all research findings, 
transcripts of interviews, quotations, codes, memos. This container is called the 
'Hermeneutic Unit'. The sole Hermeneutic Unit used in this research was entitled 
'Interview Analysis'. 
2. The association of all data files or 'Primary Documents' (text, graphics, audio) located 
anywhere in the Hermeneutic Unit. 
3. Reading and selection of text passages that were of interest and pertinence to the 
research, assigning codes and memos simultaneously (not simply the interview 
transcripts — field notes, journal entries, topical newspaper articles and lecture notes 
were included). 
4. Comparison of data segments differently or equally coded, assigning links and nodes 
simultaneously. 
5. Building semantic networks from codes. These networks together with codes and memos 
became the cornerstones of the emerging theory/themes. 
6. Finally, compilation of a written report. 
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Coding 
The procedures of coding using ATLAS/ti do not grasp the complexity of the intellectual 
efforts of coding as understood in the framework of manually rigorous qualitative 
methods, for example, grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). However, they are 
more than mere indexing procedures as annotating and commenting in every stage of 
the coding process was undertaken electronically. A variety of coding techniques was 
available, however the 'open coding' and 'code-by-list' techniques were used primarily. 
Open coding was initially used to assign a code for the first time, that is, creating a new 
code at the same time a section of the primary document was being coded. Thereafter, 
the code-by-list technique was utilised whereby an existing code could be assigned to a 
primary document selection. Any number of codes from the code list could be chosen. 
All coding resulted in quotations being linked with the assigned code. There was no 
restriction on the number of codes assigned to a quotation, and visa versa, a code could 
be assigned to an arbitrary number of quotations. For example, the following excerpt 
from a participant's narrative demonstrates how a number of codes could be assigned: 
Codes: [ethics consults/committees] [futility] [withdrawal of 
nutrition] 
It is the same process — if the physician thinks that this is 
nonbeneficial treatment, medically futile treatment they 
recommend withdrawal and change to comfort. If the family 
persists, then the physician takes it to the facility ethics 
committee, if the ethics committee agrees, now, as of 
September 1st, by State Law the family has 10 days during 
which we have to continue full treatment, but they have 10 days 
to find another physician and/or a facility that will provide 
nonbeneficiaYfutile treatment, or we can withdraw treatment, or 
the family can go to court and try to get an extension of the time, 
but it is written in the law, the judge can't extend the time unless 
that in the judge's opinion there is some reasonable expectation 
that some facility will take this person, and if there is not, then 
that it is it. But I mean, it is too bad that you have to resort to 
legal manoeuvres. 
This quotation was assigned the codes: [ethics consults/committees] [futility] [withdrawal 
of nutrition] simultaneously. The use of 'Free Codes' was useful as an additional coding- 
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related housekeeping function. Just as quotations did not necessarily have to be coded 
to justify their existence, codes could be created that had not (yet) been used for coding 
purposes. For example, codes could be created that came to mind during the routine 
coding work which could not yet be applied to the current segment of work, yet would be 
helpful later on. 
Writing Memos 
The writing of memos is an important task in every working phase of a qualitative 
research project (Muhr 1997). What was captured in memos were often the 'puzzle 
pieces' to be put together in the phase of writing the final report. The difference between 
codes and memos in this research project was that codes were a succinct, dense 
description of concepts emerging during the stage of closely examining the data. 
Like primary documents, codes could be commented on. This function was employed to 
clarify the meaning of a code, or to explain how it was to be used for coding. For 
example, when assigning the code 'Responsibility for Nutrition' the following 
comment/memo was attached to that code to further clarify its meaning: This code refers 
to whose responsibility it is to care for/manage and maintain the nutritional status of the 
patient — to avoid malnutrition, to ensure monitoring, assessment, safety and ensuring 
quality of care. 
Creating Reports 
The main strength of ATLAS/ti was the support of online activities like searching, 
browsing, and creating links. However, infrequently it was necessary to create 
something on paper or at least assemble results to be included in a report which could be 
studied offline. There was not one single location to find report related commands, yet 
for every object class there was an output menu which offered different options for 
creating printed materials. Besides generating and printing numerous primary 
documents, lists of quotations, and codes, a more complex report could be generated by 
using the HTML generator. All textual output could be directed to one of three devices: 
printer, text editor, and ASCII-file. With output redirected to the text editor, the contents 
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could be studied and modified on-screen before finally printing or saving the output to an 
ASCII-file. All output was preceded by a header containing the name of the Hermeneutic 
Unit ('Interview Analysis'), the current date and the name of the author. A textual output 
of quotations included a report of all quotations attached to either the selected primary 
text; all current quotations contained in the Hermeneutic Unit; and/or all quotations 
referring to a selected code. 
Generating Code Lists and Retrieval 
This procedure created an alphabetically sorted list of all current codes. Such a list was 
useful in two ways. It could be used to obtain a print-out of all codes used in the 
Hermeneutic Unit, or it could be used as a collection of codes which could be later 
imported into another Hermeneutic Unit, should one be established. The operation of 
retrieving coded quotes offered immediate access to the primary data even when the 
researcher was already concerned with higher textual tasks such as merging codes to 
major themes and theory construction. 
Conceptualizing: Networks, Codes and Links 
A network was essentially defined as a set of nodes and links, with a node being a 
network that could be linked to an arbitrary number of other nodes. For example, in the 
network entitled 'Principles', the nodes linked were: autonomy; autonomy-patient 
empowerment; consent; decision-making, paternalism; and equity of access. Links were 
then drawn as lines or arcs between the connected nodes in graphical presentations of 
networks. ATALS/ti also allowed for these links to be named enabling a distinct 
expression of the nature of the relationships between the concepts. In essence, this 
function produced a graphical representation of the initial codes merging into major 
themes and the theorising behind such connections. These connections culminated into 
what ultimately became the basis for thorough exploration and interpretation of the data. 
The 'Network Editor' function offered an intuitive and powerful method to create and 
manipulate network structures. It favoured a direct manipulation technique whereby the 
objects (codes, quotations, and memos) could be literally grabbed by using the mouse 
and then moved around the screen, drawing and/or severing links between them. 
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Essentially, the employment of this application proved to be relatively easy, reliable and 
practical considering the nature of the data collected. 
Determinants of Rigor: Ensuring Rigor in the Initial Phase 
Various means of determining rigor in qualitative research have been suggested 
(Sandelowski 1989; Denzin 1989; Hall and Stevens 1991; Beck 1993). There is no 
accepted test of rigor in qualitative research just as there is no one way of doing 
qualitative research. This means that researchers must use the most appropriate means 
of assessing rigor in qualitative projects to reflect the methodological assumptions of the 
project. After a lengthy and expansive review of the qualitative methodology literature, 
the following points were considered crucial to contributing to rigor in this project: 
• Reflexivity - by continually critiquing the research process 
• Credibility - by assessing initial progress via member checks (returning the transcripts to 
the participants for verification) 
• Rapport - experienced as open, trusting dynamics between researcher and participant 
• Acknowledging complexity in the research and the participants 
• Achieving consensus in decision-making 
• Addressing relevance to participants' concerns 
• Attaining honesty and mutuality 
• Naming - using participant's own terms and concepts to denote the project's objectives, 
processes and outcomes 
• Achieving rationality by forming collaborative interpersonal relationships to challenge 
ideas and respect differences (with research supervisor). 
Burns and Grove (2000) argue that rigor in qualitative research is associated with 
openness, scrupulous adherence to a philosophical perspective, thoroughness in 
collecting data, and consideration of all data in the subjective theory development phase. 
They suggest that, in order to be rigorous, the researcher needs to be open to new ideas 
and be willing to let go of old ones, and to examine many dimensions to form new ideas. 
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The early literature reveals that the concepts of validity and reliability, as understood from 
the positivist perspective, are somewhat inappropriate and inadequate when applied to 
interpretive research such as narrative analysis (Hill Bailey 1996). More contemporary 
literature suggests that because the positivist and interpretative paradigms are 
epistemologically anomalous, the transfer of quality criteria from one perspective to the 
other is not automatic or even reasonable. That is, the experimental model presupposes 
an objective and measurable reality or truth, whereas the interpretive approach is 
interested not in truth but in meaning (Chinn 1994). Traditionally, the quality of any 
research finding is determined by critiquing the validity and reliability of the research 
process. Lincoln and Guba (1985:300) offer alternative terminology to the concepts of 
rigor as purported in quantitative research. They renamed these concepts as 
'trustworthiness' criteria. Their trustworthiness criteria initially acknowledged the 
established positivist rigor criteria as superior and were, therefore, an attempt at ensuring 
some scientific acceptability of qualitative findings (Hill Bailey 1996). In their model 
'internal validity' was replaced with 'credibility', 'external validity' with 'transferability', 
'reliability' with 'dependability', and 'objectivity' with 'confirmability' (Lincoln and Guba 
1985:300). In demonstrating that the findings generated were trustworthy, it was crucial 
to show that the method employed was rigorous. Demonstrating analytical rigor of the 
data collection process was accomplished via the following steps: 
1. Being present at the interview 
2. Listening to the tape 
3. Transcribing 
4. Reading the transcription 
5. Repeating steps 1 and 2 to ensure familiarity 
6. Thinking/assimilating/intuiting - forming initial interpretations of themes 
7. Returning transcriptions to participants for confirmation/validation/debriefing 
8. Interpretation and understanding 
Essentially, this was a relatively simple process, which was hinged on familiarity of the 
data. The researcher chose to transcribe the interviews herself (a task which consumed 
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approximately four to five hours transcription per interview), so that earlier and later 
transcriptions could be simultaneously compared and annotated, with modifications of 
interpretations made if necessary. Ultimately this lead to an intimate understanding of 
the participant's issues, and/or experiences that were important to them. This is not to 
suggest that the findings represented the definitive truths about the ethical issues of the 
provision of artificial nutritional support, but they may constitute a justifiable 
interpretation, representing what Jackson Knight (1969) refers to as the 'truth of art' and 
not the 'trivial truth of fact' (cited in Rose and Webb 1998:561). Interviews were also 
transcribed as soon as possible after the actual interview in an attempt to 'stay as close 
to the data' as possible. In the majority of cases, the interview tape was transcribed 
within 24-48 hours of the actual interview meeting. 
In recent years, an extensive dialogue concerning the value or quality of qualitative 
research has occurred (Guba 1990). As a result, alternative strategies of defining the 
quality of knowledge generated within the interpretative paradigm have emerged. These 
strategies are grounded on recognition of paradigmatic epistemological differences (Hill 
Bailey 1996). The language of this dialogue reflects the evolution in the understanding of 
this concern. In this literature, research findings are now evaluated for credibility, 
dependability, confirmability, and transferability. These concepts of determining 
qualitative rigor in narrative analysis as defined by Lincoln and Guba (1985) will 
essentially inform the determinants of rigor in this research project. 
Credibility 
Credibility is a criterion that equates, to some extent, to internal validity in traditional 
positivistic research. The criterion deals with whether credible and truthful findings and 
interpretation will be generated, that is, credibility will apply to the collection of data as 
well as to the analysis. Guba and Lincoln (1981) suggest that the determination of 
credibility can be accomplished only by taking data and interpretations to the sources 
from which they were drawn and asking the participants whether they believe, or, find the 
results plausible. 
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Credibility was achieved via the following activities: 
• Repeated contact with the participants enhanced closeness and confidence with the 
researcher; 
• Each participant had the opportunity to read through their individual transcripts and to 
comment, change or make any addition that they wanted to. In this way the participants 
confirmed their interviews to be adequate and fair descriptions of their situation; 
• Credibility in the data collection depended upon the degree of closeness and mutual 
respect established, the interviewing skill of the researcher, motives and strategies of the 
participants, and the impact of the fact that the researcher may be a colleague/former 
colleague; 
• The researcher did not look for ready-made concepts in the text, but rather for codes and 
expressions for what the participant described. 
Member validation, or member checking was essentially the means of achieving 
credibility. Member validation is a technique scholars have proposed for establishing 
validity of a researcher's interpretations of data collected from research participants and 
for ensuring that these participants have access to what has been made of their 
experiences. This accordingly involves a professional obligation to 'do good science' and 
specifically an ethical obligation to support the participants' right to know (Sandelowski 
1993:4). It has also been defined by Roberts and Taylor (1998) as a procedure 
employed within qualitative research methods to ensure that participants validate their 
contributions to the overall project, as a source of determining the trustworthiness of the 
project. Similarly, Stake (1994) claims that member checking is a measure for ensuring 
honesty and identifying researcher biases that might skew the interpretation. On a 
practical level, this means that the participants were given the transcripts of their 
interviews to ensure that the information was complete and accurate, and provided the 
participant with the opportunity to comment on the initial interpretations. 
Dependability 
A qualitative approach is preferable when the aim is to explore complex connections in 
an ever-changing surrounding, such as the provision of artificial nutritional support in 
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acute and post-acute settings. A scientific indicator for solidly performed research is 
dependability. This means that the study adapts to changes in the studied environment 
and to new information obtained during the study period. 
Dependability was achieved via the following activities: 
• Collection of data and the analysis occurred simultaneously. This, according to Hamberg 
eta! (1994) supports dependability and enhances flexibility. It gave the researcher an 
opportunity to use new ideas and analytical codes from interview to interview; 
• The number of participants was not decided in advance. Instead, the sample size was 
governed by the degree of saturation in the analytic phase; 
• Consistent contact with the participants over a 12 month period meant that the research 
process will not be based on just one snap-shot of life. Instead, it will change and adapt 
as time goes by; 
• It is important that the research process can be followed by others. The researcher 
therefore made notes and memos of her thoughts and ideas in a reflexive journal during 
the study period. These memos were necessary for another criterion of sound 
interpretive research, that is, confirmability. 
Confirmability 
This criterion correlates to, but is not the same as objectivity in quantitative designs. 
Both define the neutrality, that is, the research shall not distort the reality it sets out to 
describe. This means that the research should include procedures to verify that the 
findings and concepts described are established in the data and not a result of poorly 
performed analytic work or preconceived assumptions. Confirmability means that the 
evaluation of the neutrality of a research project is moved from the researcher as a 
subject, and instead is focused on the data and the interpretation of the data. This is 
how confirmability opens the way to intersubjective knowledge (Hamberg eta! 1994). It 
should be possible for other researchers to consider findings and results as reasonable 
and fair by looking into the data (Lincoln and Guba 1985). This required a method so 
systematic and thorough that the researcher continuously had to question the findings, 
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rethink and critically review the material. Essentially the entire research process was a 
critique in progress. 
Confirmability was achieved by: 
• Choosing a method of analysis (qualitative methodology - narrative ethics) that by 
definition begins in the data and tries to identify what the data can reveal; 
• Comparing analytical codes with a senior researcher with expertise in narrative ethics; 
• Searching for negative data in the material that could either strengthen the researchers 
interpretations or cause the researcher to question her codings and classifications; 
• Testing confirmability by having the research supervisor scrutinise the transcripts, the 
researcher's codings, classifications, and memos. 
Mays and Pope (1995) maintain that the reliability of the analysis of this research data 
will be enhanced by having an independent assessment of the transcripts and comparing 
agreement between the raters of the research. 
The concepts of the determinants of rigor of research ensure that independent 
researchers will reach the same findings based on the same data. To the principle 
researcher, this is a test of confirmability, that is, that the findings/interpretations are truly 
grounded in the data and not fabrications in the researcher's head. The researcher 
engaged her supervisor in checking the data during the analysis. This was performed to 
reduce the risk that her own theoretical framework would cause her to overlook data not 
agreeable to her way of thinking. 
Transferability 
Conclusions made in a qualitative study are not proof but are descriptions and 
interpretations. They must be evaluated for their plausibility, syllogism and ability to be 
communicated to others (Hamberg eta! 1994). The eventual findings of this research 
must be comprehensible to others and regarded as reasonable, and the relations found 
must be recognisable in a clinical setting. Findings in narrative ethics research cannot be 
generalised as quantitative results but transferability relates to generalizability. 
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To make transferability judgements possible, it was necessary to: 
• Describe the context in which the study took place; 
• Describe the demographics such as gender, ethnicity, family situation, professional 
affiliation; geographical location. 
This will enable others to decide whether the findings are relevant in other situations, for 
example, will there be anything to learn from this study of ethical issues in artificial 
nutritional support for those interested in parenterally supporting terminal cancer patients 
in varying demographics. 
A potential drawback of transferability lies in the fact that the responsibility for judgement 
is left to the potential users of the findings (Hamberg et al 1995). The researcher's 
responsibility therefore, was to give a comprehensive description of the context and 
findings. However, the researcher will have no control over how the data may be 
interpreted by others, other than to communicate the findings to the wider research 
community. It is the researcher's intention to eventually publish the findings in a peer 
reviewed journal(s). 
Methodological Considerations: Validity, Reliability, and Generalizability 
The autonomy granted to the research participants results in the emergence of subject-
directed themes and propositions to sit alongside those identified at the outset. Given 
the relatively small number of participants and the essentially inductive nature of the 
method, questions about the generalizability of results, and the reliability/validity of the 
approach might well be raised. Tovey (1998) argues that no collection of narratives is 
ever likely to be gathered in such a way as to constitute a representative sample. 
Because no population is being mirrored, no generalization to any given population is 
attempted. Instead, what the rigor of the method is directed towards is a generalization 
of theory — a means by which an existing expectation, understanding, or body of 
knowledge is exposed to, and revised on the basis of new empirical evidence drawn from 
a particular site of activity. 
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Generalizability of the research deserves special consideration. Qualitative research 
employing small and purposefully selected samples has historically been considered 
nonrepresentative of the population and its findings not generalizable. Morse (1999) in 
defence of this obvious limitation declares that generalizability is not the purpose of 
qualitative inquiry. She defends qualitative research as being generalizable in that each 
participant in the relatively small sample has been purposefully selected for the 
contribution he or she can make toward the emerging theory. Therefore, the knowledge 
gained from the theory derived from this research should fit all scenarios that may be 
identified in the larger population. The theory is also applicable beyond this immediate 
group and is applicable to all similar situations, questions and problems, regardless of 
the comparability of the demographic composition of the groups (Morse 1991). 
Positivists may characterise results from research as anecdotal, because they rely on 
accounts provided by a relatively small sample of participants, or as impressionistic. This 
implication that not only are results imprecise, but also that they are more of a product of 
art than of objective scientific method (Priore cited in Weiss 1994). However, another 
argument in support of generalizability of findings via a qualitative method employing 
purposeful sampling is that it is possible to maximise the range of health care related 
disciplines thus providing an important variation under study. The participants were not 
confined to one geographical location, country, culture, health care delivery system - thus 
providing breadth and depth of experience and perspective. 
The question of relevance of notions of reliability and validity of the narrative has been 
neatly summarised by Plummer (1983): 
...validity (ensuring that the study is measuring what it purports 
to] should come first, reliability second. There is no point in 
being very precise about nothing. If the subjective story is what 
the researcher is after, the life history approach becomes the 
most valid method... It simply will not do to classify, catalogue 
and standardise everything in advance, for this would be a 
distorted and hence invalid story (Plummer 1983:162). 
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The contemporary writings of researchers engaged in narrative analysis reflect the 
evolving understanding and complexity of the quality issue within the interpretive 
literature (Riessman 1993). Researchers employing this methodology allude to the 
reconceptualization of validity and reliability within the interpretive paradigm as a 
process. For these researchers, this refashioning using terms such as trustworthiness 
and credibility has positively changed validity from an objective reality to the process of 
confirmation/validations: 
Validation, the process through which we make claims for the 
trustworthiness of our interpretations, is the critical issue. 
Trustworthiness not truth is a key semantic difference: the latter 
assumes an objective reality, whereas the former moves the 
process into the social world (Riessman 1993:65). 
Through the process of validation, the researcher allows the readers to judge the 
authenticity and trustworthiness of his or her work (Hill Bailey 1996). This process is not 
merely the employment of two or more raters during the analysis of data to ensure 
equivalence (Brink 1987) or member checking to affirm the researcher's interpretation 
(Riessman 1993). Rather, to date, the predominant strategy in narrative analysis of the 
confirmation or validation activity is simply to make the research process visible, allowing 
systematic scrutiny (Mishler 1990; Riessman 1993; Sandelowski 1993). 
For narrativists, credible and valuable narrative interpretation presents: 
...data in the form of texts used in the analysis, with full 
transcripts and tapes that can be made available to other 
researchers; ...methods that transform the texts into findings; 
and.. .the direct linkages shown between data, findings, and 
interpretation (Mishler 1990:429). 
Hill Bailey (1996) explains that the presentation of data in this manner enhances the 
authenticity of the finding by not privileging the researcher as the sole interpreter. For 
the purpose of this research the intention was to include the participants in the analysis 
process as there was not just one correct interpretation of the structures, meanings, or 
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context of narratives considering the multidisciplinary nature of the participant sample. 
Moreover, there is no specific set of rules that if followed confer credibility, rather: 
Trustworthiness becomes a matter of persuasion whereby the 
scientist is viewed as having made those practices visible, and, 
therefore, auditable; it is less a matter of claiming to be right 
than to have practiced good science (Sandelowski 1993:2). 
This closeness and attention in the researcher-participant relationship and research is 
well suited to narrative ethics research. However, the researcher remained ever 
cognisant of the combination of being a researcher and clinician simultaneously as there 
may have been situations in which the researcher had to shift from one role to the other. 
Reflections on Data Quality: The Question of Memory 
Crowe (1998) warns that qualitative methods which rely on interview for data collection 
also rely on memory processes. There is a general consensus in the related literature 
that past experiences can be recalled and communicated as a true representation of past 
events. Taussig (1992:84) however, challenges this assumption by arguing that our 
minds do not '...function like carbon paper or cameras to faithfully register the facts of 
life'. Memory processes and retrieval are reconstructed rather than recalled, and this 
reconstruction takes place within the specific and formative circumstances of the present 
(Frow 1995). Van der Kolk (1987) asserts that because some experiences, especially 
traumatic ones, are stored in memory in non-verbal modes such as sensations and 
images which may be difficult to retrieve and communicate in linguistic forms. This has 
implications (in terms of challenging the participants' memory) for the qualitative narrative 
approaches that have a tendency to assume that the participant provides a description of 
events that actually happened (Crowe 1998). Taking these constructive criticisms on 
board, it is of paramount concern to the overall quality of the research and rigor of data 
collection and subsequent interpretation that the narratives of all participants are 
regarded as true and non-fictional. These are essentially their stories, and these are 
honoured as factual accounts, impressions, perspectives and experiences. 
90 
The Whole Truth? 
Weiss (1994) contends that while interviewers can anticipate that they will be told the 
truth they cannot assume that they will be told the whole truth, nor the precise truth. The 
vagaries of respondent memory make for reports in which some observations are crystal 
clear while others are obscured, distorted or blocked. Respondents may also shade their 
responses to present a positive picture of themselves. Yet despite all the ways in which 
interview data can be problematic, richly detailed accounts of vividly remembered events 
are likely to be trustworthy. Ultimately our best guarantee of the validity of interview 
material is careful and concrete interviewing within the context of a good interview 
partnership (Weiss 1994). This partnership was achieved essentially by carefully 
following the aforementioned interview strategies. 
Minimising Researcher Bias in the Presentation of Results 
Although it is not normally appropriate to write up qualitative research in the conventional 
format of the scientific paper, with a rigid distinction between the results and the 
discussion section of the account, it is important that the presentation of the research 
allows the reader as far as possible to distinguish the data, the analytic framework used, 
and the interpretation (Dingwall 1992). The problem with qualitative interpretations is the 
sheer volume of data customarily available and the relatively greater difficulty faced by 
the researcher in summarising this data (Mays and Pope 1995). Anticipating up to 32 
lengthy in-depth interviews in this research was by no means an exception. A partial 
solution to this problem was achieved by presenting extensive sequences from the 
original data, followed by a detailed commentary. 
By virtue of the multidisciplinary nature of the data contribution, a form of 'bracketing' 
occurred thereby freeing the researcher from bias to a considerable extent. Oiler (1982) 
suggests that bias comes from the retrospective interpretation of experience built on 
inaccurate memories. Cohen (1987) adds prejudices and personal commitments as 
forms of bias. Bracketing involves deliberately seeing the other side of arguments, 
allowing thoughts to wander, to be confused and uncertain, and seeking the opinions of 
others (Rose et a! 1995). Despite these attempts of minimising bias, it was understood 
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that being totally detached from researcher bias as such was impossible. As Crotty 
explains 'researchers cannot deny that they all come armed with prior knowledge, their 
own beliefs and judgement, preconceived ideas and theories, or personal and theoretical 
bias' (1996:16). 
Ethical Considerations: Theory 
Miller (1996) contends that narrative research is the quintessential ethical project, as well 
as in support of self-reflection. Habermas (1993:118) claims that narrative research 
addresses the perennial ethical concern and goal of sensitive, aware human beings — 
answering the existential question of the 'wherefore in our lives'. From this perspective, 
narrative research in itself is an ethical endeavour (Widdershoven and Smits 1996). The 
act of exploring the narrative therefore gives meaning, and it is the act of such narrative 
exploration that both meaningful and ethical consequences can arise (Miller 1996). 
Interview-based research affords people the opportunity to explore themselves, to 
increase their awareness, to find meaning and to be understood. According to Miller 
(1996), this work is fundamental and ethical in its own right, and the dialogue that takes 
place is therefore inherently ethical. In support of this, Widdershoven and Smits (1996) 
claim that ethical issues cannot be dealt with unless one thoroughly knows the situation 
and focuses on the meaning of the issue for the people involved, thus deriving meaning 
that can be established only by the interpretation of the stories they tell. Thus, the ethics 
of employing narrative research to the question(s) of the provision of artificial nutritional 
support is theoretically justified, if not encouraged. 
Ethical Considerations: Practice 
In the course of this research, attempts were made to safeguard human rights and a 
number of processes and procedures were employed to ensure the ethical standards of 
the research. Research participants had the right to full disclosure. All participants 
received a detailed explanation, verbally and in writing, of what the research involved, 
including the aims and processes of the research, and the participants' involvement. 
They were offered the right to refuse to participate or to withdraw at any time, without 
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penalty of any kind. They had the opportunity to ask questions, make comments, and 
voice concerns that they may have concerning the project. A copy of the Consent Form 
and a Plain Language Statement (Information Sheet) can be viewed in the Appendices 
located at the rear of this thesis. For the purposes of some of the USA interviews, 
relevant documentation from the respective Institutional Review Board is also located in 
the Appendices. 
Privacy, confidentiality and anonymity were ensured throughout the research. Strategies 
included the use of pseudonyms, instead of personally identifiable information. 
Audiotaped interviews did not include the real names of participants, or any other 
identifiable information, as these were protected by the use of pseudonyms. Participants 
have been simply referred to throughout the text as their profession and country. For 
example, 'Trauma Surgeon USA', 'Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUST, and 'Critical Care 
Physician UK' — so as to maintain anonymity yet provide both a professional and 
geographical dimension to the data. These professional titles were both assigned and 
described by the participants themselves. 8 
The participants had the right not to be harmed by the study. Due to the personal nature 
of the disclosures there was the potential in which the participants could experience 
some emotional discomfort related to sensitive issues. Strategies to alleviate this were to 
assure participants of their anonymity and privacy as mentioned previously, to provide 
open access to research information concerning themselves only, to allow them 
opportunities to comment upon, and to validate the accounts. 
The processes in this research make a strong commitment to minimising power 
differences between the researcher and the participants. This was achieved by 
encouraging openness and trust, especially in relation to participants divulging their 
perceptions about ethical dilemmas inherent in artificial nutritional support. 
8 To protect the anonymity of participants, the researcher has removed or changed certain information that may identify the 
participants. 
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All data collected in this research will be stored in a locked storage compartment for 
seven years and the responsibility for the safety and security of it will reside with the 
researcher. 
Conclusion 
Narrative gives us insight into the nature of practices as ethical endeavours 
(Widdershoven and Smits 1996). The same authors also challenge us not to focus on 
principles but study narrative as told by practitioners. The assembling of narratives and 
their subsequent interpretation as expressions of what is at stake in practices dealing 
with ethical issues forms the basis of the following interpretation chapters. Such narrative 
research however, is not ethically neutral. The narratives contributed in this research 
have required both interpretation and exegesis in order to become meaningful. From this 
perspective, the ensuing narrative research is in itself an ethical endeavour. The aim, 
therefore, of the following eight interpretation chapters is to offer a new perspective(s) on 
how to deal with a problematic issue in health care today, that is, the provision of artificial 
nutritional support. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRINCIPLES 
Introduction 
The major theme entitled 'Principles' was created by the merging of the following codes: 
autonomy; patient empowerment; consent; decision-making; paternalism; equity of 
access; and ethics committees/consults. The title of this major theme reflects in essence 
the contributions of the participants on areas of their practice and experience that dealt 
with ethical principles, or the closest thing to them. Interestingly the participants only 
touched on this area very lightly, with terms such as beneficence, non-maleficence, 
autonomy and justice only being verbalised a few times throughout the entire data 
collection process. The term 'principles' was chosen by the researcher as the most 
succinct and encapsulating heading for this area, although it is understood that there are 
other ways of 'doing' ethics other than the principlist approach. However, the ethical 
principles were embraced by the participants therefore reflecting the dominant discourse 
of principlism as espoused by such writers as Beauchamp and Childress (2001). 
Subheadings or 'discussion points' were chosen and prioritised according to the 
emphasis placed on them by the participants themselves, and the incidence of 
discussion occurring in the data itself. Consequently, interesting omissions and 
surprising inclusions of discussion topics are the foundation of this chapter. The 
discussion points are: autonomy; medical paternalism; ethics committees; access; 
consent; and beneficence. 
Autonomy 
A total of 15 quotes for autonomy and patient empowerment were coded out of the 32 
interviews. The participants contributing to discussions on autonomy and patient 
empowerment consisted of: a Law Professor (USA); a Trauma Surgeon (USA); a 
Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); three Occupational Therapists (two USA and one 
AUST); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST); a General Surgeon (UK); an Oncologist 
(USA); and an Oncology Nurse Specialist (USA). The context in which autonomy was 
discussed was primarily that of honouring the wishes of the patient, for example: 
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Understanding that most of the patients we work with have 
terminal diagnoses, and their request might be to eat, to have a 
normal oral intake - now that might not be the safest medical 
thing for them to do, but understanding that people have those 
fights and those choices, and are able to make informed 
decisions is paramount (Occupational Therapist, USA). 
And: 
Now if the patient is competent and the patient says that they 
want to be fed, then doctors have an ethical obligation to feed 
them - you know, having outlined the disadvantages and 
complications. This is never a problem for me - like in a 
department store when the customer knows best. Well I believe 
that if the patients say they want to be fed then we have to feed 
them. The problem only arises when you have an incompetent 
patient meaning someone unconscious in the ICU or someone 
who has had a stroke, or in PVS. In most cases, family has 
never talked about it, so you have absolutely no idea what that 
person would have wanted - as an autonomous individual 
(General Surgeon UK). 
This participant was the only one that broached the concept of 'ethical principles' being 
non-workable in certain clinical situations, for example, patient autonomy in a critical care 
setting being virtually non-existent more often than not, whereby the patient is rendered 
unconscious and non-responsive due to their illness/ and/or sedation. Similarly, the lack 
of communication between the patient and their family members/proxies is raised, 
thereby complicating a decision-making process that would be honouring the wishes of 
the patient. Lack of such dialogue however does not appear to be as big a problem in 
environments where advance care planning and making one's wishes known through 
processes such as living wills, durable power of attorney for health care and advance 
directives are the norm. 
It is actually unusual but occasionally we have a case where the 
patient clearly wants everything done, and I mean everything. If 
his last words are `do everything' or in his advance directive he 
clearly states that he wants everything to be done that could be 
done, then you gotta decide on whether you honour autonomy 
or do you honour non-maleficence which is to do no harm, 
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because in fact by doing everything and providing that kind of 
treatment you are actually harming this person — so do we 
override patient autonomy by not doing harrn?....well in most 
cases we do.... we say I know this is what he wanted because 
he wanted everything but that doesn't mean we are going to 
harm him (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA) 
This quote embraces the principle of beneficence yet not in so many words. It also 
touches on the dilemma of harming the patient in order to honour their wishes. This 
conflict of interests is explored in more detail in a later chapter entitled 'Futility' where the 
benefit versus burden dichotomy is discussed. However, in those circumstances where 
the wishes of the patient are not known to family, the decision-making process was 
described in two ways. Firstly, from handing that responsibility on to the family, thereby 
honouring autonomy: 
Well, if the patient is not capable of making an autonomous 
decision, and let's face it, in most circumstances they are not 
because then we wouldn't have these ethics discussions, then 
in the name of autonomy, we have to put it on the family's 
shoulders.....but now they have got the monkey on their back. 
They have to address something that we would have addressed 
already (in our own minds) and the eventual outcome will be the 
same (Trauma Surgeon USA). 
Secondly, the decision-making process in a case where the patient's wishes were not 
known, was described in more paternalistic terms by a UK Surgeon: 
It is worth bearing in mind that there is no legal precedent - 
ethical or moral - for relatives to make decisions for their family 
members when their wishes are not known. These decisions 
are left up to the treating physician. That may sound arrogant 
but in reality most of the time the family cannot decide anyway, I 
mean, they have never taken it on board, you know, to discuss it 
with each other while they are all competent — so they leave it 
up to us, and the end result is almost always the same. 
Sometimes they demand intervention, consequently I think we 
have a few patients around the place who are being 
inappropriately fed (General Surgeon UK). 
97 
The concept of having similar end results of treatment regardless of an autonomous or 
paternalistic decision-making process was also mentioned by a Law Professor (USA), 
who explained that the notion of autonomy is in some ways granted too much 
importance: 
From some perspectives, including mine, that we credit 
autonomy a little too much in some cases, because the default 
is set in favour of the autonomous choice, in favour of self-
determination...and I think that from my perspective it looks like 
it is a pretty humane view that choreographs the treatment and 
the inevitable death of the patient. I mean the end point is going 
to be the same no matter what — it really is a question of how 
you get there and what kind of support you can provide for the 
patient. If the patient is aware then great, but if not, then it is the 
family who really needs to be responsible and accept the same 
end point (Law Professor USA) 
Being responsible for having one's wishes known (be it an individual or family), and being 
responsible for one's health state was similarly discussed by a Nutrition Nurse Specialist 
Despite people becoming a bit more aware of their rights as 
autonomous decision-makers, your general population needs to 
take some ownership and responsibility for their own well being 
and consequences in case they get really sick. You still see 
these patients laying in bed who want some kind of magic wand 
to be waved over them and are told 'yes off you go, you are 
cured now'.. they have to realise they have to participate in how 
they are actually going to get better, and have a positive attitude 
which doesn't just involve themselves, but getting their carers, 
their families involved too (Nutrition Nurse Specialist, AUST). 
In comparison, an American Oncologist commented on responsibility and empowerment 
within a different health care delivery system, that is, a 'privatised' systemg: 
In this system, the patient is an empowered consumer — they 
have had to be to realise what goes on. Especially with the 
Internet, we have people come in the clinics with a pile of 
9 See Chapter Five 'Money' (p. 137-138) for explanations orprivatised' and 'socialised' health care systems. 
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reprints downloaded and they do know more about the disease 
and treatments than we do sometimes (Oncologist, USA). 
This was the extent of discussions on the principle of autonomy, which essentially viewed 
autonomy as being a patient's right and not a doctor's prerogative. Physician autonomy 
as such was not mentioned by the participants, yet was alluded to in terms of 'medical 
paternalism'. 
Medical Paternalism 
In contrast to the discussion of autonomy, an unexpected inclusion in the participant's 
experiences and views on the provision of artificial nutritional support included the 
concept of paternalism, or, as it has been described by Nuland as 'medical paternalism' 
(1995:258). Nuland explains that people become doctors because '...our ability to cure 
gives us power over the death of which we are so afraid', and that 'In an attempt to 
maintain control, a doctor, usually without being aware of it, convinces himself that he 
knows better than the patient what course is proper' (ibid: 258). Knowing what is best for 
the patient could be in sharp contrast with the wishes of the patient. This notion of 
medical arrogance or paternalism was mentioned throughout the 32 by the following 
participants: a Medical Social Worker (USA): a General Surgeon (UK); a Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST); a Law Professor (USA); a 
Nutrition Nurse Specialist (UK); and two Oncologists (USA). 
In its simplest form, medical paternalism was discussed as 'doctor knows best' — with or 
without consultation from other health care professionals or the patient/family. The 
assumption that the doctor knows best was also made within the clinical and unrealistic 
confines of the hospital. As a Medical Social Worker commented: 
They [the doctors] prescribe a lot of stuff, go ahead and place 
the feeding tube, and never go into the patient's home to see 
what their real world is really like, or what it is that is actually 
going on for the patient and the family. They only think of the 
patient kind of like a car or something that breaks down and 
they are just attaching a new part, putting a new part on it to 
keep all the things running and the gas going through the parts. 
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They don't think of the patient going home to this community 
that they once lived with this family in this setting. I guess its 
kind of arrogant but it happens all the time (Medical Social 
Worker USA). 
Decision-making as a separate entity only appeared in the data once, and upon re-
reading and reflection it was obvious that it could be tied into the notion of paternalism. 
In discussing treatment decisions, a Hospital Pharmacist (AUST) explained in similar 
terms, the power of the treating doctor in relation to feeding issues: 
It is very much the way we work here, that is, the final decision 
is within the physician's court, and as to whether it happens or 
as to whether it doesn't happen, and when and how it happens 
is the physician's call (Hospital Pharmacist AUST). 
Arrogance, within the discussion of medical paternalism, was alluded to by another 
participant, yet in conjunction with patient complicity: 
Most of our surgeons and physicians, despite being old school 
or fresh out, all think they know best....I mean, some of our 
older doctors are still into the own the patient and all of their 
care' mentality, so they will not refer patients to palliative care, 
or home hospice unless they have exercised every bit of their 
so-called ownership to treat them up to their eyeballs.. .but 
certainly there are still a lot of older people who think that 
exactly what the doctor says is exactly fight, and urn.. .there is 
no deviation from that, and if Dr. X tells you to jump off the top of 
the Sydney Harbour Bridge, then that is exactly what you do — 
no questions asked (Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUST). 
Correspondingly, complicity with medical paternalism in relation to feeding decisions was 
explained in terms of 'passing the buck' onto family members. This notion was not found 
in the literature, on the contrary, most medical ethics texts espoused the doctrine that all 
individuals should be given practical assistance to maximise their decision-making 
capacity. For example, the British Medical Association's (BMA) recently published 
guidelines on withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging medical treatment clearly states 
that this should include providing information in broad terms and simple language, and 
that patients/families should not be regarded as incapable of making or communicating a 
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decision (BMA 2001). This however, does not always appear to be the case as the 
following quote suggests: 
For many of these patients there is no hope of recovery - be 
they brain injured or advanced dementia, critically ill, 
whatever.. .you can give the family the best case scenario and 
the worst case scenario - and it can be left up to the family 
although the family will often need a lot of guidance as they find 
the decision-making for all of this hi-tech stuff very difficult, so it 
is a bit like the doctors passing the buck. The doctors put all 
these decisions on to the family, and will make no 
recommendation, and will show no leniency one way or the 
other about the provision of support (Nutrition Nurse Specialist 
AUST). 
The reality of practices differing markedly between health care delivery systems was 
eloquently captured by a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist who had practiced in numerous 
countries outside the USA. In reflecting on the informed consumer of health care in the 
USA, he pondered: 
I'm wondering too if it isn't a kind of typical American thing. I 
think that American patients tolerate less paternalism than other 
cultures, and my guess is that medicine in the UK, Australia, 
certainly in Japan I know, and other countries is much more 
paternalistic, like... 'I am the doctor and I am telling you what to 
do and you go do this'. And in the United States we tend to be 
'You are the doctor, and I don't like what you are doing, so you 
are fired, and I am going to get somebody else who I do like 
what they do' (Hospital Ethicist USA). 
This culture of health care delivery systems concerning medical paternalism was also 
experienced by a Law Professor (USA) who regarded being in charge of decision-making 
regarding a patient's treatment was a shared responsibility, that is, shared with the 
autonomous patient or surrogate. However, when reflecting on the experience of one of 
his relatives in the UK, he explained the decision-making process somewhat differently: 
Over there - England - the doctors just made up their decision 
to withdraw nutritional support and my relative died within a few 
days, but 1 just couldn't believe it.. .1 mean, I was just 
floored.. .the family just all went along with it and never 
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questioned the decision or said a thing. Now that wouldn't 
happen here in the US (Law Professor USA). 
The lack of opportunity for family members not only to question medical decision-making, 
but to simply be involved in discussions regarding treatment plans was inadvertently 
exposed by an UK Nutrition Nurse Specialist. She similarly demonstrated a strong culture 
of medical paternity, and the complicity of patients and their families in the following: 
We will all meet to discuss feeding options for the patient, like 
the doctor, myself, the dietitian and the pharmacist, and the 
doctor heads up that meeting.. .and if he says 'no you shouldn't 
feed this person, then, at the end of the day, the doctor is in 
charge of things and takes that responsibility (Nutrition Nurse 
Specialist UK). 
The obvious comparison between these selected quotations reflect not only the 
dichotomy that exists between autonomy and paternalism, but also the sharp contrast 
between geographical margins, that is, the essentially socialised nature of health care 
delivery in the UK, and Australia, and the private system in the USA. This dichotomy is 
explored in more detail in a later chapter entitled 'Money'. 
Ethics Committees 
Several quotes were coded for 'ethics committees', two of which overlapped with codes 
for 'legal issues' and 'futility'. Only two participants spoke of ethics committees, ethics 
consults, their use and utilisation. They were a Law Professor and Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist from the USA, and were serving as members of several ethics 
committees at large metropolitan hospitals, including one not-for-profit teaching hospital 
attached to a major state university medical school. The advent of such committees was 
explained as being a consequence of the landmark Karen Quinlan case: 
Interestingly, and I doubt whether you know this but the judge in 
the Quinlan case read a paper by Karen Teale, who at the time 
was a resident at Baylor Waco — anyway, she wrote this paper 
where she used the term 'ethics committee' as one way to solve 
these ethical/critical issues. The judge read that paper and said 
'what you need here (in the Quinlan case) is an ethics 
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committee'. So she actually coined the term. So by now, most 
hospitals have ethics committees to deal with the issues 
(Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
The process of convening an ethics committee was explained by the Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist (USA) as: 
You can convene pretty quickly.. .an hours notice to get three or 
four of us together like for an emergency sitting, and we always 
get someone from the community attending the committee for 
'arms length' so it is not just us going on.. .the person from the 
community could be a social worker, could be a retired 
physician - urn, we have a psychiatrist, we have an attorney, 
and someone from the consumer health forum, and if they can't 
be there in person, then we have had them on speakerphone 
(Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
This raises an interesting deficiency in those hospitals that do not employ such a 
committee to deal with ethical consultations. The nature of the 'ethics committee' in the 
UK and Australia by and large only convene for monthly or bi-monthly meetings to review 
research proposals, and are essentially for the ethics review of research. This involves 
clinical trials, ethical conduct in research involving humans, and animal subject research 	0 
ethics issues. The nature of their work does not involve discussing those 'ethics consults' 
as described by the USA participants, which includes those cases requested by patients 
and their families. Once again, the power of the health consumer is clearly visible within 
the context of privatised health care. 	 r"3 
The assumption that the function of ethics committees outside the USA is deficient in 
terms of providing a function beyond the review and critique of research is supported in 
the literature by its very absence. For example, the BMA refers to ethics committees as 
the mechanism for monitoring and approving research. The function and composition of 
these committees pertain only to research; whether the scientific quality of the protocol is 
properly assessed; whether the investigator is competent; possible hazards to trial 
subjects and precautions taken to deal with these; measures for providing information 
and seeking consent; recruitment of subjects; and, storage of data (BMA 1998). In the 
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USA, the forum utilised for these purposes is termed the 'Institutional Review Board' 
(IRB). There is possibly the danger of trans-Atlantic differences in terminology in this 
comparison, however there is a notable shortfall in the literature outside the USA that 
describes institutional committees that provide a forum that is multidisciplinary in 
composition and deliberately designed to be only advisory in nature, for the consideration 
of clinical cases of ethical conflict (Singer et al 2001). 
The legal practitioner participating in this research maintained that most members of 
ethics committees would more likely take the side of the patient with the view that the 
patient and family have different values and goals than their treating doctors: 
It is just another way of saying who gets to define the values of 
medicine and the goals of medicine — is that a professional 
standard that doctors get to write for themselves or is it a social 
standard that patients could influence treatment decisions as 
much as the doctors do? (Law Professor USA). 
This not only highlights the active role of the patient/family as a powerful consumer of 
health care, albeit in a predominantly private setting such as the USA, and similarly 
exposes a deficit within the function of ethics committees within socialised health care 
settings. Another possible deficit could be the actual composition of such committees. A 
King's Fund report remarked on the dominance of hospital doctors who constituted more 
than half the total membership of 222 ethics committees in the UK, and the under-
representation of lay-people, women and nurses in the overall membership (BMA 1998). 
The success of such committees was emphasised by both participants, and both 
described the utilisation of the committees as increasing. For example, in one hospital 
the ethics committee had already met 32 times in an eight month period at the time of 
interview (that is, January to August) which was a record compared to the 29 times for 
the entire year before. Both described the advantage of the ethics committee was that 
'everybody wins' including the family, the patient, and the hospital: 
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It is a win-win situation - like, if the patient wants a good death, 
they get it, or they get treated if they want (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
And: 
I think that they are a really good thing, and not because of the 
quality of decision-making, not because we get to the right 
answers more often than not or anything like that. There is 
more to it than that...I think though that in terms of what benefits 
the patient and benefits the family, urn, we provide a process for 
dispute resolution, joint decision-making that brings people into 
the discussion that clears up factual misconception and allows 
people a forum to express preferences and beliefs, shows those 
preferences and beliefs a healthy amount of respect... airs 
differences, finds areas of agreement, narrows areas of 
disputation, and um, finds more often than not at least some 
narrow basis of agreement to proceed with. Then we can 
reassess it if is necessary and see how we all feel about it, and 
at that, that is a pretty beneficial process for most of the 
disciplines (Law Professor USA). 
The other advantage of the ethics committee was explained in terms of the law. With the 
advent of futility policies in some institutions and their absence in others, the role of the 
ethics committee was described as important in terms of legal consequence especially 
in those cases where the hospital was being sued for withdrawing life-sustaining support 
such as the provision of artificial nutrition. One participant stressed emphatically that 
ethics committees do not make treatment decisions, nor do they decide a patient's 
quality-of-life: 
About a month ago I was involved in a case where the hospital 
and physicians were being sued, and the ethics committee had 
met on this case, and basically said that they thought that it was 
ethical to make the patient a category three which, with the 
family's consent, would allow for the withdrawal of aggressive 
treatment allowing the patient to die a natural death. Well then 
the family had second thoughts later on and got an attorney.. .he 
tried in every which way to get me to say that we had made a 
treatment decision - which we don't - the ethics committee 
does not make actual treatment decisions. For the treatment to 
be withdrawn the family had to go to the doctor and say 'yeah, 
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we want everything to be withdrawn'.....we did not do that, the 
family did.. ..so the physicians and the hospital were backed up 
by the ethics committee so it is one more plug for decent 
support for them. The ethics committee helps out a lot — for 
everyone. And I think that is the reason everybody is using us a 
lot more (Hospital Ethicist/Chaplain USA). 
Clearly, the benefits of employing such a forum as explained above are obvious, yet such 
forums are only discussed in the literature pertaining to USA institutions (Skeel and Self 
1989; Danis 1998; La Puma and Stocking 1993; Fine 1998) which raises the question as 
to why 'ethics consults' do not appear in the other systems/countries? One explanation 
could be that the 'ethics consult' represents a stronger consumer expectation. This 
possibility is discussed in the Chapter Five 'Money'. 
Access 
This discussion point was raised several times by the following participants: a 
Gerontologist (USA); a General Surgeon (USA); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST); and 
a Hospital Pharmacist (AUST). Access to basic care such as feeding was raised only 
once, and the remainder of comments regarding access was to do with resources. Basic 
care, that is, the simple provision of nourishment to a patient was considered a 
fundamental right in the eyes of the family: 
People, sick or not sick, need access to food for survival.., we 
can never deny anyone that — be it via a tube or a plate of food 
in front of them (Gerontologist USA). 
This description of a person's fundamental right to be fed was associated with a fear of 
starvation. In a later discussion of the symbolism of 'food' and 'starvation' (in Chapter Six 
'Culture'), the denial of such basic care evoked powerful and emotive responses. Not 
having access to nutrition was deemed cruel and inhumane by a variety of participants. 
Yet the above participant's view was the sole contribution in the data of access to basic 
care. The remaining participants mentioned access to expensive technologies and the 
possible discrepancies or injustices between public and private health care delivery 
systems. Essentially, this was related to the ethical principle of justice, which overlapped 
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with the code 'Who Pays? — Resources'. One surgeon explained the possibilities of 
expensive nutritional support (TPN specifically) being denied to patients in an attempt to 
save money: 
I can see certain environments where they are really into cost 
cutting.. .like what Managed Care is doing...! mean, I think it is a 
real concern that if a person really needs TPN, and it is not a 
matter of having it or not, don't get it. That is bad.. .and yeah, 
there maybe some situations where people might do that. We 
don't do that here. We just don't do that. We think that if a 
person needs it we are going to recommend and fight like hell to 
make sure that they get it (General Surgeon USA). 
Similar views of cost cutting were explained by a Nutrition Nurse Specialist who 
commented on those patients who might really need TPN for survival. She shared an 
experience of a man who was terminally ill and essentially dying yet would be able to 
survive for a few more weeks (in order to celebrate his daughter's 12th birthday) if he 
received TPN. At a cost of approximately $1500 a week for the provision of home 
treatment and back-up nursing care, the man said that he would pay for it himself as he 
was not privately insured and the treating hospital did not provide TPN to dying patients: 
He said he would pay for it out of his own pocket, and at first I 
thought that all of the problems had gone (because it had been 
a real bun fight sorting it out).. .and then I thought about it and 
thought about it and realised that we were getting ourselves into 
a horrible mess about equity of access — I mean what would 
happen to another person without the funds? We would not 
provide it, and ethically to me, that is a problem (Nutrition Nurse 
Specialist AUST). 
This occurred within a strictly capitated health care region under severe budgetary 
constraints where finite funds were allocated annually for the provision of home TPN to 
suitable patients. Although it was not mentioned at the time, this problem correlated with 
experiences shared elsewhere in the data about patients forced to 'live off' their 
children's inheritance in order to pay for certain treatments that could prolong their lives. 
Paradoxically, another participant explained a common occurrence whereby private 
patients did not have the same access to nutritional technologies as public patients, and 
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were thereby clinically disadvantaged. His experience stemmed from that fact than most 
private hospitals (in Australia) do not have the facilities to manufacture and provide TPN, 
and that the expertise in doing so is considered to reside within the public hospitals: 
A situation that is not uncommon to us is when a privately 
insured patient who has had their procedure in the private 
hospital runs into problems and really needs TPN...yet doesn't 
get it because they don't have the same facilities. So what 
happens is that these patients get right behind the eight ball and 
the wheels fall off. They then get transferred to the public 
hospital and we bail them out ...usually in the intensive care unit 
which means that we have to move a public patient out of the 
ICU to accommodate the private patient... and ethically, well I 
don't know how to feel about that (Hospital Pharmacist AUST). 
This interesting contrast raises other sceptical possibilities regarding the potential for the 
public hospital to generate revenue from the transferred private hospital patient to the 
public hospital campus for expensive treatment. Despite an exhaustive search, these 
possibilities of questionable access to expensive nutritional technologies for privately 
insured patients, and the premature discharge of public patients from the ICU in order to 
accommodate revenue generating patients transferred from private hospitals were not 
found in any of the literature reviewed for this project. Despite this 'evidence' as 
contributed above being anecdotal, the mere suggestion deserves further inquiry. 
Consent 
The question of consent was raised only twice — both times by Nutrition Nurse 
Specialists, one from the UK and the other from Australia. In both cases, consent was 
discussed within the context of commencing artificial nutritional support. Firstly, the 
participant from the UK explained the reality of no legally binding form of consent by way 
of a family member to support the provision of artificial nutritional support. Her comments 
also embody certain overtones of previously described medical paternalism: 
Well sometimes the family can be very difficult, I mean... we 
know that starting feeding in particular patients just isn't fair on 
anybody, and the relatives are demanding that the patient be 
fed (and we don't want to do that).. .so sometimes they think that 
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you are putting up barriers up just to make life very difficult. In a 
court of law, their consent is not legally binding, but their 
insistence still makes it very difficult to treat the patient properly 
(Nutrition Nurse Specialist UK). 
Not surprisingly, the view of the British Medical Association on the autonomy of doctors 
supports this experience. Consent and autonomy are explained as not being the sole 
prerogatives of patients and it is not only the patient who has rights of consent and 
refusal. Doctors provide treatment, not simply because it is requested or consented to, 
but because in their view it is clinically appropriate (BMA 1998). 
The technicalities of consent, be they legal or discursive deserve a certain analysis within 
the context of commencing and then providing artificial nutritional support. Consent to 
provide a particular procedure, for example, the surgical placement of a percutaneous 
feeding tube, does not necessarily mean that consent is provided for the actual feeding 
of the patient. This was explained by the Australian Nutrition Nurse Specialist: 
When the patient can't take anything by mouth then a drip is 
initiated, but there is never consent given for that drip. Nor is 
there consent given for the nasogastric tube placed a few days 
later when the patient needs more than IV fluids. It is really only 
when we get to the provision of more invasive access such as a 
PEG, or a long term central line, or port — that we actually start 
initiating consent... and then it is for the actual procedure rather 
than the actual provision of nutritional support. So the consent 
is for the invasive procedure rather than for the artificial feeding, 
and I think that as far as explanations to relatives, patients, 
families and that go, I think that often it is assumed that they 
realise what the access is for (that is, artificial means and high 
technology means for the provision of nutritional support), 
however, often they don't. And, quite often it is not until they 
have been having the feeding for some time that the family will 
query as to whether the patient should be having it, and whether 
they actually asked for, or wanted it in the first place (Nutrition 
Nurse Specialist AUST). 
The consequences of consent, such as in the case above, being somewhat 
misconstrued, have not been described in the literature reviewed for this project. The 
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clarity of communicating such consent would appear as being the deciding factor in 
avoiding such conflict. The above narrative also implies a notion of tacit consent or a 
'taken-for-grantedness' in that what might constitute ordinary care (that is, 'a drip') for a 
clinician might be extraordinary for the patient. Undoubtedly the recognition by doctors 
that patients usually know better than anyone else what is best for them imposes a duty 
upon doctors to empower patients to make their own decisions. These decisions 
however, need to be based on information and support that is not beyond their 
comprehension. As one Oncologist (USA) lamented - there would be no ethical 
problems encountered by doctors at all if they only communicated with their patients'. 
Beneficence 
Undoubtedly, the most surprising omission in the data was the principle of beneficence. 
Despite several explanations of 'benefit versus burden' within the context of medically 
futile treatments, 10 only one participant alluded to beneficence in terms of nutritional 
therapies being of benefit to patients. This participant was a clinical dietitian who 
specialised in enteral feeding access devices. Her main ethical problem was that 
nutritional support was potentially harmful to many patients: 
My main concern is to do no harm, and all treatments can be 
potentially harmful, and TPN can be far more harmful than many 
people realise.. .and enteral feeding can be harmful too if we talk 
about aspiration and tube site breakdown, but the metabolic 
effects of TPN can kill you too. We gotta realise what we could 
be doing to these patients... by thinking that we are treating 
them we could be harming them. We gotta be mindful of the 
complications (Dietitian USA). 
The many complications associated with artificial nutritional support were discussed 
elsewhere in the data yet not specifically with harming the patient. In a subsequent 
review of the literature of enteral feeding tubes and mortality rates post tube placement in 
the elderly, it was discovered that mortality rates as high as 40% post insertion have 
been reported. 11 The failure of the participants to mention these complications could be 
10 The subject of medical futility is explored and discussed in detail in Chapter Eight 'Futility. 
11 See Chapter One 'Review of the Literature (p.19) and Chapter Nine 'Technology (p. 244) regarding complications of artificial nutritional support. 
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indicative of a certain ignorance amongst professionals of the realities of the 
complications associated with artificial nutritional support. 
Conclusion 
A closer analysis of the narratives in this chapter exposes a certain complexity as to what 
is implied by the participants' discussions on the 'ethical principles'. Ethics, as a 
discursively shaped and negotiated construct is not solely about principlism. Despite the 
participants embracing the principlist language, they may also be seen to be exhibiting 
virtuous behaviour as well as what Braunack-Mayer (1999) describes as casuistry. 
Therefore, the analysis of the narratives shared in this chapter highlights an interesting 
paradox in that the participants incorporate tacit notions of principlism yet attest to 
virtuous behaviour. 
Amongst the most quoted principles in the history of codes in medical ethics is the maxim 
primum non nocere — above all do no harm. The fact that only one participant mentioned 
this possibly suggests the lack of 'ethics' awareness across the health related disciplines. 
Similarly, despite the doctrine that autonomy, beneficence/non-maleficence and justice 
are ethical principles rooted in Western tradition, the lack of what was an expected 
emphasis on these principles raises some interesting questions. Could this reflect the 
realities of the professional perceptions of ethical principles as being derived from 
practice and not from theory? Instead, the experiences and viewpoints derived from 
practice shape the relevance of ethical principles and the emphasis afforded to these. 
An interesting inclusion was the discussion of medical paternalism, which permeated the 
other discussion points. Could it be that medical paternalism is alive and well throughout 
the experience of health care to the point where it is tacitly taken for granted? In relation 
to the provision of artificial nutritional support, it appears so and therefore is worthy of 
further exploration. So too is the discrepancy between health care systems relating to 
the functions of ethics committees. 
Ethics 'at the bedside' with regard to the clinical function of the ethics consultation as 
explained by the American participants certainly lends itself to a more thorough 
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appreciation of the ethical principles than the somewhat staunch and limited 'IRB' 
function of the ethics committee as explained by the UK and Australian participants. This 
restricted view does not appear to be developing further, as a recent publication 
demonstrates the finite role of the ethics committee in Australia within the bounds of 
research ethics mechanisms (Komesaroff and Cohen 2001). 
There is much to be said for the development of multidisciplinary ethics committees in 
Australia which serve as an advisory forum with regard to clinical decision-making in a 
variety of health care settings. Like the USA, Australian human research committees 
need to recognise lay participation as important and to affirm the diversity of views with 
regard to the contested socio-political spaces with are discursively shaped as ethics, 
quality and clinical practice. There is not a better illustration of the variety of views in 
health care than is to be found in those discussions of the concept of 'death', which is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEATH 
Introduction 
The major theme entitled 'Death' was formed by the merging of the overlapping codes: 
Process of Dying — Death; Palliative Care; Buying Time; and Cancer. Artificial nutritional 
support was considered by the majority of participants as being one of the most difficult 
life-sustaining treatments to withdraw in an end-of-life situation. This subject of death, 
(and/or end-of-life issues), was granted more emphasis than the researcher expected, 
and permeated other related subjects, or discussion points that also were not anticipated. 
These included the influence of film and television media on peoples' perceptions on 
death, the 'medicalization' of death, the lack of acceptance of palliative care by other 
medical specialties, and primarily, the notion of 'buying time' in end-of-life situations. 
Another interesting discussion point arising from the interviews was that of education and 
the lack of acceptance of dying as a normal physiological end point of life, and the 
possible origin of that being a notable shortfall in current medical education on death and 
dying. 
The following discussion points that are explored in this chapter were named according 
to the participants' own wording and descriptions. These are: Medicalizing Death; Good 
Death Care; Buying Time; and Demystifying Death and the Media. Not all participants 
considered death and dying as relevant to the provision of artificial nutritional support. 
Those who did consisted of: Two Palliative Care Physicians (AUST); two Oncologists 
(USA); a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST); a 
Medical Social Worker (USA); an ICU Nurse Specialist (USA); a Gerontologist (USA); a 
Critical Care Physician (AUST); a General Surgeon (AUST); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist 
(UK); a Hospital Pharmacist (AUST); a Health Services Administrator (USA); a General 
Surgeon (UK); and a Dietitian (USA). 
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Medicalizing Death 
This discussion point encompassed several related issues, mainly overtreatment and 
ignorance in providing appropriate end-of-life care. Essentially the participants described 
death as being unnecessarily medicalized by the inappropriate continuation of 
aggressive nutritional support, which often led to more clinical complications thus 
expediting the patient's death, or creating increased discomfort. Several reasons were 
provided by the participants as to why this might occur with a 'lack of acceptance' and 
'ignorance' being given. Participants who spoke of this included: a Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); a Medical Social Worker (USA); two Palliative Care Physicians 
(AUST); a General Surgeon (USA); a Dietitian (USA); and a Health Services 
Administrator (USA). 
The act of medicalizing someone's death was explained by one participant as being 
possibly inadvertent due to a lack of understanding of the physiological process of dying. 
He explained that regarding nutrition, many dietitians would be concerned that patients 
(those who were actually dying) were not getting enough nourishment by mouth to meet 
their requirements and would need to have either enteral of parenteral alimentation. His 
disbelief of the ignorance associated with a dying person's nutritional needs was 
poignantly captured in the following quote: 
Well of course they can't meet their nutritional 
requirements... they are azotaemicll They aren't supposed to be 
eating anything because that is the way people die, and I think 
that we have largely forgotten how people die in the last 50 
years because we have medicalized death and confined it to 
medical settings. So if anything, I think that the emphasis on 
clinical nutrition is way overdone — and that is not well 
understood by most professionals, let alone patients and 
families (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
Several supporting arguments were located in the literature regarding dying being 
associated with increasing institutionalisation. Lerner (1970) claims that an estimated 
80% to 90% of all deaths take place in hospital or a long-term care facility. This is echoed 
by Meyer (1998). Corr (1993) argues that 100 years ago, roughly the same percentage 
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of all deaths would have taken place in the home, and that most people now die in a 
strange place, in a strange bed, surrounded mostly by sights, sounds, smells, and people 
who are strangers to them. In short, direct encounters with all facets of death have been 
diminished in our modern society. Care for the dying and care of the dead has been 
moved away from the family and out of the home into a medical setting. 
Azotaemia is described by Meyer (1997) as a condition in the which the body's waste 
nitrogen products become elevated in the blood. The role of azotaemia is described by 
the same author in a later publication as being something that results in a good death. 
As dehydration occurs, waste products build up in the body and serve as natural 
analgesics to insulate the body from pain. The patient becomes tired, sleepy, less and 
less conscious, falls into a coma where all pain ceases, and eventually dies. Attempts at 
medically reversing this process by maintaining artificial nutritional support creates a bad 
death by waking up the patient so he or she can fully experience suffering and death 
(Meyer 1998). Similarly, Jett (1995) claims that decreased nutritional intake and 
dehydration are the natural state of the dying organism. This process was mentioned by 
only two other participants in the entire research. 
This sentiment was also reiterated throughout those comments coded under 'Palliative 
Care'. For example, one Palliative Care Physician (AUST) explained that occasionally 
medicine will prolong people's suffering inadvertently through the provision of artificial 
nutritional support. She explained that as a normal part of the dying process, the person 
will stop eating and drinking as the body finally begins to wind down. If artificial 
measures to both nourish and hydrate the patient are commenced at this stage, it can 
cause undue pain and suffering: 
They should just be allowed to fade out... which is what they 
would be doing if we didn't interfere in that process (Palliative 
Care Physician AUST). 
Another Palliative Care Physician (AUST) expressed an identical view on not interfering 
with the patient's natural process of dying, yet in more physiological terms: 
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When somebody enters that active stage of dying and stops 
eating, drinking.., well there is a lot of work that has been done 
to show that the body kicks in with natural endorphins, 
encephalins that are produced when people begin to die — like 
natural pain relief..., which we switch off as soon as we put up a 
drip or put in a feeding tube.. .and why should we be stopping a 
natural process? (Palliative Care Physician AUS7). 
This process was also mentioned by an Oncologist (USA) whereby the initiation of 
artificial nutritional support in a dying person would render the patient more alert to the 
point that they would lapse back out of a comfortable slumber and realise that they 
' were in pain, dying and very uncomfortable'. A General Surgeon (USA) also upheld 
the patient's right to be protected from a medicalized death: 
The feeding of a terminally ill patient is in many ways 
detrimental to a peaceful death, and, in many ways, that feeding 
causes far more complications than the patient deserves 
(General Surgeon USA). 
There is ample evidence in the literature that minimal nutritional intake and dehydration 
may enhance the comfort of the dying patient by decreasing secretions, oedema, pain, 
incontinence, cardiac load, and pulmonary distress (Andrews eta! 1993; Billings 1985; 
Musgrave 1990; Stone 1993). However, as the participants continued with their stories, 
it became clear that their experiences involved continuous aggressive feeding in dying 
patients. Ignorance of the realities of dying that was evidenced by the medicalizing of a 
debilitated nursing home patient's death was also expressed with a degree of sarcasm 
and disbelief: 
[gestures with eyes rolling and holding up hands]..! 	- 
mean.. .HELLO, is any one home??? It can't be that difficult for 
these people to realise that a debilitated demented frail aged 
person who needs to have their legs broken to get the PEG in is 
probably not going to do too well. I see this all the time. Why 
can't they just let them go — I mean, excuse me but when 
someone is in their 90's, has terminal everything and has been 
circling the drain for years, why the heck would you want to put 
them through more suffering and treat, treat, treat? (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
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The incidence of frustrating encounters such as the above was higher than anticipated. A 
Medical Social Worker explained that she dealt with death being medicalized everyday. 
Her experiences were more to do with dealing with the consequences of complications of 
when aggressive medical treatments went wrong in dying patients: 
I deal with it everyday, and I am sure that these patients die 
prematurely because they get aspiration problems from their 
feeding tubes and end up choking to death.. .or their tube gets 
infected and then they get septic and die in pain. Both the 
family and the doctors are at fault here.. .they just don't accept 
the fact that these people are dying and should be made 
comfortable (Medical Social Worker USA). 
The sole Health Service Administrator interviewed for this study reflected on her 
experience in caring for her father who was dying with lung cancer, close to death, yet 
the physician caring for him ordered nasogastric feeds. The following quote captures 
similar tones of disbelief in unnecessary medicalization of what is clearly a process of 
active dying: 
Just before he died it happened — they put a tube in and started 
feeds. It woke him up and he was so wild and aggressive to all 
of us. We held his hands to stop him from pulling the tube (at 
first), and they were going to restrain him. I couldn't believe it, so 
I let his hands go and he pulled the tube out.. .he pulled the tube 
(smiling).. .it didn't impress the doctors but too bad! thought. It 
was a good thing (Health Service Administrator USA). 
The patient's death therefore could then be possibly prolonged and unnecessarily 
medicalized due to what essentially is an ignorance of palliative care, or as one 
participant described as 'good death care'. A subsequent review of the literature found 
that measures to improve such ignorance and lack of end-of-life education on how 
people actually die were only just being recently incorporated into medical education. 
This surprisingly was only occurring in the USA where programs (such as the EPEC 
Project) 12 were being implemented into medical curricula and continuing education 
12 Education for Physicians on End-of-life Care which is sponsored by the Robert Woods Johnson Foundation, and reviewed by the 
American College of Medical Education. 
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programs thereafter to address the knowledge deficit in end-of-life care. In February 
1999 the American Medical Association launched the EPEC Project which facilitated 
subjects including but not limited to: 
• Decisions about life-sustaining treatment 
• Discussing poor prognosis 
• Accountability and quality of care at the end of life 
• Grief and bereavement 
• Accommodating religious and cultural diversity 
• Addressing concerns about the law 
• Caring for the dying 
• Do-not-resuscitate orders 
• Forgoing medically supplied nutrition and hydration 
• Medical futility 
• Ethical decision-making 
• Management of pain 
• The physiology of dying 
• Organ donation 
• Family issues 
• Communication skills 
However, such attempts to improve end-of-life education was more the exception than 
the rule. The general assumption via the literature (compounded by the absence of 
similar programs in the UK and Australia) suggests that there is little or no teaching on 
the subject of what to do when a disease cannot be reversed. According to Seravelli 
(1988), most medical schools do not teach palliative medicine in undergraduate curricula 
and as a result, most medical students evolve into doctors who are keen to treat the 
curable conditions, yet have little training in what to do with chronic irreversible 
conditions. Seravelli (1988) argues that this omission makes it difficult for doctors to deal 
with their own sense of therapeutic failure. Doctors are consequently socialised to 
consider medicine's technological 'rescue imperative' (Meyer 1988:10). 
Good Death Care 
The title of this discussion point is essentially the very foundation of what palliative care 
strives for, yet in a subsequent literature review following the data collection phase, this 
term was located only once (Meyer 1998). Eleven participants considered palliative care 
as a medical specialty to be paramount in the ethical decision-making of the provision of 
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artificial nutritional support. They included: a Gerontologist (USA); two Palliative Care 
Physicians (AUST); a Health Service Administrator (USA); an Oncologist (USA); two 
Dietitians (USA); a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); a General Surgeon (UK); an 
Oncology Nurse Specialist; and a Hospital Pharmacist (AUST). 
The success of striving for a good death in terms of the ideals of palliation were 
sometimes thwarted by the unrealistic demands of the patients' relatives to continue with 
artificial nutritional support which they considered to be a life preserving treatment. Most 
participants agreed that this was a particularly difficult scenario to deal with, yet the 
important thing was to convey to people the reality that withholding such support would 
not contribute to the death of the patient. For example, a Gerontologist (USA) explained 
that: 
I know for a fact that nutrition will not keep them alive...I mean if 
we give them tube or IV feeding they will die in a few days and 
maybe weigh 42kgs versus not feeding and they die in a few 
days and weigh 40kgs. Nutrition cannot prolong a patient's life 
when they have end stage malignancy (Gerontologist USA). 
The idea of the disease killing the patient and not 'starvation' was also suggested by the 
following three participants: 
The cancer will kill them and not the fact that they are not being 
fed. Sure you can feed them but the cancer will eventually 
spread to the bronchus and they can't breathe and die. No 
nutritional treatment is going to stop that from happening 
(General Surgeon UK). 
The biological process of the cancer or the degenerative 
disease like motor neurone disease, that is going to ultimately 
bring about the person's death — the disease process is 
inevitable irrespective of what we do, we cannot stop the actual 
process of death as an outcome (Palliative Care Physician 
AUST). 
The malignant disease will cause the patient's death, but so 
could enteral feeding where you cause aspiration pneumonia. It 
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is not a life saving measure and has no role in palliative care of 
a dying patient (General Surgeon USA). 
The premise that artificial nutritional support did not have a role in the provision of good 
death care was agreed upon by most participants. Comments such as 'the use of 
artificial feeding is not really part of the palliative care culture' (Palliative Care Physician 
AU ST), and 'feeding is not an issue in palliative care - it is usually stopped before the 
patient is transferred to the palliative care unit (Palliative Care Physician AUST) sum up 
the basic assumptions that PN or EN did not have a role in palliative care. Bruera and 
Fainsinger (1993) support this assumption by maintaining that with the exception of 
extraordinary cases, the use of artificial nutritional support does not have a role in 
palliative medicine. This view was also supported by the belief that palliative care needed 
to be acknowledged as a medical specialty with a discreet body of knowledge and 
wisdom which was unfortunately, for some participants, not recognised: 
Unlike most other specialties, we in palliative care do know the 
endpoint - we know the outcome, so we actually have a bit 
more authority in the practice of doing no harm. Unfortunately 
we often don't get taken seriously. Other units refer to us to 
clean up their mess. That is a shame, and I hope it is changing 
(Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
Avoiding the provision of artificial nutritional support yet still providing good palliative care 
was explained by one participant as something very basic, that is, good mouth care. 
Oral hygiene is described in most nursing texts as being basic care to ensure a feeling of 
well being (Ferrel and Coyle 2001; Laporte and Witt 2001; Norlander 2001). The act of 
providing the same in a dying patient was described as being potentially life prolonging 
by one participant: 
Mouth care is so important in these people... they can absorb all 
the fluid they need through their mouth. If someone can't drink, 
then you sit with them with a little bowl of water, some ice, some 
swabs, and keep the mouth moist, keep their lips moist. They 
can't get as much water as they can though artificial means, but 
what you are doing is replacing the insensible losses and they 
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have their mouths beautifully cared for, and they can survive 
comfortably for weeks without anything else because they have 
good mouth care going on (Oncology Nurse Specialist USA). 
The provision of mouth care was mentioned just once yet alluded to other forms of basic 
comfort care that would be given in lieu of complex treatments, for example, parenteral 
feeding. Avoiding the initiation of artificial nutritional support has already been explained 
in terms of avoiding the unnecessary medicalization of death, and avoiding the 
associated complications of such treatments, yet in the palliative care setting, the 
participants gave a further reason. The difficulties experienced in withdrawing a 
treatment once it had already been started, was problematic for most participants. It was 
much easier not to start treatment than to cease it. For example: 
It is much easier to not commence nutritional support than to 
reason with family about discontinuing it....it is difficult once you 
are in an established mode of treatment to work out how to get 
out of it when it is clear that it is either not working or doing more 
harm than good (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
This opinion is resounded throughout the medical futility literature regarding the 
withholding and/or withdrawing of artificial nutritional support. Yet in terms of when 
patients were referred to palliative care settings with artificial nutritional therapies in place 
created a hurdle for those involved: 
Despite making it one of our stipulations that before we take 
anybody on to our unit that PN or EN will not be continued, and 
although we make very clear to the referring medical unit, that 
unit occasionally fails to communicate to the patient that this is 
what happens. It is like they cannot bring themselves to discuss 
withdrawal with them — so they dump it on us, and it makes for a 
very awkward situation (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
The 'fallout' generated by the lack of communication was described as being destructive 
both in terms of ongoing palliative care treatment of the patient and their family, and the 
continued relationship with the referring unit. This could essentially be the result of a 
process of denial, which is related to the lack of acceptance and ignorance of the dying 
121 
process as described earlier in this chapter. By and large, the role of artificial nutritional 
support in palliative care was agreed upon by the contributing participants as being 
inappropriate. However the withholding or withdrawing of such treatment was not viewed 
as cruel, or clinically problematic, and as the following quote suggests, be far more 
beneficial to the patient in terms of prolongation of life and comfort care: 
Withdrawing feeding from someone who is dying often prolongs 
their life — with good mouth care and sublingual absorption 
keeps them comfortable and free from feeding related 
discomfort. It is good care. That is what it is all about (Palliative 
Care Physician AUST). 
The concept of good death care was not confined to discussions of dying in a palliative 
care setting. An interesting aspect of death in hospital was that of death in a critical care 
setting. Several participants spoke of 'hi-tech' deaths in intensive care units which were 
both common and predictable. As one participant stated 'a lot of people die in ICU (ICU 
Nurse Specialist USA). The notion that death occurs frequently in this setting, yet is 
devoid of the same 'palliation' as would occur in a palliative care setting, was suggested 
in several ways by one Oncologist. He explained that patients were not supposed to die 
in critical care settings, meaning that 'intensive care' meant exactly that — intensive 
caring to ensure that life was preserved at all costs. He went further to justify the 
difficulties inherent in providing good death care in these settings due to nature of 
sudden and/or catastrophic illness that renders a patient in a critical condition with no 
warning: 
In order to prepare for death, and to do it well, you almost need 
the involvement of the patient, and a lot of the time in the ICU 
setting.. .you don't have that kind of time.. .so you are left with 
the family to do that on their own. It is one of the advantages of 
oncology — if there is an advantage.. .that we have some time to 
involve the patient so that they can take the lead in preparing for 
dying. But in the ICU you don't have that — plus you have a 
catastrophe in which the family is not prepared for. 
Consequently death in the ICU has a tendency to be...um...not 
so good (Oncologist USA). 
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It is interesting here to reflect back to the principles of autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence and justice when discussing the concept of death (and lack of palliation) 
in the ICU setting. Firstly, the patient is not autonomous in that they are, more often than 
not, heavily sedated, nonresponsive and comatose. Secondly, many of the hi-tech 
treatments provided to sustain life are coupled with significant adverse reactions and side 
effects, therefore potentially doing the patient harm. And thirdly, the monetary nature of 
many treatments is exorbitant. Therefore it is casuistry and/or virtue ethics at work here. 
Consequently, the treatment of a critically ill patient in the ICU setting significantly 
challenges the fundamental principles of medical ethics in many ways. This view does 
not feature the literature, albeit one source which was located during a subsequent 
literature search post data collection (Downie 1996). Whether this paradox contributes to 
the deficiency in 'palliation' for patients who are essentially dying in the ICU is a theory 
warranting further inquiry. 
In relation to withdrawing treatments such as artificial nutritional support in a critical care 
setting where the patient is dying was considered more difficult than in oncology and 
palliative care settings. An interesting notion of 'not on my watch' was insinuated by one 
participant who explained that physicians do not want the responsibility of withdrawing 
treatment and often avoided making those decisions. This was explained also in the 
context of moving dying patients out of the critical care setting to die elsewhere: 
It is awful to think that the ICU can't take that kind of 
responsibility and give good death care.. .like they might want to 
keep their unit mortality rates down, and ship them downstairs to 
another ward where another group of strangers will look after 
them. I can't prove that, but I know it goes on (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
Another interesting inclusion to the discussion of good death care was a term coined by 
one the participants, that is, life's Short.. .Eat Dessert First' (Palliative Care Physician 
AUST). Apart from seeing this quote printed on a bumper sticker and parfait glass since 
the time of the interview, it was nowhere to be found in the related literature. This 
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expression was described as being both a nutritionally sound and enjoyable method of 
maintaining a well nourished state in the terminally ill person: 
I tell people, life's short, eat dessert first.. .it is a nice way of 
telling people how to feed someone with cancer.. .their energy 
levels are going to be low, their only means of getting 
sustainable energy is through the sugar/glucose cycle, so let 
them have their dessert... they can eat whatever they want to 
from their main course after that, and make sure they get all the 
rubbish they ever wanted to eat but were never allowed to. 
Giving someone with advanced cancer a health diet to prevent 
cancer is ludicrous (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
The complex oncological specialty of bone marrow transplant (BMT) was highlighted by 
one participant as being worthy of special consideration with regard to aggressive 
nutritional support. However he explained that these patients were extraordinary in that 
the treatment should always be short term with a finite end point: 
The finite end point is that the patient is going to die... and that 
doesn't make that much sense after all the aggressive treatment 
that they may be going through with BMT, or have already gone 
through, and TPN or enteral feeding may or may not make the 
patient more comfortable. It certainly ties them to the hospital 
and ties them to procedures that they may be better off without 
(Oncologist USA). 
Despite the general agreement that artificial nutritional support was indicated in the 
treatment of patients undergoing BMT (agreement via the participants and related 
literature), the above quote reminds us that such treatment is not without its drawbacks. 
Serious illness (namely septicaemia leading to death) related to parenteral feeding via 
central venous access in the BMT patient is well documented in the related literature 
(Kennedy et al 2000; Lina et al 1995). This raises serious questions as to whether there 
is a gap in the treatment ideals and aims between acute oncology care and good death 
care. Acute oncology has been described as being dedicated to the preservation of life 
with little tolerance for the inevitable flow of life toward death (Jett 1995). It is important 
here to differentiate between treating a patient with a diagnosis of cancer (yet is not 
deemed terminal), and one who is at the end stages of an advanced malignant disease. 
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It is also important to be mindful of how we define the word 'terminal'. Doyle et al 
(1997:11) claim that 'terminal' suggests that all is finished, that there is neither the time 
nor the opportunity to do more, and that active treatment is unjustified and might well be 
'undignified'. The Encyclopaedia and Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing and Allied Health 
(1983) defines 'terminal' as forming or pertaining to an end. Similarly, the Australian 
Oxford Dictionary defines 'terminal' as forming or undergoing the last stage of a fatal 
disease (Sykes 1987). The word 'fatal' is paramount in how we utilise the term 'terminal' 
as not all cancers are actually fatal. 
Buying Time 
The concept of 'buying time' was explained by several participants as the continuation of 
artificial nutritional support in those patients who were terminally ill in order to prolong life 
for a specific period of time. The prolongation of life in these patients was described as 
an extraordinary measure in order to reach a certain goal, for example, a birthday, an 
anniversary, or to allow time for relatives from afar to bid their loved one farewell. This 
concept was not anticipated, and did not feature in the review of the literature prior to the 
commencement of the research. 'Buying Time' was mentioned by nine participants who 
comprised of: Two Palliative Care Physicians (AUST); a Critical Care Physician (AUST); 
two Oncologists (USA); a Medical Social Worker (USA); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist 
(AUST); and a Hospital Pharmacist (AUST). Essentially, the participants were clear in 
offering strict practice guidelines in the implementation of a 'buying time' strategy and 
some shared detailed stories from practice where 'buying time' with artificial nutritional 
support had been employed in extraordinary circumstances. 
The establishment of clearly identified goals for 'buying time' was expressed by most of 
the participants as being the deciding factor in continuing aggressive nutritional treatment 
in the terminally ill patient. One Palliative Care Physician offered the following 
guidelines: 
We must ask the patient what are they trying to buy time for? 
What amount of time are they trying to buy is going to be the 
question (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
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With artificial nutritional support, the emotive issues aside, it has 
to be asked what clear goals are you trying to achieve? If there 
is no means of battering the cancer into submission then 
nutrition is not going to help...but...if there were some clear 
goals that the person had, like they couldn't eat and wanted to 
make it to his daughter's wedding in two weeks time, and could 
be put on TPN for two weeks, then I would be the person who 
would argue for it. Yeah, withdrawing it after the wedding and 
then allowing the normal process to take its course. A clear 
defined goal is probably a very important thing to have when 
initiating expensive treatments that way (Palliative Care 
Physician AUST). 
Two participants spoke of realistic goals when 'buying time' as being ultimately short 
term. These two interviews in particular were conducted in August 1999, and both 
participants explained that with their patients (at that time) they did not talk of reaching 
the new millennium. Short-term goals that were realistic were described as being: 
The family reunion in two weeks time, or other urgent short term 
goals like that are not out of the question, but we don't talk 
about making the 2000 celebrations (Oncologist USA). 
I do not have a problem with buying time in certain cases, like it 
is fine to say yeah let's keep going with TPN for the next two 
weeks because the patient wants to make it to a child's birthday, 
but I not sure if you could justify it so they could see in the 
millennium. I mean, that wouldn't be feasible because the 
underlying disease would get them before that (Oncologist 
USAft2). 
It is interesting to note here that the time frame mentioned by these participants was 
exclusively two weeks. Such a definitive period of time appears to be a somewhat vague 
assumption of 'a fair thing' that is not based on any particular institutional policy or clinical 
guideline. The origin of the two-week period for 'buying time' is unclear. No reference to 
it was located in a subsequent review of the literature, which included several Intensive 
Care and Palliative Care texts (Marick 2001; Lynn and Schuster 2000; Doyle et al 1997; 
Oh 1990). 
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Other disclosures of the need for realistic goals, and when 'buying time' was unrealistic 
included the following comments from a Hospital Pharmacist: 
I am quite comfortable with the notion of buying time for very 
definite goals.. .identified goals...I mean if it is necessary for a 
patient to make up with an estranged son, or to get their life in 
order, well that's fine. I have no problem with assisting and 
participating in that process — for defined goals. But if it is a 
case that the patient is terminal, on death's door, motphined up 
to their eyeballs and about to die then I cannot support that 
process. But for the attainment of definite goals yes.. .buying 
quality time is perfectly OK as far as I am concerned. (Hospital 
Pharmacist AUST). 
Another participant shared a similar perspective in which 'buying time' for a terminally ill 
patient would be inappropriate: 
TPN is not going to change the outcome but might be good care 
for a limited time — I have no problem with that. But I do have a 
problem when somebody wants to buy time with nutrition in 
somebody who is actually in the active process of dying where I 
think it is quite wrong to provide it. That would be a cruel waste 
of everybody's time (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
Most participants considered 'buying time' with artificial nutritional support as being 
worthwhile and reasonable. In the context of critical care, one participant described 
'reasonable' as when a patient who did not have a large amount of time to live, would be 
maintained on all life supporting modalities for various reasons like: 
It is important that their existence is prolonged for a given period 
of time.. .like while family get here from England (Critical Care 
Physician AUST). 
And: 
It is not unreasonable to buy time in malignant disease. I have 
done that with TPN and the patient survived a bit longer and had 
some good quality time for unfinished business with her family 
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for which she and her family were very grateful. So yes, buying 
time is a reasonable thing to do (Critical Care Physician AUST). 
Another participant referred to Elizabeth Kubler Ross' work (one of only two that did in 
the entire research) with regard to 'buying time' in the case of advanced terminal illness 
and imminent death. This quote also mentions the importance of 'buying time' for family 
members: 
Kubler Ross talks of no longer having long term goals but short 
terms ones which are important and if you can get to those then 
buying time is worthwhile.. .it is certainly worthwhile for families 
(Oncologist USA). 
The most descriptive example of 'buying time' was shared by an Australian Nutrition 
Nurse Specialist. She explained a situation involving a young man with a terminal 
diagnosis of metastatic carcinoma of the liver who, secondary to catheter erosion, 
developed an iatrogenic small bowel syndrome, and due to a high output fistula, could 
only be maintained with TPN. Both surgery and further chemotherapy were considered 
as futile treatments in the face of a rapidly progressive disease: 
We talked quite frankly with him and his family of how we could 
provide TPN in the home and the potential hassles with CVC 
placement, care and the pump alarming etc. He really wanted 
to get home.. .to spend his last few weeks with his wife and 
young kids.. .it was heartbreaking, but we were doing the right 
thing. Most doctors would not have consented to such a costly 
treatment in the face of death, but TPN afforded him that 
incredibly precious time with his family in their own environment 
before he died. In the time before he died, I asked him whether 
or not he would have gone through it all (CVC etc) to have his 
home TPN and he said 'yes.. .most definitely he would'.. .and his 
wife... well the bereavement counsellor specifically followed up 
on it and she said that they would not have changed anything 
those last few weeks... they felt that his quality-of-life in the fact 
that he was home and enabled him to time to spend with his 
kids was precious (Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUS1). 
Only two participants offered explanations of having problems with the concept of 'buying 
time'. The first, an Oncologist (USA), explained that he did not have a problem but the 
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people who would have a problem with 'buying time' for a patient were health insurance 
companies. The only participant who did not agree with the concept of 'buying time' was 
a Medical Social Worker who worked primarily with the advanced dementia patients. 
She explained that the majority of the patients in her care were artificially nourished via 
PEG tubes and enteral formula, and most were so severely demented and frail that they 
were bedfast, noncommunicative and nonresponsive. She expressed a degree of 
embarrassment during the interview when she awkwardly described some of her patients 
as being simple 'organisms' and 'stool machines' when commenting on their quality-of-
life: 
Keeping them going with PEG feeding I think is wrong — like the 
patient has no quality-of-life. Many of my patients who are that 
far gone, I mean... [long awkward pause].. .it seems like they are 
just this organism, they are totally nonresponsive, they are 
breathing on their own but they cannot talk, they do not respond 
to painful stimuli, or anything like that. All you are doing is 
keeping them clean, bathing them, tube feeding them and all 
they do is groan and poop.. .this sounds so bad but it is like they 
are just stool machines. It makes me wonder just what we are 
buying time for with these patients? (Medical Social Worker 
USA). 
The concluding question in her quote led on to what became the most controversial of all 
questions raised in the entire research project, that is, what are people 'buying time' for 
with the continued provision of artificial nutritional support in the advanced dementia 
patient? The question in the above case was explained by the participant as 'buying time 
for who?' when she shared a horrific patient care scenario suggesting abuse and 
financial gain. Again, the participant took a long time in carefully explaining what was 
obviously a very disturbing experience, yet one that she obviously felt very strongly 
about: 
This sounds real bad but I know it is true.. .that some 
people.. .some families or caregivers have ulterior motives. I 
have this real cynical theory that people continue with PEG 
tubes — some families want the PEG tube because in some 
cases it can prolong life... well most cases with our demented 
patients, and by prolonging someone's life who would receive a 
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welfare payment in a poor socioeconomic community, well that 
is their way of survival, you know. It is a really twisted thing, but 
I see it happening. And what is really bad is they are only 
concerned with the money because in terms of their overall care 
to the patient, well it is borderline abuse. They keep them alive 
to get the payment, and they don't care for them in any other 
way. It is appalling but it goes on.. .so it brings me back to the 
question of who exactly are we buying time for — the patient, or 
the family who benefits? (Medical Social Worker USA). 
This situation was the only description offered by the participants of what could be 
described as both fraud and neglect. It certainly raised an unexpected twist to the notion 
of 'buying time' via the provision of artificial nutritional support — one that was not 
mentioned by any of the other participants in the study nor featured in the literature 
reviewed for this research. The concept of treatment in such cases as being akin to 
abuse could possibly be paralleled with discussions on benefits versus burdens of 
aggressive therapies and their debilitating complications as mentioned in Chapter One 
'Reviewing the Literature' (p. 28-29) yet in terms of questionable if not profoundly 
unethical financial gain, this situation is an isolated dilemma that demands further 
exploration and inquiry. 
Another question arising from the data on 'buying time' has to do with how to withdraw 
treatment after the 'buying time' period has expired, or the clearly identified goal has 
passed? The problem here is to ask whether or not it is ethically sound, fair, or 
reasonable to withdraw life-sustaining nutrition the day after the goal has been reached, 
for example, the day after the birthday, the wedding, or the family reunion? The 
treatment has kept the patient alive until now, so is it not fair to assume that it will keep 
them alive for another two-week period? If so, is it ethically wrong to withdraw nutrition 
which would expedite the patient's death? This contested notion of justice renders such 
questions problematic. Only one participant commented on how one negotiates with 
patients after the goal has been achieved: 
Well then you have to provide more evidence. Usually a patient 
is pretty well aware of reality, but you can look for other short 
term goals but you may have to change your parameters — like, 
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well now the short term goal is just to be at home and be 
comfortable and spend a few more days with family or whatever 
(Oncologist USA). 
Despite this explanation, the fact that such treatment is dependent upon negotiation if not 
bargaining, raises questions regarding the act of withdrawing support in these patients. 
The use of an economic discourse here is interesting. Furthermore, the application of an 
economic construct of 'buying time' might need a discursive revision considering the 
finite contract that is being provided. A further exploration of this dilemma is examined in 
more detail in Chapter Twelve 'Reflections' (p. 284-285) of this thesis. 
Demystifying Death and the Media 
This discussion point encompassed the experiences of participants who worked in close 
proximity to dying patients, primarily in palliative care and oncology settings. The 
concept that death is still granted a considerable amount of taboo and is hidden from 
view was a common perspective shared by these participants. Whereas 50 years ago 
when it was common practice for people to actually die at home, surrounded by family 
and friends, the reality today is that in many communities, death is confined to a clinical 
setting, and witnessed only by a discreet number of people who then possess a real 
perception of the process of dying. The misconception of what death might look like was 
blamed on the media, that is, film and television. This was mentioned by three 
participants: A Palliative Care Physician (AUST); an Oncologist (USA); and a Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist (USA). The following excerpts from their narratives explain the origins 
of this supposed taboo, plus the misinformation on the process of dying as provided by 
the popular media: 
I don't know how many people my age or younger have even 
seen people die in the home. Now, they just disappear in to the 
hospital and everybody else never really sees what it is like. 
Families of dying patients have absolutely no idea how to cope 
with it...it freaks them out to think that they aren't going to 
respond to treatment like they do in the movies (Oncologist 
USA). 
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Lack of real information for people involved in end-of-life situations was coupled with 
comments on their decision-making capabilities being thwarted by unrealistic perceptions 
of what death might be like, or how it can be avoided, by how it is represented on major 
television shows: 
TV can be blamed for so much misinformation. The garbage 
that screenwriters chum out — like what we end up seeing and 
believing in terms of dying is just abysmal. What happens is 
that in real life, I have people, family members, making end-of-
life decisions based on what they saw on 'Chicago Hope' or 
'ER'.. .basing such decisions on major prime time TV dramas 
which are 20 years out of date when it comes to dying (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
This participant had an obvious professional commitment of exposing the shortcomings 
of such television dramas in terms of their misrepresentation of what a real death really 
is. His concern was compounded by the fact that shows like 'Chicago Hope' and 'ER' 
are televised all over the world thereby educating millions about what to expect from their 
health care system — that is, 'free', maximum treatment from which the majority of people 
recover: 
Let's not talk about nutrition and let's look at CPR rates, you 
know, like people actually surviving a code. Well the CPR 
success rates on "Chicago Hope" are about 96%. The truth is 
that in the United States anyway, surviving a code rates 
between 12% and 15%.. .and survival to discharge rates are 
less than three percent. So you have this incredible disparity 
about what the public is seeing on TV, thinking that they have to 
have their family member made a full code because they are 
going to make it through the code, rip themselves off the 
ventilator then peddle home on their bicycle a few days later 
(Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
This quote also captures the high expectations on health care that are deceptively 
transmitted via the news media. Advances in medicine are often over-reported in the 
media, including the ever-expanding information available on the Internet, and hailed as 
major breakthroughs. The constant bombardment of the public with news of apparently 
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miraculous advances in the fight against disease subconsciously raises expectations of 
health. According to Buckman (1993) it becomes difficult for an individual to face the fact 
that he or she will not be cured despite the many miracles seen on television or in the 
papers. 
The process of clarifying what death might actually be like, in terms of debunking the 
perceptions derived from film and/or television was considered a primary function in the 
role of palliative care. Making sure that both patients and families realise that what they 
might see on film or television dramas is very far removed from the truth, was a constant 
battle, especially for one Palliative Care Physician: 
It is a real down turn in the process of trying to do your 
job... when a family member expects miracle recoveries akin to 
a TV show, when in reality the patient is in the active stages of 
dying. I think they feel very cheated (Palliative Care Physician 
AUST). 
The feeling of being cheated could contribute to a growing amount of scepticism of what 
medicine can actually do. One Oncologist (USA) also explained that usually with patients 
and family there is an enormous faith in medicine, yet as more people (be they 
professionals, patients, their families and friends) see somebody die in hospital, it raises 
an awareness of what actually takes place. He too commented on film and television 
dramas contributing to confusion: 
TV doesn't help. I don't know how many times I have had to 
explain to people that people just don't take a big breath and 
then snuff it gracefully.. .it is very shocking for people to accept 
that in many circumstances there is nothing graceful about 
peripheral shutdown, cheyne stoking, and so on (Oncologist 
USA). 
Essentially the failing of film and television medical dramas is that they fail to represent 
how a person actually dies. A subsequent literature search after the data collection 
period did uncover several sources in support of these assumptions. Meyer (1998) 
explains that although the majority of people want their deaths to be quick, painless, at 
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home, and with family around, in reality 85% of deaths (in the USA) occur in medical 
settings with 15% of that 85% occuring in intensive care units. These deaths are seldom 
quick or painless and families and loved ones are kept at bay by unreasonable visiting 
hours. This belief is supported by Corr (1993) who claims that in many of these 
institutions, family members are excluded, or are only permitted to be present and 
participate in limited ways. Because dying is most likely to take place outside of the 
home (in modern societies), family members are often not present at the moment of 
death, and learn about a death by a telephone call from an institution. Cleaning, 
dressing, and preparation of the body — actions that once were regarded as final 
gestures of love and respect, are now likely to be performed by nurses and funeral 
directors — not family or loved ones, and not by doctors either. 
This 'medicalization' of death featured strongly in the participants', stories and a 
subsequent reflection to a scene in a movie occurred for the researcher. The movie 
'Places in the Heart' which was filmed in Waxahachie, Texas 13 in 1984, involved a 
moving, yet foreign scene (to the researcher) where a man's body was brought to the 
family home by male colleagues after being fatally wounded in a shooting. The man's 
corpse was laid down on the large kitchen table where the women then tended to him — 
bathing and dressing his blooded body. The story took place in the post war depression 
period and typified how death would have been realistically dealt with by family and 
friends in the 1930's in a small Texas town. This confronting reality is in stark contrast to 
the aforementioned contemporary dramas. 
Conclusion 
Many of the points made by the participants correspond with similar findings in the 
literature, including the so-called 'death myths' that permeate peoples' perceptions of 
death. The fact that death is often constituted as medical failure is significant. This is an 
important factor in the continuation of aggressive nutritional treatment for those patients 
entering their final stage of life. 
13 Coincidentally, two of the research participants were from Waxahachie, Texas, and spoke 'off the record' of when the film was 
being shot in their hometown near a now deserted railway track, thus reminding the researcher of the particular scene. 
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This situation can be aligned with one of the death myths cited by Meyer (1997:30), 
namely, 'Death is evil. Death means failure'. Meyer holds that while the church is largely 
responsible for promoting this myth, the medical profession is responsible for its 
persistence. In examining the medicalization of death we learn from the participants' 
contributions that needless suffering may be alleviated by a thoughtful look at our 
assumptions and biases about proper end-of-life care. 
Indeed acting to address misdirected intervention that does not foster a peaceful death 
demands research. Addressing the shortfall in appropriate death education for medical 
trainees only factored in the American interviews and literature. It was discovered that 
major steps were being taken to address this - namely by the Association of American 
Medical Colleges (AAMC). A 1997 review of medical education by Field and Cassel 
throughout the USA concluded that medical training failed to provide graduates with the 
knowledge, skills and attitudes required to care well for dying patients, and their 
families/carers. As a result the AAMC (1999) suggest that an increased emphasis on 
end-of-life education and clinical ethics education in the areas of medical futility and duty 
of care has resulted in 96% of USA medical schools now teach about death, dying and 
end-of-life care as part of an existing course. Further, one third of USA medical schools 
were in the process of improving the curriculum that address end-of-life care for the 
chronically, critically and terminally ill. 
The lack of similar education programs in the UK and Australia suggests an interesting 
connection here considering their socialised and privatised tendencies respectively. 
Similarly, the connection between hi-tech deaths in critical care settings and the lack of 
acceptance of palliative care in such settings are surely compounded by this shortfall in 
the education process. 
The most confrontational conclusion from the narratives explored in this chapter 
concerns the vexing concept of 'buying-time' in the specific case of tube feeding in a 
severely demented elderly patient for the carer's financial interest. One of the limitations 
of qualitative research is that we can never take from the one instance and automatically 
claim a systemic problem. However, further inquiry is warranted into whether such 
practice is more extensive. Such inquiry however does not fit within the parameters of 
this thesis. It is important to note that other participants certainly raise the issue of 
revenue generation. Accordingly, it is most appropriate that this contentious issue is 
further examined in the next chapter entitled 'Money'. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MONEY 
Introduction 
Whether health care is financed by the market or the government, whether providers are 
public employees or private entrepreneurs, according to Morreim (1995) no health care 
system has enough resources to meet every need or desire of every citizen. This 
assumption forms the basis of this chapter which has been aptly entitled 'Money' as it 
conveys in the simplest of terms, those issues raised when discussing utilisation of 
resources. The participants spoke in terms of 'generating revenue'; 'payment'; 'who 
pays?'; and, 'health system differences' which became the names given to the codes that 
were then merged to form this major theme. The provision of artificial nutritional support 
was discussed within the context of money mainly in terms of cost cutting, revenue 
generation, and wasted resources. However the actual provision of artificial feeding was 
not always a dominant point in these discussions. The participants overall tended to 
speak of wider reaching issues of which nutrition was only a small part of. The semi-
structured nature of the interviewing allowed for this flexibility, and also made way for 
other discussion points that were not only unexpected, yet somewhat enlightening. 
The four codes were discussed in various ways depending on the geographical location 
of the participant, or more simply, what model of health care delivery system the 
participant practiced within. This latter point shaped the participants' contributions more 
than any other factor, and it is useful here to explain the essential differences between 
health care delivery systems as experienced by the participants. Those participants from 
Australia and the UK defined their practice environments as being 'public health care 
systems', 'socialised health care', and/or 'universal health care'. These terms have been 
referred to as such in the literature (Parker 1999; Holm 1995; Himmelstein and 
Woo[handler 1986; Frenkel 1998; Schramm 1992). Both countries also employed a 
system of private health care whereby patients could choose to have private health care 
insurance which was optional. 
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The USA participants explained a health care delivery system as 'privatised', or as 
several participants stated 'capitalised', whereby health care delivery was not publicly 
funded via government imposed income tax (as in the UK and Australia), yet funded by 
health insurance companies via member contributions/premiums. These insurance 
companies were referred to as managed care14 companies, health maintenance 
organisations, and health insurance companies. Publicly funded health care in the USA 
(which was confusingly referred to as Medicare — as it is in Australia, yet both having 
different meanings) provides health cover to people aged 65 and over, those who have 
permanent kidney failure, and certain people with disabilities. Additionally, Medicaid was 
also referred to, that is, the joint-funded (Federal and State) health insurance program for 
certain low income and needy people —a program which covers approximately 36 million 
Americans including children, the aged, blind and/or disabled (Official Health Financing 
Commission of America: www.hcfa.gov). 
The following discussion points as contributed by the participants underpin this chapter: 
Resources; Power of Insurance Companies; Generating Revenue; and Apathy and 
Activism. They are discussed in order of relevance placed upon them by the 
participants. Interestingly, these discussions attracted more importance and contribution 
by those participants practising in the USA than from the UK or Australia. 
Resources 
This discussion point was raised numerous times by the following 14 participants: A 
Gerontologist (USA); two General Surgeons (USA); a Critical Care physician (UK); a 
Critical Care Physician (AUST); two Oncologists (USA); a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist 
(USA); a Dietitian (USA); a Palliative Care Physician (AUST); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist 
(AUST; a Hospital Pharmacist (AUST); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (UK); and a General 
Surgeon (AUST). The first point to be raised was the notion of wasting costly resources, 
that is, parenteral or enteral feeding on certain patients. This was discussed as occurring 
14 'Managed care is medical care that is provided by a corporation established under State and Federal laws - a company that makes 
medical decisions for you in much the same way a financial adviser takes charge of your investment portfolio. Your managed care 
provider tells you which physicians to consult monitors the medications and treatments they prescribe, and ensures that your costs 
remain as low as possible. For these services, you pay a set insurance premium each year. 
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in patients where the treatment could be considered futile, and also when the treatment 
could be considered as being superfluous. Firstly, in the case of futile treatment, one 
Gerontologist explained that a lot of TPN was wasted on critical care patients who were 
fast approaching death: 
I sometimes have patients in the ICU that stay for far too long. 
The ventilator costs a fortune, the dialysis costs a fortune, the 
TPN costs a fortune, and we just keep on going with it because 
no one wants to pull the plug.. .so we think about cutting costs, 
but it ends up costing a fortune. It ends up being a huge waste 
of resources for some patients, and yes — we do waste a lot of 
resources that way (Gerontologist USA). 
Cost cutting was mentioned numerous times in relation to both avoiding the wasting of 
resources and ways of saving money by the act of restricting or limiting the provision of 
artificial nutritional support. One participant explained that the 'managed care' 
environment in the USA had contributed a lot to this: 
I see certain environments where they are really into cost cutting 
and managed care is of real concern. Let's just say that if a 
person who really needed TPN (and it is not a matter of one or 
the other) — you know, like we could skimp on things and give 
them enteral...if they really needed it, then there may be 
situations where people might do that — might skimp on the TPN 
and give enteral. That is not that hard to comprehend because 
those managed care companies can really impact upon your 
practice (General Surgeon USA). 
All participants agreed that parenteral nutrition was far more costly than enteral nutrition, 
yet there were conflicting views between the participants with regard to nutritional 
support being an expensive treatment or not. The following participants explained it as 
being somewhat inexpensive when compared to other treatments: 
In the overall cost of health care, nutrition is a small amount of 
the big cost of the hospital stay (Gerontologist USA); 
Sure TPN is expensive compared to enteral but when you 
compare it to some of the new generation antibiotics it is 
probably a walk in the park (Critical Care Physician UK); 
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There are many other things more expensive than TPN, and 
TPN has become cheaper by being able to buy it ready mixed, 
plus there are loads of suppliers now for premix in the UK 
(Nutrition Nurse Specialist UK); 
Costs associated with nutritional support are not that great - I 
mean a hundred bucks a day for TPN is peanuts -1 wouldn't 
view the costs as sort of overwhelmingly substantive.., nutrition 
is a very small part of the overall cost involved in supportive 
treatment (Critical Care Physician AUST). 
This last participant did not consider the provision of artificial nutritional support as being 
pertinent to true cost cutting and resource allocation arguments. He explained his views 
in terms of managing the 'whole' patient in a critical care situation: 
The cost of nutrition, well it doesn't faze me. Even if we all know 
that the feeding isn't doing any good but we keep feeding to 
appease the relatives then so be it. I don't view that as being 
nearly as difficult as having a patient parked in the ICU on a 
ventilator, and I am cancelling surgery and sending people to 
Sydney or Melbourne from our emergency department - now 
that costs money, and I view that as a big thing. I don't view 
somebody getting a bag of milky white fluid costing $100 a day, 
even if it is not strictly necessary, as a big thing. If giving them a 
bag of milky white fluid costing $100 a day makes it easier for 
the doctors and family to come to terms with the disease, then I 
think that is money well spent.. .personally. I don't think that it is 
a big enough issue to get caught up about (Critical Care 
Physician AUS7). 
Similarly, another participant referred to the potential of over-prescribing when in fact it 
might not be therapeutically beneficial due to the cost of TPN not being expensive when 
compared to other therapies: 
There is a lot of over-prescription of TPN because it is so readily 
available now to the point where you could consider it as being 
reasonably cheap, yet because of that it is often inappropriately 
over-prescribed (Oncologist USA). 
Conversely, several other participants challenged these assumptions by explaining that 
the treatment was expensive, to the extent that it could be withheld in an attempt to save 
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money. A Trauma Surgeon (USA) explained that the provision of TPN was very costly 
and prescribing it without considering the cheaper and more physiologically beneficial 
methods of enteral feeding would end up impacting upon the overall budget: 
TPN is costly, no doubt about it, and we got to make sure that 
we give it out to the people who really need it, otherwise it all 
comes back to the unit's budget, and the first thing to go will be 
the nurses' salaries.. .there won't be any money for nurses here 
if we don't look at cheaper alternatives.. .especially if those 
cheaper alternatives actually work a whole lot better (Trauma 
Surgeon USA). 
This participant was referring to enteral access and feeding as cheaper alternatives with 
improved physiological benefits. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine 
'Technology' (p. 246) where the parenteral versus enteral argument is explored in depth. 
It is interesting here to refer back to the literature where nutritional support is claimed to 
account for approximately one percent of total health care costs in the USA equated to 
approximately six billion dollars (Ofman and Koret 1997), hardly an insignificant amount. 
Artificial nutritional support in the form of complex home therapy was also explained as 
being very costly and impacting upon the health budget significantly. An Australian 
Nutrition Nurse Specialist offered a detailed description of how one home PN patient can 
'blow out' the entire budget for a particular service: 
The North Shore Hospital has just closed a surgical bed 
because they now have four people on home PN and they 
cannot resource it without closing a bed. We too have four 
people on home PN and it is extraordinarily expensive - $60 000 
- $70 000 each year for each patient — one of my patients is up 
to $96 000 a year — and you sort of think Oh God how are we 
going to get the money? We get no money coming off the top 
of our budget, and we get no money from anywhere. In Victoria 
they have a scheme where they get $50 000 per home PN 
patient which means that it is finite, and if you have cancer then 
you don't get home PN. So things are only going to get tighter 
(Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUST). 
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This participant explained that home PN cost on average $1600 per patient per week, 
which was an amount that was unwillingly funded by the various Australian private health 
insurance companies. Therefore, home PN was funded out of the public health area 
service which begrudgingly paid for such treatment. As the participant commented: 
We have to go through this bloody great palaver through the 
public hospital to pay for home TPN. It is thankless work.. .sure 
you might get a thanks from the patient and the family, but you 
don't have the hospital CEO saying 'congratulations.. .you have 
just spent $40 000 on someone who has never contributed a 
cent to this hospital'.. .11 really is like getting blood out of a stone 
(Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUST). 
The financial drain of costly nutritional therapies on the health budgets of either an 
institution or the wider community was also discussed by a Hospital pharmacist. He 
explained the provision of artificial nutritional support as being either 'wise economy' or 
'false economy' in terms of responsible allocation of health resources: 
We are the custodians of the money, and health gets so much 
money... we have to relate to the cost to the hospital, the cost to 
the community and we have to ask ourselves are we spending 
our money well, or wisely? So if someone chooses to place a 
person on costly TPN then there are significant 
implications.. .are we getting good value for money?.. .are we 
getting the best possible value from that money? And are we 
doing the best thing for our patient? (Hospital Pharmacist 
AUST). 
The economical impact on society is mentioned briefly in the literature on terminal care. 
Fischer (1992) argues that ethical evaluations have been raised by the desire of some 
individuals to prolong their lives at the high expense to society as such that other 
individuals are denied services because of limitation of available resources. Cost cutting 
was also discussed by a Critical Care Physician (UK) who embraced a certain degree of 
humour when explaining the severity of cost constraints in clinical reality. He explained a 
common situation in which he was told to make cuts to the ICU budget, then another five 
percent of cuts the following year, another five percent the year after, and yet another 
five percent the year after that. These cuts were to be made from a present baseline 
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budget which he described as being 'minimal'. In order to comprehend his budgetary 
situation he offered the following explanation which he had also conveyed at a meeting 
with hospital management: 
When I was thinking about how I could make these cuts to the 
ICU budget, the pharmacist said that we were spending too 
much money on TPN. I then suggested that instead of starving 
people by withholding costly nutrition support, the best way of 
saving money would be to bring in leather biting blocks so we 
wouldn't have to use opiates. The chief executive who was 
party to this discussion started laughing and said to me the he 
hoped that these bite blocks were going to be re-usable! So this 
is the sort of level we are working at (Critical Care Physician 
UK). 
Concerns regarding continual cost cutting as mentioned above does feature in the 
literature. Several authors argue that cost cutting devices result in one-time savings that 
temporarily diminish the baseline of medical expenditures without affecting the rate of 
growth. However, such devices like reducing length of stay can only be reduced so far, 
and once clinical routines of care have had their 'fat trimmed', further cuts will only 
compromise care (Ginsberg 1987; Schwarz 1987; Ginsberg 1983; Spivey 1984). 
The ethical and efficient utilisation of costly artificial nutritional support was also 
discussed within the context of best practice based on good evidence. This was also tied 
in with discussions on wasted resources. For example, one participant explained that 
providing artificial nutritional support at the end-of-life was rarely dependent on good 
evidence that it was worth the expense. He referred to a study of cancer patients being 
artificially fed to the tune of $100 000 per year of life, and that '... obviously there are 
other situations in which such provision and cost has to better measured (Oncologist 
USA). At first, this comment read as being somewhat blunt in terms of placing a dollar 
figure measurement on somebody's life, yet after revisiting the interview transcript and 
comparing it to several other transcripts, similar blunt yet truthful confrontations of 
economic realities became apparent when discussing artificial nutritional support in 
vulnerable patients. This is only mentioned briefly in the related literature whereby 
Ofman and Koretz (1997:453) explain that there is insufficient evidence to support 
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nutritional therapeutic intervention in many patients, as its costs are not 'economically 
defensible'. They also claim that the widespread use of this modality cannot be justified 
in a cost-constrained health care system. One participant did offer a placating 
explanation: 
It is a question that comes up a lot — are we actually wasting 
resources on people when someone else could be benefiting 
from it.. .like artificially feeding a dying patient with TPN when a 
post op patient in ICU should really be getting it. Now all of this 
sounds really cruel to brand treatment as not economically 
viable but in reality that is what we sometimes do (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
The expression 'economically viable' was also suggested in terms of 'false economy'. 
Again, this term reads as being insensitive and unnecessarily abstract when considering 
that we are dealing with real people whose lives are dependant on the so-called 'milky 
white fluid'. However as another participant explained, the severity of cost constraints 
and the pressures placed upon service delivery by strict budget management created 
situations where such treatments were rationalised in order to either meet budget targets, 
and/or avoid other compensatory cost cutting mechanisms: 
We are always over budget... we always have too many patients 
per year to accommodate. Of course we don't send people 
away, but we are constantly reminded that we are going over 
budget, so that the economics of the provision of care has to 
come into it no matter how distasteful it is. To provide one 
patient with TPN or EN when that patient is actually dying — well 
in any other circumstance not be receiving it is quite wrong 
because it means that some other patient will then either not get 
a bed or will be denied some other treatment Unfortunately 
such a basic thing as basic nutritional care comes down to 
money, and it very much impacts on the budget we have 
(Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
Operating within limited resources featured more prominently in the discussions offered 
by the UK and Australian participants. The impact of false economy on the community at 
large was only mentioned by one Australian participant. This Hospital Pharmacist 
described poor prescription (based on poor evidence) of both TPN and EN might not 
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necessarily impact upon the hospital budget per se, yet would have far reaching 
consequences on the wider community: 
I personally don't feel that! have a responsibility for buying into 
it...I like to stay out of those arguments. If some prima donna 
surgeon or physician demands TPN for every Tom, Dick and 
Harty then that is up to them. But it shouldn't be.. .that kind of 
practice ends up draining on the budget which ends up draining 
the community.. .like we will have to either cost cut in tens of 
closing beds or cancelling operating lists to come in on 
budget.. .and that is not fair to the people out there who really 
need those services (Hospital Pharmacist AUS7). 
Cost cutting discussions were confined to those health care settings previously described 
as public, socialised or universal. Thus, these featured primarily in those discussions with 
participants working in either the Australian public hospital system, and the National 
Health Service (NHS) in the UK. It is useful to point out here that only those American 
participants who granted cost cutting with considerable importance were those practising 
within county hospitals which were funded by Medicare and Medicaid. 15 This however 
was more the exception than the rule, and conversely, those participants practising within 
privatised settings mentioned the potential of revenue generation. 
Generating Revenue 
The concept of generating revenue via the provision of artificial nutritional support was 
described by some participants as the hospital being able to derive a 'fee for service' for 
the prescription and delivery of such treatments. Not all participants agreed that this 
occurred within their practice settings, yet most commented that it was not an 
unreasonable thing to assume. The denial of actually partaking in revenue generation 
not only protected the individual participants from admitting unethical behaviour, yet by 
virtue of believing that it 'probably did go on', and/or 'could see where that would 
happen', created an admission of sorts to the actual practice itself. Those practising 
15 In the United Sates of America, Medicare is a health insurance program for people aged 65 years and older, some disabled people 
under 65, and people with end-stage renal disease. Medicaid is a jointly-funded, Federal/State health insurance program for certain 
low income and needy people. It covers approximately 36 million individuals including children, the aged, blind, and/or disabled, and 
people who are eligible to receive federally assisted income maintenance payments (www. medicare.00v: www.hcfa.00v). These 
definitions differ with the Australian version of Medicare which is Australia's universal health insurance scheme. 
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within public health care environments adamantly explained that reaping financial gain 
was impossible, as described in the following quotes: 
I doubt there is any way that we could make money out of 
providing TPN or EN.. .by providing it, well it actually costs us 
money in the NHS. Whether or not we wouldn't provide it 
because we couldn't afford it or had blown our budget, well that 
is possible but I doubt whether that would ever happen (Nutrition 
Nurse Specialist UK); 
I don't think that goes on, well I hope it doesn't...no....that isn't 
quite true in the sense that in private hospitals TPN is expensive 
and we cut costs by skimping sometimes.... we will use a half-
baked TPN without lipids to cut down on cost instead of full TPN 
- that is somewhat of a little compromise to save on price 
(General Surgeon AUS1); 
On the NHS side of things, every single patient who is put on 
TPN - well we have our Rottweilers in the Pharmacy who will be 
trying busily to find any way possible to stop giving them TPN 
because it is a real drain on the budget (Critical Care Physician 
UK); 
Here private hospitals rarely do their own TPN because of their 
lack in necessary infrastructure but I would bet my bottom dollar 
that if they could they would do so as a revenue generating 
exercise - that wouldn't surprise me (Critical Care Physician 
AUST). 
A Critical Care Physician (AUST) who worked exclusively in a public hospital setting 
provided a scathing attack on such practice when asked whether he thought that artificial 
nutritional support could be used as a source of revenue in a private setting. This 
colourful description embraced his personal description of ideal 'socialism' and 'free 
health care': 
The issue of fee for service medicine is something that I am 
fundamentally opposed to. I am basically very much left wing...I 
consider the collapse of communism to be the end of a rather 
noble social experiment actually. Urn.. .so I am nailing my 
political colours to the mast here. I think that fee for service 
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medicine allows private hospitals and doctors to generate 
money on the basis of activity, and not on the basis of need. 
And it happens.. .you have people like me doing the right thing 
and then you have your chardonnay sipping money hungry 
bastards that charge the crap out of their patients for TPN 
whether they need it or not.. .probably finances their kids' school 
fees or their golf club membership (Critical Care Physician 
AUS7). 
The sarcasm articulated in this last quote was not an exclusive feature on this subject 
from this sole participant. Other participants gave similar, yet far less provocative 
explanations of comparable practice. A Critical Care Physician (UK) described how he 
personally could not generate revenue from providing artificial nutritional support, namely 
TPN, in the public setting, yet could do so (if he wished) in the private setting: 
In the private system here in the UK you may well find abuse of 
nutrition for the usual income generation things that 
happen.. .yes, I know people who do that, but then in any 
system you are going to find the guys who abuse the system 
(Critical Care Physician UK). 
Similarly in the American privatised health care setting, a General Surgeon (USA) 
admitted that the practice of deriving income from fee for service medicine relating to 
prescription of artificial nutritional support did occur: 
Oh sure it is possible that some practitioners reap money from 
prescribing TPN and enteral support — I mean they are 
expensive treatments and the monitoring that goes along with it 
means for fees for the physician. I don't do that, and I would 
hate to think that it goes on, but it wouldn't surprise me (General 
Surgeon USA). 
Fidelity (or lack of, as implied by these last three participants) should fundamentally be a 
benign requirement, that is, that the doctor refrain from '...vulgar exploitation of 
vulnerable patients in order to line his pockets with a little extra gold...' (Morreim 
1995:63). This leads to the related concern of conflicts of interest. An Oncologist (USA) 
offered a wider reaching explanation of the nature of generating revenue from within a 
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privatised setting that was not just confined to the questionable prescription of artificial 
nutritional support. As he spoke he mentioned that he was 'being a little cynical' yet 
'frank and open' about what really occurs in practice when TPN might be used over EN 
because it would be more profitable for the provider: 
The efforts to use the gut and prescribe EN are certainly not 
taken on board by some.. .especially if they have shares in the 
company that makes TPN. It is exactly the same as renal 
physicians owning dialysis centres, and if you have interests in 
the company that makes the stuff well none of those companies 
ever talk about non-provision.. .they are all pro-provision 
(Oncologist USA). 
According to various sources gleaned from the health economics literature, doctors 
voluntarily incur conflicts of interest by becoming owners or investors in a variety of 
facilities, ranging from pharmaceutical or medical equipment companies, to free radiology 
or surgery centres, and to laboratory services both in and outside their own offices 
(Institute of Medicine 1986; Ginsberg 1986; Hillman et al 1990; Morreim 1989). The 
motivation behind providing aggressive nutritional support was discussed by another 
Oncologist (USA) who explained that '...TPN companies are going to say that it is 
warranted this much because they want to sell more'. He also added that some doctors 
might be overly aggressive in such provision because `...they may want the charges, the 
reimbursement for administering a complicated treatment' (Oncologist USA). 
The concept of 'pro-provision' was also embraced by another participant describing the 
provision of medically futile feeding in the dying patient, and the somewhat sinister nature 
of such provision in terms of the potential for gaining financial reward via the privatised 
payment system for health care in the USA: 
Most doctors will agree when it is time to consider withdrawal of 
feeding in the dying patient but every now and then a patient will 
arrive back in the hospice setting after having a PEG tube 
placed by a surgeon, and we will be just amazed and ask why? 
Like why did someone do this instead of just letting them get on, 
but you know why.. .well all I can think of is that someone, some 
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doctor wanted the billing! Somebody wanted the money you 
know.. .it is ridiculous (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
Similarly, a Critical Care Nurse Specialist (USA) spoke of 'unethical people' with regard 
to billing for unnecessary nutritional treatments in patients who were suffering a 
catastrophic illness and rapidly approaching death: 
I think it happens a lot. I mean, there are a lot of unethical 
people out there. Now I can't prove that but we have had dying 
patients that we would recommend against placing a tube but 
the family goes and shops around the different hospitals, and in 
the past they have gotten what they have wanted 
somewhere.. .there is always somebody out there who is going 
to do what you want whether or not it is in the best interests for 
the patient. Nine out of ten people will easily agree that this is a 
bad thing to do, but the tenth person will go ahead and do it so, 
so you got to wonder what the tenth person's motivation is.. .and 
often times, in a situation such as that where you taking off a 95 
year old's leg with end stage diabetes, or you are placing a 
feeding tube in them when they are clearly dying, then you think 
that this person just wanted the billing, just wanted the business. 
I think that goes on a whole lot more than what we would like to 
think. I think that there is always someone who will try to do it 
(Critical Care Nurse Specialist USA). 
Whether these responses are based on the participants' own cynical theories or clinical 
realities, the practice of revenue generation was not solely confined to the practice of 
doctors. A previously mentioned scenario in Chapter Four 'Death' (p. 129-130) involving 
a Medical Social Worker's (USA) confrontational perception of welfare fraud in terms of 
prolonged feeding for prolonged living in an advanced dementia patient, also deserves a 
certain synthesis in the revenue generation discussion. Despite being mentioned by only 
one participant, it does raise further questions as to the hidden practice of financial gains 
from the provision of artificial nutritional support — not from the doctor's perspective, but 
from the family's. She elucidated this in terms of prolonged feeding being demanded by 
the family because they realised that as long as the patient was being kept alive, an extra 
source of income in the form of welfare payments could be obtained. This explanation is 
repeated here to clarify this assumption: 
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This sounds real bad but know it is true.. .that some 
people.. .some families or caregivers have ulterior motives. I 
have this real cynical theory that people continue with PEG 
tubes - some families want the PEG tube because in some 
cases it can prolong life.., well most cases with our demented 
patients, and by prolonging someone's life who would receive a 
welfare payment in a poor socioeconomic community, well that 
is their way of survival, you know. It is a really twisted thing, but 
I see it happening. And what is really bad is they are only 
concerned with the money because in terms of their overall care 
to the patient, well it is borderline abuse. They keep them alive 
to get the payment, and they don't care for them in any other 
way. It is appalling but it goes on.. .so it brings me back to 
question of who exactly are we buying time for- the patient, or 
the family who benefits? (Medical Social Worker USA). 
Only one participant commented on the financial impact revenue generating activities on 
behalf of doctors could potentially have on the patient and their family. She described 
the multifactorial nature of medical problems that many of her patients endured, and 
ultimately paid the price both financially and physically: 
These patients that require nutritional support have a whole 
gamut of problems. The fact that they can't eat is only one of a 
myriad of problems, and they usually have fifty people they have 
to go and see. They have to see the surgeon about their 
abdominal problems, they have to see the physician about their 
head problem, they have to seen the vascular surgeon about 
their ischaemic toe, they have to see the endocrinologist about 
their chronic osteomyelitis that we have probably given them 
from not enough calcium over the years and for their insulin for 
their diabetes.... so they get pretty much `speciaftied out', but 
then they have to go see their respiratory physician because 
they have a pulmonary embolus from the thrombus that they've 
got from their long term central venous access, and it goes on 
and on... they are having to see a whole lot of people and they 
have a lot of bills coming in if they are privately insured.. .and I 
feel that if we generate another bill, well that is pretty 
terrible.. .they have to go to this office and that office to pay this 
and pay that, and these people have so much on their minds 
about what they have got to do with their lives (Nutrition Nurse 
Specialist AUST). 
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In all of the participants' assumptions of questionable practice, they alluded to the fact 
that such practice would be extremely difficult to prove. One participant explained that 
proving such behaviour was a difficult subject to broach, and could be viewed as pure 
speculation (Medical Social Worker USA). Similarly, a Palliative Care Physician (AUST) 
mentioned the problem of not being able to prove certain unethical practices, and that 
such practices were made known via both urban legend and backroom discussions. This 
following quote does not refer to artificial nutritional support specifically, yet embraces the _ 
wider practice of fee for service medicine in oncology: 
I think that ordering TPN parallels many other things that 
happen in private practice, which I believe, are very much driven 
by the oncologist's pocket. And perhaps that is not even a 
conscious thing.. .perhaps it is just part of the way practice has 
gone, but I am sure that it is conscious. I am aware of an 
oncologist who is said to practice for at least ten days after the 
patient has died.. .and I think that is the kind of thing we are 
alluding to here — that yes, I am sure TPN is no different from 
some of the very expensive treatments that are actually thrown 
at patients when people perhaps, sitting in a different camp 
shake their heads and ask why is this being done., isn't it 
obvious that this person is at the end of their life? (Palliative 
Care Physician AUST). 
A similar scenario was given by an Oncologist (USA) who openly admitted that he had 
colleagues who were renowned for continuing to bill for service some weeks after the 
patient's funeral. This participant then shared a joke which essentially illuminated what 
he was insinuating, that is, 'why do they nail down the lids of coffins?' The answer being 
'to keep the oncologists out from administering the last doses of chemotherapy. 
Humour, sarcasm, cynicism and scepticism were utilised by these participants to convey 
the unethical practices of generating revenue from the provision of such treatment. 
Overall, this issue of generating revenue poses as one of the most controversial 
elements of the participants' discussions on the provision of artificial nutritional support. 
Yet surprisingly this topic has warranted only scant attention in the related literature. 
Whether this paucity of investigation signifies the diversity of practice differences 
between the public and private health care delivery systems rendering such discussions 
too complicated for intensive inquiry remains uncertain. One thing that is certain is that 
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the assumptions conveyed by the participants regardless of their practice settings 
warrant rigorous investigation. To some extent, this has recently occurred in the USA 
following the advent of managed care which leads to the next discussion point. 
The Power of Insurance Companies 
It is necessary to point out here that this discussion point was fundamentally an issue for 
only those participants practising in the USA. Again, the actual provision of artificial 
nutritional support was spoken of as being only one small part of a much larger issue. 
The five participants contributing to this discussion included: A Health Service 
Administrator (USA); two Oncologists (USA); a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); and a 
Law Professor (USA). The dominant proposition of these discussions focussed on the 
power health insurance companies could impose upon the actual practice of health care. 
The actual nature of reimbursement from insurance companies for services rendered by 
health care providers was viewed by some as changing the nature of practice and the 
quality of health care delivered. For example, one participant explained that since the 
advent of managed care, the quality of health care had deteriorated because the goal of 
the health insurance company was to fund a level of care that was considered adequate: 
Managed care companies now use the term `adequate 
care'.. .not optimal care, but adequate, and they are very open 
about that in their policy statements.. .in their mission 
statements and stuff. That way, they will provide, they will fund 
for adequate care, whereas before, it was optimum care, you 
know, premium care, or whatever their best word was that they 
could think of for their mission statement.. .and now, they are 
very proud of `adequate' (Health Sell/ice Administrator USA). 
Consequently, the level of health care that was funded by the insurance company was 
explained as being driven by cost constraints in order to save the provider money. 
Those who directly pay for health care, including government, businesses, and insurers, 
institute a broad variety of controls and incentives to ensure that physicians and patients 
consider the economic as well as the medical wisdom of their health plans (Morreim 
1995). For example, one participant described the level of care that used to be provided 
in a neurosurgery setting: 
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We used to be funded to keep the patient in for a few more 
days, get some good physical therapy going, some good rehab 
to make sure that they were safe in mobilising, get their 
swallowing under control so they wouldn't get aspiration 
problems.. .well now, they are pushed out the door in half the 
time. The problem here is that if we do provide more optimum 
treatment, and then we tty to get reimbursed for it, well the 
insurance company will not approve it.. .so we end up witting off 
a lot of bills.., we don't get paid for the care that we provide, the 
care that the patient really needs (Neurosurgeon USA). 
This participant went on to explain that the provision of purely adequate care would result 
in creating more expense because many patients would develop more complications 
from either expedited discharge, deficient care, and/or lack of appropriate follow up. He 
mentioned that between 1998 and 1999 he had witnessed the closure of numerous local 
home health care agencies that he used to refer to a lot for home physical therapy and 
skilled home nursing care for many of his post operative patients. These agencies had 
closed because they were not able to seek reimbursement for the many skilled visits that 
they provided, and consequently were no longer economically viable. Consequently, 
many of his postoperative patients were developing complications that would necessitate 
further hospitalisation: 
Unfortunately now it is common place for some of my patients to 
develop decubiti or footdrop — I mean, like it is accepted practice 
that following a complex laminectomy you get decubiti and, or 
footdrop. Now a couple of years ago that would be totally 
unacceptable, like bad practice. Now it is almost the norm 
(Neurosurgeon USA). 
The notion of health care providers being disempowered by strict reimbursement criteria 
from insurance companies was also mentioned in terms of only providing 'adequate' 
care. One participant described a common scenario in which the insurance company (or 
representative thereof) could dictate what treatment was necessary or not, without ever 
seeing the patient: 
Somebody at the insurance company will determine what 
medical procedures need to be done.. .and that person doesn't 
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necessarily need to be a physician that is determining this.. .so 
they have no idea of who the patient is and what that patient 
might really need.. .so whatever the doctor thinks is a fair thing, 
you know, like a necessary test or treatment, well that person in 
the insurance office can say 'no, they don't need that so we 
won't pay for it'. This goes on all the time (Health Service 
Administrator USA). 
In relation to artificial nutritional support, only the provision of TPN was problematic for 
these participants whereby the insurance company would query the necessity of 
parenteral feeding in certain clinical situations such as critical care. The participants did 
not experience problems with reimbursement for the provision of enteral feeding, 
however it was mentioned within the context of hospice care and the criteria for funding 
of such care: 
In a hospice situation you can find yourself arguing with 
insurance companies all the time.. .you see there is this theory 
that hospice care is for six months and that is it.... well who is 
going to guarantee that it is going to be for six months. The 
biggest fear with a lot of patients in hospice is that they are 
going to live for seven months because then you have to justify 
the whole thing, and the insurance company can then turn 
around and try not to pay for any of the hospice care (Oncologist 
USA). 
In contrast to the provision of such hospice or palliative care in the UK or Australia, no 
such finite terms or restrictions to care exist. Despite the denial of certain treatments and 
'optimal' care that could be considered as expensive, the value for money that patients 
were receiving from their costly insurance premiums was considered as being poor. 
After many years of paying insurance premiums to various companies, the quality of care 
that would be readily funded by the insurer was considered by some participants as far 
from adequate. One participant explained that paying substantial monthly insurance 
premiums for over 20 years could easily culminate in many thousands if not hundreds of 
thousands of dollars which would not determine the quality of care to be refunded if it 
was ever needed. When asked if whether or not all the money contributed to such 
companies over the years would make a difference in the quality and amount of care that 
would then be funded, she responded adamantly to the negative: 
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It means that regardless of all the thousands of dollars you have 
paid into health insurance over the years, and if you then 
requested post op therapy thinking that it would be part of the 
costs covered, you then find out that it would not be part of your 
cover.. .you would only get what ever your insurance company 
would grant what is adequate (Health Service Administrator 
USA). 
The same participant added that the only party to benefit from the payment of premiums 
and denial of reimbursement was the insurance company. Embracing a certain tone of 
sarcasm, she explained that all the money contributed, and saved via denial of 
reimbursement, goes to the insurance company administration: 
The money all goes to insurance administration — who are like 
the people on the Fortune Magazine top ten CEO's.. .Fortune 
500 people yeah! They are paying their salaries and buying 
their boats and buying their houses and giving them all the 
perks and the people that have their insurance aren't getting the 
care they need.. .it's horrible (Health Service Administrator 
USA). 
Similar dissatisfaction was conveyed with the processing time taken by insurance 
companies when claims for reimbursement were either denied or stalled when 
challenged by providers. One participant (Neurosurgeon USA) explained that he spent 
most of his weekends writing letters to such companies justifying to the point of 'begging' 
for consideration of further treatment for some of his patients. He explained that there 
was very little satisfaction in his work when he would be trying to do the right thing as a 
doctor and by his patients, when '... any old utilisation review nurse can go look through a 
claim and dictate to you and reject payment or stall it.' This dissatisfaction and/or 
disillusionment was also suggested by another participant who claimed that doctors were 
choosing to either leave medicine or not study medicine because of the power that 
insurance companies had over contemporary medical practice: 
I know a lot of doctors who have quit medicine because they 
cannot give their patients the care they need. I know one guy, a 
surgeon, well he now writes computer animation software for 
medical training. It is far more lucrative and he doesn't have to 
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fight with insurance companies the whole time (Oncologist 
USA). 
This disillusionment in practising medicine has been mentioned by Morreim (1995) who 
argues that doctors' positions have changed profoundly, as his/her obligations to each 
patient are now embedded in a network of competing obligations and conflicting 
interests. Another participant also commented on the frustration and disillusionment that 
could be experienced when dealing with 'far removed' representatives from insurance 
companies that could dictate denial of funding for treatments considered necessary by 
the provider: 
If you can talk to someone there at the insurance company who 
is experienced in what you are dealing with clinically then it is 
not usually a problem, but usually you are dealing with someone 
who is inexperienced in what you are dealing with, and they only 
have a written guideline and no real idea what even the disease 
process is — so you cannot talk to them about it (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
With regard to managed care in the USA, patients and providers are encountering 
significant changes in the way health care professionals provide crucial services 
(Rambur 1998). They discover that there are now incentives for providers to restrict or 
deny care, that tensions between the needs of the individual and the needs of the 
population exist and are growing, and that, perhaps most significantly, third party payers 
seem to have acquired more authority than health care providers in many matters that 
bear directly upon treatment (ibid.) The frustration that was conveyed by these 
participants in relation to the dominance and overriding influence that insurance 
companies had over the provision of health care was expressed from their perspectives 
as both providers and consumers of health care services. The 'activism' of the health 
care consumer in the privatised setting compared divergently with the 'apathy' referred to 
in the socialised setting. This is explored in more detail in the following discussion point. 
Apathy and Activism 
This discussion point was not anticipated in the research proceedings which reflects its 
absence from the literature. Although only a few participants spoke of this concept, it is 
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worthy of a certain exploration within the context of health service differences. In many 
ways, the notion of consumer activism is closely related to previous discussions on 
autonomy in Chapter Three 'Principles' (p. 95). Consumer activism was expressed in 
terms of people taking on more responsibility for their health, and a heightened 
awareness of their health care, its consequences, and their rights as health care 
consumers within privatised settings. Conversely, apathy was expressed as being 
resultant from a socialised system of health care funding and provision that did not foster 
personal and/or financial responsibility, awareness and/or accountability. This was 
explained by one participant who had practiced in both the USA and Australia, as being 
secondary to the fact that people in socialised settings did not have to contribute 
financially for their health care and were therefore not as active in its delivery: 
I notice this a lot.., that is, people take more responsibility over 
their health care, the health care of their family in the US, 
whereas in Australia we have been spoilt rotten by this system 
of Medicare, of socialised medicine that has been dished out — 
and that system does not foster the same responsibility and 
knowledge (Occupational Therapist AUST). 
This 'responsibility' for one's health care was explained by another participant as being 
diminished due to the paternalistic nature of socialised health care. That is, autonomy 
granted to the physician does not foster the same consumer awareness as experienced 
in a privatised setting: 
British law still grants autonomy to the physician and Australia's 
system is based on that model, whereas in America it is very 
much a user pays system where the patient has rights as a 
consumer, and the patient is usually very much aware of those 
rights (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
This view is a good example of presumed physician autonomy, which is well documented 
in the literature pertaining to the autonomy of doctors (BMA Ethics, Science and 
Information Division 1998). Responsibility for one's health and health care could be 
equated with the term 'public involvement', which has been explored and explained in 
depth throughout the primary health care literature. Yet pertaining to discussions on 
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acute tertiary health care, public involvement is often neglected (Calman 1994), therefore 
compounding the lack of recipient involvement and responsibility, and therefore 
reinforcing apathy. The opposite would mean patients and families being considered as 
part of the resource allocation process, thereby being aware of the range of possible 
treatment options, possible outcomes and success rates. 
The concept of not contributing financially to one's health care as occurs in the UK (NHS) 
and Australia (Medicare) was considered by two participants in the USA as being more 
favourable than their current situation with managed care companies. One commented 
that she had heard of universal health care from a visiting nurse (from Australia), and 
remarked that it seemed to be '...a lot fairer, and a lot less fuss...' (Health Service 
Administrator USA): 
It sounds like... with universal health care coverage.. .that there 
is less 'treat em and street em' going on.. .like here, we ship 
them in and ship them out. I would not object at all to 10% 
being taken out of my pay check as long as everybody had the 
same and we were all insured, and we wouldn't have to write 
claims off all the time and having people burdened with medical 
expenses (Health Service Administrator USA). 
On the contrary, a participant from the UK explained that by financing one's own health 
care through private insurance schemes created a better system of consumer 
awareness, if not consumer demands: 
If you are paying for it then you see more of a user-pays 
mentality, like.., well if! have been forking out a hundred bucks 
each pay for my private health cover, and I get sick, need a 
hospital bed and certain treatment, then I damn well want it 
(Nutrition Nurse Specialist UK). 
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An Australian participant spoke of the apathy of people not taking out private health 
insurance, or those that do 16 could still opt for free public care. For example, she 
explained that: 
If something happened to me I can simply roll up at the nearest 
public hospital, even if! have private health insurance, because 
I won't have to pay for it... and anyway, if! did go to the private 
hospital, and if! needed more specialist care then I would be 
transferred to a public hospital so why bother paying for private 
health cover in the first place... and that is the attitude that a lot 
of Australians take (Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUST). 
Despite these suggestions of consumer apathy within socialised settings, one Australian 
participant did comment that from her experiences, the situation was beginning to 
change. She explained that many patients, especially the older population were 
apathetic, yet it was interesting to observe an increase in those people who did know 
their rights. As a means to overcome this apathy, she considered that regardless of 
one's insurance status, all patients admitted to public hospitals should contribute 
payment even if it was a token amount: 
It is my personal opinion that everyone who goes to hospital 
should be paying something on a daily rate towards their 
hospitalisation.. .even if it is only ten dollars a day because I 
think that many people.. .and this is just the frailty of human 
nature.. .they don't appreciate the things that they don't pay for. 
So therefore, they don't make an attempt to get themselves well, 
and there is no incentive to try and stay well, and for many 
people, finances are a real incentive to do this.. .in that if! have 
to go back to hospital, it is going to cost me money 
(Occupational Therapist AUS7). 
This last comment alludes to the notion that money is essentially omnipotent and the 
driving force behind many treatment decisions, actual treatment provision, responsibility 
for one's own health status and health care, and the style in which health care delivery 
systems are modelled upon. The all-powerful dollar, regardless of its national currency, 
le Approximately 37% of Australians carried private health insurance at the of this interview, according to the Australian Health 
Insurance Association, reported on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation website:www.abc.netaufnews/2000/07/item200007.  
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held far more predominance, influence and significance to the ethical questioning posed 
in this research than previously anticipated. Despite an extensive review of the 
international literature, discussions on health care delivery system differences and the 
way they may shape resource allocation decision-making were not located. 
Conclusion 
The detail and emphasis afforded to money in regard to the provision of artificial 
nutritional support were greater for those participants practising within a privatised 
setting. Of these participants, those practising in the USA contributed more to these 
discussions than those from Australia and the UK. This surely reflects the important 
nature of health care and the difference between public and private models of service 
delivery. Although many of the participants' contributions to this major theme were 
directed at wider reaching aspects of acute health care provision, the breadth and depth 
of issues attested to reflected the participants' true perceptions of what was more than an 
issue of artificial nutrition. 
Over-prescription of artificial nutritional support given its easier availability raises the 
possibility of the advantages of cost containment. There are indeed numerous ways in 
which the health care professional could reduce quantity of care without impairing quality. 
As demonstrated in this chapter there are many situations encompassing 'money' and 
artificial nutritional support — whether to save it or to make it. Regardless of service 
model or location, these complex situations of health care financing demand ethical 
analysis. However, what this means for providers and consumers in medicine's new 
economics remains unclear. While recognising that economics profoundly affects health 
care, it should be imperative that all providers can and should avoid compromising their 
patient's welfare in the name of generating revenue or even cutting costs. As Morreim 
(1995) reminds us, we can no longer speak of fidelity as a benign requirement that the 
health care provider refrain from exploitation of vulnerable patients in order to line his or 
her pocket with a little extra gold. The practice of treatment decisions based upon 
revenue generation demands critical evaluation although this is not possible within the 
parameters of this thesis. 
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In this chapter we have encountered the various cultural dimensions of money within 
various Western clinical arenas. The limitations of this study do not allow for an 
exploration of the non-Western monetary dimensions. In exploring monetary 
considerations, we inevitably need to understand the cultural milieu of artificial nutritional 
support, which is the subject of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CULTURE 
Introduction 
This chapter was created by the merging of the following codes: family; food and water; 
ordinary versus extraordinary care; sloganism of starvation; guilt; and multicultural 
differences. Essentially, this chapter explores the socio-cultural context of how artificial 
nutritional support is perceived by both provider and recipient. The 22 participants who 
contributed to discussions within this major theme included: A Gerontologist (USA); two 
General Surgeons (USA); a Critical Care Physician (UK); two Palliative Care Physicians 
(AUST); a Critical Care Physician (AUST); two Occupational Therapists (USA); two 
Oncologists (USA); a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); a Gerontology Nurse Practitioner 
(USA); two Medical Social Workers (USA); two Clinical Dietitians (USA); a Nutrition 
Nurse Specialist (AUST); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (UK); a Hospital Pharmacist 
(AUST); an Oncology Nurse Specialist (USA); and a Trauma Surgeon (USA). Two major 
discussion points are presented in order of relevance and contribution as emphasised by 
the participants in their various conversations. These have been termed 'Distortions' and 
'Culture and Intervention'. 
Distortions 
'What is food to one man may be fierce poison to others' (Lucretius cited in Marino and 
Finnegan 1996:667) embraces the essence of this discussion point. It confronts the 
assumptions of artificial nutritional support being compared to food and water, or as the 
following participant explained as the fundamental requirement for living: 
There are lots of ethical issues I think, with nutritional support, 
and it sort of goes around the base that people see the provision 
of food and water as the basic requirement of life (Nutrition 
Nurse Specialist AUST). 
The comparison of artificial nutritional support with basic food and water has long been a 
controversial topic discussed frequently in the related literature under the common 
heading of 'ordinary versus extraordinary care' (Goldstein and Fuller 1994; Daly 1990; 
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Thomasma eta! 1986; Watts and Cassel 1984). The participants however, gave 
numerous conflicting perspectives on this so-called confusion — some which were not 
anticipated by the researcher. For some participants, this confusion or distortion of 
complex nutritional therapies being akin to basic food and water was not an issue as 
evidenced in the following quotes: 
I have never had to deal with that...I have never had a problem 
with family when it comes to withdrawing TPN or tube feeding in 
an ICU patient. I guess for me it is not an issue, or that the 
feeding is just part of a whole array of treatments that we 
withdraw (Critical Care Physician UK); 
(think that it is recognised as a medical treatment, but it is a 
medical treatment that maintains body weight, maintains 
hydration and not necessarily food. So, as a medical treatment, 
it is continued but not necessarily thought of as food I don't think 
(Oncologist USA); 
I don't think that is the case, but! haven't really given it much 
thought.. .no, (think that TPN or enteral — well they are just part 
of the whole process just like the ventilator or the dialysis. So, 
no...I don't think that there is an issue with nutrition.. .it is just 
part of the whole treatment process (Hospital Pharmacist 
AUS7). 
I can understand how people, nonmedical people get them 
mixed up but clinical nutrition is only one part of the life-
sustaining modalities that are rendered necessary for the 
survival of the patient.. .along with hydration, antibiotics, 
ventilation and so on (General Surgeon USA). 
These participants spoke of artificial nutritional support as fundamentally being a clinical 
intervention akin to a plethora of complex clinical modalities that are provided in an acute 
care setting, and one that is not equated in any way with eating food or drinking water. 
Essentially, they grouped clinical nutrition under the title of 'extraordinary care' or, as 
Studebaker (1988:306) explains, a 'medical treatment'. This raises a need to expose 
those treatments considered by the medical profession as being part of the technical 
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spectrum of life-sustaining clinical interventions, and those that for some are considered 
as basic care. 
Those participants who did believe that there were issues around the distortions of 'food 
and water' and artificial nutritional support offered far more detailed explanations derived 
from their respective experiences. One participant offered this explanation of the 
confusion that can occur when artificial nutritional support is referred to as food in 
situations when people are dying: 
If artificial nutrition is called food, then the patient, the family 
thinks that if you don't provide it, you are starving them to death. 
So you have to be very careful about not referring to it as food 
and then explaining to them how people really die. People die 
basically dehydrated so we must talk about that death trajectory 
with people and how in fact that it is more comfortable to die that 
way than to die with nutrition and hydration where you can get 
stuff that happens.. .like diarrhoea, nausea, vomiting, aspiration, 
bloating, pain... (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
This quote raises an important issue of providing explanations to people of not only how 
they die, but also more to the point at hand, what artificial nutrition is and what it is not. 
This need for explanation, for communication and education in terms that people can 
understand was further elaborated on, revealing the problematic outcomes of what 
occurs when such information is not conveyed: 
Physicians, nurses, dietitians, nutritionists, still refer to artificial 
nutritional support as food and water, and it is not food and 
water. And to do that sets up a frame that the family then is 
almost obligated to continue.. .so when I educate families I talk 
about artificial nutrition and artificial hydration, medical 
treatments, all of which can be withdrawn... and talk to them 
about what happens if you withdraw it and what happens if you 
maintain it, because they do not know this stuff. I mean, how 
are they going to know?.. .they are not stupid, but they are not 
informed because nobody tells them this (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
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Another participant similarly referred to other professionals referring to, or considering 
artificial nutrition as food and water, and the need for raised awareness of the outcomes 
of prolonged aggressive medical feeding: 
Many people don't see it as medical treatment.., they see it as 
part of basic care, and throw statements at you like 'you have to 
feed them, you can't starve them to death'. Actually I have had 
that quoted at me just recently by a ward nurse who said to me 
that her patients are not going to thrash around the bed starving 
to death. We need to educate all our staff that when people are 
unconscious or very very sick there is a tendency for the gut to 
slow down, and you don't get that same feeling of hunger. But 
you get this blanket statement thrown at you — 'you will feed and 
that's that', regardless of whether you are probably going to do 
that patient more harm because there is a morbidity.. .mortality 
involved in nutrition support no matter what way you look at it — 
to some extent (Nutrition Nurse Specialist UK). 
The questioning of whether or not dying from the withdrawal of artificial nutritional 
support does appear in the affiliated literature frequently. In a 1996 response to an 
article regarding such withdrawal, a Registered Nurse remarked 'What hypocrisy! Does 
anyone actually think that dying of hunger and thirst is comfortable?' (Vause 1996:9). 
Such responses do well to compound the distortions apparent in differing discourses and 
knowledge systems between food and water, artificial nutritional support, hunger, thirst, 
and starvation. For those who cannot accept a negative answer to the question asked by 
Vause (1996), the contributing participants posed the question differently by embracing 
the aforementioned benefit versus burden argument. The complications referred to by 
the participants of burdensome feeding are well documented (Finucane eta! 1999; Hull 
eta! 1993; Kohli and Block 1995; Grant 1993; Finocchiaro eta! 1997; Rabeneck eta! 
1996; Cowen eta! 1997; Oyogoa eta! 1999; Stuart eta! 1993; Kutiyanawala eta! 1998; 
Wijdicks and McMahon, 1999; Ciocon et al 1988; Keymling 1994; Patchell eta! 1994; 
Abuksis et al 2000). 
The literal description of starvation being similar to either withholding or withdrawing 
artificial nutritional support appeared in the literature in surprising dearth. One 
exceptional article however (Ahronheim and Gasner 1990) support the claims made by 
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the participants. They explain that the use of the word 'starvation' is especially 
provocative when it is applied to the clinical consequences of not providing artificial 
nutritional support. The picture it conjures up is a powerful one associated with the 
'...wasting, cracked skin, oedema, impaired wound healing, infections, swollen belly, and 
listlessness of protracted protein-calorie malnutrition in the third world so vividly 
portrayed on television' (Ahronheim and Gasner 1990:278). Understandably, such 
images disturb our well-fed society, yet as these participants suggest, may not be 
relevant to discussions about nourishing certain patients artificially. However, the 
symbolism of feeding as a basic caring task deserves a thorough appreciation and 
acknowledgement, thus necessitating appropriate communication between providers and 
recipients and their families/carers. 
The inability of family to come to terms with 'food' not being provided was also 
experienced by one Medical Social Worker, who, when reflecting on her clinical 
experience also referred to the necessity for education and communication in 
understandable terms: 
When I worked the floors I often used to come across frequent 
conflict between the medical team and families.. .and the issues 
were normally around the termination of nutritional support. 
Family just could not come to terms with the notion that food 
was not going to be given and that their loved one would starve 
to death. Of course that is not how it happens, but to lay family 
that is how it seems. takes hours of explanation and 
education and support (Medical Social Worker USA). 
Even though these participants accepted this distortion as being a painful reality in many 
ways, they all agreed that artificial nutritional support could not be equated to basic 
feeding, or the pleasures of eating. As one participant remarked when asked how he 
viewed a bag of TPN he replied: 
It is not a filet mignon by any stretch of the imagination 
(Palliative Care Physician AUS7). 
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Similarly, another participant who was adamant about artificial nutritional support being a 
medical treatment and not to be confused with food, water and eating, did agree that 
there was a certain confusion around the subject, yet not of major concern: 
I don't think that there is any symbolism of food and eating 
around nutritional support, but there is that disquiet, although 
not outspokenly (Critical Care Physician AUST). 
Interestingly, only one participant (Gerontologist USA) did convey similar thoughts on 
'starvation' as perceived by many patients and families when the provision of artificial 
nutrition support is either withheld or withdrawn. 
This is how the family thinks.. .just think about it yourself, the 
thought of someone starving is kind of cruel, so I think that 
probably the family thinks the same way. If you withdraw or 
withhold tube feeding, or not put in the PEG for them to eat, well 
that would be starving them, and the family would think that they 
would be in agony from that, and I tend to agree, so I never 
withdraw feeds (Gerontologist USA). 
This was the only participant who shared the previously described distorted views on 
aligning withholding or withdrawing treatment with 'starving'. It is possible that this is 
because this participant (of Asian descent), was conveying both his professional and 
socio-cultural response to the issue of nutrition. It was later found in the related literature 
that this is a well-accepted perspective on both food and feeding in many Asian cultures. 
The importance of food itself in Asian cultures is well documented. Chang (1977) 
contends that few other cultures are as food oriented as the Asians. Cooking and food 
preparation has occupied a lofty position in Asian history, with one great Chinese 
philosopher claiming that 'governing a great nation is much like cooking a small fish' 
(cited in Chang 1977:32). The above participant was also the only participant who 
claimed that artificial nutritional support was different from other forms of medical 
treatment. He also conveyed his cultural beliefs regarding disclosure of a patient's 
diagnosis: 
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It is common Asian cultural practice to keep certain diagnostic 
information from the patient according to the wishes of that 
patient's family, and we must abide by those wishes 
(Gerontologist USA). 
This participant did not consider that PN or EN should be classified in the same group of 
technological life-sustaining modalities such as ventilation and/or dialysis as described by 
the other participants contributing on the subject of ordinary versus extraordinary care. 
This sentiment is reflected in the literature by those proponents of continued treatment 
who explain why 'food and water' can never be denied (Derr 1986; Siegler and Wiesbard 
1985; Anscombe 1981). Conversely, two participants gave explanations of why artificial 
nutritional support was not to be considered as basic or ordinary care by comparing the 
modes of nutritional delivery, that is, natural or artificial: 
If the patient can actually eat or drink normally then they are 
going to do that and that is natural. But if the patient is unable 
to do that for himself then it is not ordinary food and drink, and 
that of course renders feeding artificial (General Surgeon USA). 
The second participant gave a similar explanation yet also provided an interesting 
paradox of a certain inequity of providing simple oral feeding to dying patients and death 
row inmates: 
One thing we can do for patients and their families is educate 
them that food is fine as long as they can take it orally, I mean 
why not? As long as providing food orally is not going to cause 
them to cough and aspirate. But we are terrible at doing 
that... we are terrible at providing nice little morsels of delicious 
food as comfort at the end of life. We are kinder to death row 
inmates than we are to people trying to die! The guy on death 
row down at the State Prison.., the day before he gets a lethal 
injection we feed him his last supper, and ask him what he 
wants — he can have anything he wants. Yet the guy in ICU who 
is really struggling, and wants a shot of Jack Daniel's, well we 
say 'no, it might kill you? You know, how ironic (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
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The primary component of the conversations on distortion was persuasively described by 
an Oncologist (USA) who emphasised the importance of communication and education 
in order to heighten awareness amongst patients and their families. This in reality, was 
often thwarted by virtue of the episodic consultative nature of hospital medicine: 
Normally the family comes around very quickly to the 
understanding that they are in a dying situation. It needs to be 
explained so carefully and clearly and more often than not, if 
they are frustrated with anything it is because their doctor has 
not come by and fully explained things to them. If he does come 
by it is for two minutes, and goes away and doesn't discuss all 
the issues that need to be discussed. I have never found it to 
be a problem because I always put in the time (Oncologist 
USA). 
This declaration is closely related to the same participant's comments in Chapter Three 
'Principles' (p.110) where he explained that there would not be any ethical problems if 
doctors only communicated with their patients. This importance of communication and 
education regarding both the clinical and ethical realities of aggressive nutritional support 
in vulnerable patients is supported in the literature. McCamish and Crocker (1993) claim 
that communication is the operative word, explaining that difficult situations are facilitated 
by effective communication with the patient and family. 
The cruelty and abandonment implied by the word 'starve' is not conveyed in the 
participants' stories. Indeed, as several participants suggest, the continuation of artificial 
nutritional support may in some cases be cruel, if not fatal. Essentially, these participants 
agreed that the non-provision of such treatment did not constitute starving, nor did it 
result in a gruesome, cruel, or violent death. The related topic of 'force feeding' dying 
patients was mentioned by several other participants within the context of 'needful 
intervention' which leads to the next discussion point that is still very much embedded 
within these discussions on the distortion of what actually constitutes food and artificial 
nutrition. 
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Culture and Intervention 
Feeding, unlike any other medical treatment, has a moral and emotional significance 
derived from culture (Ashby and Stoffell, 1995; Murcott 1984; Connelly 1989; Carson 
1986), and is considered paramount to one's quality-of-life (McGrath 2002). As 
mentioned previously in this thesis, from breast-feeding to Thanksgiving and Christmas 
dinners, birthday cakes and potlucks, to food brought to families in mourning, feeding is 
central to the experience of passage. In the Judaic and Christian traditions, the shared 
meal is an important representation of the faith's life and moral significance. 'You are 
what you eat', 'Bread is the staff of life', 'An apple a day', 'Eat up, it's good for you' — such 
clichés and sayings highlight the commonplace symbolic representation of nutritional and 
social values (Murcott 1984). Feeding, according to Cox (1998) is an expression of 
nurturing and caring, unquestionably for infants and children, and in many cases for 
vulnerable adults as well. Once one enters the realm of complex, hi-tech medical care, it 
is difficult to shed the emotional symbolism of food. Yet the participants went beyond the 
literature in their narratives. By way of describing not only their own views but by sharing 
some descriptive accounts from practice, the participants revealed certain thought-
provoking realities. The views conceded by the participants offered various insights on 
how nutrition was considered between certain socio-cultural groups. The emphasis 
afforded in our societies to 'food' was referred to by an Occupational Therapist working 
with elderly and demented patients explained that so much of her patients' lives revolved 
around food: 
From an occupational therapy and holistic perspective I think 
that food serves as a great function in our lives both in terms of 
visual stimulation, olfactory stimulation, the sensation of taste 
and also the social connotations that are concerned and that 
revolve around food.. .and I think that a lot of our elderly people 
who are not eating, well often that has a lot to do with lack of 
social environment— because we do tend to socialise a lot 
around food (Occupational Therapist USA). 
A Palliative Care Physician (AUST) offered the following confronting yet condensed 
quote revealing a certain 'taken for grantedness' of the importance (and incidence) of 
food in our lives: 
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Food is a cultural process, and it is more pronounced in certain 
patients — like with Mediterranean families for example. To tell 
someone that you can't feed them, well you may as well shoot 
them. When we met today for this interview, I offered you a cup 
of coffee.. .it is a social thing. Offering and providing food is part 
of our way of saying to someone that we care, and in families it 
is sometimes the only way in which the love of the family has 
been expressed (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
One participant directly referred to the social issue of food and feeding which, as he 
explained, was particularly prevalent in 'his' part of the country, that being the 'Deep 
South' of the USA. He described food as being of major importance to socialising in 
caring settings that were especially marked in the large Roman Catholic Hispanic 
communities. When commenting on how this particular culture would respond to the 
idea of either withholding or withdrawing artificial nutritional support from a patient, he 
specified that: 
You have a lot of tap dancing to do... with our Catholic Hispanic 
community, the cultural and religious impetus to feed and 
continue feeding, to do everything for as long as possible. So 
much importance is placed on food, on feasts with these people, 
that to then talk about removing it from a family member, a loved 
one, is just such a sensitive issue. You have to be so sensitive 
and careful (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
Another participant presented a somewhat controversial perspective on the issue of 
withholding or withdrawing tube feeding in African American patients. He explained in 
particularly sensitive terms that he had experienced strained dynamics when dealing with 
the families of dying African American patients with regard to their perceived inequality or 
discrimination concerning continued treatment: 
There is also a racial component — not all the time, but quite 
often — in dealing with the African American families, and you 
are an Anglo doctor... there is a very subtle 'white man is trying 
to do me in' aspect, and you have really got to watch it. And 
they sometimes imply that 'we are getting everything we 
deserve because we are African American'.. .and 'If I was white, 
you would put the PEG in'. I mean, it sounds really overstated 
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for me to say that here but there is that dynamic that I have 
experienced many times (Neurosurgeon USA). 
This notion of strained racial dynamics with regard to the provision of artificial nutritional 
support was not located in the related literature, however, several references to marked 
cultural dynamics concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment were 
subsequently retrieved in the literature on medical futility. Morrison and DeMichele 
(1997) discuss how culture, religion, and ethnicity affect perspectives on life, death, and 
the initiation and withdrawal of life supporting treatments. Their discussions include the 
American Caucasian culture, the African American Culture, the Hispanic/Mexican/Latino 
cultures, the Asian culture, and the Native American culture. Such 'strained' dynamics 
are referred to in brief terms by Morrison and DeMichele (1997) who explain that 
discrimination may be feared in hospital settings, increasing the wish to initiate or 
maintain life support in terminal illness. 
A proposition closely related to the importance of food, or more specifically, the 
symbolism of food was the concept of intervention, or as several participants explained 
by coining the words of family members 'you have got to do something'. This notion that 
people 'must intervene' was mentioned by the majority of the contributing participants. 
By way of not intervening, or not providing nutrition (be it considered natural, artificial or 
otherwise) family members could feel deprived of the very essence of their role, or their 
cultural purpose, as carer: 
It is that cultural process of 'you've got to do something', and 
with people who are dying, with the spouse usually.. .if it is a 
female spouse (it may be sexist to say), but elderly females 
usually it has been their role to feed the family. The caring 
aspects are really the only things the family can do when 
medicine falls.. .and to have the feeding role taken away is a 
large chunk of their perceived ability to care (Palliative Care 
Physician AUST). 
McIntosh and Zey (1989:319) claim that society has decreed that '...a wife and mother's 
success rests as much on the socioemotional aspects of her food provision as on its 
healthfulness'. This statement reinforces the notion of food's symbolic meaning. Despite 
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this meaning, the above quote from this sole participant was the only mentioning of food 
provision and gender throughout the entire research. The same participant also 
described an innate need for family members to continue the active role of feeding (that 
is, providing food orally) in order to quell their own needs of knowing that they are 
providing care, yet often to the detriment of the patient's comfort. He offered a common 
experience in his dealings with families of Mediterranean ethnicity: 
I have experienced this many times with Mediterranean families 
where the husband, the father, the patriarch is ill, is dying.. .you 
often see, well they are almost unconscious and the family is 
around the patient literally stuffing food down their mouth 
because it is the only thing that the family knows what to do in 
order to make things better. Unfortunately it often either wakes 
the patient up so they realise how much pain they are in and the 
fact they are dying, or brings on a violent coughing fit (Palliative 
Care Physician AUST). 
The idea of not providing food was also explained in terms of guilt. The guilt that could 
be felt by family members by virtue of not providing the most basic act of nurturing to 
their dying relative was also related to the need to intervene. One participant explained 
that this could be relieved by explaining the realities of cancer cachexia in cancer related 
situations: 
People do feel guilty if they don't spoon feed the patient.. .yeah, 
actually I think that is very interesting.. .just the notion of natural 
feeding and understanding cancer cachexia. Mostly, we have a 
lot of families who come in and just ask about that... 'he is just 
not eating - what should I do?' Well we can give them a 
multivitamin and so on, but we have to emphasise I think, that 
they should not feel guilty that they are not eating.. .that it is a 
part of the disease, part of comfort is not being force fed, and 
you will have waves and you just have to take advantage of it - 
their appetite - when they are ready to take a mouthful, but you 
can't force feed them to do that because it probably makes them 
more uncomfortable if you try to do that (Oncologist USA). 
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Guilt was also referred to by a Gerontology Nurse Practitioner (USA), who explained that 
because food is a basic necessity for human survival, the idea of not providing it in its 
basic form could create highly emotive situations: 
People think like — let's give him food, and love, and warmth you 
know. They think that well we are here to take of Mamma or 
Daddy, I am taking care of them in their old age. There could be 
a lot of guilt involved. I see that a lot, and it is a very emotional 
issue for family (Gerontology Nurse Practitioner USA). 
This interpretation of feeding as nurturing, especially when embedded within the 'caring' 
discourse such as 'love' and 'warmth' was also alluded to as 'Mom's chicken soup'. This 
term, a well-known comfort food and therapeutic intervention in the North American 
society and popular culture (Canfield and Hansen 1993) was used by a Clinical Dietitian 
(USA) and an Oncology Nurse Specialist (USA) when describing their interactions with 
family members who were reluctant to refrain from 'force feeding' of their dying relatives: 
The patient is not going to stem, nor do they have an 
appetite.. .like when the patient is terminally ill then it is OK if 
they don't want to eat — that is part of their illness. It is the 
hardest thing for people, for their family to understand, like 
'come on and have this, it will make you feel better'.. .trying to 
shovel in Mom's chicken soup which fixes everything. That is 
what people think but it isn't always the case, and for some that 
is really confusing and hard to accept (Clinical Dietitian USA); 
The second participant described a situation where the family members could not come 
to terms with not intervening with nutrition. In this situation, the family had insisted on the 
placement of a PEG tube in their dying mother who, by virtue of her disease process, 
had a very low platelet count. Shortly after the insertion procedure, she haemorrhaged, 
went into hypovolaemic shock and died within hours: 
The family really screwed up there and I believe that they 
wanted it so much because they felt as if they had to be doing 
something... like the most important thing was to keep her 
nourished, you know, like making someone chicken soup when 
they are sick. They could not handle the thought of just 
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standing by and watching her deny food or fluid... they felt that 
they had to do something, instead of feeling helpless and letting 
nature take its course (Oncology Nurse Specialist USA). 
This participant added that the initiation of artificial nutritional support was often a 
proactive stance by the family on behalf of a relative, and raised the issue of questioning 
whose benefit the feeding was for — the patient, or to quell the guilt and feelings of 
helplessness experienced by the family? 
Feeding is more a proactive stance on their behalf, the 
family... however family have to realise that it is not about them, 
it is about the person who is on the receiving end of the feeding 
tube. I have seen a lot of that. I think it is a parent-child 
relationship that is exacerbated by any past guilt that might be 
resurfacing (Oncology Nurse Specialist USA). 
This 'proactive stance' on behalf of the family, coupled with the question of 'who is 
actually being treated' when discussing the guilt experienced by family, was also referred 
to by another participant practising within the area of oncology. He commented on 
situations he had experienced in which the clinical team would often submit to the 
family's request for continued aggressive nutritional treatment to alleviate their guilt, yet 
to the potential detriment of the patient: 
Occasionally we would have family members that would insist 
on everything that can be done and jump up and down for the 
insertion of a central line so their dying relative can have TPN — 
people are a lot more knowledgeable than they used to be with 
the internet etc. I don't agree with central line insertion for those 
patients. In those cases it is an issue of treating the family 
members and not the patient.. .because often the underlying 
cause of the patient's deterioration has nothing to do with their 
nutritional status but it is because of their disease process 
taking over. Their underlying problem will not be fixed with 
nutrition. So it becomes a question of just who are we treating 
here? (Oncologist US4). 
Similarly, the difficulty for family to discontinue what they perceive as basic nurturing and 
loving care was described by another participant in terms of 'force feeding' and/or 
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'shovelling food down' when in fact it was clinically (and comfort-wise) inappropriate to do 
so. She explained the need for family to intervene and to feel as though they were 'doing 
something' as not being uncommon: 
I deal with this every day. Carer's are there trying to shovel food 
down them right up until the last minute. They find it very hard 
to stop that basic care I guess. I think that at the last minute we 
should not always feed the patient...I mean, the patient will stop 
taking food - that is a natural decline. Our patients die every 
day, and if they take food then we give them food - whatever 
they want, but if they don't, they don't want it, they don't need to 
have stuff rammed down their throats (Medical Social Worker 
USA). 
The same participant shared the following account from practice, which suggests both 
guilt and denial on behalf of family members who were desperate to intervene with 
nutrition: 
One patient that I have right now, that I saw just yesterday... well 
the family just keeps trying to shovel food into the patient's 
mouth at a much faster pace that the patient is at with her 
intake, and her ability to chew and to get it down.. .and I think 
that in some ways the family are forcing their own agenda... they 
have a hard time letting go. I think it is like denial... they can't let 
go of the person that the patient used to be. That is what I see, 
that the family doesn't want to let go (Medical Social Worker 
USA). 
The family's 'need' to intervene via the provision of nutrition was also explained by two 
Australian participants. Firstly, a Nutrition Nurse Specialist offered a similar explanation 
to the latter American participants regarding the difficulty in withholding a treatment that 
was considered basic nurturing: 
I asked the family if they had considered withdrawing the 
nutritional support, and they said that they just couldn't do it 
because they felt that it was just like turning and bathing and 
caring for him (Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUST). 
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The next participant shared an account from her practice in a palliative care setting which 
involved a subtle conflict between the patient and the family over the need for nutritional 
intervention, and the reluctance of family to accept the outcome of the dying process: 
In the family's mind nutrition was his whole life-sustaining force 
as it were. The patient interestingly enough had been a cook, a 
chef, so he had been quite focused on food and the provision of 
food — that was his job, but as I said it wasn't so much his 
problem, but it was the problem of the people who loved him 
and their inability to just allow him to die. They thought that 
nutrition was his only hope of survival, and the ongoing means 
of keeping him alive and if we stopped it, then he would die. 
And there was a real sticking point in trying to help them 
understand that in fact he was dying from his disease — which 
was advanced gastric malignancy — and that he was not dying 
because he was not being provided nutrition (Palliative Care 
Physician AUST). 
The need for heightened awareness of the consequences of providing artificial nutritional 
support in those patients who are dying was also mentioned within this context of 
'needful intervention'. One participant coined the terms 'curing and caring' when 
explaining the difficulties he had experienced when dealing with families who wanted to 
continue feeding their relatives despite the complications that ensued for the patient: 
Families get in these situations where they think that they have 
to treat always for cure instead of for comfort, and it is really 
clear that artificial nutrition in patients with a terminal condition is 
uncomfortable.. .it causes discomfort, it causes clinical sequalae 
that are uncomfortable and unmanageable and can cause 
intractable diarrhoea, can wake people up so that they fully 
appreciated their suffering and death. So we are simply 
unskilled at this, and by the nature of inexperience and not 
being educated about it, yes I think a lot of stuff happens that 
doesn't need to which is why some of us are so diligent about 
staying on top of it with people and reminding and educating 
physicians, educating families about it. They — families — don't 
know what their options are, and doing what we can to assuage 
guilt on the part of family members because they think they are 
killing somebody if they don't provide that support (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
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The shortfall here it seems is that the 'pro-procedure/pro-intervention' characteristic of 
typical Western medicine in fact creates the same expectation for those on the receiving 
end of acute medical care. Families and their need to intervene with nutritional support is 
reinforced by the culture of Western medicine as we know it. The fact that medical 
practitioners throughout their previous academic and ongoing clinical education are 
bombarded with 'curing, intervention, procedure' therefore have limited appreciation of 
comfort care. There is therefore an overwhelming need to embrace palliative medicine as 
a specialty in order to heighten the awareness of appropriate symptom management, 
and to accept that withdrawing aggressive treatment is not akin to withdrawing care, 
rather, changing the focus of management. Surely this acceptance and appreciation of 
good death care needs to be embraced by all providers so to project a similar 
acceptance and appreciation on to patients and their families. 
Conclusion 
The employment of burdensome treatment without real physiological justification coupled 
with the potential for clinical complication and subsequent discomfort raises the question: 
What powerful influence is operating that vindicates such intervention? The participants 
contributing to these discussions of culture, symbolism, distortion and needful 
intervention point to a primal nurturing within family frameworks as an important 
consideration. When this is applied to an acute clinical setting, it exposes such 
distortions of what constitutes food and feeding, curing and caring, and basic care or 
medical intervention. Socio-cultural ritual and the symbolism of the provision of food 
have fundamental roles in caring. Yet it is apparent that these fundamental roles also 
contribute to marked difficulties and vulnerabilities for both provider and recipient. As 
several of the participants suggested, the clarification of these distortions is dependent 
upon appropriate communication and education. As Dunlop et a! (1995) claim, 
discussions with family should not be argued from a philosophical standpoint, yet it is 
important to present the facts carefully. However, as one participant suggested, the 
opportunities for extending appropriate communication and education were often not 
fostered by medical professionals (Oncologist USA). This again raises questions 
regarding the ability of health care providers to be effective communicators when 
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confronted with end-of-life scenarios. Whether this exposes inadequacies in their own 
educational preparation for caring for patients and families confronted by withdrawing or 
withholding artificial nutritional support (or life-sustaining treatment collectively) remains 
unclear. The literature generally does support the suggestions made by the participants 
contributing to this major theme of culture, yet with an overwhelming consensus that 
artificial nutritional support is not food and water, rather extraordinary medical treatment. 
However the main shortfall in the literature reviewed for this research was the reference 
to the socio-cultural equations of food to its artificial counterpart in which only a handful 
of excellent sources were located. 
What is certain is that the rudimentary nurturing gesture of offering food and fluid 
transcends all cultures (Ashby and Stoffell 1995). Whatever the experience, this is 
affirmed by the wisdom of the participants in this study. This is not to say that patients 
who have difficulties in taking food and fluid are beyond care. It is rather an 
acknowledgement of the limits of usefulness of medical treatments and 'comfort food' in 
the care provided for dying persons. It could be argued from the collective view of the 
participants that symbolic meanings are not always sufficient for determining the 
rightness of actions. Such acknowledgements certainly raise conflicts regarding artificial 
nutritional support and what constitutes 'feeding'. These conflicts are discussed in the 
following chapter which has been aptly named 'Dilemmas'. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DILEMMAS 
Introduction 
The title of this chapter was chosen as it represented the perplexing and controversial 
nature of certain experiences associated with the questionable provision of artificial 
nutritional support as endured by the contributing participants. The merging of the 
following codes formed this major theme: conflict re feeding; overtreatment; legal issues; 
inappropriate treatment; ethical dilemmas; convenience; and abuse. The 27 participants 
contributing to discussions included: A Critical Care Physician (UK); a Critical Care 
Physician (AUST); a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); a General Surgeon (UK); a 
Neurosurgeon (USA); two Critical Care Nurse Specialists (USA); three Clinical Dietitians 
(USA); a Palliative Care Physician (AUST); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (UK); two 
Medical Social Workers (USA); two General Surgeons (USA); an Occupational Therapist 
(AUST); two Oncologists (USA); a Gerontology Nurse Practitioner (USA); a Law 
Professor (USA); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST); and Oncology Nurse Specialist 
(USA); a Health Service Administrator (USA); and a General Surgeon (AUST). 
The main discussion points identified when reviewing all data pertaining to this major 
theme centred on the issues of abuse, conflict, and the law. However, a further in-depth 
analysis of these discussion points identified communication (or lack of) as the main area 
of concern for the participants. Abuse as a discussion point encompassed those 
controversial treatment issues of overtreatment, inappropriate treatment, and 
unexpectedly, convenient treatment. Legal issues, a discussion point which was 
contributed to exclusively by the USA participants, conveyed the practice realities of what 
one participant termed 'defensive medicine' and the unethical nature of health care 
litigation. Several other issues raised by the participants were also unanticipated, having 
not been commented on in the literature pertaining to ethics and nutrition. The following 
discussion points are considered in order of emphasis and content as granted by the 
participants. 
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Abuse 
It should be noted that the employment of the term 'abuse' was done so with a 
considerable degree of trepidation considering the controversial connotation it evokes. 
However, as several participants utilised this word freely in their narratives, as well as it 
appearing in the related literature, its employment was deemed appropriate. The 
literature however, does not contribute to the 'abuse' discussions in the same way as the 
participants. Only two articles were located that embraced the notion of abuse of artificial 
nutritional support (Archer eta! 1996; Silberman 1991), referring to only the technical 
aspects of such therapy in strictly objective terms. Neither mentioned those subjective 
explanations as offered by the participants in this discussion point. The controversial 
nature of these discussions could be one reason why they are either overlooked or 
avoided in the related literature. 
Discussions of the possible abuse of artificial nutrition as a treatment ranged from 
technical and clinical inappropriateness to burdensome and unethical practice, especially 
in those patients who were considered vulnerable. Only one participant believed that 
there was not the potential to abuse or exploit the readiness or improved availability of 
artificial nutritional support as a clinical modality. This participant (a General Surgeon 
AUST), referred to the technological aspect of his clinical responsibilities, and did not 
believe that such support could ever be abused. When asked whether or not he believed 
that there was a potential for such treatment to be over-used or under-used, he 
responded: 
I don't think that there is any ethical area really, I mean I get 
asked to place implanted ports for patients with cancer, who 
might need TPN, or a feeding tube...I get asked to perform a 
technical procedure, so I do it. I personally don't get involved 
thank God in all that ethical stuff.. .so for me it is not an issue 
whether they need the stuff or not. I just do my job. (General 
Surgeon AUST). 
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Interestingly, this participant considered his technical role as being value neutral. 
Conversely, two other General Surgeons, both from the USA, had very conflicting 
opinions: 
TPN gets over-used all the time (General Surgeon USA); 
There is a lot of over-use of TPN especially with people who are 
near death, and it always causes the patient more complications 
(General Surgeon USA); 
An interesting paradox was provided by another General Surgeon (UK) who explained 
that artificial nutrition was actually abused from all angles including the proponents for 
enteral and/or parenteral nutrition, and even those patients and carers who did not make 
enough effort to feed naturally: 
Is it abused?.. .well yes it is. It is abused by the evangelists for 
parenteral nutrition who feed people parenterally when perhaps 
they should be feeding enterally. It is abused by the much 
greater number of evangelists for enteral nutrition who believe 
that everybody can be enter* fed, and they slavishly pursue 
this without taking cognisance of inadequate nutritional support 
and don't use parenteral nutrition. And it abused by the whole 
job lot of them for patients who are able to eat and drink 
naturally (General Surgeon UK). 
The technical aspects of providing artificial nutrition when coupled with the scenario of 
'overtreatmenr, 'inappropriate' treatment or 'abusive' treatment was similarly commented 
on by several other participants who suggested that too much emphasis was placed on 
its provision within an acute care setting. Overtreatment was mentioned by one Clinical 
Dietitian (USA) who explained that there should be a lot of concern for overprescribing of 
TPN when it is not clinically indicated, yet is prescribed without proper clinical guidelines: 
I see a lot of inappropriate TPN being written up.. .they will 
recommend TPN for a patient that came in completely well 
nourished and does not have any indication that they are a 
nutritional risk, like nil by mouth for a prolonged period of 
time.. .like they are going to have a routine coronary bypass and 
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graft surgery.. .and they get put on TPN...it is unbelievable. I 
feel that they do that because they can — like it is there so we 
may as well use the stuff I think that it is a case of people 
throwing their weight around and overemphasise clinical 
nutrition without really getting a grip on the established clinical 
guidelines for its provision (Clinical Dietitian USA). 
The application of clinical guidelines for the provision of either parenteral or enteral 
nutrition is well documented (ASPEN 1993). 17 This view is also supported in the 
relatively recent clinical literature covering appropriate provision of both parenteral and 
enteral feeding (Archer et al 1996; Silberman 1991; Souba 1997; Nordenstrom and 
Thorne 1994; Wood 1998). Archer eta! (1996) specifically claim that there are distinct 
indications as well as associated risks which mandate justification for its provision or non-
provision. The same participant explained her reservations about the overtreatment of 
many surgical patients regarding TPN, and referred to the institutional guidelines based 
on best practice and evidenced based medicine, yet lamented on the apparent disregard 
for such guidelines by some clinicians: 
When someone comes in perfectly well nourished and is just 
going to have surgery that will make them nil by mouth for 
maybe seven days, then it is grossly inappropriate for them to 
be artificially nourished during that time. We have policies 
based on all the best research that shows that seven days will 
not be of any harm to the patient ...in fact you can be doing 
them more harm if you aggressively feed during that time. But 
unfortunately some of my colleagues don't like to be told, and 
they go ahead and feed and haven't thought it through that it is 
maybe too invasive for this person (Clinical Dietitian USA). 
This 'seven day rule' was also referred to by a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (UK) who 
explained that a maximum of seven days will pass before the Clinical Nutrition Team will 
commence feeding. She explained that malnutrition will not set in before this time, 
therefore feeding before the seven days had passed is inappropriate. Again, this 
participant referred to evidence based medicine as grounds for this clinical guideline: 
17 According to the ASPEN website (www.clinnutr.oro) these guidelines were being revised at time of data collection and are to be 
published in 2002. 
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We are not great advocates of pre-surgical nutrition, nor do we 
'feed' those previously well nourished patients for a maximum of 
seven days because there is absolutely no evidence out there to 
prove that there is any benefit to the patient (Nutrition Nurse 
Specialist UK). 
This clinical guideline is supported by both the ASPEN Guidelines for the Use of 
Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition in Adult and Pediatric Patients (1993), as well as several 
other leading researchers in the area of perioperative nutritional support (von Meyenfeldt 
et al 1992; The Veterans Affairs Total Parenteral Nutrition Cooperative Study Group 
1991; Moore et al 1992; Archer et al 1996). 
Another Clinical Dietitian (USA), who practiced between two surgical ICU's, a Neuro ICU, 
and a Trauma/Burns ICU in a major inner city county hospital, commented on the need 
for professional collaboration, and the recognition from all specialties that there were 
strict guidelines for the provision of artificial nutritional support, especially in the acute 
surgical patient, in order to avoid inappropriate treatment: 
Thankfully the surgical team sees us as knowing what we are 
talking about... we have a very good relationship with our 
doctors. It would be pretty unusual for us to do any bad feeding 
because most of them are like 'we trust you and you know what 
you are doing'.... because our primary rule is the same as the 
doctor's — to do no harm, you know.. .that is what I tell my 
students, that is our primary purpose, not to hurt anybody. So 
here, we go for the best treatment option for the patient and 
nobody has any hidden agendas (Clinical Dietitian USA). 
The closing comment in the quote above raises an interesting question — 'what sort of 
hidden agendas could there be regarding the prescription of inappropriate artificial 
nutritional support?' Possibilities include those discussed in the chapter 'Money' 
whereby revenue could be generated by the prescribing physician, or cost savings made 
by the providing institution by withholding the treatment. When questioned regarding her 
comment, this participant explained that she sometimes interpreted over-prescription of 
TPN or EN as being 'convenient' for the prescriber. This view was also shared by 
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another intensive care clinician who believed that EN was prescribed by medical staff so 
they could avoid the monitoring and complications associated with TPN: 
I often think that it is too complicated for the doctors to arrange 
TPN, so they go ahead and order tube feeding without really 
understanding the plumbing [laughs], you know, the anatomy, 
and you will have enteral feeds spewing up all over the 
place.. .they don't want the responsibility of all the monitoring 
and extra responsibility of managing the TPN so they go for tube 
feeds when they should have gone with TPN but it was maybe 
too much of a deal for them to get their head around. I know that 
sounds pretty unprofessional but! think that is something that 
does go on (Critical Care Nurse Specialist USA). 
Similarly, a Clinical Dietitian (USA) argued that enteral feeding was more convenient for 
medical staff in terms of the lesser degree of clinical monitoring that it generated for 
medical staff when compared to the more complex parenteral feeding: 
I think that it is easier on the doctors ordering-wise to get tube 
feeds going because then they don't have to fill out a form every 
day as opposed to TPN where they do, and then they got to 
monitor their labs real close (Clinical Dietitian USA). 
Another participant (Neurosurgeon USA) agreed that TPN was often considered as being 
more inconvenient to the practitioner than EN, and offered several clinical practice 
explanations justifying his claim: 
I think TPN is often not prescribed when it should be because it 
involves having to monitor the patient rigorously when they are 
on TPN for metabolic complications from the parenteral 
solutions and associated problems from parenteral fat 
emulsions etc. Because here we have some pretty specific 
guidelines when you use TPN and how often you have to get 
electrolytes, and how often you have to monitor all of that, 
whereas you don't have to follow that if they are on enteral - 
you just want to get some kind of average calorie balance. But 
the doctors are not worried about convenience for the nursing 
staff (Neurosurgeon USA). 
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The last comment pertaining to convenience for nursing staff raised a conflicting view 
with regard to the modality of feeding and to whom it is administered. These last two 
participants believed that enteral feeding was often prescribed as being the more 
convenient option for medical staff, yet the following participants suggested the contrary, 
that is, that TPN was more convenient due to its 'clean' nature. The fact that TPN avoids 
the instillation of nutritional formula into the gastrointestinal tract (thereby attaining 
complete bowel rest), creates the absence of digestive activity which in turn diminishes 
much residual bowel action (Stotland et al 1998). Consequently, a patient receiving TPN 
for any length of time will commonly not have a bowel action until the commencement of 
enteral or oral feeding. This outcome is favoured by many carers, primarily nurses, who 
enjoy the freedom from 'messy' beds. This notion of 'clean' convenience by virtue of 
TPN was raised by several participants from various specialties. A Nutrition Nurse 
Specialist (AUST) believed that TPN was considered as being very convenient for 
nursing staff (primarily in the ICU) who were almost obsessed with maintaining a 'faeces 
free' environment. She commented on the reaction of her ICU nursing colleagues when 
she wished to pursue enteral feeding as an alternative to TPN: 
TPN in the critical care setting is awfully convenient- it just gets 
hooked up to another pump and what's more, the patients don't 
open their bowels... which keeps everything nice and clean, and 
no messy bed to clean up. It is almost a joke when these 
nurses see me walking into the ICU obviously keen to pursue 
enteral access and they cringe and say 'here she comes, Sister 
Poop'. There really is an ICU nurse thing - about having 
complete control over the patient's physiological functions, 
complete order, almost military precision, and poop just throws 
that order all out of whack (Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUS1). 
This supposed need for control, neatness and cleanliness was also referred to by a 
Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA) who described a certain resentment when nursing staff 
were faced with the change in nutritional treatment from parenteral to enteral: 
The nursing staff love the convenient nature of TPN...to the 
point that they will complain to those wanting to initiate enteral 
feeding, that sure, you can go ahead and start enteral feeding if 
186 
you are prepared to hang around here and clean up the mess 
(Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
Although this assumption is not commented on in so many words in the literature 
reviewed for this research, it is referred to in several clinical articles on enteral versus 
parenteral feeding in the critical care setting. Kudsk et al (1992:503) state that although 
clinicians agree that the gastrointestinal tract is the preferable route for nutrient 
administration, '...patients are often provided TPN because of ease and reliability of 
administration'. Moore eta! (1992) support this claim by commenting that enteral nutrition 
may be cheaper and safer, but TPN is easier to administer. 
The convenient nature of TPN was not limited to the absence of the body's elimination 
functions. Several participants spoke of many patients in whom artificial nutritional 
support would need to be provided often had pre-existing indwelling central venous 
access, for example, those oncology patients who had long-term implanted infusion 
ports, or tunnelled central venous catheters. Because these devices were already there, 
it was often easier for their nutritional needs to be met intravenously, instead of pursuing 
enteral access. This opinion is supported in the literature whereby Kudsk eta! (1992) 
claim that it is easier to infuse parenteral nutrition through an indwelling central line than 
to deal with initiating enteral access and then caring for the consequences of nutrient 
administration via the gut, that is, bowel activity. An Oncologist (USA) explained this in - 
terms of inappropriate provision of TPN which can predispose immuno-compromised 
patients to catheter sepsis: 
Enteral feeding could really be tried a lot more readily in 
oncology but it isn't because it is far more convenient to go for 
parenteral feeding because so many of these patients already 
have a CVC insitu. So most of them get TPN because people 
opt for convenience.., until they get into trouble with sepsis. 
They don't understand that enteral is much easier, it is easier to 
do it in hospital, at home with the family — there are many many 
reasons why we should be doing it (Oncologist USA). 
Similarly, another participant commented on the convenient nature of pre-existing central 
venous access being abused for the purpose of parenteral feeding: 
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It happens a lot with cancer patients because they have the 
catheter already there and it is easy so again that convenience 
thing raises its ugly head, but you have to ask yourself who is it 
easier for. It sure isn't easier for the family, and most importantly 
it isn't easier for the patient. I think a lot times with these 
patients, giving TPN is a real cop out because the clinicians 
can't be bothered going the extra mile and trialing enteral 
feeding (Clinical Dietitian USA). 
Likewise, the convenience of pre-existing central venous access was mentioned by a 
Gerontologist (USA) who referred to those patients in critical care settings who routinely 
had multiple lumen central venous access: 
I see a lot of that happening in the ICU where they have triple or 
quad lumen CVC's and it is real easy just to plug in another 
infusion without going through the motions of placing a feeding 
tube... or it is just convenient to leave the patient on TPN even 
though it is probably appropriate now to switch the patient to 
tube feeding, so I do see that happening (Gerontologist USA). 
One participant, a Gerontology Nurse Practitioner (USA) offered a literal description of 
'abuse' in terms of the provision of artificial nutritional support — in this case enteral 
feeding via a PEG tube. He recounted an experience from practice whereby he became 
suspicious of a caregiver's noncompliance with not only the provision of tube feeding, but 
also the administration of medications as evidenced by the patient's abnormal serum 
levels. This account is grounded in the context of strained family dynamics as previously 
discussed in Chapter Six 'Culture' (p. 172-173) of this thesis. 
I see a lot of guilt, and then I see some stuff with people who 
might have had an overbearing parent, and now they are in 
control. In one particular family! remember that medications 
and feeding were given by the son as a ways of getting back at 
his dad. This patient did not have normal lab values for this one 
particular drug, and we were trying to figure it out, and it turned 
out that the son was doing some funny things with the 
medications in retaliation. That was weird, but he also did some 
pretty rough things with his PEG and feeds like run through a 
day's worth of feeds in an hour? It later turned out after talking 
with the sister that he was really getting back at his Dad.. .they'd 
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had a real bad relationship in past years (Gerontology Nurse 
Practitioner USA). 
This above scenario also represents a similar form of abuse as previously discussed with 
tube feeding elderly patients in Chapter Four 'Death (p. 129-130). However, the most 
confrontational and surprising contribution made by the participants with regard to 
'abusive' feeding came from two participants in the USA who explained the somewhat 
bizarre occurrence of nursing homes or long term care facilities opting for feeding tube 
placement and enteral feeding, instead of maintaining normal oral feeding. The natural 
hand to mouth feeding of frail, elderly and often demented patients is in reality labour 
intensive. Both participants explained that often these facilities would not accept new 
patients if they did not have an indwelling feeding tube which would make 'meal times' 
much easier for staff: 
One thing that happens with nursing homes is that it is much 
more convenient if you can just PEG them and then feed them 
like that, and in fact, we can't send them to a nursing 
home.. that is right.., unless they have a PEG in place (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA); 
I know this sounds really bizarre. It is that simple, you cannot 
get them into a nursing home if the don't have a PEG insitu, I 
mean the nursing home will not take them, because they do not 
have the staff to manually feed them (Neurosurgeon USA). 
This scenario is not mentioned in the related literature yet is worthy of serious 
investigative inquiry along the lines of unnecessary medical and surgical intervention as it 
could well be equated with some degree of assault. On the contrary, the literature does 
make reference to the need for nurses to assess the functional status of geriatric patients 
and identify areas in which nutritional support is needed. Kenefick (1999:26) states that 
this includes '...providing preferred foods and ensuring nursing staff availability to provide 
physical assistance with eating'. This could well be the 'idealistic' feeding scenario and 
not the 'realistic' one as alluded to by the above participants. Despite such realistic 
explanations of convenience not being located in the associated literature does not 
preclude the absence of such practice, especially considering that we are witnessing a 
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marked increase in feeding tube insertion in vulnerable patients, especially the elderly 
(Oyogoa eta! 1999). Anecdotal evidence provided by these participants practising within 
the area of gerontology as to the increased incidence of feeding tube placement is 
testament to this questionable practice. The benefits of this medical intervention are 
unclear, and the risks substantial. This is a fact well documented in the related clinical 
literature (Ashby and Stoffell 1995; Ciocon et a! 1988; Finochiarro eta! 1997; Finucane et 
al 1999; Mitchell and Lawson 1999). 
This description of convenient practice so to accommodate (it could be argued) poor 
nursing care and cost cutting/staffing practices, were not exposed and discussed in the 
literature reviewed for this research. However, one closely related article authored by a 
consultant physician dying from cancer was subsequently located. Khadra (1998) 
claimed that perhaps modern health care cannot afford compassion and that it may not fit 
into the corporate model of patients as clients, nurses as managers, doctors as visitors 
and administrators as the pinnacle. The compassionate, yet time-consuming nature of 
hand to mouth feeding of the frail aged fits this claim well, and completely debunks the 
myth of quality care for senior citizens. 
Only one participant offered an 'either/or' explanation regarding the convenience of 
artificial nutritional support comparing parenteral to enteral feeding. He argued that 
nursing staff were not concerned about the convenience of feeding in the same way that 
the surgeon or the physician would be: 
On one hand, the physician doesn't want to pursue enteral 
access if he or she can't be bothered or they might not have the 
knowledge or the skills to place a feeding tube intraoperatively, 
and then, on the other hand, if they do want to go for the gut, it 
can be convenient for them too because they don't want to be 
called when the central line clots off to go put a new central line 
in.. .you know, if it is an NG tube or a Dobhoff then the nursing 
staff can just go ahead and place another one down in most 
cases. But if the central line clots off then the doctor has to 
come and a put a central line back in (General Surgeon USA). 
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These contrasting representations of how parenteral or enteral feeding are considered 
because of their convenience and not necessarily their physiological benefits to the 
person on the receiving end of treatment are clearly described by the participants. These 
descriptions of convenient care are also suggested in the literature, albeit not in the same 
depth and richness. Only one participant offered an opposing perspective on the notion 
of convenient feeding by arguing that any modality of artificial feeding was not at all 
convenient. She provided this descriptive account based on her past experiences of 
when patients were faced with leaving the artificial and protective environs of the acute 
care setting, to face long term artificial nutritional support in their own homes: 
I don't think that it is ever convenient.. .convenient for who? 
Maybe convenient for the doctor, but when you take this person 
home and the caregivers have to deal with this, it is not at all 
convenient — ills not convenient for the patient either in my 
opinion. It requires a lot of maintenance especially on the 
continuous feeding plans where the Dietitian has to set the 
pump. And a lot of people on our program are low income, and 
of low education, low literacy, and education of the families, the 
care providers is a huge issue. It is so tedious and time 
consuming and often there is a language barrier, and the 
supplies that take up an entire room in an often tiny dwelling — 
well it is not convenient at all. A lot of these people live in 
overcrowded unsanitary environments, roach infested, where it 
is just not conducive to good infection controL We are always 
going out there to fix a lot of them in the home — the tubes will 
be leaking or clogged. Our Nurse Practitioner will have to go 
out there and fix them — it is a big issue. The concept of the 
PEG is pretty basic plumbing but in reality they can be very 
problematic and you can't be there 24 hours a day to ensure 
they are working. Plus the carers sometimes, they are not 
compliant — this is a very difficult issue. It is not convenient for 
anybody (Medical Social Worker USA). 
Inappropriate provision of artificial nutritional support was also discussed at length by 
several participants who referred to improper feeding at the end-of-life, especially in 
those patients with a malignancy. Their comments were more angled at the potential 
complications arising from inappropriate aggressive feeding and not so much 'abuse' of 
the technology as suggested by the previous participants. A Palliative Care Physician 
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(AUST) explained an interesting clinical consequence of inappropriate nourishing of 
cancer patients which resulted in more rapid tumour growth: 
If there is no other aggressive anti-cancer treatment in place, 
not only is artificial feeding using up a lot of resources, but it is 
also kicking the cancer along without really benefiting the 
individual.., you actually end up growing the cancer quicker 
(Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
Despite several supportive and also conflicting views subsequently located in the 
literature (Bozzetti et al 1999; Cozagglio and Bozzetti 1994), this participant offered the 
following explanation of how artificial nutritional support, primarily TPN, will actually 
increase the rate of tumour growth: 
There are a number of cancers where this can happen. The 
physiological model of the paired rat connection where 
researchers have stuck a couple of rat circulations together - 
one with cancer, one without cancer, and The rats feed normally, 
and both rats lose weight because of the circulating tumour 
factors going on. You artificially feed them and what happens is 
that both rats continue to lose weight, but the rat with the cancer 
grows a bigger cancer, and then you disconnect their 
circulations, and the one without the cancer gets back to a 
normal weight rate, and the one with the cancer just shrivels 
away and dies. So there is a biological process where the 
cancer actually changes the body's ability to handle the proteins 
and carbohydrates and is really left with basically just the 
glucose drive to go with. And to give an artificially rich nutrient 
solution to someone with a certain cancer really just promotes ill 
health rather than their health (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
Another Palliative Care Physician (AUST) expressed similar sentiments regarding 
inappropriate aggressive nutritional treatment in those patients with an advanced 
malignancy that actually created more suffering: 
I know at times we prolong people's suffering quite inordinately 
through the wrongful provision of artificial nutritional support 
(Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
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Similarly, another participant commented on inappropriate feeding at the end-of-life: 
Prolonged aggressive feeding of any sort can create a lingering 
death that is not the most humane way of managing someone's 
exit from this world (Oncology Nurse Specialist USA). 
The same participant also reflected back to her experiences as a nurse caring for the 
elderly who, by virtue of their age and/or their underlying disease processes, were 
considered incompetent, and treatment decisions were therefore made for them, not by 
them She expressed concern regarding the inappropriate nature of these 'clinician 
imposed' treatment decisions that often lead to the demise of the patient: 
In the elderly, we seem to sweep them under the carpet and not 
give them the benefit of the doubt because the majority of them 
are incompetent. So we make their treatment decisions for 
them and subject them to prolonged deterioration or worse, kill 
them with the associated complications of tubes and tube 
feeding. I find this dilemma really difficult and sad (Oncology 
Nurse Specialist USA). 
Interestingly, the irony of 'nutrition specialists' not endorsing the provision of the very 
specialty that they upheld was explained by one participant as being a difficult paradox in 
her everyday work role: 
Everybody thinks that we, the nutrition team, who have jointly 
published heaps of papers and take our jobs very seriously, that 
we are there to always feed. People, patients, family, staff - 
they think we should feed everybody because that is what we 
are there to do, that is part of our job...we are there to highlight 
nutrition and that is it. Often, there is no understanding of 
perhaps the times when we shouldn't (Nutrition Nurse Specialist 
UK). 
This irony represents a certain misconception of other professionals, patients and family 
members on the role of feeding. Consequently, this leads to the following discussion 
point raised by the participants, that is, conflict. 
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Conflict 
Essentially, conflict was discussed in terms of what occurred when there was a 
breakdown in communication. Communication was implied by the participants as being 
the conveying of truthful information to colleagues, patients, and family members of the 
realities of artificial nutritional support, and the goals of such treatment. Not all 
participants believed that conflict was ever an issue when dealing with the provision of 
artificial nutritional support. These participants considered conflict to be between 
clinicians concerning the choice of either enteral or parenteral support of patients in a 
critical care setting. Two Critical Care Physicians (UK and AUST respectively) gave the 
following explanations: 
I cannot recall the last time I had any conflict in terms of feeding. 
What I says goes as far as feeding is concerned (Critical Care 
Physician UK); 
I don't find that there is conflict about the area of nutrition 
management in this hospital as the surgeons by and large allow 
us to make those sorts of decisions (Critical Care Physician 
AUST). 
Another participant practising within a critical care environment also commented on the 
lack of conflict that he had experienced in terms of feeding which, he believed, was due 
to maintaining very close links with family members and providing a collaborative 
approach to care: 
I think we avoid a lot of conflict because we do a good job... we 
try to keep good contact with the families, with the doctors, and 
the nurses. We have a case management team with a social 
worker, and we have a lot of involvement from neurosurgery and 
good contact with the families. So I think that we know their 
wishes and we are straightforward with them, so in the time I 
have been here, I have never seen that conflict (Critical Care 
Nurse Specialist USA). 
However, for those participants practising in clinical environments elsewhere, the issue of 
conflict regarding feeding were abundant. For example, when a Palliative Care 
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Physician (AUST) was questioned whether or not conflict was an issue, the response 
was very different: 
Oh, about every week.. .three times a week it becomes an issue 
(Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
Despite his admission that conflict was common, he did explain that within the specialty 
of Palliative Care, there were 'theoretically' very few areas of conflict about the artificial 
nutritional support. However, issues did arise 'practically' when people wanted to have 
feeding continued when it was patently obvious that it was not going to be of benefit to 
the patient. Correspondingly, another participant commented on the incidence of conflict 
regarding feeding in vulnerable patients and how it sometimes reached 'crisis' level: 
Conflict occurs frequently. It happens every week. It is a major 
crisis we have now (General Surgeon UK). 
A Neurosurgeon (USA) explained conflict with family as a 'social decision' that resulted 
from an understanding of what constituted medical feeding and how it did not equate with 
cultural feeding: 
It is a social decision, because we know what to do medically, 
but the conflict that occurs with the family is just so amazing 
because it is what they understand. They don't understand the 
medicine, but they understand feeding — because it is part of 
their cultural background (Neurosurgeon USA). 
A multiform explanation of what constituted conflict(s) was also provided by the following 
participant in terms of religion, culture, race, finance and ultimately, the law: 
There are several conflicts when it comes to artificial 
nutrition.. .there are religious conflicts, there are cultural and 
racial conflicts, and there are financial conflicts. And I don't 
think that people outside the United States realise the legal 
implications — because I have a family that tells me that 'we 
need this PEG in there'.. .and 'my brother is lawyer and he 
would like to sit down and chat with you about this'.. .then you 
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are just going to put the tube in, so there are legal conflicts as 
well (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
A second Palliative Care Physician (AUST) recounted in detail two occasions from 
practice where conflict also reached a 'crisis' level due to a breakdown in communication 
between the referring medical team and receiving hospice team. This lapse in effective 
communication caused family members to 'fallout' with providers: 
On at least two occasions that I can remember, poor 
communication has really let us down. The patients were 
transferred to our unit with TPN still going and the dilemma was 
then left to us to discuss withdrawal of feeding with the patient, 
and patient's family... and the enormous fallout that comes from 
that has been destructive both in terms of our ongoing treatment 
of the patient and family, and also our continued relationship 
with the referring unit (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
This same participant provided a thick, descriptive account from practice of a particular 
incident that obviously had considerable impact on her clinical experiences of conflict 
regarding feeding. This rich textual account has been presented in full in order to 
capture both the complexity and significance of such conflict:" 
To give you an example, I remember very clearly a man who 
was probably in his late 50's, early 60's who had been 
diagnosed with a very advanced gastric carcinoma. He had a 
complication in that his daughter was a senior nurse in the 
referring oncology unit, and I don't know to what degree that 
influenced the treatment he was given, but he was a patient that 
had received TPN, when I believe perhaps in other patients it 
would never have been provided. However that was done, and 
when it became clear to the oncology unit in which he was being 
cared for, that the time had come where they could not do any 
further active treatment and they needed to consider placing him 
elsewhere, they asked if we would be prepared to take him into 
the hospice. Quite obviously it was a perfectly appropriate 
transfer except for the fact that he was on TPN. So, we went 
through the normal discussion with the doctor involved and the 
treating staff to discuss with this the patient and to get the 'all 
clear' that TPN be ceased and for him to come over to the 
hospice. In fact that was apparently never done, and so when 
the patient came into the unit and went through a routine 
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admission at which point it was discussed with the patient 
himself and his family including his wife that in the hospice 
situation we would not be continuing TPN as it was really quite 
opposed to the goals of hospice care to do that, and also 
because our budget didn't allow for it. All hell broke loose. We 
probably, I think, spent an enormous amount of energy w,ith 
trying to come to some consensus, mainly with the patient's wife 
and family. My memory is that the patient himself was quite OK 
with the treatment being stopped, because I believe that he 
firmly understood that he was actively dying, and it was not 
achieving any great benefit. However, his wife and daughter 
saw things very differently and really felt that they had been 
conned into bringing him over to the hospice unit. Their view 
was that the oncology unit probably just wanted him out of there 
because his daughter worked there and it was very difficult for 
the staff to go on treating someone's parent and that these 
things had never really been explained to them. So that was 
just one instance in where it took really days of time and effort, 
and dealing with each individual member of the family as well as 
the patient, to encourage them to come to a point where they 
felt OK about our discontinuing that treatment. We did reach 
that point and his ongoing care I think was relatively 
satisfactory.. ..but I think that there was always a discomfort in 
the minds of all of us that this should never have happened 
(Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
This account raises the fundamental flaw in patient-provider relations which are 
predisposed to conflict, that is, poor communication. It also highlights the need for truth-
telling in terms of communicating poor prognosis, and treatment goals. The same 
participant exposed this flaw in her own descriptions of insufficient discussion of a 
medical nature that should take place between the treating team and the patient for what 
happens 'further down the track': 
I believe that far too often those conversations are left to 
somebody else, and often that somebody else is the palliative 
care specialist. So that reinforces that we are the deliverers of 
bad news (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
This notion of providers who work within 'death care' environments such as palliative 
care or hospice settings being the harbingers of bad news is well documented in the 
literature (Poulson 1998; Ptacek and Ellison 2000). However, this raises certain 
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shortcomings in the abilities of other health care providers to fundamentally communicate 
effectively and truthfully. As the following participant explains, the power of truthful and 
effective communication is not only essential in medical care, but is essential in avoiding 
the unfortunate consequences of what Goldberg (2000:181) describes as a 'litigious 
society'. He offers this description of how patients and their families may not be 
equipped with the interpretative capabilities of complex medical jargon, yet are 
heightening their awareness due to receiving care in the information age: 
Ethical issues usually arise when the doctor doesn't talk to the 
patient. Ethics are the ethics of the patient. Those are the 
ethics that are most important. The ethics of the doctor are 
irrelevant and shouldn't take precedence. But most of all the 
ethical issues that make it to the legal front almost always are 
related to communication — Dr A or Nurse B said something that 
they shouldn't have or didn't say something that they should 
have. Patients, most of them, are not versed in medicine per 
Se.. .they will probably attach to one or two or three statements 
out of a conversation with the doctor. If things get really 
complicated and frustrating for the patient, then instead of 
heading into the legal side of things it really is resolvable with • 
more medical conversation other than legal conversation. But 
unfortunately that is not the reality in this country. A little 
knowledge is very dangerous, and unfortunately everyone has a 
little knowledge — doctors have a little knowledge, patients have 
a little knowledge, the Internet has a lot of knowledge — and you 
put all of that together and sometimes the decisions that are 
made are not academically defensible, but they be socially 
defensible, they be personally defensible, even ethically 
defensible, but legally, well that is another story (Oncologist 
USA). 
In the previously mentioned initiative of the American Medical Association's Institute for 
Ethics, The EPEC Project does contain teaching modules encompassing 
communications skills and discussing poor prognosis. These modules target an 
audience of practising physicians, nurses, medical students, and all allied health care 
providers. Their goal is to provide a framework to enhance communication between 
patients, families, and providers at all stages of the patient's relationship with his/her 
disease. The material actually encourages providers to spend time with their patients, 
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and to encourage patients to become active participants in their care. This initiative was 
launched in February 1999. It is indeed both a timely and pertinent initiative considering 
the certain shortcomings of health care providers' obvious inadequate preparation in 
these areas. No such education initiatives on end-of-life education were located in either 
the UK or Australian medical curricula which certainly represents a deficit. One of the 
many areas covered in the EPEC Project is that of working with the law with regard to 
decisions about life-sustaining treatment and end-of-life care. The contributing 
participants identified 'the law as of major consequence in the way they provided care to 
those on the receiving end of artificial nutritional support, and are explored in the 
following discussion point. 
Legal Issues 
The tendency to view artificial nutritional support as different to other forms of medical 
care is one that is sometimes shared by professional ethicists and courts (Mayo 1996). 
The related medico-legal literature concerning this modality conveys a near-unanimous 
consensus in the court decision of this subject (Meyers 1985; Nelson eta! 1995). 
However, for the participants contributing to discussions on legal issues, the main ethical 
dilemma discussed was that of fear of litigation, or more simply, the practice of 'defensive 
medicine'. Several participants described certain treatment practices regarding artificial 
nutrition support provision that could be aligned with overtreatment in an attempt to avoid 
litigation proceedings. Despite the majority of contributing participants to this discussions 
being those who practiced within the USA health care delivery system, several other 
participants from the UK and Australia also shared similar views on defensive medical 
practice in order to avoid legal proceedings by families. The term 'defensive medicine' is 
typically understood to refer to instances where health care practice decisions are 
motivated primarily by the desire to protect him or herself from the risk of legal liability 
(Sharpe and Faden 1998). Studies have shown that medical practice patterns are 
indeed influenced by concerns about legal liability (Reynolds et a! 1987). The following 
descriptions of overtreatment aligned with defensive medicine in a litigious society were 
offered by the following participants: 
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There is the very real possibility of the defensive practice of 
medicine — in order to avoid being sued or avoid being sued 
successfully, you order a battery of tests that are not medically 
necessary,  you continue or start aggressive treatments that are 
futile, or you keep the patient in the hospital longer than would 
be advisable just for that extra sentinel of safety (Law Professor 
USA); 
You must understand that the United States is a litigious society, 
and frequently, not doing everything whether reasonable or not 
opens you up to a lawsuit. You get the 'why didn't you doctor?' 
question thrown at you, so there is a very real tendency to over-
utilise treatments from that perspective (General Surgeon USA); 
Not providing artificial feeding, even when it is clear that such 
treatment will put the patient at risk of more complications, well I 
think that is a very difficult decision for the doctor because I 
think in that sort of situation they would possibly be leaving 
themselves open for litigation (Occupational Therapist AUST); 
Physicians are, for a whole bunch of reasons, they are scared of 
lawsuits and renegade family members wanting to sue for 
anything, and you know, they should be scared (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
This last comment discloses the notably litigious nature of the USA health care culture 
whereby malpractice insurance premiums for physicians now average a yearly 
contribution of ranging from $6000 for an internist to over $57 000 for an 
obstetrician/gynaecologist (Rice 1998). Recently, Albert (2001) predicted that these 
figures can be expected to rise between six percent and 50% over the next two years. 
This belief was also supported by another non-clinician participant who argued that 
medical liability premiums constituted approximately one percent of the cost of health 
care in the United States. He further explained the impact this had on the overall cost of 
health care: 
If you wiped out the need for liability insurance you would have 
a one percent effect on the cost of health care which might not 
seem much but you must remember that we are talking in 
billions of dollars when it comes to health (Law Professor USA). 
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This above assumption is also maintained by Gray (1998). In line with the concept of 
defensive medicine, the previous participant further explained his comment of why 
physicians should be afraid of litigation: 
In the United States, it is, I don't know about other countries, we 
are so litigious that a lot of defensive medicine is practiced, and 
so you 'do the PEG' because you don't want to be deposed by 
an attorney six months later who tells you '...so let me see, the 
patient's nutritional requirements were not being met, and the 
standard of practice is to put in a PEG for that, and you didn't do 
it... therefore you are liable.. .you caused the death'. Now you 
can argue whether or not that is standard of practice in a 
terminal condition, but that is the fear that motivates a lot of end-
of-life treatment.. .nobody wants to get sued for not doing 
everything that is possible (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
This described 'fear of litigation' was subsequently found in the medical ethics literature 
on withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Weir and Gostin (1991) claim that the USA 
courts decide many such cases, usually because hospital attorneys have refused to 
allow their doctors to act in what they agree to be their patient's best interests, for fear of 
litigation. Jennett (1999) supports the assertions made by the participants regarding 
such conflicts not being worthy of legal deconstruction, but that doctors and families 
should be able to reach treatment decisions between themselves. This would demand 
the communication suggested by the participants with regard to avoiding conflict. 
The way the fear of litigation shapes medical practice regarding artificial feeding was also 
commented on by another participant who explained the often times questionable 
motives of attorneys in order to 'win' a case: 
If! appear to the family that I am not doing everything possible, 
that I am taking care of this patient — like if I think that continuing 
feeding is killing the patient like with aspiration or infection, then 
I know that some smart ass attorney will encourage the family to 
say that I should have fed the patient because that patient might 
have got the immunity to fight and survive (Neurosurgeon USA). 
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The supposed questionable motives of legal professionals was also discussed within the 
context of doing whatever one can in order to win the case, sue the physician 
successfully, and consequently make money. The same participant described his past 
experiences of litigation in which attorneys actually lied in order to argue their case 
because they were not under oath. This explanation was conveyed with notable angst 
and frustration on behalf of the participant: 
You know that the attorney standing there is lying, and 
everybody in the courtroom knows it. They know he is lying, but 
it is OK because it is legal. The attorney is not under oath to tell 
the truth so he can go and argue and call you everything he 
wants, and quote things that are totally irrelevant and that is 
perfectly legal. So we refer to it that we have a legal system — a 
legal system.. .not a justice system (Neurosurgeon USA). 
When this participant was questioned concerning the practices of these attorney's, he 
explained that `...they don't care...they only care if someone can get sued.' He also 
explained how disturbing it was for new medical graduates who were confronted with 
their first legal encounter as a physician: 
Regardless of what they might learn in med school and the 
content of those courses, new physicians are so naïve until they 
get their first law suit — it is so devastating so see such unethical 
behaviour (Neurosurgeon USA). 
An interesting contradiction between the definitions of law and ethics is exposed here. 
Several participants commented that law and ethics were not the same (as suggested 
by the previously explained 'unethical' practices of attorneys), however they explained 
that to attorneys, the definitions of the law and ethics were the same: 
Attorneys don't often understand the difference between law 
and ethics — they think that they are the same thing. It is their 
definition of ethics. To them, ethics equals law.. .if it is legal, it is 
ethical, and that is not true (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA); 
The definition of ethics for an attorney — for them to be ethical — 
they have to do everything that can to represent their client. So 
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if their client, you know, is lying, but they can give a legal 
argument that allows them to lie and they have done something 
unethical, and then the attorney doesn't do everything he can 
legally, then he is considered unethical. Al! of us here would call 
that fraud and totally unethical but for an attorney that is their 
definition of ethics. So if I (let's pretend I am an attorney), and I 
blame the physician for his supposed crime, then I have done 
my job, and that is ethical (General Surgeon USA). 
This notion that the law and ethics, or the law and morality were not the same was 
located in, as such, a precise explanation in a text providing translations from Greek 
philosophers. According to Socrates, the State may decide what is legally right and 
wrong, but the law and morality are not the same thing (cited in Robinson and Garratt 
1996). 
The practice of defensive medicine secondary to the fear of litigation was explained by a 
Gerontology Nurse Practitioner (USA) as the result of things having 'gone crazy'. He 
described a no-win situation in which a practitioner could in fact be sued for doing 
either/or in regard to the provision, or non-provision, of artificial nutritional support, yet 
provided some solace to this dilemma by stressing the importance of communication: 
I think a lot of treatment decisions are made because of the fact 
that health care in America has gone so crazy now...I mean you 
could just as easily be sued if you don't place a feeding tube, or 
you could be sued if you do put one in and the patient develops 
a complication. So in many ways we are screwed either way. I 
think that it really depends on the relationship that you have with 
the family and I think that as long as you have a good sort of 
relationship with the family, you don't have law suits. That is 
what we try to do. We don't have a choice but to do that 
because this is such a litigious society that we have created 
(Gerontology Nurse Practitioner USA). 
This sentiment regarding communication was similarly explained by a UK participant who 
also referred to the fact that health litigation was not a predominant feature in his 
practice: 
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I think that what is very important in that situation is that people 
with an interest and understanding about why we might feed or 
not feed is to sit down with the relatives and take them through 
it. You must have open lines of communication with the family - 
that is imperative. The number of times doctors are going to do 
things that are diametrically opposed to the family's wishes is 
negligible, yet I think that is also because we don't tend to sue 
here in this country like they do in America (General Surgeon 
UK). 
An Australian participant expressed a similar view regarding the 'non-litigious' nature of 
health care in Australia, yet identified with the consequences of defensive medicine 
regarding artificial nutritional support. Her explanation also provided the interesting 
referral to the comparisons between the health care delivery systems as being akin to 
different planets: 
A lot of what I have read seems that it is a far greater problem in 
the United States than it is here in Australia, and I think that the 
underlying problem is the fear of litigation which I think that at 
this point in our history is not big for us.. .perhaps in maybe 10 
years or so down the track, but I don't think we live in the same 
kind of fear of practice that the US doctors seem to. So I think 
often that is what drives inappropriate provision of nutrition.. .it 
seems to me a fear that if they don't do this, somebody, 
somewhere will sue them. And I think that we have much 
greater freedom to practice what I believe is true, more ethical 
medicine than in the States - that is just a very broad 
generalization, but most of the things that I have read 
really.. .well it is almost as if we are practising medicine on two 
different planets (Palliative Care Physician AUS7). 
The consensus that the law and ethics were two different things, plus the explanation 
that communication and truth-telling were the keys to avoid both ethical dilemmas and 
legal consequence was poignantly summarised by one participant who emphatically 
explained that '... ethics are the ethics of the patient....' (Oncologist USA), and that these 
ethics are the ones that we should be concerned with. In explaining the common 
paradox between law and ethics he offered the following explanation with regard to end-
of-life situations: 
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The true ethical issue is something that the patient faces and 
the family faces.. .am I going to die? Am I going to spend $100 
000 of my children's inheritance and take good care of myself, 
or is it good care? That is your ethics. The patient could say 
that I am not going to do that or he could say yes I will spend my 
children's inheritance - it does not make him a worse or better 
individual, but you live according to you own ethics I think. As 
far as issues about if you bring this ethic to whether or not a 
treatment should be done I think that you are just legalising 
ethics and that is wrong. That is the basic fall down of medicine 
nowadays, that ethics is confused with the law, and that the 
doctor has been forced by the law to abdicate the responsibility 
of ethical patient care in order to be legal (Oncologist USA). 
This explanation evokes a powerful and confrontational reality also provided by another 
participant who cited a similar belief that medicine was losing its appeal as a profession 
due to this alleged 'abdication' and the constraints of defensive medicine: 
No-one wants to study, to practice medicine these days and I 
don't blame them.. .1 am looking at getting out of it myself 
because you can't provide the care that patients deserve 
because you spend a career walking on eggshells waiting for 
the next deposition, or there is no money in it because some of 
us have to pay yearly premiums that equal up to 90% of our 
income. The law has become business and not justice 
(Neurosurgeon USA). 
The previous participant also acknowledged this sentiment: 
These sorts of decisions decreases the meaning of ethics 
because what it does is aligns it with legalities. Nowadays there 
is almost no such thing as ethics... there is only the legal 
aspects of ethics that we are concerned about. As long as you 
only concentrate on the medical, social, religious aspects of 
ethics and practice your medicine that way then you should not 
have to get to the legal aspects. That is a very frustrating way 
to do your job (Oncologist USA). 
Physician resentment of the legal system was located once in the medical ethics 
literature. Zussman (1992) claims that physicians are often vexed at what seems to be 
an overbearing legal system. He explains that physicians often resent the law deeply 
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and ascribe to it an influence unwarranted by court findings. Here we encounter the 
contested notion of justice, which is a recurrent theme in the bioethics literature. As the 
participants suggest, the law does not deliver unequivocal notions of justice. 
Conclusion 
The lived experience of the participants shows that truth-telling and communication are 
ethical concepts which are, at times, honoured in the breach. The participants speak of 
institutional practices which discursively shape ethics. Those ethics are in sharp contrast 
with the ideals espoused by the literature. Despite the medical ethics texts reviewed for 
this research proclaiming that honesty between doctor and patient is the key element in 
the partnership (BMA 1998; BMA 1999), the narratives of the participants suggest that it 
is rather the exception than the rule. The discussions on 'convenience' feeding are 
similarly confronting considering their sharp contrast with the cultural symbolism of food 
and feeding. Such discussions are more confronting considering their absence in the 
related literature. In the case of the feeding tube, it could be concluded that these 
devices appear to have more rights than patients. Such a provocative speculation 
necessitates both extensive ethical and legal inquiry. Collectively, the dilemmas 
associated with the provision, or non-provision, of artificial nutritional support are 
certainly not limited to 'conflict'. Abuse, conflict, and the law, are problematic concepts 
that warrant a definite all-out analysis that would truly expose ethical dilemmas beyond 
both the scope of this research. Such confrontational inquiry would be challenging to say 
the least. The associated dilemma of 'futility' is equally as challenging, and provides the 
substance of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
FUTILITY 
Introduction 
Few issues in health care are more complex and difficult than those addressed by 
patients, their relatives, and their health care professionals concerning the decision to 
withhold or withdraw life-prolonging treatment. This major interpretation chapter deals 
with the notion of futility within both the discrete concept of the provision of artificial 
nutritional support, and also within the broader context of the provision of life-sustaining 
treatments. This resulted in the merging of the following seven codes: futility; withdrawal 
of nutrition; advance directives; quality-of-life; curing and caring; complications from 
feeding; and benefits and burdens. These codes were discussed at length by the 
following 26 participants: A Nutrition Nurse Specialist (UK); a General Surgeon (AUST); 
an Oncology Nurse Specialist (USA); two General Surgeons (USA); a General Surgeon 
(UK); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST); a Clinical Pharmacist (AUST); a Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); a Gerontologist (USA); two Palliative Care Physicians (AUST); 
two Medical Social Workers (USA); a Gerontology Nurse Practitioner (USA); two 
Oncologists (USA); a Law Professor (USA); a Critical Care Physician (UK); three Critical 
Care Nurse Specialists (USA); a Clinical Dietitian (USA); a Medical Administrator (USA); 
and an Occupational Therapist (AUST). Significant overlapping of codes occurred 
throughout the interpretation process, primarily with withdrawal of nutrition and futility. 
The title of this chapter was chosen not just to embrace the most significant code name 
adopted by the participants, but also to reflect the timely nature of the concept of futility 
as represented in current medical and ethical/legal debate. Three major discussion 
points have been identified from what turned out to be both a vast and complex 
compilation of participant contributions. These are discussed in order of importance as 
afforded by the participants and have been termed futile feeding, honest communication, 
and advance care planning. Prior to the exploration of these discussion points, it is 
helpful firstly to examine the discourse of 'futility'. 
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Discourse Analysis 
Many aspects of modern medicine provoke spirited ethical argument, but few engender 
as much disagreement about what exactly is at issue as does the futility debate. The 
term 'futile' stems from the Latin word 'futilis' meaning 'leaky', and is defined by the 
Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary as 'useless, ineffectual, vain, frivolous' (1987:428). 
In terms of medical futility, the concept is explained in terms of the simple recognition of 
the limits of medicine to cure and to extend life, and that health professionals should not 
be obliged to provide further curative treatment. The associated literature yields 
considerable acknowledgement of this concept and features frequently around 
discussions of futility judgements, futility and professional integrity, futility policies, death 
with dignity, and forgoing life support. However, such definitions are by no means clear-
cut or without controversy. As Tomlinson and Czlonka (1995) have argued, defining 
futility whether by setting quantitative standards or by identifying categories or patients 
who should not be treated, creates several risks. Defining medical futility creates the 
illusion of specificity where none is possible; it may lead to superficial medical 
evaluations, and it ties futility to narrow biomedical goals for the patient (ibid.). 
Many different bodies of organised medicine (American Medical Association 1991; 
American Council of Physicians 1992; American Thoracic Society 1991; Society of 
Critical Care Medicine 1990), ethicists (Schneiderman et a! 1990; The Hastings Center 
1987), and legal commentators (Grant 1992; Darr 1995; Sadler and Mayo 1993), have 
offered markedly different definitions of futility that range from the lack of intended s 
physiologic effect to low likelihood of survival to discharge, to low likelihood of surviving 
more than a few months, to poor quality-of-life or permanent dependence on intensive 
care. 'Futility' has quite different connotations. According to Jecker and Schneiderman 
(1992), 'futility' suggests that medical care is wasteful, that even the best efforts will be 
pointless, useless, if not hopeless. These discussions on futility however, are seldom 
able to stay within the narrow confines of medical usage. 
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One of the research participants offered what he considered to be a more appropriate 
and practical term (instead of the word 'futile'), that being 'irretrievable'. He explained 
this choice in reference to the Tony Bland 18 case in the UK: 
The Tony Bland case was interesting because they were 
actually allowed to withdraw nutritional support and other 
support, because he was considered to be irretrievable (Critical 
Care Physician UK). 
The same participant also provided an insight into whether or not the term 'withdrawal' 
was actually appropriate when discussing futility, as withdrawal of treatment did not 
necessarily occur, rather treatment was changed or modified: 
I often wonder whether the term 'withdrawal' is an inappropriate 
term because usually withdrawal is an active process only in 
terms of you turning things off. But what you are almost 
invariably doing is changing the focus or direction of treatment 
with a different end point...and I think that is a very different sort 
of thing... ethically (Critical Care Physician UK). 
The choice of language is therefore problematic considering that the identification of a 
palliative end point rather than an aggressive one could be compared to changing the 
focus of other therapies. The choice of language here is interesting in that it indicates 
the dominance of the acute care orientation of medical discourse. The same participant 
compared changing a patient's medication from gentamycin to vancomycin as a similar 
proposition, that is, not withdrawing antibiotic therapy, rather simply changing it: 
We have a patient upstairs now with septicaemia on 
gentamycin, and is not doing very well, and we got blood 
cultures back and it was MRSA, so we withdraw the gentamycin 
• because it is not doing anything and we would use vancomycin 
— maybe that is different, I am not sure, but it is not that 
18 Tony Bland was left in PVS after the 1989 Hillsborough disaster, His parents fought a protracted legal battle for the right to allow 
him to die. The House of Lords Committee ruled that his artificial feeding was a medical treatment and was therefore withdrawn. This 
suggests a consequentalist ethic. According to Fisher (1994) the consequentalist view says that all that matters are consequences, 
meaning that if a person dies because we kill them or sit by and let them die, the result is the same. His case in particular is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter One 'Reviewing the Literature (p. 10-12). 
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different. It is a positive action in a different direction (Critical 
Care Physician UK). 
According to Schneiderman and colleagues (1996), no professional or societal 
consensus has been achieved about the definition of futility. Therefore, for the purpose of 
this discussion, the terms 'futility' and 'withdrawal' are employed, albeit with recognition 
of their precarious interpretation considering that discourses reflect differing conceptions 
of reality. 
Futile Feeding 
This discussion point was imbued with overtones of the benefit versus burden argument, 
wasted utilisation of costly resources, and the principle of autonomy. The concept of 
futility in terms of the provision of artificial nutritional support was a common problem for 
the following participant who described his dealings with this problem as occurring 'all the 
time'. He offered what he explained was a common scenario in terms of futile feeding: 
There is a patient of mine with adenocarcinoma of unknown 
primary who is not responding to chemotherapy... he has 
intestinal obstruction, he has a line with IV morphine and a TPN 
line, and he got another round of chemotherapy in hope that 
something will 'open up' ...and now he has an NG tube for 
drainage.. .and he is a very young guy, it is a very difficult 
situation. Neither the chemo nor the TPN are doing him any 
good, in fact they are only dragging out more 
complications.. .but it is his choice to continue treatment even 
though it is not going to do him any good (Oncologist USA). 
Another issue of withdrawing nutritional treatment on the basis of futility as being 
problematic was discussed by one participant in terms of patient autonomy. He 
explained that questionable provision of artificial nutritional support is only a problem 
when the patient is not competent: 
When a patient is competent and requests the provision of 
nutritional support, then clinicians then have an ethical 
obligation to feed them. The dilemma only arises with 
withholding treatment because withholding and withdrawing 
from an ethical standpoint are just the same. The problem only 
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arises when you have an incompetent patient, that is, someone 
who is unconscious in an ICU, or has a stroke, or in a persistent 
vegetative state (General Surgeon UK). 
The same participant did not consider that there should be an issue about feeding in the 
terminally ill by explaining that if the patient who is terminally ill such that they are 
anticipated to die imminently, then it was not ethical to feed this patient, because there 
was no benefit: 
It is clearly unethical to feed those patients who are anticipated 
to die within ...let us say...7 to 14 days, because all you are 
doing is subjecting them to a potential discomfort and 
unpleasantness when there can be no tangible benefit.. .there is 
no benefit to feeding if death is imminent, and I regard death as 
imminent if it is within 10 days (General Surgeon UK). 
The consideration of artificial nutritional support as being futile was viewed by several 
participants as not being exclusively problematic, that is, that it was just one aspect of a 
myriad of aggressive treatments that collectively could be withdrawn, or considered futile. 
This was explained primarily within the context of costly critical care: 
If the patient has been in ICU for months and we know it is 
going to cost thousands of dollars for the ventilator, thousands 
of dollars for the TPN, plus all the sedation and inotropes...we 
roll that into one package when we discuss the overall care for 
these patients who are futile (Gerontologist USA); 
The patients that have been in the surgical ICU for ages and 
their prognosis is like.. .you know... they are not going to make it, 
and nutrition is just part of everything that we withdraw. Nutrition 
is just part of that.. .like with long term patients I can't ever really 
remember a case where they specifically stopped the nutrition 
and just did that — they withdraw the ventilator support, stop 
antibiotics, and I guess stop nutrition as part of the big picture 
(Critical Care Nurse Specialist USA); 
In a critical care situation, feeding is just part of that overall 
withdrawal of treatment, and in the care of the terminally ill it is 
pretty much the same...I have never really considered feeding 
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to be especially isolated from the rest of their management 
(General Surgeon USA); 
In terms of withdrawal of nutrition, that is a decision that is made 
on the basis of a number of circumstances like when you 
commence life-sustaining therapy in the absence of a clear 
diagnosis, and then a clear diagnosis of an untreatable primary 
condition becomes apparent - like disseminated malignancy, in 
which expensive supportive therapy like nutrition and 
mechanical ventilation, dialysis etc are of no particular relevance 
or benefit so they are withdrawn (Critical Care Physician AUS7). 
For the following two participants, the withdrawal of nutritional support was similarly part 
of the collective of aggressive life-sustaining treatment, and was an issue that had not 
been previously considered as exclusively significant: 
I have never really thought about it, I mean, the most frequent 
situation where we would stop the TPN or enteral feeds is when 
the patient has been offered the chance for a curative 
procedure, they have taken that chance and the wheels have 
fallen off, and the anastamosis has broken down, and they are 
septic, on the ventilator, dialysis, and the TPN is just part of that, 
and so the decision to withdraw the TPN is just part of the whole 
process and you don't decide to withdraw one aspect and not 
another - it is a case of well, do we have anything further to 
offer this patient? So the withdrawal of nutrition is part of the 
withdrawal of renal support and cardiovascular support and 
respiratory support (Clinical Pharmacist AUST); 
Stopping the feeding happens within the context of withdrawal of 
all treatment, I mean, nutrition is part of a whole bunch of stuff 
that gets turned off and that's a fairly regular occurrence. I have 
never thought of it as being important on its own (General 
Surgeon AUST). 
This assertion is supported, albeit partially, throughout the related literature. Mayo 
(1996) contends that families and other surrogate decision-makers sometimes reach a 
different conclusion when the care consists of ventilation or other life support This 
tendency to view artificial nutritional support as different is sometimes shared by 
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professional ethicists and courts (ibid.). This view is also shared by several participants 
who contributed to the previous discussion point 'Food and Water' in the previous 
chapter 'Culture' (p.163). There was a definite subset of patients that several participants 
did identify as being on 'the receiving end' of futile feeding, where the provision of 
artificial nutritional support was considered as both quantitatively and qualitatively 
inappropriate. These were essentially the frail aged dementia patients, and those 
terminal patients in the active process of dying. In particular, the frail aged warranted the 
following powerful yet controversial response from one General Surgeon (USA): 
A lot of geriatric patients get bed sores and sure, they need 
nutrition to heal those, and there is a huge ethical issue with 
those patients who are breaking down, they are not eating 
anymore, they do nothing, they have a feeding tube and they 
just become stool machines — that is all they do (General 
Surgeon USA). 
This participant's choice of description, that is, 'stool machines', conjures up an uncaring, 
inhumane attitude. This description however can also be literally and metaphorically 
interpreted as a simple machine that churns out a useless waste product. Such a blunt 
conveyance of perception was previously insinuated by a participant in Chapter Four 
'Death' (p.129). A participant who also worked within the field of gerontology provided a 
similar negative view on the provision of aggressive nutritional support in the frail aged. 
This impassioned quote also highlights the consideration of quality-of-life in those 
patients who are incompetent: 
I used to think that it would be horrible to consider withdrawal of 
nutrition in a person because you would be starving that person 
to death and that would be a horrible way to die, but some of 
these patients that I see now, the lives that they are living aren't 
worth living.. .they are horrible, horrible lives...I mean, they are 
laid up in bed with Foley's and infected feeding tubes, decubiti, 
they cannot communicate with you at all, they are end stage 
dementia, and a lot of them have been in comas for years.. .that 
must be a horrible way to live (Gerontology Nurse Practitioner 
USA). 
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Another participant gave his perspective on futile feeding in the neurosurgical ICU 
environment in terms of trying to continue a physiological process in a patient whose 
physiology was essentially defunct, and only partially restored by mechanical means: 
What we do with these patients is really stupid, I mean you have 
someone that is dying and you keep on filling their belly up with 
all this stuff that just sits there and doesn't do anything. I haven't 
seen a lot of that but it does happen and all you are doing is 
wasting your time and probably making things worse for the 
patient (Critical Care Nurse Specialist USA). 
Futile feeding was also discussed in terms of providing false hope for those patients with 
a terminal condition, and was equated with a 'life-line' (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
This participant provided a concrete example of a patient with carcinoma of the 
oesaphagus who, by virtue of an oesophageal obstruction, could only be nourished via a 
PEG: 
The problem that! have with feeding this patient is that at what 
point should it be ceased when it is clear that the patient is 
dying? Sometimes the answers are given to us, like if the tube 
becomes infected or there is some technical complication that 
means that it should be removed, and then after further 
discussion with the patient that another won't be reinserted. But 
there are times when people are not at all comfortable with the 
fact that they are dying and see that as their life-line and insist 
on feeds being given, when in any other situation they would in 
fact be allowed to die far more comfortably (Palliative Care 
Physician AUST). 
Making things worse for the patient via futile feeding was mentioned by another Palliative 
Care Physician (AUST) who explained that withdrawing nutritional support from a person 
who was dying often prolonged their life and made them less susceptible to 
complications and discomfort. Not feeding the patient was considered by this participant 
as a good thing, providing a kinder transition via dehydration (and the avoidance of 
annoying secretions), whilst maintaining the optimum in comfort: 
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Someone who is in a coma and you are not providing artificial 
nutrition but you give good mouth care can last up to a fortnight 
or longer, cause they are still getting the natural processes — 
their natural fluids replaced in terms of sublingual absorption. So 
it is not hastening their death, it could even be prolonging their 
living, and it is a process of good care (Palliative Care Physician 
AUST). 
The same participant also explained the futile role of nutrition in those patients who did 
not need generous caloric supplementation. He provides the following explanation of 
how each patient should be carefully assessed on an individual holistic basis: 
There is no point giving someone 3000 calories a day if they are 
lying in bed and they need 600 — that is a waste of time and 
resources. Eventually nutrition should be wound down and then 
stopped because of their deteriorating clinical condition. So it is 
a process of looking where the person is, what they want, what 
they are trying to achieve, and what we have to offer. It is a 
very individualistic approach (Palliative Care Physician AUST). 
This above quote also highlights another theme mentioned frequently within the 
discussion of futility and that is the identification of goals — goals of treatment, and goals 
of the patient. The identification of goals and the realisation of the end point(s) of 
treatment are explored as part of communicating the purposes and limits of artificial 
nutritional support in the following discussion point. 
Honest Communication 
Communicating not only the goals of treatment, but also the expectations of treatment 
considering the high probability of complications inherent in either parenteral or enteral 
feeding, featured throughout the discussions of futility and the withdrawal of treatment. 
The participants contributing to this discussion point essentially spoke of communication 
and identification of end points of treatment, and the difficulties that were often 
experienced when conveying the realities of treatment limitations and the likelihood of a 
patient's restoration and recovery. One participant working in the critical care 
environment explained that prior to any decision regarding the instigation of nutritional 
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therapy, the patient (if conscious) and the relatives were paramount to such discussion 
regarding treatment and its limitations: 
We always do that... when we talk to relatives about the purpose 
of intensive care is to fix people up and get them back to what 
they were like before, and if that isn't a viable likelihood or viable 
possibility, we have no right to subject them to the rigors of 
intensive care without any hope of actually achieving the end 
point that we are pretending that we are going for. So everyone 
gets told this when patients first arrive (Critical Care Physician 
UK). 
Honest communication of the expectations of treatment emerged as the important reason 
why the following participant did not experience any problems or difficulties regarding the 
withdrawal of nutritional support in the critical care setting when dealing with brain injured 
patients. By way of close interaction and communication with the patient's relatives in 
understandable terms, conflict regarding withdrawal or withholding of nutritional support 
could be avoided altogether: 
If the patient is, or is going to be pronounced brain dead, we will 
keep feeding until the family are together and then we tell 
them... 'hey, it is looking this way'...and I believe we give them 
adequate time for the shock to kind of wear off a little bit or for it 
to have absorbed in, and the doctors are pretty straight forward 
with them, and we get support from the Transplant Team, and 
do our best to explain that really that person is no more, like a 
swing moving with nobody on it, so we have never had a 
problem — even though their relative's chest is still going up and 
down and their heart is still beating. We interact closely with the 
family and extend an understanding of what is really happening 
— one that they can understand (Critical Care Nurse Specialist 
USA). 
Conversely, another participant regularly experienced difficulties regarding 
communicating withdrawal and/or withholding of nutritional support due to the patient's 
and/or the family's inability to accept the limitation of treatment, or more simply to let go'. 
Families' attitudes are therefore shaped by the pro-provision nature or medicine as well 
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as medicine's lack of recognition of palliation. This was explained in terms of 
burdensome treatment within the frail aged: 
The patient who is in a nursing home often just stops eating, 
and the family just want some miracle cure or some button 
pushed to get them eating again and when that doesn't happen, 
well the family don't want to let go. And! understand that, and 
they want to put a tube in, so I explain that it is an option - we 
can put a tube in through their abdomen, do a PEG. But! think 
that when we don't deal with some of those issues then we wind 
up with a double-edged sword because we know that they are 
going go to get decubiti and all those things, bed ridden 
problems. Often the family won't see those potential problems 
(General Surgeon USA). 
Communicating the potential complications and the reasonable expectations of such 
treatment was of paramount concern to the following participant who gave this simple yet 
descriptive explanation of why futile therapy of any sort had no place in the palliative care 
environment: 
Continuing on with an established feeding process is something 
that we would probably continue to do with the objective of 
trying to find out from the individual and the family - what are 
the real aims and goals, what are they trying to achieve with 
this? And what is going to be the outcome of a complication.. .it 
is all very well doing something, but if there is an expected 
outcome, an expected complication of a process, what are we 
going to do if that occurs? If sepsis is going to occur following 
TPN through a CVC, how are we going to treat it? Do we then 
go on a merry go round of keeping a process going because of 
commencing a treatment that we don't really agree with to a 
certain extent? Dealing with what people expect of palliative 
care as a service is part of taking on people as well, and also 
defining what we won't do, and what we shouldn't be doing in 
order to try to achieve things that are impossible (Palliative Care 
Physician AUST). 
Another participant working within the area of oncology also spoke of the importance of 
honest communication of treatment outcomes as well as establishing reasonable goals. 
He described an experience from practice that highlights the need for understanding the 
consequences of treatment provision and how autonomy impacts upon this: 
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Patients have to make their choices, and live out the 
consequences of their choices. That is the pitfall of autonomy if 
there is a pitfall. I had a guy this past weekend with myeloma 
who said that early on in his disease that he would never hook 
himself up to a feeding tube, but now that he is farther along and 
his gut is starting to fail, he is going to change his mind. We 
don't have any policy that limits that kind of treatment, so 
patients often think and want and get what they think is the best 
thing without really understanding the consequences 
(Oncologist USA). 
This is an excellent example of the way in which circumstances mean that people do 
different things. A similar example could be the current euthanasia debate whereby • 
people want euthanasia abstractly in various circumstances but when faced with those 
circumstances things change. This tsocio-temporal' space has been similarly mentioned 
by Zalcberg and Buchanan (1997:150). 
Understanding the consequences of potentially burdensome treatment was also 
mentioned by a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (UK) with an emphasis placed on the 
associated complications of gaining access for both parenteral and enteral nutrition: 
We have had lots of patients who have aspirated post CVA with 
dysphagia and it has been enteral-related. We have had 
patients who have died post PEG insertion, and patients that 
have suffered pneumothorax post CVC insertion. Therefore it is 
so important that these risks have to be explained to the patient 
before you do any of this. The patient has to understand, and 
relatives have to understand that as well. But sometimes the 
relatives demand that the patient be fed regardless of the 
consequences and this can be disastrous for the patient 
(Nutrition Nurse Specialist UK). 
Another Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST) also commented on communication of realistic 
treatment outcomes and the benefits and burdens of such outcomes, as well as the 
importance of such communication being interpretable by the patient and family: 
You need to have confidence that the clinicians have explained 
the risks and benefits of treatment and that the patient knows 
exactly what is going on.. .and that they are informed at their 
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level of understanding, and not told a whole heap of medical 
jargon. You have to sit down and explain to them exactly what it 
involves, what the risks are, what the benefits are — if there are 
any benefits.. .there may not be any benefits (Nutrition Nurse 
Specialist AUST). 
The same participant also put forward the assumption that 'clinicians' (namely medical 
practitioners) were too optimistic of such treatment and not mindful of the detrimental 
consequences of futile treatment — both in terms of harming the patient as well as the 
unnecessary expenditure of costly resources: 
The doctors are always extremely optimistic that they only 
explain the benefits of feeding.. .they don't want to say to the 
patient 'well frankly my dear you are stuffed... here's a 
bullet.. .off you go'. They are more interested in pro-treatment 
regardless of the harm it can cause and the budget blow out it 
creates. They really need to be better informed of the downside 
(Nutrition Nurse Specialist AUST). 
Such ignorance of burdensome treatment was also suggested by another participant 
(General Surgeon USA), who explained, albeit briefly, that many of his colleagues were 
not mindful of the potential waste of time and money inherent in futile feeding: 
A lot of surgeons are not aware of how much all of this 
unnecessary treatment costs, and how wasteful it is considering 
it is only going to do harm.. .rarely have I seen any benefit in 
feeding a terminally ill patient. I mean... we should all know this 
because we are all under such constraints, yet I see it all the 
time...a lot of time expensive treatment like TPN is given out 
with very little if any true benefit (General Surgeon USA). 
Another participant shared similar thoughts on the problem of resource utilisation and 
expenditure of scarce resources for therapies that are not likely to restore health to the 
patient, and the financial risks inherent in such practices: 
One of the issues for me is how do I align the incentives for end-
of-life care so that I don't expend resources for things that are 
not going to help. And whether you can do that without having 
the physicians who are actually responsible for writing the 
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prescriptions have some sort of financial risk involved.. .my 
personal feeling is that you can't (Oncologist USA). 
The dissemination of factual information about the consequences of treatment was 
explained by one participant in terms of the ongoing need for updated education 
regarding the benefits and burdens of artificial nutritional support, and the need to raise 
professional and lay awareness of medicine's limitations. He identified the shortfall in the 
skill base of end-of-life care as being responsible for improper communication to patients 
and their families: 
So we are simply unskilled at this, and by the nature of 
inexperience and not being educated about it, yes I think a lot of 
stuff happens that doesn't need to which is why some of us are 
so diligent about staying on top of it with people and reminding 
and educating physicians, educating families about it They — 
families — don't know what their options are, and doing what we 
can to assuage guilt on the part of family members because 
they think they are killing somebody if they don't provide that 
treatment (Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
Communicating honestly about the futility of aggressive treatment was identified by 
several participants as a difficulty that was unmatched in terms of their experience 
dealing with the vulnerable patient and/or family. The notion of 'can't you do something?' 
and the inability to let go' were discussed within the context of medicine's limitations and 
the so-called miracle cure. Despite the difficulties inherent in communicating bad news, 
the need to do so is imperative. The difficulty of stopping treatment once started was also 
mentioned: 
With feeding...um...usually it is not the individuals themselves 
who are saying 'feed me.. .1 want to survive longer'.. it is the 
relatives who are saying 'can't you do something?' But the 
argument is still there... there is still anguish, still hurt, and there 
is still suffering in that request of 'can't you do something'.. .it is 
the hardest thing I come up against (Palliative Care Physician 
AUST); 
The real problem is the emotive issue of 'can't you do 
something?'.. .which tends not be a very good reason to do 
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something... but that obviously has to take a lot of time and effort 
to explain why you don't think it is a good idea to do (Palliative 
Care Physician AUST). 
Another Palliative Care Physician (AUST) explained in vehement terms not only the 
importance of honest communication regarding futility, but also how ethically 
questionable it was to do otherwise. She explained that those patients with a poor 
prognosis who have been commenced on what could be considered futile treatment, 
were given arguably false indications as to what their future held: 
The dilemma then becomes for us, ethically, to stop things that 
others have inappropriately started. I think that it is quite true to 
say that on many fronts, whether it be enteral nutrition or 
whether it be the straight provision of intravenous fluids, it is far 
easier to start some things and feel that you are doing 
something, than it ever is to stop it. And I think of the decisions 
about the appropriateness of commencing the therapy are not 
dealt with in nearly as greater depth as they ought to be at the 
time those decisions are taken (Palliative Care Physician 
AUST). 
The commencement of artificial nutritional support was therefore avoided where possible 
in questionable cases due to the difficulties of withdrawing support once it was already 
established. This featured frequently in the discussions regarding withholding and/or 
withdrawing treatment. One participant in particular gave the following explanation: 
We try not to start it because it is hard then after you start it 
because the family thinks that this is the magical bag of nutrition 
that is going to cure, and you don't have the heart to stop that. It 
is like giving the family false hope by starting nutrition in those 
situations. We have a lot of patients that have been like end 
stage organ failure, four systems down, and the family wants 
everything done and the doctor will try to put them on TPN but 
really, that is only going to make their organ failure worse and it 
is going to be of no benefit to them (Clinical Dietitian USA). 
Another participant spoke of the difficulties of ceasing aggressive treatment considering 
the distress not just for the patient and family, but also for staff: 
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It is a huge distress for medical staff to have to go through the 
process of pulling back.. .it is much harder once it is started.. .it 
is much harder to withdraw something which is well 
established.. .it is more difficult once you are in an established 
thing to work out how to get out of it. (Palliative Care Physician 
AUST). 
This view is supported by Jett (1995) who maintains that it is often more difficult to 
withdraw technological interventions than it is to withhold them in the first place. One 
participant did however offer a succinct explanation of how he communicated the 
withdrawal of aggressive yet futile treatment in the critical care setting: 
Frequently when talking to a relative, one of the key things we 
use, and use in a very intentional way is that we say 'at this 
point in time, we have no real therapeutic options, in that we 
have nothing else to offer- the situation is desperate- nature 
will take its course inevitably in whatever we currently do - our 
focus has changed from trying to promote survival which we 
know we can't, to making sure that the patient is in comfort, and 
that there is no possibility of them suffering'..., and that becomes 
our entire focus of our management, that is, our job is to ensure 
that during the next phase, they aren't in any discomfort as far 
as we can tell (Critical Care Physician UK). 
This explanation essentially describes a change in treatment focus from aggressive care 
to supportive care, and the implementation of a positive line of management with a 
completely different focus in terms of what medicine is trying to achieve. The primary 
objective is extending good death care, rather than embracing the burdens of so-called 
beneficial treatment. The same participant went on to provide an additional description 
of what he meant by not necessarily withdrawing care, but changing the focus of care: 
What you are actually doing is something very positive. You are 
making a positive decision that your role as a clinician is to look 
after that patient in an optimal way given the circumstances - 
which, if you were a family practitioner looking after someone 
who is terminally ill who has got severe pain in the middle of the 
night and is dying, then you would dO a house call and give an 
opiate. If you have someone who is drowning on a ventilator 
with lousy lung disease then making sure they are not awake 
during that and suffering and feeling the intensity of asphyxia 
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while their lungs fall apart on them is actually what your primary 
job should be. If you look at it from that view point then the 
active administration of life saving treatments that aren't 
working, or are futile should not be hard to swap for those that 
are palliative. Therefore you never lose the battle because your 
primary objective has been achieved (Critical Care Physician 
UK). 
The importance of thorough communication is supported by McCamish and Crocker 
(1993) and Ravenscroft and Bell (2000) who maintain that difficult situations are resolved 
via effective communication involving the patient, family, surrogate and care givers. 
Several participants believed that much of the futility debate could be avoided altogether 
if the prior wishes of the patients were in fact known. By communicating one's wishes via 
the advance care planning afforded by advance directives and living wills, futile , 
aggressive therapy could be ethically, and legally withheld in the name of patient 
autonomy. This issue is explored in the following discussion point. 
Advance Care Planning 
This discussion point evolved from a general concept of advance care planning which 
included discussions on advance directives, living wills, durable power of attorney for 
health care, futility policies and quality-of-life. The term 'living will' was first used in the 
USA in 1969 by Kutner who argued that a competent adult should be able to have his or 
her wishes with regard to futile care recorded and respected. In 1991, legislation was 
taken further (in the USA) by the patient Self-Determination Act which compels all 
hospitals to inform patients of their rights in relation to advance directives (Murphy 1992). 
In the UK, the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics (1994) supported the 
development in advance directives on the basis that they enable expression of individual 
preferences and stimulate discussion between doctor and patient. 
In Australia, no formal implementation of such advance care planning strategies were 
documented at the time of data collection. However, in a subsequent review of the 
literature, Bielger and colleagues (2000) explain that three Australian states and two 
territories now have legislation which provides for advance directives. Despite their 
prevalence in the USA, and the legislative developments in the UK and Australia, 
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advance directives in many instances have failed to guide clinical decision-making, and 
their utility has been questioned (Teno et al 1997). 
Only five participants spoke exclusively of advance directives and withdrawing artificial 
nutritional support (a Gerontologist USA; a General Surgeon USA; a Law professor USA; 
an Oncology Nurse Specialist USA; and a Medical Social Worker USA), yet numerous 
others contributed to this discussion point in the broader terms of collective withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment. The one exception to the general assumptions put forward by 
the contributing participants was by a Gerontologist (USA) who did not associate the 
provision of artificial nutritional support as relevant to the discussion of advance care 
planning. Essentially, he did not consider such treatment to be ever associated with futile 
treatment, and as such, would provide it indefinitely: 
Directives address different things, you know, I always think of 
directives as addressing the ventilator, addressing the CPR, the 
inotropes, those kinds of things. When I think of directives I think 
about those things that acutely intervene to maintain their lives. I 
never think of directives of withdrawing or withholding nutritional 
support. I guess I just don't think of it that way, so, even though 
a lot a patients do have a living will, we just never attach the 
living will to nutritional support as one of the things they don't 
want continued (Gerontologist USA). 
This participant's stance on indefinite feeding was also consolidated in his following 
quote: 
• Withdrawing nutrition — we never do that, even in patients who 
are chronically ill at the end of their lives, we would never 
withdraw nutrition, and that is something that we keep on giving. 
We withdraw medication, we withdraw other kinds of support, 
but nutrition is never something that we would consider 
withdrawing because we just think that, you know, you must 
keep on feeding them until something else will take their life 
(Gerontologist USA). 
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Interestingly, the same participant exhibited a certain degree of contradiction when he 
subsequently explained that he often struggled with the idea of continuing aggressive 
measures to nourish patients at the end of their lives: 
We will continue to feed the patient until whatever, but, that 
comes to my mind a lot of times, you know... why do we need to 
put this in, you know, why do we put in a PEG for someone who 
is going to die very soon, and prolonging their life with nutrition 
which they, right now, to us are considered brain dead, they are 
just lying there comatose (Gerontologist USA). 
The other contributing participants did not exhibit any such predicament. All were 
reasonably clear in their explanations of continuing potentially futile treatment, or 
withdrawing the same, at the wishes of the patient as previously expressed in advance 
care planning. Interestingly, these discussions were offered by those participants 
working within the USA health care delivery system only. These participants gave the 
following explanations of the usefulness of such advance care planning, as well as 
expressing the difficulties that arise when such planning has not taken place: 
Living wills and advance directives are very vet)/ useful because 
then you know the patient's wishes and you can honour them. It 
is hard when you don't know what they want so then you put it 
to the family.. .and the family often say Well I have no idea what 
Mother would want'.. .so I put it to them, what they would then 
want in this kind of situation.. .and sometimes they say that they 
would want everything possible so then I of course would be 
obligated to treat but at the same time negotiating again and 
discussing the futile nature of care, the detrimental effects of 
some of that care, you know, like aspiration pneumonia from the 
feed. So it is always easier and kinder to know what the patient 
wanted (General Surgeon USA). 
I think it is tragic in so many ways to continue feeding in many of 
these patients because what we end up doing is supporting a 
slow progression of deterioration in situations where they have 
not been able to verbalise their thoughts, their wishes 
themselves — that is why I am a great believer in advance 
directives. I used to joke and say that when I am 75 or 80 or 
whatever, I am going to get a tattoo on my belly that reads 'No 
PEG, No G tube, No CPR' (Oncology Nurse Specialist USA). 
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We always discuss advance directives with everybody - 
patients, their families, their primary physicians, everybody. It 
seems to be a case of all or nothing - we don't have a lot of 
people who say that they are not quite sure of what they would 
do, so they either say no or pull out, or want everything, but at 
least then you know what you are in for, and so do they - 
everybody goes in with their eyes open (Medical Social Worker 
USA); 
Patients under my care, well we talk to them about what are 
their wishes, and they state whether or not they wish to remain 
fed and basically being kept alive through artificial means. It 
gives us all a very clear picture of the road ahead (General 
Surgeon USA). 
The difficulties that arise when advance care planning does not occur was discussed in 
terms of pressure on family members to make treatment decisions that could be swayed 
by feelings of duty and guilt. Such decision-making could be seen as bestowing an 
awkward, or fearful responsibility on to those who are then required to make decisions 
regarding the withdrawal and/or withholding of treatment. A second Medical Social 
Worker (USA) gave the following explanation: 
A lot of times I think that the family want to keep the patient alive 
out of a sense of duty or guilt. And that they think that this is 
what this person wanted. And other times I think that it is fear - 
that they feel by saying `no' to something that is going to prolong 
life then they are taking responsibility for that person's life, and 
they don't want to be the ones to take responsibility for the end 
of that person's life. Like, you know, I keep trying to educate on 
do not resuscitate (DNR) and quality-of-life, and the family will 
say that yeah, the quality-of-life of that person is no good and 
she would feel a lot more peaceful, and logically you get right up 
to it, you know, you mention DNR and they are just like 'no - I 
can't be the one...I would have to pump on her chest...I just 
can't be the one to make that decision' (Medical Social Worker 
USA). 
This view is supported by Kaplan (1997) and Swigart eta! (1996) who remind us that if 
physicians, patients, and families discuss the patient's values and beliefs about death 
and end-of-life care, there is a record, hopefully on paper, that provides valuable data to 
feed into the decision-making process. The importance of advance care planning was 
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subsequently explained by the same participant, in the situation where the patient is no 
longer autonomous or competent to make such treatment decisions: 
The patient is way gone, she can't tell you anymore, she never 
signed any directives and so there you go again continuing this 
kind of treatment so there is really all kinds of aggressive 
treatments still going on, and no one is willing to say stop, and I 
think that makes that decision so difficult, and often that decision 
is never made (Medical Social Worker USA). 
The continuation of futile treatment was also explained as occurring so to avoid 
bestowing a 'cruel punishment' on family members when faced with the massive 
responsibility of decision-making, when a miracle cure could be possible: 
I think what is driving physicians in keeping that treatment going 
even when they think it is futile but the family did not, is a sense 
that it would be cruel unusual punishment for the family to have 
a patient taken off life support and allowed to die when they are 
still praying for a miracle or they are still saying that the patient 
wanted every chance to live (Law Professor USA). 
The above quotes implies a vicious circle of continued aggressive treatment, not capable 
of restoring the patient back to a previous quality-of-life, and potentially exposing the 
patient to all the known complications of life-sustaining therapies. The prolongation of 
futile treatment in the wake of not knowing the patient's wishes, and the family's inability 
to make a decision regarding the withdrawal of such treatment, was similarly explained 
by the sole non-American participant commenting on this subject. He explained a 
situation in a critical care environment where a patient in PVS (in the ICU for 19 months) 
was continued on aggressive treatment due to the family's reluctance to permit a 
decision on withdrawal of treatment: 
...and so we had a patient who had nothing apart from roving 
eye movement, and it was like this for 19 months...I had a 
neurology colleague who kept bumping into me in the corridor 
and saying that 'you're mad, you're mad, just pull the tube, just 
sort it out, it is crazy, you are absolutely mad'... the family would 
not make the decision, and nobody knew what she would have 
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wanted... her husband was totally resistant to the idea of any 
type of withdrawal. So it took her 19 months to die. In cases like 
this we should really not have to keep on going (Critical Care 
Physician UK). 
This above quote leads to the subject of family demands of continued futile treatment as 
well as raising the critique as to whether those 19 months were worthwhile and according 
to whom? This quantitative and qualitative quandary as to who defines futility remains 
unclear. This was spoken of both in terms of evidence and quality-of-life. The question of 
who quantifies futile treatment was posed by one participant who explained that certain 
evidence was needed both clinically and financially to deal with the demands for 
continued futile treatment. This participant spoke from a background in oncology where 
certain chemotherapy and haematology treatments were exorbitantly expensive. 
Well, from my standpoint the biggest issue of end-of-life care is 
having good evidence that it is worth the expense. I am sure you 
know of the one study of cancer patients where you could do it 
(artificial feeding) but that it was about $100 000 per year of life, 
but there are other situations in which is has to be better 
measured.. .we need better evidence of what is useful, or better 
policies about what actually is helpful care, and what is not 
helpful care (Oncologist USA). 
Policy regarding the provision of futile care was also mentioned by another participant 
who gave a detailed explanation derived from a recent practice experience that involved 
a family demanding the continuation of aggressive care for a patient in PVS. This rich 
textual excerpt also suggests the implementation of a futility policy via an institutional 
ethics committee: 
One of the mechanisms that is very useful is a very active, 
aggressive, assertive ethics committee at the hospital. And we 
meet at a moments notice and help pull the various parties 
together to talk about what really are the ethical options. The 
worst case scenario we had was a couple of years ago, 
[mentions patients name] in bed eight ICU, I'll never forget 
it... this woman, something happened in surgery which is why 
nobody, no doctor was going to say 'OK, lets just pull 
everything', because they knew that somebody was going to get 
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slammed over this. Something happened in surgery and this 
lady ended up in ICU for 11 and a half months. She had decubiti 
you could put your fist in, and the family were, kind 
of... fundamentalist religious type, and this family were 
impervious to intervention...I mean, nice people, well meaning 
people but it finally got to the point where they were showing up 
less and less. I think a number of things worked - the chaplains 
met with the pastor of their church. Unfortunately it was an 
African American family and there was that cultural dynamic 
again of 'what are you really trying to do here?'.. .so we got that, 
and then the nurses started inviting the family in at dressing 
changes, when it was time to do the wound the care of her 
decubitus ulcers which were huge, and all the debriding etc. So 
the nurses said to the family, 'come in here and watch 
this'.. .and a few times of doing that, I think they finally got it. 
This is 11 and a half months. She was in a vegetative state - 
she had been in a vegetative state the whole time since surgery 
- I think she was anoxic during surgery and there were major 
problems with her ventilation, I don't know, nobody quite figured 
out what happened. After that, the ethics committee developed 
a futile treatment policy that basically said that we think that this 
is futile treatment then we don't have to provide it. Interestingly 
enough, as of September 1st 1999 that is now a State law in 
Texas (Hospital Ethicist/Chaplain USA). 
This narrative demonstrates a consequentalist ethic on the behalf of the ICU clinicians in 
this given situation. By applying the 'shock tactic' (of what would have been a confronting 
wound care procedure) the clinicians achieved the desired result, that being the 
succumbing of the patient's relatives to the prevailing clinical consensus to withdraw 
treatment. 
The process of determining futility was also offered by this participant. He explained that 
if the physician thinks that the treatment is nonbeneficial or 'medically futile', then the 
recommendation is made by the treating team to change the focus of treatment from 
aggressive to comfort. In those cases where the family still persisted with demanding 
futile care, the next step created what was essentially a formalised futility policy: 
Then the physician takes the decision to the facility ethics 
committee and if the ethics committee agrees that all continued 
treatment is futile, then now, as of September 1, by State law, 
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the family has 10 days during which we have to continue full 
treatment, but they have 10 days to find another physician, 
and/or facility that will provide nonbenefical, futile treatment, or 
we can withdraw treatment, or the family can go to court and try 
to get an extension of the time, but it is written in the law, the 
judge can't extend the time unless that in the judge's opinion 
there is some reasonable expectation that some facility will take 
this person, and if there is not, then that is it. But, I mean, it is 
too bad that you have to resort to legal manoeuvres (Hospital 
Ethicist/Chaplain USA). 
This above explanation exemplifies the recent policy development within the State of 
Texas. At the time of data collection, new laws were passed in the State of Texas 
regulating advance directives and end-of-life care. Three prior laws were combined and 
simplified into a single law and was entitled 'Directives to Physicians and Family or 
Surrogate'. The new advance directive allows patients to either request or reject 
treatment. The formulation of this law was considered straight forward by the working 
party, however a major area of difficulty (according to one of the research participants 
who was involved in the writing of the new law) was around 'futility'. The essence of this 
new law is that if an institution follows the prescribed process, 19 they achieve immunity 
from civil and criminal liability if they ultimately remove treatment over the objection of 
surrogate or living will. 
The principle of justice can be seen here as a contested battleground. It has been 
championed by some as the basis for futility policies (Halevy and Brody 1996), and has 
been rejected by others such as Jecker and Schneiderman (1992) as confusing futility 
with rationing. The primary examples of futility policies featuring in the literature were the 
'Houston Policy' (Halevy and Brody 1996), the Veterans' Administration Medical Center 
Policy — Buffalo, New York (Wear et al 1995), and the Parkland Memorial Hospital Policy 
— Dallas, Texas (Sadler and Mayo 1993). Other mentioning of such policies were also 
provided by Darr (1995), Pentz (1998), Rivin (1997) and Vawter (1996) and Fine (2001). 
There was no mentioning of futility policies by those participants from the UK or Australia. 
19 See Appendices (p. 358) for a detailed explanation of the process (Appendix 4). 
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The only criticisms of advance care planning as it pertains to the question of futility was 
provided by one of the non-clinician participants in this research. A Law Professor (USA) 
explained that as an abstract principle, the futility scenario (that is, that doctors are under 
no obligation to provide futile care) was right both legally and ethically. However, proving 
what was futile was going to be problematic. His main criticism was that despite all 
things, the most probable outcome of such a dilemma was going to side with the wishes 
of the family of the patient: 
If doctors think that continuing artificial nutrition is futile they 
have the argument that they are under no professional 
obligation to provide futile care — which as an abstract principle 
is fight both legally and ethically, but they are going to have a 
heck of a time proving what is futile, or what is futility. And the 
legal system has not had to deal with that very frequently. When 
it has, is has almost always sided with the patient and the 
patient's family demanding more care (LawProfessor USA). 
This was the only legal commentary regarding advance care planning in the entire 
research. The same participant went on to explain that despite certain advance care 
planning measures being in place or absent, the end point was usually the same, that is, 
that the decision-makers' wishes were upheld, except in those cases where abuse might 
be suspected: 
The default system and legal system is set in favour of the 
surrogate decision maker and in favour of family decisions, 
except in those cases where it is absolutely clear that it is futile 
— or it is clear by preponderance of the evidence that it is doing 
significantly more harm than good to the patient in terms that 
might resonate with a judge thinking about patient abuse like 
more pain, more suffering. For example, the PVS patient.. .it 
would certainly appear that the patient is not in any real 
discomfort so that is a really hard argument to make for a PVS 
patient... but strangely enough, that is the patient a lot of doctors 
have in mind when they are thinking that there has to be a limit 
to care (Law Professor USA). 
A subsequent review of the literature supports this assertion (Hall 1994; Haddad 1996; 
Wear et al 1995; Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association 
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1999). Cowe (1996) argues that there is the possibility of abuse of living wills, and 
suggests that subtle persuasion from family members who stand to benefit from the 
patient's death could occur. Also, it may be possible that patients may choose to refuse 
treatment because they fear becoming a burden to their family as they become 
increasingly incapacitated (Cowe 1996). The same author suggests another form of 
abuse of living wills regarding resources, that being, an overburdened health service 
might promote the use of advance directives/living wills to reduce demand on scarce 
resources. 
The second criticism of advance care planning was that it could be considered worthless 
considering that the outcomes were the same regardless of having directives in place or 
not. The same participant explained that in those countries, cities, institutions that did not 
espouse any formalised advance care planning, people were still dying the same 'hi-tech' 
deaths as those where such strategies did exist. His main criticism of advance directives 
per se went as such: 
The fact that you [Australian researcher] practice the same hi-
tech and high quality care and the fact that people are dying 
pretty much the same way is actually my answer to your 
question because if you don't need advance directives to 
produce that result — if you don't need futility policies to produce 
the result then I think that is fine. I mean, I am not a believer in 
advance directives just for the sake of advance directives.., they 
serve a function. Back in the days when doctors wouldn't 
respect family requests to stop care... what we are now seeing 
in the name of autonomy is an evolution by which advance 
directives are becoming a vehicle for demands as well as 
refusals (Law Professor USA). 
This participant explained that the advance directive was now turning into something 
other than what it was intended to, whereby certain medical decisions should not be of 
any real concern of the family and/or surrogate decision-maker. He gave as examples 
those extraneous matters that are extremely important to the clinician but not necessarily 
the family: 
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...like should there be a rational limit on care, how much are we 
pouting into end-of-life treatments? (Law Professor USA). 
This comment highlights the need to revisit the principle of autonomy. As Daly (1994) 
explains, autonomy does not create requirements of services that we must provide. In 
such cases where family demands of continued costly treatment that is considered 
medically futile, some institutions have adopted policies regarding such requests which, 
essentially, limits patient autonomy. Limits on patient autonomy regarding futility is also 
examined by Jecker and Scheiderman (1992) who explain that autonomy has faced 
challenges that invoke medical futility and rationing of scarce health care resources. By 
and large, the related literature supports such challenges to autonomy. It is argued that 
physicians may withhold or refrain from offering specific futile therapy to burn patients in 
an acute care setting (Hammond and Ward 1989), low birth weight infants in a neonatal 
ICU (Lantos et al 1988), patients without a reasonable chance of discharge from an ICU 
(Taffet et al 1988), severely ill infants incapable of experiencing pain and whose 
prognosis is poor and survival questionable (Murphy 1988), and terminally ill incompetent 
patients whose families request aggressive therapies (Brennan 1981). We might ask 
then whether 'futility' diminishes respect for patient autonomy? Sulmasy (1998) ponders 
whether or not the whole futility movement is a backlash by physicians who have felt their 
power ebb over the past 30 years. He questions whether the increasing spirit of 
consumerism among patients made this state of affairs inevitable. This is also explained 
in terms of consumer activism, which is previously discussed in Chapter Five 'Money' (p. 
156-157) of this thesis. 
These varying discussions on futility all embody some predilection of the notion 'quality-
of-life'. The majority of participants all agreed that the continuation of futile feeding (as 
well as all aggressive medical treatment collectively), could seriously affect the recipient's 
quality-of-life. Several participants gave concrete examples from practice, whist others 
offered more general assumptions: 
There are things that can be done to prolong the process of 
living, provided that the person feels that the quality of their life 
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is appropriate. But irrespective of what we do, we can't sort of 
stop the actual process of death as an outcome of disease 
(Palliative Care Physician AUST); 
It is hard, when quality-of-life is nothing and the family just 
keeps pushing the food down the tube — it is hard to cope with. 
To me, a lot of the time the patient appears comfortable, I mean 
a lot of times there is very good care that is given, they are 
turned, their skin, they put lotion on it, I mean, they are really 
being nurtured, and I guess that really nobody can say what is 
going on in their head when they are in this late stage of 
dementia — nobody knows subjectively what is in their minds. 
But it appears that they have no clue what is going on — like it is 
just this organism living here with no awareness of its 
surroundings. So what I do in those situation is that I talk about 
advance directives, about DNR orders and things like quality-of-
life with the family... and a lot of times you get resistance you get 
'no, we don't believe in that', and it may be a religious thing, or it 
maybe their values are different from the values that medicine 
holds (Medical Social Worker USA); 
For me as a practitioner, if someone is, well if their quality-of-life 
is pretty much shot or they are they pretty much dying, I think 
my priority is making them comfortable than more their diet. I 
mean, that is where my focus would be as making them more 
comfortable.. .1 mean if the tube feeding is interfering with the 
comfort then I think that is a good reason to discuss withdrawing 
(Critical Care Nurse Specialist USA). 
The difficulty in determining one's quality-of-life was also raised by one of the above 
participants. When explaining a situation whereby a patient who was deemed 
'irretrievable' who then made a significant recovery, regaining consciousness from a 
dense stroke and began to feed himself again, this participant demonstrated how 
problematic it is to decipher someone else's quality-of-life: 
I think that in a lot of cases he would not have been fed and 
would have died. He would have been passed off as old, 
demented, stroked-out, and not worth the expense considering 
the poor quality-of-life that was assumed for him (Medical Social 
Worker USA). 
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This above quote resonates with the literature regarding avoiding inappropriate 
prolongation of dying (Singer et al 1999; Ahronheim et al 1996; Capron 1997). The 
decision to limit nutritional therapy raises difficult questions about the 'standards' of life 
such as intelligence (Fletcher 1982), or potential for interaction (McCormick 1974). 
Neither is sufficient to conclude that the life of someone else is not worth living (Lynn and 
Childress 1983). The critical issue of quality-of-life was also raised within the context of 
futile treatment in the case of the frail aged patient. The following participant gave this 
example of how he regularly came across quality-of-life as an issue in the role as 
Hospital Ethicist, and provided an explanation of how he might deal with such issues: 
Quality-of-life is a big issue. My first question is whether the 
patient is in a condition that it is ultimately incompatible with life 
— they are to die from this, and then the second question is — is 
this the quality-of-life in which the patient wants to remain. We 
get this all the time. I swear I get a call once every two weeks 
from a family member who has an Alzheimer's patient in a 
nursing home with pneumonia asking 'what do I do?'... well, if 
you are a physician, you rightly say IV antibiotics will take care 
of the pneumonia, but if you are a family member you gotta ask 
that in curing pneumonia do we restore the patient to the 
previously acceptable quality-of-life for them.. .and if we don't, 
why are you treating them with antibiotics? Why aren't you 
treating them with morphine? (Hospital Ethicist/Chaplain USA). 
The overwhelming consensus in this discussion point, if not the entire major theme of 
futility, was that artificial nutritional support could not improve quality-of-life in a clinical 
sense. As one participant explained: 
It is not the patient's nutritional state that is going to save them 
or provide them with a better quality-of-life.., ten days of living 
longer in pain are ten days of living longer in pain (Oncologist 
USA). 
These quotes raise the question of whether or not quality-of-life dilemmas could be 
avoided if 'quality-of-life' and 'futility' were broached via the consideration (and 
implementation) of advanced care planning? We might ask ourselves whether such 
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patients would ever get to the stage of suffering the complications of continued 
aggressive medical treatment if their prior wishes were known? 
Conclusion 
The importance of understanding futility, despite its various definition(s), has far reaching 
implications for health care, and how health care professionals interact with patients and 
their loved ones. Despite the difficulties is assigning an absolute definition to the term 
futility (since it is inherently a value-laden determination), the participants favour a 'fair' 
process for determining and subsequently withholding or withdrawing what is thought to 
be futile care. Yet this is hardly straightforward. The biggest lesson derived from this 
chapter is that futility requires complex judgement. It cannot be decided quickly or easily. 
It requires considerable thought and 'honest communication' before families are 
approached with treatment discussions. This essentially provides the argument in favour 
for advance care planning strategies and the need for honest communication, thus 
debunking the so-called death myths. Whether such strategies are helpful in these 
circumstances remains unclear, inasmuch as not all of the participants' experiences of 
withdrawing care were based on the existence of advance directives, living wills, and/or 
durable power of attorney for health care. 
Rationing and futility also remain contested discourses. Despite several participants 
alluding to the allocation of resources as a reason for the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatments, it was not an overwhelming consensus. This is consistent with 
broad ethical guidelines stating that such decisions should be based on the benefits and 
burdens of treatment for patients, not on social circumstances. Nevertheless, the 
literature suggests that society will respond to the rising cost of medical care by giving 
the appropriateness of aggressive artificial nutritional therapy (and life-sustaining 
technologies at large) increasing scrutiny (Englehardt and Rie 1986; Jecker and 
Scheiderman 1992; Menzel 1990; Frader and Watchko 1997; BMJ 1999). 
Situations of futile feeding and medical futility collectively often constitute difficult 
dilemmas. According to the contributing participants, these dilemmas raise conflicting 
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emotions of both failure and frustration. It is essential that we are clear both in our own 
minds, and in our communications with others, about 'futility' and the extent of our 
obligations as health care providers. To do this we have a professional obligation to be 
well versed in the ethical debates regarding futility to contribute effectively (McCormack 
1998; Erlen 1996). Such an assumption coincides with the previously explored issues of 
raising awareness of end-of-life education, good death care, and participation in ethics 
consultation activities. Encouraging such dialogue of advance care planning does seem 
to be easier said than done considering the certain taboo surrounding death as an 
acceptable outcome of health care. Surely this presents the most cumbersome 
challenge to the pro-aggressive treatment nature of health care with regard to the 
provision of aggressive nutritional support in vulnerable people. Discussions concerning 
medically futile treatments ultimately involve discussions on the technology used the 
provide them. The technology which constitutes artificial nutritional support forms the 
basis for the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
TECHNOLOGY 
Introduction 
The technical processes in which artificial nutritional support could be physically provided 
to patients inform the discussions that underpin this chapter. These discussions resulted 
from the merging the following codes: tube feeding; EN versus PN; using the gut; elderly; 
and critical care. Those 23 participants contributing to this major theme (who were 
predominantly practising within the USA) included: A Health Service Administrator (USA); 
two Oncologists (USA); a Palliative Care Physician (AUST); three Clinical Dietitians 
(USA); a Gerontology Nurse Practitioner (USA); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (UK); two 
Medical Social Workers (USA); a Critical Care Physician (UK); two Critical Care Nurse 
Specialists (USA); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST); a Trauma Surgeon (USA); a 
Critical Care Physician (AUST); an Oncology Nurse Specialist (USA); two General 
Surgeons (USA); a Gerontologist (USA); a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); and a 
General Surgeon (UK). The most significant merging of codes was seen between 
'elderly' and 'tube feeding', and it is from the synthesis of this merger in which the major 
discussion point arose which has been entitled 'aggressive feeding'. The participants 
afforded a blatant emphasis on the role of tube feeding (which they defined as enteral 
nutrition via nasogastric or PEG tube) with a lesser emphasis on the use of parenteral 
nutrition. The second discussion point of this chapter provides mixed insights into the 
enteral versus parental nutrition debate and has been aptly named 'tubes or wires?' 
Aggressive Feeding 
The title of this discussion point was considered appropriate as being the essence of the 
arguments posed by the contributing participants. The origins of this term however 
deserves some inquiry. 'Aggressive' as a medical term denotes an acute sense of 
clinical rigor yet it is also implies a discourse of 'conflict'. This raises the question as to 
why we embrace the language of conflict with regard to medical treatment? We are 
therefore reminded of the interesting interactions of power and knowledge that shape our 
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language. This has recently been reiterated by Bjornsdottir (2001). The main concern of 
the participants centred on the aggressive if not inappropriate insertion of enteral feeding 
devices (and provision of EN thereafter) in those patients who could be considered as 
vulnerable - primarily the elderly and those patients with a terminal illness. The majority 
of the contributing participants raised their concerns in terms of the complications derived 
from such treatment, as well as the sustenance of ethical treatment considering quality-
of-life. These concerns were primarily discussed within caring for the elderly. Despite 
plenty of anecdotal evidence existing to support the assumption that there was a certain 
increase in the placement of feeding tubes in those patients who could be considered as 
being vulnerable, only one reference was located despite an ongoing literature search to 
support this (Oyogoa et al 1 999). The following participant shared his strong views on 
tube feeding in the elderly and the apparent increase in such practice: 
It seems as though they place an awful lot of PEG's here. I 
know that in our geriatric department that it is a big discussion 
with the families because often times when we have a PEG 
placed, the patient will actually start going downhill and they 
may not last much longer after the tube placement. I have seen 
a lot of illness associated with PEG's, and I think it is more sad 
just to be living a life with these tubes and no quality.. .just to be 
kept on going with no higher function whatsoever (Gerontology 
Nurse Practitioner USA). 
This quote includes reference to the increase in PEG placement in the elderly, clinical 
complications associated such placement, and questionable quality-of-life. The same 
participant goes on to clarify his viewpoints regarding the increase in morbidity (and 
mortality) associated with PEG insertion and feeding, as well as providing an unsubtle 
example from his practice regarding quality-of-life: 
There is definitely an increase in morbidity with these patients 
who get PEG'S, and some of them die because of it. I would say 
that the majority of our patients who have PEG'S are also 
demented.. .we talk to them and say that if they don't eat then 
we are going to have to talk about ways to feed you. Like I said, 
they are out of it, they can't communicate with you at all, their 
brain function... well they are just vegetables.. .they can't eat by 
themselves, can't do anything by themselves, let alone eat. But 
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if they did not have a PEG tube, they would have died a year or 
two ago, and you can easily argue that would have been a 
blessing, but as it turns out that has been a family decision - to 
keep things going via a PEG. It is hard to say whether or not 
that is inappropriate if not abuse...but I definitely think that it is 
inappropriate (Gerontology Nurse Practitioner USA). 
A similar view was offered by another participant practising in the area of gerontology: 
I have a negative view of artificial nutrition support.. .to me it 
always coincides with a general decline, lower quality-of-life - 
just in my experience that is what I have seen. To work out why 
these choices are made, why doctors do that - place PEG'S all 
the time, I just don't know, I really don't know what they are 
trying to achieve (Medical Social Worker USA). 
Enteral (or what was commonly referred to as 'tube feeding') attracted the majority of 
ethical discussion by participants. For example, one of the UK participants (Nutrition 
Nurse Specialist) who regularly dealt with patients suffering from severe CVA's. She 
questioned her own practice regarding the commencement of nutritional treatment in 
these patients. Interestingly this participant also defined her patients in accordance with 
technology: 
The ethical dilemmas that we tend to come across are enteral 
patients, insofar as we get these patients with severe CVA's and 
strokes and the physicians start feeding within 48 hours of the 
CVA, but we (clinical nutrition team), we don't think that we 
should feed at all, because they probably aren't going to survive 
and we would use dysphagia as an indication of survival - if 
their swallowing hasn't returned in seven days we know that 
their outcome isn't good. But we get a lot of pressure from 
medical and nursing staff to feed these patients.. .you get a 
great furore of why you should tube feed these people when 
they are not going to survive, and their quality-of-life is going to 
be such that there is no quality-of-life, and certainly they end up 
in nursing homes, incompetent for the rest of their lives with a 
PEG insitu, and you wonder what we are trying to achieve with 
that? (Nutrition Nurse Specialist UK). 
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Raising this question of 'what are we trying to achieve?' also occurred for a Clinical 
Dietitian (USA) who discussed the need for long term planning and honest 
communication with patient and family members regarding the placement of a permanent 
route for feeding. Her views on pre-treatment discussion and planning were often 
thwarted by the physicians' very own nonparticipation in such dialogue: 
Does the family want this person's life prolonged? Do they feel 
comfortable doing this, do they feel comfortable if they don't, 
and if they do take this person home and they are going to 
become very emaciated and dehydrated... how are they going to 
feel about that? What we need to do is to come to a sort of 
mutual agreement - and I support whatever they want. There 
needs to be that discussion. What is really annoying is when 
you have done all that, and the doctors don't take part in that 
discussion and then come along and figure that the patient is 
not eating so they schedule a PEG insertion.. .you know, all the 
good work has just been undone (Clinical Dietitian USA). 
The overall lack of planning, and lack of forethought regarding the appropriate provision 
of tube feeding was similarly communicated by the only Australian participant who 
contributed to this discussion point: 
I think it is a real issue for medical staff also. I think it is a real 
issue for those people who put these things in. I think perhaps at 
the time, the decision that is taken to use enteral feeding, it may 
be perfectly appropriate, and no one would deny that they 
haven't been inserted with the best intentions but I think not 
nearly sufficient thought is given to what happens further down 
the track, when other complications arise and without this being 
in, the patient would die perhaps in a much shorter time, so in 
fact I believe that in some cases they (feeding tubes) do prolong 
people's suffering far more than they ought. (Palliative Care 
Physician AUST). 
This comment also raises the issue of the primary treatment focus being on the acute 
phase rather than the chronic or terminal phase of illness. Inappropriate placement of 
feeding tubes was also resolutely commented on by an Oncology Nurse Practitioner 
(USA) who explained that she had experienced a lot of inappropriate PEG placements. 
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She shared the following experience from when she worked in an infectious diseases 
unit, caring mainly for people with AIDS: 
A young man had wasting syndrome and was very adamant that 
he wanted minimal intervention, but it was his family that wanted 
to proceed with tube feeding because he was no longer able to 
take anything by mouth. Ultimately they did place a PEG and he 
went home with hospice, but the PEG placement was traumatic 
and gave him much discomfort.. .the feeds also created a lot of 
gastric discomfort, diarrhoea, bloating and pain. It really 
complicated things for him and his family who ended up 
regretting the decision. PEG'S in these circumstances can 
create a much higher onset of complications with these patients 
(Oncology Nurse Specialist USA). 
A similar complex example from practice in an oncology setting was also provided by a 
Palliative Care Physician who, reflecting on her practice, described a situation where a 
PEG tube had become infected: 
It was causing extraordinary pain, and it was very clear to 
everybody that the person was dying, but even the patient 
himself had become so attached to the PEG as his only lifeline 
and insisted on it being used against every bit of medical advice 
given to him. And then you are really caught, because there is 
this thing in there that is causing him pain and suffering to 
continue using it, but he is not giving permission not to use it. 
My thoughts are that it should have never been placed in the 
first place (Palliative Care Physician AUS7). 
One participant in particular questioned her very own practice in terms of preventive 
care. She shared her thoughts of inappropriate feeding tube placement and usage in lieu 
of better nutritional preventive care within both elderly and end stage 
oncology/haematology patients: 
When I first started nursing in a medical unit, I found that there 
was a lot of aggressive feeding in elderly patients who were very 
debilitated, who were pretty much — gosh I can't believe that I 
am going to say this but there is a terrible phrase coined here in 
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this country called Gomer's20 — you know.. .the unresponsive, 
curled up, contracted, cache ctic elderly patient with a PEG or G-
tube. That is really not right. I mean firstly, these patients should 
not end up like that anyway. There should be a lot more 
preventive care that occurs to ensure that these patients do not 
become contracted and cachectic. I often used to ask myself 
why are we sustaining life in these tragic individuals by placing 
feeding tubes (Oncology Nurse Specialist USA). 
This participant's impassioned discussion regarding the use of feeding tubes in the 
elderly did not stop there. She shared her view on the plight of the elderly regarding 
aggressive feeding tube placement and the clinical realities of associated complications: 
I find it really sad because the elderly population is really hidden 
from public view and debate. No one wants to deal with Gomer 
crumbles. All the money and research goes into cancer and 
AIDS and we debate continuously about whether or not to 
continue with aggressive treatment or to withdraw it. In the 
elderly we seem to sweep them under the carpet and not give 
them the benefit of the doubt because the majority of them are 
incompetent. So we make their treatment decisions for them 
and subject them to prolonged deterioration or worse, kill them 
with the associated complications of tubes and tube feeding. I 
find this really difficult and sad (Oncology Nurse Specialist 
USA). 
Nowhere else in this research was the prevention of this certain state of decline in 
vulnerable patients discussed with such ardour. However a considerable dialogue did 
take place regarding the recognition and responsibility of nutritional status as a basic 
medical and nursing care practice, and this is explored in detail in the next chapter. 
The issue of quality-of-life associated with the placement and use of feeding tubes in 
vulnerable patients was also problematic for both Medical Social Workers (USA). The 
following participant explained that the placement of PEG's seemed to remove the 'life 
essence' in the patients under her care: 
2° GOMER is an acronym for Get Out of My Emergency Room, a colloquial term popularised in the book The House of God', by 
Samuel Shem. 
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Many of our patients have PEG tubes and their quality-of-life 
really seems to be impacted... they are not able to enjoy their 
food, chew, taste. I think feeding tubes really take away a lot of 
the humanness that I see in older people — it seems like they 
have lost pad of their life essence (Medical Social Worker USA). 
This notion of 'humanness' is therefore explained as being erased by a technology, 
consequently raising questions of compromising the dignity of the human person. This 
same participant also commented on the aggressive nature of tube feeding in the elderly 
courtesy of 'pro-provision/pro-procedure' physicians. She shared the following 
experience from her practice in the area of gerontology: 
We recently had a frail aged patient, demented, who came to 
our unit with bed sores — nothing to do with her nutrition as such 
as she was eating fine.. .but upon discharge the doctor in charge 
of her care was just like cramming, forcing the family to PEG 
her... 'you gotta put in a PEG tube, you gotta put in a PEG 
tube'... and in many other people's opinion this was premature 
and unnecessary. There are lots of times where they are 
inappropriately placed, like with this lady — she went down hill as 
soon as it went it (Medical Social Worker USA). 
The notion of aggressive placement of feeding tubes, or as the above participant 
described 'pro-procedure', has been referred to elsewhere in this thesis as the 
'technological imperative'. This is not new to the associated literature, however there is a 
noticeable gap regarding discussion on pre-device insertion planning. From a technical 
perspective, the issues that surround feeding tube usage are purely that — technical. Yet 
the issues that face both patient and carer are hardly limited to the technological 
imperative. The clinical realities of aggressive tube feeding are well documented. The 
actual placement of a PEG itself can cause many complications including death 
(Finucane et al 1999). Mortality during PEG tube placement ranges from 0% to 2% (Hull 
et al 1993; Kohli and Block 1995). Perioperative mortality ranges from 6% to 24% (Grant 
et al 1998; Finocchiaro eta! 1997; Rabeneck eta! 1996). Complications associated with 
the placement of such a device include but are not limited to: colocutaneous fistula, 
gastro-oesophageal reflux, wound infection, granulation tissue formulation, tube leakage, 
tube blockage, insertion site bleeding (Kutiyanawala eta! 1998); aspiration pneumonia, 
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accidental removal, gastrointestinal bleeding (Wijdicks and McMahon 1999). Aspiration 
probably contributes to a death rate of 40% in elderly patients (Ciocon et al 1988). Such 
complications were commented on by numerous participants. With reference to the 
previously shared narrative in Chapter Six 'Culture' (p. 174), an Oncology Nurse ' 
Specialist (USA) epitomised the above synopsis of feeding tube complications when she 
described the placement of a PEG tube in a dying woman. In this situation, the family 
had insisted on the placement of a PEG tube in their dying mother who, by virtue of her 
disease process, had a very low platelet count. Shortly after the insertion procedure, she 
haemorrhaged, went into hypovolaemic shock and died within hours. 
The above offerings from the literature were subsequently supported by the participants' 
very own experiences from practice. However, one profound issue that two participants 
raised that was not located in the reviewed literature was that of the natural process of 
dying via the cessation of eating. A Medical Social Worker (USA) explained in that (in 
gerontology) it was not only swallowing difficulties that gave rise to tube feeding, yet 
more so dementia and the process of life's natural decline: 
They forget to eat, they don't remember how to eat, food just 
isn't a priority, they can't take the feed that others are offering 
and swallow safely. I have a lot of issues about people wanting 
to place feeding tubes in people with end stage dementia, or at 
the end of their lives. There are many people who do that and 
see it as a viable option. That is something that I do not push 
professionally from an ethical stance because I see it as gross 
interference with life's natural process of wrapping things up 
(Medical Social Worker USA). 
This quote resonates with another participant's views on the provision of artificial 
nutritional support in vulnerable patients when he simply explained that '...they aren't 
supposed to be eating anything because that is the way people die' (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). Not recognising the natural process of death and continuing to 
treat aggressively has been discussed by Nuland (1995) and Meyer (1998). Both these 
sources stand alone as deliberately exposing the ethos of medicine to prolong life (and 
death essentially) as long as clinically and/or technically possible. 
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The lack of participation by physicians in what is essentially an end-of-life/withdrawal of 
treatment issue, could in fact represent the overall unwillingness and discomfort 
displayed by medical practitioners regarding such issues. This could also be represented 
by the seemingly minimal emphasis placed on such issues within medical curricula. 
Such an assertion has been mentioned, in part, in the literature albeit insufficiently. A 
recent publication by the Association of American Medical Colleges (1999) discusses the 
importance of education and evaluation in this general area of end-of-life care, and 
claims that one third of medical schools in the USA are in the process of improving the 
curriculum that addresses palliative care for the chronically and terminally ill. The other 
major contributor throughout the literature pertains to the previously mentioned EPEC 
Project which is designed to educate all USA physicians on the essential clinical 
competencies required to provide quality end-of-life care (AMA 1999). No such 
resources, or mention of similar projects/strategies in the UK or Australia were located. 
Tubes or Wires? 
This discussion point encompasses those exchanges concerning the choice of providing 
either enteral (tubes) or parenteral (wires) nutrition. Whereas previous discussion has 
centred on the issue of nutrition in the elderly and those with a terminal illness, this 
discussion point considered mainly those medical/surgical patients who were acutely ill 
and being cared for in a critical care environment. The majority of participants did not 
consider the debate between EN or PN as having any particular ethical relevance. 
However several did see a connection regarding the professional issues of convenience, 
resources, and a reluctance to change practice. One participant in particular vehemently 
expressed his belief that there was in fact an ethical argument at stake: 
Absolutely!... One of the fundamental precepts of ethics is that 
you give the patient the choice and then having given the patient 
the choice you do maximum benefit for minimum harm. And 
harm and benefit are not the same — they are different. And 
there is a colossal naivete about nutritional support against 
these evangelists for enteral and parenteral nutrition. So the 
enteral pharisees have swallowed the line that everybody can 
be fed enterally (General Surgeon UK). 
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Conversely, another participant did not consider any ethical dimension to the EN versus 
PN debate(s) and based such treatment decisions on a clinical basis which was 
influenced by outcome and cost: 
There are very few, if any, ethical dimensions to that. That 
decision is a decision based on a clinical decision with a 
preference to use enteral nutrition because it is better, cheaper 
- so the dimensions of that decision are dictated by clinical 
circumstances rather than by any sort of specific ethical decision 
(Critical Care Physician AUST). 
Interestingly here the nature of ethics is contested. Both participants essentially explain 
that decisions regarding treatment are 'medical procedure', and by mentioning medical 
judgement, thereby removes ethical judgement. However, the first participant is quick to 
denote autonomy and the 'ethical trump card'. Nevertheless, ethics does not end there 
in a clinical sense. For the most part, participants contributing to this discussion point 
considered that more effort should be made in providing EN. Examples of such 'pro-
enteral' discussion included the following: 
I am really sold on the concept of enteral alimentation...I hardly 
ever use TPN. As a surgeon, I just don't have much use for it. In 
my particular practice I have always leaned more toward enteral 
alimentation even for my ICU patients because it is better 
(General Surgeon USA); 
There has really been a big swing to enteral feeding - more 
people are more receptive to it.. .most people don't realise that 
the gut needs something in there, plus it is easier, cheaper, you 
have less complications - no pneumothorax or catheter sepsis, 
less metabolic fluctuations, so I am very pro-enteral (General 
Surgeon USA); 
Using the gut really does affect length of stay, I mean there are 
formulas that enhance the immune response and slow down the 
inflammatory process.. .there is good clinical evidence that you 
can get ICU patients off ventilators earlier with this stuff (Clinical 
Dietitian USA); 
On the contrary, several participants spoke negatively of EN in acute care situations: 
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Shoving litres of enteral formula into their stomachs so they can 
aspirate it all, when nothing is actually happening and they are 
not absorbing anything seems to be moronic in the extreme. I 
will not fill up someone's gut with nice sugary materials because 
invariable they get into trouble, so it is best to give them TPN 
(General Surgeon UK); 
I have to revere the benefits of TPN and must admit that I am 
pretty slow to take up with the enteral side of things.. .you know, 
in principle is sounds wonderful but practically getting these 
tubes past the ligament of Treitz is very difficult and then the gut 
won't accept the feeds. I am happier to leave things be and 
push on with TPN - especially in the ICU (General Surgeon 
USA); 
There is a great enthusiasm for PEG'S and jejunostomies, but 
what happens if the PEG goes wrong? Well the consequences 
can be disastrous for the patient, and there is now a recognised 
mortality related to tube insertion. I mean it is not common but I 
think that is unacceptable. How would people feel if we were 
killing people with parenteral nutrition.. .they would feel quite 
rightly very strongly about it. So that is the down side of enteral 
(General Surgeon UK); 
Pro-enteral ICU doctors say 'use the gut', and I just know that 
there is no way that it is going to work, and then they have their 
bellies all blown up, and they say it doesn't matter if they have 
an ileus, arguing that all the fiterature shows that you can 
absorb it ...and sure enough, two days later, they have a bit of a 
vomit and aspirate, and I say, yeah well all right so lets go back 
to TPN, so I don't have much time for enteral feeding (General 
Surgeon AUST). 
One participant however did offer a conclusive albeit analytical explanation of the 
profound benefits of enteral nutritional support in the critical category of patients when he 
reflected on his experiences of caring for burns patients over a period of some twenty 
years: 
I have a patient in the Burns ICU right now on TPN - like he is 
the first TPN in six months, and we are running a big unit, 200 
patients a year through the Bums ICU, and a total of 600 in the 
Burns Unit a year so we are not talking about small numbers, 
we are talking about big numbers, and I think that it is really is a 
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question of never letting them get an ileus cause you start 
feeding them across the board. I think that in the United States 
everybody believes, at least all the surgeons believe that the gut 
is better, and a lot has come from Wesley Alexander's work in 
bums, and even Dudrick21 the founder of TPN is a surgeon still, 
I mean he will still primarily gut feed patients.. .and the thought 
is, that is what God made us to do to begin with, he gave us a 
gut so it ought to be a good idea to use it because we are 
designed that way. But I guess that, well, we haven't seen a lot 
of changes with burns care in the last 20 years - except feeding. 
And we do much better than we did 20 years ago so, I say we 
blame that on feeding - like less time in ICU, less time in 
hospital which is complex, multifactorial, and better 
survival.. .and is it all the gut? Well no, but we aren't giving any 
different antibiotics, same antibiotics were here 20 years ago, 
same theory of getting the patient to the operating room quickly 
was here 20 years ago. So you might ask what wasn't here 20 
years ago - well feeding, post pyloric enteral feeding wasn't so 
we at least attribute most of our success to feeding (Trauma 
Surgeon USA). 
Issues of convenience (as previously discussed in Chapter Seven 'Dilemmas' p. 185- 
186) were raised by several participants in terms of the ongoing debate of EN versus PN. 
Conflict arising from this debate was experienced regularly in most practice settings. A 
Gerontologist (USA) offered the following scenario as a common occurrence when 
dealing with treatment decisions regarding artificial nutritional support in a general 
medical setting: 
Let's say between TPN and tube feeding, a lot of the time, a lot 
of the nutritionists, the GI doctors suggest that we need to give 
tube feeding as much as possible versus PN. But a lot of 
doctors don't think that way. I see a lot of them write the patients 
up for TPN when it might be better to give them tube feeding. 
Maybe they do that because it is convenient for them just to 
leave the patient on TPN even though it is probably appropriate 
now to switch them to tube feeding because that is better for the 
patient - so, yeah, I do see that happening a lot (Gerontologist 
USA). 
21 Although many researchers contributed to the development of TPN, Stanely Dudrick is usually given preeminence. It was his report 
in 1968 that provided the impetus for the rapid development of clinical TPN. See Dudrick et a!, Long-term parenteral nutrition with 
growth, development and positive nitrogen balance. Surgery. 1968; 64: 134-142. 
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Observing current research and best practice with reference to which modality one would 
choose to provide was commented by a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST): 
You have to go with the literature and at the moment the 
literature is suggesting that enteral feeding is the way to go. So 
until then when the literature to the contrary turns up then we 
have to go with the flow and because that is what is best for the 
patient.. .and the reason we are all here is to look after these 
patients and to provide the best care possible (Nutrition Nurse 
Specialist AUST). 
In their dealings with the sick and vulnerable, clinicians are bestowed with a considerable 
degree of trust. Patients and their proxies must have confidence that decisions 
concerning the provision of enteral or parenteral nutrition are based on sound clinical and 
ethical judgement. Either modality can predispose the recipient to a myriad of 
complications — not all of which are purely technical. The resounding consensus drawn 
from this discussion point is to be aware of current best practice and identifying one's 
reluctance to accept progressive practice. What defines best practice however, is 
forever debatable. However such 'ethical' debate is absent from the vast literature 
available on EN versus PN in the clinical literature. As the interpretive chapters show, 
this debate is worth having because it teaches us a lot especially in those areas that 
remain unchallenged. 
Conclusion 
Considering the arguable increase of enteral tube feeding in vulnerable patient 
populations, and the absence of necessary dialogue concerning such aggressive 
nutritional treatment, raises an interesting parallel with the previously mentioned 
discussion points 'Advance Care Planning' and 'Honest Communication'. We are 
reminded by Scofield (1991) that we should be as concerned about inappropriate, 
unwarranted use of feeding apparatuses as we are about the improper use of restraints 
and urinary catheters — especially in the elderly. Sadly, this aspect of the ethics of the 
feeding tube has attracted little attention. The essential questions raised in this chapter 
are 'what are we trying to achieve?' and 'how do we avoid bad decisions?', ultimately 
raise the need for better planning and communication — not only of the ethical issues 
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inherent in such practice, but also the clinical realities that are not confined to the acute 
hospital environs. 
One interesting omission in the narratives of the participants is the failure to discuss the 
provision of either enteral or parenteral feeding of children and adolescents. All 
discussions consider the patient as an adult. The literature also affords an overwhelming 
emphasis to the patient as 'adult' with some exceptions, albeit these are essentially 
clinical papers on (but not limited to): Crohns disease in childhood and adolescence; 
treatment of severe anorexia nervosa; intragastric feeding following traumatic brain 
injury; and management of dysphagia in stroke patients. The consequences of 
aggressive tube feeding should be made visible to all concerned and not be covertly 
sanctioned within the confines of long term care settings, be they institutions or one's 
own home. 
So how do we improve such decision-making and improve the channels for appropriate 
communication? How do we remind clinicians of the role of nutrition in vulnerable 
people, be they frail aged, terminally ill, or critically ill? Raising such awareness certainly 
coincides with the need appreciate to end-of-life education. The provision of appropriate 
nutritional support in patients regardless of their clinical setting is another concern. This 
is explored in the final interpretive chapter of this thesis which has been entitled 
'Responsibility'. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Introduction 
This final empirical chapter represents a marked departure from the previous chapters 
which discussed the many and varied ethical issues inherent in the provision of 'artificial' 
nutritional support. The following discussion offers those fundamental views of the basic 
necessity of 'natural' nutrition in acute care settings, and the shortfalls experienced by 
the participants under the heading of 'Responsibility'. This title was chosen as it was 
stated by the participants of what is often lacking or poorly defined in a clinical sense 
when it comes to the provision of adequate nourishment of hospitalised patients. The 
seven codes that contrived this major theme were: responsibility for nutrition; 
malnutrition in hospital; nutrition not sexy enough; basic care; education issues; 
reluctance to change practice; and research in nutrition. The 24 contributing participants 
comprised of: A Gerontologist (USA); two General Surgeons (USA); a General Surgeon 
(UK); a Critical Care Physician (UK); two Occupational Therapists (USA); an 
Occupational Therapist (AUST); two Oncologists (USA); three Critical Care Nurse 
Specialists (USA); an Oncology Nurse Specialist (USA); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist 
(UK); a Nutrition Nurse Specialist (AUST); three Clinical Dietitians (USA); a Hospital 
Pharmacist (AU ST); a Neurosurgeon (USA); a Hospital Chaplain/Ethicist (USA); and a 
Trauma Surgeon (USA). 
Three main discussion points arose from the merging of codes, and these have been 
entitled and ordered according to their subject matter and importance as expressed by 
the participants. These discussion points deal with the apparent lack of emphasis placed 
on the basic necessity of nutrition and the consequence of malnutrition evident in acute 
care settings, and pose the question as to whether patients fall in the gaps of 
responsibility. Other shortfalls are also discussed and these include the lack of 
education regarding nutrition support, the need to raise awareness of such deficits, as 
well as several criticisms of inadequate basic patient care. Essentially, it is the lack of 
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recognition and the discharging of responsibility for nutrition that provides the basis of 
this chapter. 
Not Enough Emphasis on Nutrition 
Essentially this discussion point deals with those concerns of the simple fact that 
nutrition, be it artificial or simple oral intake, is considered with the importance (or 
emphasis) that it rightly deserves. The majority of participants agreed that not only 
complex clinical nutrition failed to attract the appropriate attention it deserved, yet more 
troubling was the assertion that simple oral intake was often ignored. Several reasons 
for the lack of importance afforded to the monitoring of simple oral intake were offered by 
the following participants: 
I think that unfortunately the physicians have less involvement 
and less understanding of the complexity of oral intake and it 
seems that they, and the majority of nurses are more concerned 
with the patient's bowel and bladder habits rather than what 
goes in the other end (Occupational Therapist USA); 
The doctors don't think about nutrition because they are so 
busy, and nutrition to them is just too basic to warrant any 
immediate clinical concern (Critical Care Nurse Specialist USA); 
I think one of the biggest issues with the lack of nutrition support 
is the delay that seems to happen so often. We see people who 
should have been started five to seven days ago and this really 
puts them behind the eight-ball, and why does this 
happen.... well I think it is because the medical team has been 
too busy doing everything else that they forget the basics. That 
is troubling for me (Oncologist USA); 
Medical schools all over the world get very little, if anything on 
nutrition. In that context, I believe that not enough emphasis is 
put on nutrition — it is probably seen as being too basic, too 
boring. It is not high-powered hi-tech stuff you know (Clinical 
Dietitian USA). 
The concept that 'food is not considered as being 'clinically rigorous' was a common 
concern for the majority of participants. This concept of technological determinism is well 
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documented, especially in the nursing literature on the critique of science (Nyatanga 
1991; Parker 1987; Lumby 1992; Johnson 2000). Several participants also discussed this 
concern in tandem with an overarching concern that there was in fact, a notable 
incidence of malnutrition among hospitalised patients. The following participant offered 
this sarcastic explanation, yet one that resonated with the other contributing participants: 
If you wanted to find a group of people in the UK who are 
malnourished, all you have to do is go to your nearest NHS 
hospital and malnutrition is there — institutionalised! (Critical 
Care Physician UK). 
This sweeping statement is supported in part by one particular offering in the related 
literature pertaining to malnutrition in British hospitals (McWhirter and Pennington 1994), 
and is further elucidated by this interesting explanation of how malnutrition can occur in a 
hospitalised patient: 
When a patient hits the place, they get put on nil by mouth for 
investigations, they get put on nil by mouth for operations, 
everything gets delayed, cancelled, postponed, and they are left 
nil by mouth for ages. And the biggest single sin that a junior 
resident can commit is to actually feed a patient when they are 
booked to have something done, because they have a window 
of opportunity to get an investigation done, or the surgery done, 
and they miss it because the patient has been fed — had his or 
her hunger alleviated, then that is almost a sackable offence. 
So everything that we do is geared either to diagnosis of 
something other than malnutrition, or to providing malnutrition 
for those who haven't got it simply because feeding is way down 
on the list of priorities (Critical Care Physician UK). 
Despite an extensive Medline search, no articles pertaining to the above suggestion were 
located. However, two articles specifically dealing with a review of excessive fasting in 
paediatric patients prior to elective surgery were found (Veall et al 1995; Maclean and 
Renwick 1993). The above explanation also suggests an element of 'bad planning'. Bad 
planning leading to the overlooking of a patient's need for, and lack of nutritional 
sustenance, was also suggested by several participants when they explained their 
dismay at the way hospital wards were managed from a human resource perspective. 
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This raises the question as to for whom is the ward managed? Does the institution need 
to operate in a particular manner despite the needs of the patient? For example, the 
occurrence of patients not being fed due to staff shortages, or the lack of recognition of a 
patient's cognitive inability to feed oneself was explained: 
We see a lot of older and weak patients who are unable to feed 
themselves very well, and the people who bring in the meals are 
not nurses, and they bring in the meals and then when the time 
comes, they take away the meals whether the patient has eaten 
or not. They do not notice how much the patient has eaten and if 
no one notices, then it is taken for granted that they have eaten 
when in fact they have gone hungry (Gerontologist USA); 
The same participant goes on further to explain his frustration with what he considered 
should be fundamental patient care: 
Periodically, I will come on to the ward and see that their meal 
trays are still full and they are just on the side because the 
patient is unable to feed themselves. Unfortunately, if someone 
would feed them they would eat it, but! have to write orders, I 
actually have to write a doctor's order to 'please assist patient 
with meals', and then the nurses will do it, but otherwise they will 
not (Gerontologist USA). 
This raises the alarming concern that the basic provision of food and water to a needy 
patient is dismissed as either irrelevant, too basic, or possibly too inconvenient in the 
midst of other more rigorous clinical responsibilities, therefore necessitating a special 
written order. Feeding a patient is essentially a natural extension of good nursing care 
that should be integrated automatically into the care plan of the patient. Similarly, 
another participant practising in the area of gerontology explained tad planning' of the 
coordination of meal times and human resources: 
A lot of PCA's [patient care assistants], well their job is just to 
bring out all the trays and collect the trays at the right time. So at 
5.30pm they disperse the trays, and then at 6.30pm it is time for 
them to collect the trays. That is their job. They do not have to 
be concerned about the clinical aspects of the patient's 
nutritional status. They just gotta take care of the trays. They 
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just work there to earn a wage, and are not into the health care 
mentality (Gerontology Nurse Practitioner USA). 
The cognitive abilities of patients in terms of self care and the simple activities of daily 
living such as feeding (and associated inability to feed), was of primary importance to a 
subset of participants, namely the three Occupational Therapists that contributed to this 
research. The fundamental ability to actually eat, and to then enjoy eating, could be 
subsequently challenged by hospitalisation and medical care itself. These participants 
explained how hospitalisation and medical care provide certain hurdles to the process of 
eating and nutrition, and describe the simple barriers these patients contend with in order 
to eat: 
If a patient is cognitively able enough to not only understand that 
there is food in front of them and physically be able to feed 
themselves then their nutritional intake is often somewhat 
adequate. A lot of them have anorectic tendencies and lack of 
appetite and loss of taste buds due to old age and heaps of 
medications. They may also be on a restrictive diet like a renal 
diet (or no taste diet) or one for dysphagia, like pureed, 
thickened fluids, and the likelihood of them getting adequate 
nutrition is unlikely (Occupational Therapist USA). 
Staffing of hospital wards and the associated poor management of meal times was also 
raised: 
I think that the staff levels are inadequate to meet the patients' 
needs and that the people who are often providing the front line 
care to the patients are inadequately informed of either 
cognitive, physical status or swallowing status. For example, it is 
very likely that a certified nursing assistant will place a tray in 
front of a patient and not be aware of either the diet or the 
patient's physical or cognitive limitations. The tray will be there 
in an inappropriate position, the patient is unable to reach it, 
either the utensils or the food, or sometimes there is an error in 
their dietary tray and the patient is unable to eat the food that is 
provided (Occupational Therapist USA). 
Several other examples were provided of how and why some patients did not receive 
adequate oral intake whilst hospitalised. Funding also featured, in that certain payer 
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issues (in the USA health care environment) and subsequent staffing levels that are 
affordable within reimbursement situations led to situations of not enough staff being 
present to assist with meals: 
We would see a much better rate of oral intake if there were 
more staff present to encourage patients to feed themselves, 
rather than shoving food in their mouth at an inappropriate 
rate.. .and I think that if the nursing staff had more time to 
present food to people in a way that made food appetising 
rather than off-putting or over stimulating (Occupational 
Therapist USA). 
The Australian Occupational Therapist participant shared similar views with her American 
counterparts: 
My experience is a frequent experience where people who are 
not physically capable of feeding themselves are left often 
unfed. I have known of relatives who had to visit the patient 
everyday and assist them with their meals because of their fear 
that their relative would not be fed by the ward staff 
(Occupational Therapist AUS7). 
Her main concerns centred on the lack of 'basic care', if not a criticism of a shortfall in 
what should be fundamental quality nursing care: 
I think that basic care like nutrition is so basic, and good basic 
nursing skills that should be observed and so often these basic 
things are ignored. Hygiene comes into it as well because to 
have an appetite, good mouth care is important, yet so often 
these patients have foul mouths, and one example I can 
remember where a patient had been in hospital for 11 days with 
no toothbrush, no mouth toilet. The nurses are either too busy or 
don't care that having a mouth like sandpaper or the bottom of a 
parrot's cage does not lend itself to a healthy appetite let alone 
sense of well being (Occupational Therapist AUS1). 
I think that basic care is being ignored. I think without a doubt 
that it is the nurse's responsibility in the first instance. I think that 
if there is something physically preventing the patient getting 
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their hand to their mouth then they should be referred to the 
appropriate therapy for intervention (Occupational Therapist 
AUS7). 
Bad management associated with staffing levels and coordination of meal times was of 
similar concern for the same participant: 
The meals are plonked down in front of the patient often where 
they can't reach them, by the kitchen ladies who hand out the 
meals, and of course, one of the biggest problems is when lunch 
or dinner time comes, half the nurses are off the ward at their 
own meal break, so that if their patient requires feeding, unless 
one of the other nurses is prepared to help out and is aware of 
the problem in need, the patient does not get to eat - unless 
they have a relative there to assist (Occupational Therapist 
AUS7). 
This last quote outlines a fundamental flaw in the recognition of basic patient needs, as 
well as revealing the questionable ethic of the institution. It also highlights an obvious 
need for better coordination of staffing to ensure that well-informed staff are present at 
meal times to ensure that patients receive the therapeutic intervention necessary to 
ensure that their most fundamental requirements for improved functioning and recovery, 
if not human existence, are being met. However, better coordination of staffing is hardly 
the sole solution. Simple awareness of the importance of nutrition also appears to be 
seriously lacking. Several participants mentioned this as being partially resolved by 
hospitals having designated nutrition teams that afford a sense of 'professional 
seriousness' to a subject that was otherwise dismissed as being boring or too basic: 
We have a nutrition team that is very visible and people do take 
note (Clinical Dietitian USA); 
We follow the recommendations from the nutrition team in terms 
of what and how we should be feeding our patients because 
they know what they are doing, they are the experts 
(Gerontologist USA); 
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Malnutrition is not high on the list here because it is being 
addressed by the Nutritional Support Team who do all the 
assessing and intervention (General Surgeon USA); 
All our patients get a Dietitian who reviews them regularly, and 
we follow their recommendations (Critical Care Nurse Specialist 
USA); 
In this hospital, yes.. .1 feel that the Dietitians are very active and 
really get in there and appropriately recommend when a patient 
should be put on nutrition support, and always assess the diet to 
make sure that it is appropriate. This hospital really recognises 
the importance and the contribution of the nutrition department 
(Clinical Dietitian USA). 
The emphasis and importance afforded to simple or complex nutritional intake is 
obviously enhanced by the presence of a nutrition team. This assertion is also supported 
by the recent literature on the emergence of Clinical Nutrition Teams (Hebuterne and 
Schneider 2000; Suchner et al 2000), as well as the literature, albeit minimal, associated 
with the concept of malnutrition in hospitals. Only three major articles (McWhirter and 
Pennington 1994; Allison 1998; Plester 1996) were located on this somewhat hard to 
believe occurrence which formed the next discussion point. 
Malnutrition in Hospital 
The notion of malnutrition was not defined within the discourse of ethics in the dominant 
ethics literature. The literature which documents malnutrition tends to do so within the 
discourse of 'quality' as opposed to 'ethics' as demonstrated by Ella and Stratton (2000) 
and McWhirter and Pennington (1994). The concept of malnutrition in hospital was 
essentially explained as being tacit, taken for granted, hidden or as one participant 
explained 'not allowed to happen' thus being 'swept under the carpet' (Critical Care 
Physician UK). The fact that many professionals were not attuned to the incidence of 
malnutrition amongst hospitalised patients was also raised, as well as the misconception 
that malnutrition was not associated with people living in industrialised countries — hence 
only being considered as a phenomenon akin to third world and famine-stricken nations. 
This supposed ignorance of malnutrition amongst hospitalised patients (if not a 
consequence of hospitalisation) was explained in extraordinary detail by one of the UK 
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participants. His explanations range from deficits in the education of health professionals 
to unfortunate shortcomings of hospital catering: 
We are not attuned to malnutrition in hospital. From the medical 
students who are trained to look at skinny people from the 
perspective of what underlying disease is making them skinny, 
and not from the perspective that they are malnourished. 
Malnutrition is not considered to be a significant entity.. .in the 
UK anyway.. .because that is what health care systems tell us — 
that basically that is not really allowable so it does not happen 
(Critical Care Physician UK); 
The focus on the wards has to do with illness, and not 
necessarily recovery.. .so we see the nurses all hell bent on 
getting all the drugs administered and attending to the machines 
that go 'beep' rather than attending to the basic needs of the 
patients such as nourishing (Critical Care Physician UK); 
One of the great wonders of the world is that the NHS buys the 
best produce available cause they are the biggest purchaser in 
the UK of food products. The kitchens here have actually special 
legislation — they are not just ordinary kitchens, they have got to 
be up to a certain standard in meal provision. The cooks here (I 
find this amazing) are actually specialty trained. The foods they 
prepare have to dietetically and nutritionally sound and planned. 
And given that, how come they produce what they produce, that 
is, the crappiest off-putting food out! That is the great wonder of 
the world. The food smells awful, looks awful, gets slopped out 
to them and the nurses then go off and do whatever nurses do 
and then come back and collect it all up (Critical Care Physician 
UK). 
The problem of hospital food was located in the clinical nutrition literature. Allison (1998) 
discusses the role of hospital catering and contests that it is not well designed to care 
adequately for the nutritional needs of the sick and is in need of reform. He maintains 
that malnutrition among hospital inpatients is common, occurring in up to 40% of 
admissions, and that problems with hospital catering play a large part in causing the 
problem. The above participant also offered an excellent explanation (albeit somewhat 
sarcastic reflecting the frustration experienced) of how bad planning and the reality of 
hospital management could interfere with the adequate nourishment of patients. His 
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contribution also mirrors those comments made by the three Occupational Therapist 
participants in the previous discussion point with particular reference to criticisms of 
nursing patterns: 
This is how frustrating it is to find out how your patients are 
going.. .you go on to the ward and first find the nurse, now that 
might take a while, and then you find a nurse who knows 
anything about the ward — that may take several weeks 
considering all the agency and PRN nurses... and then find a 
nurse who knows the ward and even knows the patients, and 
then you can ask what their nutritional intake has been, and they 
won't have any idea. I guess I am being a bit sarcastic but it 
does represent the actual pattern of nursing behaviours in our 
wards. And if you ask nurses to put patients on diet sheets so 
we know what they have eaten, it never happens.. .they lose 
interest in that between coffee breaks (Critical Care Physician 
UK). 
Another UK participant also commented on what seemed for her to be a recent 'loss' in 
the art of nursing, that is, the disregard for basic patient care that essentially formed the 
foundation of the profession's original existence. She also alluded to the previously 
discussed issue of staffing patterns and bad planning: 
Nurses have seemed to have forgotten about the general day to 
day importance of nutrition. I have just completed a meal audit 
here and I know that nursing staff do not take responsibility for 
nutrition at all, from the point of giving someone their dinner and 
sitting them up, and making sure that they can reach the table 
and their food, and we wonder why patients are becoming 
malnourished in hospital. Those things seem so minor but the 
art of nursing, of simple caring, is really one of those things that 
has disappeared.. .and it has been handed over to people who 
are not qualified. Nurses are very good at the technical side of 
things and quick to hang up a flask of TPN, but shocking when it 
comes to simple feeding. Consequently patients often go 
hungry (Nutrition Nurse Specialist UK). 
This last comment also raises another criticism of nursing's shortfall in the provision of 
basic care, and that is the apparent seductive power of the technological imperative. The 
seduction of 'science' in nursing is not a new phenomenon and is well addressed in the 
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nursing literature refuting science in nursing (Nyatanga 1991; Lumby 1991; Parker 1991; 
Parker 1987). The notion that nutrition is not 'sexy' enough was explained by the same 
participant in terms of the seduction of science. She also reiterates previous comments 
made regarding the management of meal times in hospital: 
Nursing has really been seduced by science and feeding 
someone naturally isn't that sexy. Also we aren't very good at 
the simple organisation like when the meals come and half the 
nurses are off the floor having their own breaks. Or they are too 
busy doing a drug round or are called to do a round with a busy 
surgeon and so on... those things take precedence over getting 
to the patients' meals. Our priorities seem to have shifted 
(Nutrition Nurse Specialist UK). 
Similarly, an Australian Critical Care Physician commented on an apparent shift of 
priorities and referred to the lack of basic nursing measures regarding nutrition and 
hydration of patients: 
You can do the simple nursing things that we sort of lost track 
of.. .1 mean, you can get out a small spoon and offer them a little 
bit of fluid and keep their mouth moist and clean, and if they are 
able to take a little bit of food it can be ladled in with a little 
spoon. Those things are good nursing care and are qualitatively 
very different - although probably not as clinically challenging - 
as putting a tube down someone's nose into their stomach and 
drip feeding them (Critical Care Physician AUS7). 
The 'clinically unchallenging' nature of the simple oral provision of nutrition fits well within 
the previous descriptions of nutrition not being 'sexy' or scientifically seductive enough to 
warrant due consideration and nursing attention. Yet these criticisms should not rest with 
the discipline of nursing alone. Medicine too, sports a certain shortfall regarding the 
awareness of malnutrition among hospitalised patients, and the importance of nutritional 
assessment, teaching and research. Other shortfalls include the role of nutrition in end-
of-life care, as well the paradoxical occurrence of 'over-nourishing' patients. These 
issues inform the final discussion point of this chapter. 
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Other Shortfalls 
The fact that 'nutrition' per se does not rate highly in medical or nursing curricula is 
mentioned in the literature, albeit briefly, regarding malnutrition in hospital (McWhirter 
and Pennington 1994). Despite this shortfall, one participant did mention a recent 
improvement in this shortfall: 
A survey done by BAPEN22 last year showed that only 30% of 
hospitals had nutrition teams, so clearly there is not sufficient 
awareness in this country or in most European countries, and so 
there is still a relatively little amount of nutrition taught in 
undergraduate medical school curricula. Although, I am pleased 
to say that there is an increasing acceptance of most of the 
colleges of the need to have some modules of nutrition for 
specialist registrar training in gastroenterology, so it is moving, 
but not enough as yet (General Surgeon UK). 
Another perspective of the shortfall in clinician education was provided by another UK 
participant. He also referred to the 'technological imperative' as distorting the simplicity 
of what is a very basic concept, that is, if you do not eat, you become malnourished: 
It is all clinically.., unnecessarily so. The biochemistry side is 
well researched, particularly in Australia, and it is an expensive 
way of doing what a taxi driver can tell you. So here, we use the 
'taxi driver' sign a lot [grins]. If a taxi driver can tell you that it 
looks as if someone has lost a lot of weight, then you don't need 
all that biochemistry. A lot of that science — biochemical 
markers and anthropometric measurements are only confirming 
what a taxi driver can tell you... that the patient has lost a lot of 
weight and looks malnourished (Critical Care Physician UK). 
This above quote supports the previously made proposition that basic nutritional 
assessment, education and care have been lost to what appears to be a disinterest in 
basic supportive care that need not be attached to the clinical rigors of scientific analysis. 
This assumption also supports the theory that nutrition rates low down on the list of 
medical and nursing priorities as determined by the technological imperative. Another 
factor possibly contributing to this low rating is the fact that it is very difficult ethically to 
22 BAPEN — British Association of Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition 
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justify scientific research on nutrition due to the reality that ethics clearance would never 
be granted with regard to 'starving' a control group. This was explained by the same 
participant who utilised the non-scientific taxi-driver test: 
There are so many nutritional studies that cannot be done 
because we cannot withhold nutritional treatment from a patient. 
We cannot do that. It is therefore very hard to do nutritional 
studies. A lot of our nutritional studies actually come from World 
War Two when people in concentration camps starved.., that is 
where our nutritional data came from, from POW camps, and it 
was seen how people reacted to starvation. But it is hard to do 
that on real people today. So consequently, because we cannot 
do that research, it renders the subject a bit void of hard data 
(Critical Care Physician UK). 
Another briefly mentioned shortfall concerning 'responsibility' involved the recurring 
theme throughout these interpretation chapters of education regarding end-of-life care. 
Two participants spoke of 'responsibility' in terms of being responsible for accepting and 
preparing for the inevitable outcome of dying, that is death by azotaemia (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA; Critical Care Nurse Specialist USA). However, the most 
interesting consideration of 'responsibility' in terms of nutrition came from an 
Occupational Therapist (AUST) who described a divergent view of nutrition in hospitals, 
that is, over-nutrition as compared with malnutrition: 
I think that it is just as big a problem with the overweight people 
in hospitaL I think that greater use could be made of the 
dietitians in the hospital on the matter of people who are grossly 
overweight who come to hospital and there is no attempt made 
to help them lose weight. I think that could come back and bite 
us one day because I feel that by not helping them out in all 
aspects of their health care we are not giving them the best care 
we possibly can. It is a bit like allowing people to smoke while 
they are patients in hospital (Occupational Therapist AUST). 
Over-nutrition in terms of clinician responsibility was not mentioned by any of the other 
• 	contributing participants. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to explore what the participants meant by being responsible 
in terms of caring for the basic nutritional status of their patients. The discussion points 
suggest what can only be described as a certain disinterest or disregard in a subject, and 
an extension of basic care that is not attached to any significant clinical science. On the 
contrary, nutritional science is indeed a complex subject that draws heavily on the 
disciplines of biochemistry and physiology. However, in its most elemental form, 
nutritional care of the patient appears to have fallen short of the scientific requirements 
necessarily for serious and responsible consideration by clinicians. Be it the lack of 
scientific seduction or hospital ward management, it appears that nutritional care of the 
patient — the most fundamental necessity for homeostasis — has certainly gone awry. 
This appears to keep happening regardless of care settings as claimed by both the 
participants and the related literature on malnutrition in hospitals. Certainly these 
findings suggest what can undoubtedly be a continued lack of importance afforded to 
clinical nutrition. The shortfalls associated with the responsibilities of nutritional care 
signify a dire need for appropriate recognition of clinical nutrition curriculum development 
and ongoing education. The case therefore has been made for the consideration of 
malnutrition in hospital as an ethical issue. The political question is therefore raised as to 
whether it would be constituted. Such a question and many others gleaned from these 
eight interpretative chapters are further explored and discussed in the following reflective 
chapter entitled 'Implications'. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction 
The outcomes of this research information are many and far-reaching. The five main 
implications for practice have been identified in the previous eight interpretation chapters 
as being particularly significant for the provision of artificial nutritional support and 
critically understanding life-sustaining technologies in general. These are: 
1. The importance of improving clinicians' understandings of ethics 'at the bedside' via the 
facilitation of end-of-life curriculum development; and to assist clinicians' abilities in 
integrating that understanding into clinical practice. Hence the recognition of 'Clinical 
Ethics' as popularised in much of the North American medical literature. 
2. Strengthening institutional policies and procedures regarding the use of artificial 
nutritional support (and strengthen the delivery of clinical nutrition education) and other 
life-sustaining treatments, thereby embracing the process of advanced care planning. 
3. Supporting the active participation of patients and their families/surrogates in decisions 
about the way in which they live and die. 
4. Improving communication among providers, patients, and families concerning the 
complexities posed by the availability of artificial nutritional support and other life-
sustaining technologies. 
5. Delineating appropriate roles and responsibilities for the various disciplines involved in 
critical/acute and palliative care, fostering teamwork, conflict resolution and mutual 
support. Hence the bridging of the gap between the 'acute' and 'palliative/hospice' 
settings in extending 'good death' care. 
266 
Enacting These Suggestion of the Experts 
The first, and most powerful of these points regarding ethics at the bedside, embraces 
the need for improved mechanisms of delivering end-of-life education. The second and 
third points highlight the need for clarification and development of the role of ethics 
committees and their subsequent development and support, as well as an extension to 
recipients towards increased participation. The fourth point comprises the need for 
fostering honest communication and improved advance care planning, as does the fifth 
point - which essentially highlights the need for clearer lines of responsibility and the 
recognition of the need for palliation when and where appropriate. Drawing upon the 
wisdom of the multidisciplinary mix of participants interviewed, it is suggested that there 
are some important ways of enacting these five areas towards better holistic care. 
So how are we to implement these recommendations in evidenced-based practice, 
recognising that the insights from the participants interviewed provide significant 
consensus across disciplines and cultural divides? We may identify particular domains of 
practice, with those domains of practice being identified clearly by the participants in their 
narratives. 
Addressing Shortfalls in Education 
Hoefler (1994) maintains that physicians generally do not deal with the subject of death 
well, which enhances the disconnection between physicians and their patients, he notes, 
that modern medical training is at least partly to blame. This theme is explored in Chapter 
Four 'Death' (p.117-118), which recognises that courses in death and dying are not an 
integral part of medical curricula. Despite some recent developments such as the EPEC 
Program (1999), and even more recently the ELNEC Program (2001) 23 in the USA, the 
majority of medical school students receive only brief discussions of dying in clinical 
courses that primarily deal with biophysical considerations, leaving aside entirely the 
psychosocial dimensions of death. Death is viewed as a scientific entity therefore being 
ELNEC: The End-of -Life Nursing Education Consortium, established in February 2001 is a comprehensive, national education 
program to improve end-of-life care by nurses, funded by a major grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation; and in 
partnership with the American Association of Colleges of Nursing (AAcN) and the Los Angeles-based City of Hope National Medical 
Center. This resource was located during a last minute review of the literature prior to submission of this thesis. 
267 
humanly denied. Consequently, formal education in end-of-life care has been absent 
from medical school and residency training. The experience of being ill-equipped in a 
holistic sense to care for the dying is epitomised in this following statement by Charles F. 
von Gunten, Director of the EPEC Project. 
They said there was 'nothing to do' for this man who was 'end 
stage'. He was restless and short of breath; he couldn't talk and 
looked terrified. I didn't know what to do so I patted him on the 
shoulder, said something inane, and left. At Tam, he died. The 
memory haunts me. I failed to care for him properly because 
was ignorant (von Gunten 1999:www.epec.net). 
It is clear from the literature that there is no standardisation of education in end-of-life 
care in medical schools at any level of training. This proposition is seemingly evident in 
Australia and the UK whereby no associated study into this subject was located in the 
related literature. Therefore without any training, how can medical practitioners, wherever 
they may be in the world, become confident and competent in end-of-life care? The 
absence of end-of-life education therefore breeds an ethic of detachment that 
emphasises saving lives rather than focusing on the care for and disposition of dying 
patents and their families. Doctors are consequently socialised to consider medicine's 
technological 'rescue imperative' (Meyer 1988:10). This classic Cartesian mentality does 
not lend itself to being skilled in or comfortable with attending to the emotional needs of 
people in their care. 
With the rise of the patient as consumer, individuals may feel that they are not getting 
everything they want from the medical care that they receive. In short, medical training 
(both undergraduate and postgraduate) may produce, from the recipient's perspective, a 
provider that is best described as a stranger or a mechanic, rather than a friend or 
companion. 
Out of the potential barriers to end-of-life care, one barrier in particular is exposed by the 
participants and is a vital finding of this research. Discomfort, inability and failure in 
communicating bad news and/or poor prognosis, lack of skill to assist patients with 
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treatment priorities, and lack of understanding of patients' rights to decline or withdraw 
treatment have led to frequent misunderstanding and excessive futile intervention. Also, 
lack of experience, confidence or simple ignorance have prompted some to avoid dealing 
with patients who are dying altogether. The importance of 'honest communication' is 
frequently referred to throughout this entire research, yet to be able to fulfil the role of 
'honest communicator', health care practitioners require information, education and 
ultimately support. Without this we shall continue to experience these serious gaps in 
end-of-life care as the participants in this research all too frequently explain. 
The participants remind us that the end of a person's life can be one of the most 
important times in that life. While the way we die has changed considerably during the 
20th century, neither our society nor modern medicine has adequately valued end-of-life 
care, with the exception of the recent development and recognition of palliative and 
hospice care. Yet so often palliative care is viewed as a final resort rather than an 
integral part of a cycle of care. Medical curricula need to equip physicians with 
knowledge, skills and attitudes that can be tailored to their unique and diverse practice 
settings. Similarly for nursing and the allied health professions, curriculum development 
in this area is also timely - such as the previously mentioned ELNEC Program in the 
USA. The ultimate goal of such dissemination of knowledge is to relieve suffering and 
improve the quality of the lives of all people on the receiving end of health care, 
regardless of where they live, who they live with, and what they are of dying of. One 
possibility in improving this educational shortfall is the development of Internet-based 
teaching modules for clinical ethics. This would enhance the dissemination of teaching 
materials, as well as responding to the needs and convenience of clinicians. An example 
of such a resource was located during a 'last minute' review of the literature. The Ian 
Anderson Continuing Education Program in End-of-life Care 24 provides numerous 
teaching modules available online including subject headings such as 'Palliative Care', 
'Symptom Management', 'End-of-Life Decision-making', 'The Last Hours', and Indigenous 
Perspectives on Death and Dying'. 
24  A joint project of Continuing Education and The Joint Center for Bioethics, University of Toronto, and The Terry Lather Center for 
Palliative Care, Mount Sinai Hospital, Toronto - see www.cme.utoronto.ca/endoflife/overview.htrn  
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The ongoing process of curriculum reform in Australian medical schools (Lawson et al 
1998; Forbes 1994) provides a timely and welcome opportunity to address the 
deficiencies in end-of-life care teaching. However, as Glare and Virik (2001) maintain, 
clinicians-in-training are not prepared to assess the clinical and psychosocial factors that 
indicate to what extent curative, life-prolonging and palliative care are appropriate for a 
patient, or how they are to be initiated and managed, throughout the course of an illness. 
Such a shortfall necessitates a concerted effort of curriculum review and development. 
Examples of this could be the facilitation of grand rounds incorporating more frequent 
discussion of care at the end-of-life, or more emphasis awarded to topics on death and 
dying issues at National/International meetings of specialist societies. A review of the 
'last minute' literature discovered an entire supplement of the Medical Journal of 
Australia (November 2001) entitled 'Death and Dying Issues' which is evidence that the 
subject is by no means a mute point. This coincides with an ongoing series in the same 
journal entitled 'Clinical Ethics' which is certainly a positive step towards such confronting 
subject matter as an engaging discipline, which demands incorporation into practice and 
education 
Food for Thought 
End-of-life education is not the only implication for practice drawn from this research 
concerning education. These discussions have merged artificial nutritional support into 
the broader area of life-sustaining treatment. More specifically, the provision of nutrition 
in hospital, regardless of its route of administration also requires attention with regard to 
education. The chapters"Symbolism', 'Technology' and 'Responsibility' all highlight the 
need for more emphasis in medical and nursing curricula on the importance of nutrition in 
the clinical setting. Such an emphasis would challenge the obvious conception that 
nutrition as a therapeutic modality is not clinically rigorous or scientific enough to warrant 
such attention - unless of course it is attached to a machine that goes lping'. 25 
Limitations to basic education in nutrition for clinicians (dietitians and nutritionists 
excluded) have become apparent in this research. Staff providing clinical care are often 
25 Reference is made here to the infamous hospital machine in the Monty Python sketch The Miracle of Birth from the movie "The 
Meaning of Life" see wwwuzzle.ona/python/birth.htrni. 'Ping' is an artifactual way of referring to the technological imperative as 
discussed in Chapter Nine 'Technology' (p. 244). 
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not aware of basic factors, which may well be contributing to the overall poor condition of 
their patients. An overburdened and under-educated workforce in conjunction with 
systemic practices of organisation which fail to address nutrition as a vital component of 
care, have resulted in responsibility for distribution of nutrients being delegated often to 
the junior, and frequently to the least well-qualified members of the health care team. 
Without the emphasis of nutrition being duly stressed, there is a danger of undetected 
malnutrition — as is attested to in Chapter Ten 'Responsibility (p. 258-259). Therefore, the 
nutritional needs of patents should be on the agenda of every clinical educator, and 
incorporated into relevant curricula. 
Will the Real Ethics Committee Please Stand Up 
One participant (Oncologist USA) proposed that there would not be any ethical problems 
if doctors only communicated honestly with their patents (Chapter Three 'Principles' p. 
110). This sweeping statement is supported in part by Jonsen eta! (1998), who explain 
that in the usual course of the practice of medicine, important decisions are, and should 
be, made by the patient and physician together, and, that outside parties have no right to 
partake in those decisions unless invited to do so by the principal parties. However, the 
growing complexity of ethical issues in clinical care has stimulated the development of 
ethics committees and ethics consultation. Ethics committees are established in health 
care institutions as advisory groups on policy and sometimes on cases that involve 
ethical issues. Jonsen et al (1998) argue that it is the responsibility of these committees 
to be familiar with the literature and methods of the field of bioethics, and to make 
available the best informed opinions about issues to those who seek their counsel. 
As Curtin (1994) suggests, clinical ethics committeess are helpful and constructive in 
resolving ethical dilemmas regarding the provision of artificial nutritional support. Clinical 
ethics committees can review a case to confirm the responsible physician's diagnosis 
and prognosis of a patent's medical condition; they can provide a forum for incorporating 
the broader social and ethical concerns raised by a particular case; such bodies may 
also have an education role, especially by teaching all professional staff how to identify, 
frame and resolve ethical issues; they can be a means for formulating policy and 
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guidelines regarding such decisions; finally they can review decisions made by others, 
such as physicians and surrogates, about treatment in specific cases. While such a 
forum, and its function, has obvious merit, the consultative nature of the 'ethics forum' is 
essentially a North American phenomenon. This is attested to both by the participants 
and the literature. This representation is also mirrored in the membership of ethics 
committees throughout the USA, which is in sharp contrast to ethics committee structure 
in Australia and the UK, which is essentially the 'research ethics committee' or 
'institutional review board'. 
The very absence of a multidisciplinary forum-style of clinical ethics committee in the 
traditional Australian and UK hospital model, as well as the paucity of formalised 
processes such as living wills, durable power of attorney for health care, and advance 
directives, exposes a certain deficiency in the ethical processes of complex decision-
making in end-of-life situations and/or decision-making regarding the provision of all life-
sustaining technologies. This may in part be a definitional problem whereby different 
terminology is used to explain these forums and their functions. 
However, the USA participants (and the North American literature: Jonsen eta! 1998; 
Singer et al 2001) explore the nature of research ethics (Institutional Review Board) and • 
ethics consultation (Ethics Committee and/or Clinical Ethics Committee). The UK and 
Australian participants (reflected in the UK and Australian literature: BMA 1999; 
Komesaroff and Cohen 2001) only include reference to the research ethics forum. There 
is a palpable absence of a forum for ethics consultation in these countries, despite a 
recent assertion by Slowther eta! (2001) that clinical ethics support services are 
developing in the UK. Another possible exception to this is the recent revision of the 
British Medical Association's guidelines for decision-making which offers a 
comprehensive set of principles which apply to all decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
prolonging treatment (2001). However, on closer examination of this particular text, there 
is no discussion of 'ethics consultation', rather a physician-driven process of decision-
making. This clearly demonstrates a certain deficit in the UK literature reflecting medical 
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paternalism when it comes to such decision-making. Medical paternalism is not solely to 
blame for such a deficit. 
Yet the lack of end-of-life education for physicians only compounds this. This is no more 
apparent than in the discussions on medical futility. For physicians who do not have 
access to such education or professional development, can fall into the trap of 
paternalistic decision-making (thereby avoiding potentially difficult consultation and 
discussion) as well as defaulting into continued aggressive treatment and thereby avoid 
the wrenching discussions that must occur if such treatment is to be abated. As Goodhall 
(1997) argues, the fact that doctors dominate the ethical decision-making process (in 
settings where paternalism is the norm) results in an imbalance, which allows the 
masculine ethic to predominate. 
The lack of clinical interface in the Australian and UK descriptions of 'ethics committees' 
suggests a troubling shortfall, in that those forums that are divorced from the 'clinical coal 
face' (that is, the practice setting), and embedded in theory and contemplation, risk 
rendering themselves less than relevant. Accordingly, the clinical consultative nature of 
an ethics committee needs to be incorporated into those health care delivery systems 
which only provide a research ethics review function. Despite recent concern that there 
is a lack of evidence regarding the effectiveness of ethics consultation services (Kerridge 
et al 2001) when questioning a future for such services in Australia, the North American 
experience, according to the related literature, is certainly positive. Three American 
articles on evaluations of institutional ethics consultation services in particular support 
this statement. Scheiderman et al (2000) 26 explain that ethics consultations were useful 
in resolving conflicts that may be inappropriately prolonging futile or unwanted 
treatments, and are perceived to be beneficial. Dowdy eta! (1998)27 similarly report that 
ethics consultation offers a promising approach to improving decision-making and 
communication, as well as reducing the length of ICU stay for dying patients. 
28 Department of Family and Preventive Medicine, University of California, San Diego, School of Medicine, La Jolla, USA 
27 Bon Securs St. Mars Hospital, Richmond, Virginia, USA 
28 Loma Linda University, California, USA 
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In addition, Orr eta! (1996)28 claim that ethics consultation provided by clinical ethicists to 
be helpful in the majority of cases. This particular evaluation documents seven areas of 
effectiveness: 1) increased clinical clarity; 2) increased moral or legal clarity; 3) 
motivation to do what they believe is right; 4) facilitation of the process of decision-
making; 5) implementation of a decision; 6) interpretation of technical language; and 7) 
consolation and support (Orr et al 1996). More recently, the Baylor University Medical 
Center conducted a recent review of its Ethics Consultation Service since the 
incorporation of the Texas Advance Directive Act of 1999 which has witnessed an 
increase of 57% in general ethics consults and a 91% increase in explicit futility 
consultations. 28 The consultation utilised in particular has observed the process as a 
legally sanctioned mechanism as opposed to a process that was simply part of an 
institutional culture, which in turn clears confusion for clinicians and patients/families. Yet 
considering this research endeavour the most compelling evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of such committees and consultation is offered by two of the USA 
participants. The quotes below are taken from Chapter Three 'Principles' (p. 104): 
It is a win-win situation — like, if the patient wants a good death, 
they get it, or they get treated if they want (Hospital 
Chaplain/Ethicist USA). 
I think that they are a really good thing, and not because of the 
quality of decision-making, not because we get to the right 
answers more often than not or anything like that. There is 
more to it than that...I think though that in terms of what benefits 
the patient and benefits the family, um, we provide a process for 
dispute resolution, joint decision-making that brings people into 
the discussion that clears up factual misconception and allows 
people a forum to express preferences and beliefs, shows those 
preferences and beliefs a healthy amount of respect.. .airs 
differences, finds areas of agreement, narrows areas of 
disputation, and urn, finds more often than not at least some 
narrow basis of agreement to proceed with. Then we can 
reassess it if necessary and see how we all feel about it, and at 
29 Unpublished report : 'A Brief Summary of the BUMC Ethics Consultation Experience Before and After the Texas Advance Directives 
Act of 1999' obtained from the author Dr. R.L. Fine, Director, Office of Clinical Ethics, Baylor Health Care System, in September 
2001. 
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that, that is a pretty beneficial process for most of the disciplines 
(Law Professor USA). 
Hence, these research participants make clear that the ethical dimensions of care 
involve more than a crude consequentalist approach where process is just as important 
as outcome. Process needs to provide support to patients, families and the health care 
team, and clinically focused ethics committees in Australia and the UK have a potential to 
foster what one expert so succinctly put —*in-win situations'. 
Improved Advanced Care Planning and the 'Death Taboo' 
Most discussions regarding advance care planning came from the USA participants. 
They had routine engagement with advance directives as being those statements arising 
in the context of an increasing need to respect and promote patient autonomy. In the 
USA, the focus on advance directives can be traced back to the American emphasis on 
autonomy and truth-telling (Solomon 1999). Indeed, in the USA this is mandatory by law 
upon hospital admission (American Academy of Family Physicians 1994). Advance 
directives have received widespread support in the USA, whereby all 50 states now have 
a statutory basis for such statements (ibid.). The very presence of an advance directive 
promotes dialogue between patient and clinician about what is essentially planning for 
future care, if not more frank discussions about end-of-life care. This could also be 
evidence of America's greater acceptance and participation in 'death dialogue' - a claim 
which is also supported by Sherwin Nuland's previously mentioned text 'How We Die' 
winning a National Book Award in the USA. In support of this is an editorial comment 
located in a recent supplement to the Medical Journal of Australia (November 2001): 
Sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll are no longer taboo in polite 
conversation or even medical consultations. Death and dying 
however, still are. Or, if not taboo, then Technicaliseds at least in 
medical circles (MJA 2001:506). 
Kellehear (2001) also supports this from an Australian perspective when he argues that 
Australian culture, through its artworks, readily acknowledges death and grief, but not the 
process of dying - as commonly observed in European artworks. Furthermore, no 
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special prescriptions or behaviours are portrayed for bridging the transition between 
active life and death. Is it any wonder that when Australians (or any other country/culture 
that acknowledges a 'death taboo') face the prospect of dying, they are empty of ideas 
about what is to be done? 
Likewise, the very absence of an advance directive lends itself to the absence of the 
same dialogue. The Australian situation is testimony to this. Despite three Australian 
States and two Territories having legislation, which provides for advance directives, the 
validity of these at common law is yet to be tested in an Australian court (Bielger et al 
2000). This coincides with the lack of formal education in end-of-life care. Consequently, 
the recognition of end-of-life care is presumably ignored on two fronts. First, in education 
as discussed previously, and secondly, in direct patient care. The very discussion that 
ensues when implementing an advance directive, between patient and clinician, is 
confrontational and awkward. However, such discussion is needed to ascertain the true 
wishes of the patient thus respecting autonomy. If such discussion is absent then a 
situation whereby the clinician assumes autonomy in planning the proposed treatment or 
cessation of the same, is not difficult to appreciate. Acknowledgement of the 'death 
taboo' if not a social denial of death only compounds this problem. 
According to Gorer (1965:195), in the twentieth century 'death' has become more and 
more 'unmentionable'. Encounters with death in modern society have diminished, even 
as violent death has increased unparalleled in human history. Thus, the last century has 
witnessed an unparalleled degree of human-induced death in wars and concentration 
camps, a new set of encounters with death by way of automobile accidents, usage of 
illicit drugs, and a significant rise in the role that violent death plays in fantasies offered to 
mass audiences, not to mention the modern day phenomenon of mass murder via 
terrorism.30 
30 Reference is made here to the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA which occurred just prior to the completion of this 
chapter. 
276 
According to Becker (cited in Buckman 1997), contemporary society is going through a 
phase of virtual denial. The price of this denial or avoidance is paid by the person whose 
life is threatened and who has to face death, and by those who care and support the 
patient Such death denial could also be a result of the previously mentioned media-
hype. Advances in medical sciences are often over-reported in the media and hailed as 
major breakthroughs. As Buckman (1997) explains, the constant bombardment of the 
public with news of apparently miraculous advances in the fight against disease 
subconsciously raises expectations of health and even offers tantalising hopes of 
immortality. It therefore becomes even harder for an individual to face the fact that he or 
she will not be cured despite the many miracles seen on television or in the papers. 
It is noteworthy that the greatest difficulties will occur when there are formal and informal 
taboos which inhibit the plain speaking and plain dealing about death, which so 
characterises palliative care. It will therefore remain difficult to provide 'good death care' 
to those who for religious, cultural or psychosocial reasons cannot accept their reality. In 
such cases, 'good death care' is likely to be limited to the essentials of pain control and 
supportive nursing care. This is not necessarily a failure, rather an acknowledgement 
and appreciation of the many variables one needs to respect regarding global health 
care. 
Close analysis of the narratives shows that physicians still hold power to control 
information through their management of information giving. Information giving is 
selective, so that the information givers can facilitate a discourse which justifies, rather 
than eliminates, the information control. As such, clinical information control is often 
about providing information about treatment as opposed to prognosis. Miyaji (1993) 
supports this claim in explaining that clinicians often give vague information about 
prognosis. Information about treatment is more readily shared in order to counterbalance 
the negative impact of the news on patients. The way doctors control information is 
closely related to the way they handle aspects of the reality of clinical practice, such as 
their own emotional coping, institutional and legal constraints, and power relationships 
among patients and other caregivers. Yet the humane dimension to the doctor, although 
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suppressed in the currently dominant, contractual ethical framework, is still powerful in 
doctors' narratives. Patients are important. 
The need for honest communication is explored throughout the interpretation chapters 
and the various discussion points of this research. The narratives explicitly depict 
honesty as being needed not only at initial diagnosis, but that patients and their 
families/carers should not have to press for information about outcomes of treatment. 
Developing approaches to disclosure that are appropriate for different cultural groups 
also needs attention. As one of the narratives in particular teaches us, 31 strongly held 
views from mainly families/carers either for or against informing the patient of diagnosis 
and/or prognosis can be expected. This is supported by Campbell (2001) who explains 
that there may be culturally determined rules (regarding disclosing diagnosis and 
prognosis) relating to gender, family hierarchies, who should disclose (e.g. eldest son), 
as well as consideration of linguistic issues. The contested space which is 'food' is also 
important here. Even when the continued provision of nutritional support may be clinically 
detrimental, denial of nutrition may be more harmful spiritually. Awareness, appreciation 
and recognition of the multicultural variances concerning death and dying with regard to 
'honest communication' are surely indicated for practice. 
Palliative Care in Critical Care and the Problem of Death 
Exploring the interface between critical and palliative care also stems from the various 
narratives about recognising end-of-life care or 'good death care' as being less than 
optimal in the high technology arena of critical care medicine. Intensive care reflects the 
modern preoccupation with the mastery 32 of disease and the eradication of an 'untimely 
death'. It is also the place to which clinicians refer a patient when that person stands at 
the brink of death or 'circling the drain' 33 and is beyond the reach of conventional 
therapies. Understandably, the debates of withholding and/or withdrawing treatment in 
our current climate may well cause clinicians to distance themselves from any actions 
"In particular see Chapter Six 'Culture (p. 166-168). 
"The masculine metaphor is deliberately used here. For a discussion see Susan Shemin's  No Longer Patient Feminist Ethics and 
Health Care 1993, Temple University Press, for a feminist account in power relations in health care. 
"See Chapter Four 'Death' (p. 116). 
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that may be interpreted as active euthanasia. However, the most interesting paradox 
derived from the narratives on palliating patients in critical care stems from why patients 
might receive protracted and costly multiple organ system support in the hours and days 
immediately before death (Singer 1994). To add to this, even when death is recognised 
as certain, it lies within this paradox of what constitutes natural and artificial in 
contemporary health care with its technological imperatives. 
Commentators such as Ashby (1998), recognise that most deaths are managed in some 
way. The narratives encountered in this research suggest we can, and should, embrace 
management practices that improve quality of care for patients, their families and carers 
at the end-of-life. In reality, death in the ICU is neither simple nor natural, and a cultural 
clash with the principles of palliative care is evident. As Chapple (1999) explains, the 
problem is that terminal care is the precipice when ICU knowledge and sophistication 
ends, and that death is not the mission of any ICU. Attending to the dying process (and 
recognising dying as a multifaceted process) is undoubtedly a challenge to ICU 
clinicians. Acknowledgement of an ultimate lack of control in the face of death is needed 
and can indeed be liberating and positive. Clinicians in high-technology, high-stress 
environments routinely seek to exercise control over the body systems of their patients. 
The prospect of allowing a patient to deteriorate in his of her care is a source of great 
discomfort to some critical care clinicians. It runs contrary to the culture. This is well 
described in those narratives concerning the 'messy' nature of enteral feeding in the ICU 
whereby nurses would complain about the onset of active bowel function, and how such 
bowel activity would be both inconvenient and unsavoury. 34 Letting go of that supposed 
control, thereby avoiding the unnecessary medicalization of death presents as one of the 
most fundamental challenges for critical care clinicians. Likewise, there is the challenging 
suggestion stemming from the various conversations of the research participants. The 
merging of the two disciplines, that is, critical care and palliative care which necessarily 
occurs when providing optimal care for patients. 
34 See Chapter Seven 'Dilemmas (p. 186). 
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Traditionally, and from the perspective of the research participants, it would be unusual 
for critical care and palliative care practitioners to be involved in tending the same 
patient. Despite these two disciplines sitting at opposite ends of the patient care 
spectrum, the narratives suggest that this is not in the best interests of acutely or 
severely ill patients. Bridging the distance between critical and palliative care is crucial. 
Coinciding with this is the extension (however awkward) of advance care planning to the 
critical and acute care setting, and embracing all those aforementioned ideals of honest 
communication, holistic care, and not simply the management of symptoms. 
The formal recognition and support of palliative care as being a distinct medical and 
health care specialty, and the embracing of this specialty in acute patient care settings is 
paramount for the attainment of a 'good death'. The narratives teach us that until this 
improved recognition, acknowledgement and better understanding is reached, and 
greater debate and discussion is encouraged about the management of end-of-life care, 
it will remain the case that clinical behaviour will range from (as according to Ashby 
1998:74) '...abrupt cessation of treatment, minimalist palliative care and treatment 
directed at bringing about a rapid dying process to excessive caution about being seen to 
be instrumental in causing the death'. 
The problem with end-of-life care, or more simply 'death' is not simply about the need for 
better recognition and appropriation of palliative care. Nor is it simply about the need for 
better communication between clinicians and patients, and honest communication at 
that. The actual situation is far more complex than the narratives suggest. The problem 
of death in Western societies is about the extension of what Foucault called medicine's 
'gaze' (1975) - as a cultural phenomenon to advanced age and the end-of-life. As the 
USA participants explained, 'death' is problematised by the power (and fear) of litigation 
that influences every hospital activity to complicate decision-making, action and 
acquiescence to patient surrogates. It is also complicated by the vast gulf between lay 
and professional understandings of human physiology and the role of technology. The 
confusion about the nature of the end of human life, and the physiological process of 
dying, is best explained in the narratives on the role of popular media and peoples' 
expectations of life-sustaining treatments (including those particular narratives 
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concerning what constitutes food and what artificial nutritional support is not). This, 
coupled with medicine's undisputed ability to facilitate survival for many years (especially 
in those cases without the patient achieving awareness or being able to interact with 
others), has led to expectations in society about the extent to which it is possible to 
postpone death, such that death is seen not as a natural, inevitable event, but as a 
failure of medicine to deliver all that the hype and rhetoric promise. 
Adequately tackling the problem of 'death', and embracing the ideals of palliative care for 
all people at the end of their lives will depend on a broad reconsideration of the dominant 
role that medicine plays - not just in institutional practices, but also in all aspects of 
social life. At one time, critical care and palliative care may have seemed to be 
inherently inconsistent. End-of-life care was simply a sequel to failed intensive care. This 
is no longer a workable paradigm. The role of medicine therefore, to facilitate, and 
embrace a transition process from life to death (and one that is highly variable from 
person to person) is perhaps the most far-reaching implication drawn from this research. 
Some aspects of medical treatment will always remain uncertain. Death is a certainty for 
everyone yet, except in a small number of cases, diagnosis and prognosis are based on 
probability and past evidence rather than absolute certainty. Societal perceptions also 
need to embrace a shift away from the view that life can be prolonged indefinitely, 
towards a realistic acceptance of the inevitability of death as part of life. This need could, 
in part, be addressed by the formulation and availability of appropriate information giving 
(by way of family conference and/or the use of information booklets in the clinical setting) 
to help people understand the principles of care, and to enable them to participate in 
early and more informed decision-making. Further research into how clinician 
communication concerning end-of-life care can be improved, regardless of clinical area, 
is surely indicated from this research. Ashby (2001) and Glare and Virik (2001) offer 
some timely additions from the Australian literature in support of this claim. Also indicated 
is addressing the absence of accurate assessment of premorbid health and quality-of-
life, and a comprehensive audit of outcome by way of follow up which could include the 
'bereavement visit' as suggested by Parkes (1997:685). 
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Conclusion 
Factors driving continued aggressive clinical care include pressure from patients, media-
hype, relatives and referring clinicians, medico-legal concerns or the simple employment 
of new technologies. These in conjunction with the variances in effective dialogue, 
honest communication, appropriate education and information giving about what 
constitutes good holistic care (and not simply the clinical), complicates care. In this 
chapter, the case has been argued for improved management, care and education based 
upon the interviewees' expertise, and the literature. We have also encountered the 
political dimensions of why the status quo exists, and the challenges in providing for 
coordinated care. The very challenge which emerges is inherently political, in asking if 
such change will occur and for whom the system operates? 
Health care providers cannot assume that their patients understand what they tell them. 
Essentially what is needed is research into improving our abilities and to embrace 
communication, truth-telling and advance care planning as interdependent imperatives 
for quality holistic patient (and family) care and support. Learning the skills to understand 
patient/family/carer preferences will enhance treatment practices and policies in the 
management and provision of all life-sustaining modalities, and not just artificial 
nutritional support. 
The overwhelming evidence drawn from this research supports the recognition and 
further multidisciplinary development of end-of-life care. End-of-life care is appropriate 
for the practice of health care professionals everywhere, whatever their discipline, their 
specialty, whatever their culture, and religious beliefs. The appropriate provision of life-
sustaining treatments and the relief of unnecessary suffering, whatever its cause, is the 
concern for us all. In many ways it is indeed a rediscovery of age-old truths. The 
challenge will undoubtedly remain to confront the many taboos associated with death 
and dying. The exposure and deconstruction of these taboos is possibly one of the most 
significant implications drawn from this research. The factors that lead on to this 
exposure and deconstruction are revisited in a reflexive exercise in the final discursive 
chapter of this thesis which has been entitled 'Reflections'. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
REFLECTIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter retrospectively explores those research findings discussed in previous 
chapters where further analysis aids the thrust of this thesis. These include the utilisation 
of a principlist discourse to research heath care ethics by the participants whereby 
casuistry is evident; the theme of 'buying time' as outlined in those discussions on death 
and continued treatment; dissatisfaction within the disciplines; and the confronting 
suggestions of possible abuses of artificial nutritional support. Also, reflexive critique of 
the research project's methodology, structure and difficulties is offered. Further 
discussion is also provided in light of a 'last minute' review of the associated literature 
and the timely nature of this project. Most importantly, an overview of the research's 
relevance to the disciplines as well as the wider community is also undertaken. 
Challenging the Principles 
Throughout this research the limitations of a purely principlist approach to ethics are 
evident. In utilising narrative ethics as a methodology and via the close analysis of the 
participants' stories, it is clear that ethical assumptions that shape practice might well be 
influenced by the principles, but the discourse of 'principle' is mediated by experience 
and interaction. A closer analysis of the narratives encountered in the research exposes 
a broad interpretation by the participants with regards to the 'ethical principles'. 
'Principles' is in many respects verbal shorthand with meaning given in the associated 
text Ethics, as a discursively shaped and negotiated construct is not solely principlist. 
Despite the participants embracing the principlist language, they essentially exhibit 
virtuous behaviour based on what Braunack-Mayer (1999:13) describes in terms of 
'casuistry'. This therefore highlights a complexity in that the participants incorporate 
explicit notions of principlism, yet on exploration of the narratives exhibit tacit virtuous 
behaviour. 
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Hence this research embodies various forms of casuistry, which contribute to the ethical 
reflections on the provision of artificial nutritional support and life-sustaining technologies 
at large. This practice of casuistry adds complexity to a health care system in which 
accounts of principlist medical ethics are still dominant but not necessarily practiced. This 
is evident in those discussions concerning medical paternalism, and the conflict between 
beneficence and autonomy, where a certain paradox of principles is clear. The 
discussion concerning ethics in critical care in Chapter Four 'Death' (p.123) is testimony 
to this. These ethical principles are therefore difficult for physicians to apply in the critical 
care setting. Beneficence is difficult when critical care technologies that support life also 
cause pain. Autonomy is difficult to uphold when patients are unresponsive, their prior 
wishes are unknown, and the pace of medical intervention and its associated 
technological determinism accelerates. Finally, the interests of patients and society 
(multi-faceted spaces in themselves) may clash over questions such as the continuation 
of life support in the face of a poor prognosis and limited bed space in the ICU. This 
paradox of principles exposes the shortcomings of a principlist approach to medical 
ethics in these environments. 
Buying More Time 
Reflecting on the in-depth discussions of this concept within Chapter Four 'Death' 
(p.125), 'buying time' is a concept not located in those terms within the literature. 
Accordingly, this key concept warrants further consideration. It is apparent from those 
narratives regarding 'buying time' in particular, that a dying person may set a date, or 
identify a goal, and look forward to a significant event, with a slowing of deterioration 
during that time. This notion was later verified in the palliative medicine literature and 
referred to as 'psychoneuroimmunology' (Stevens 1997:706). More specifically, 
psychoneuroimmunology is referred to as the physiologic effects of wish-granting. One 
hypothesis to this theory is that the wish-granting experience may influence the patient's 
immune systems and possibly even favourably influence the course of the patient's 
disease (Stevens 1997). 
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Wish granting and 'buying time' have obvious similarities within this concept of managing 
terminal illness, and the dying process. It could be argued that in those examples 
provided by the participants from their varied practice that the two are one and the same. 
Regarding psychoneuroimmunology, it is obvious that evaluation of well-controlled and 
relevant studies will be required to establish this intriguing concept. 
'Buying time' is certainly not limited to the continued provision of artificial nutritional 
support. The process of commencing or continuing aggressive nutritional support in the 
advent of end stage illness poses similar issues with other treatments, in particular, 
aggressive antibiotic therapy. It is well accepted in the palliative medicine literature 
(Morant and Senn 1997) that in clinical situations where antibiotics will result only in a 
prolongation of the dying process, there is rarely an indication for such therapy. Patients 
with Gram-negative septicaemia, if untreated, may succumb within hours to their disease 
(Sickles eta! cited in Morant and Senn 1997), and aggressive combination antibiotic 
therapy in such situations is questionable. This approach of withdrawing and/or 
withholding treatment is 'ethically justified' (Morant and Senn 1997:382), as the result of 
such treatment is only to prolong patient suffering without truly enhancing quality-of-life. 
This is also referred to as disproportionately burdensome treatment However, the notion 
of 'buying time' provides as exception to this withdraw/withhold approach. The examples 
provided in the narratives are proof of this. 
Within the broader discussions of 'buying time' and such exceptions to the 
withdraw/withhold approach, some patients may wish to be alive for an approaching 
family event such as a wedding of a child, a birthday, or an arrival of a relative from 
abroad. 'Buying time' however, is not a guarantee of prolonged survival as, despite 
medical knowledge, it is often very difficult to know when a patient has entered the final 
phase of dying, and its duration and nature. 
The monetary discourse associated with 'buying time' needs to be considered here. 
Whether its metaphorical usage was intended by the participants is uncertain, yet 
continued treatment in order to gain more time does, undoubtedly, costs money — and 
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lots of it. Ethics applied to health care cannot escape an involvement with economics, for 
the practice of medicine and the provision of health care costs money. The cost of health 
care, however it is provided, is rising in every country of the world. The provision of up-
to-date health care facilities, medical equipment, powerful drugs, together with the 
appropriate salaries for health professionals, all contribute to that cost. The increase in 
the cost of the practice of palliative medicine may not be so great as in other disciplines, 
particularly in the acute health care sector. Yet the increased cost of other services in a 
global health service will decrease the resources available for palliative medicine, or 
more simply, end-of-life care. Paradoxically, 'buying time' may become increasingly 
difficult The following quote provides a succinct explanation of such a paradox: 
It is Common experience that increased resources do not result 
in decreased need and therefore decreased cost: The more 
health care is provided, the more is required and demanded, 
and the greater their anxiety about health, the less healthy 
people are (Wilkinson 1997:502). 
This paradox helps to explain the rising costs of health care and how they are both 
related to human attitudes and conduct which are the concern of ethics. Cost cutting, 
down sizing, and all economic rationalism activities must ultimately impact upon 'buying 
time' practices. This will surely be to the detriment of good death care, where the 
identification of reasonable goals and wish granting has much to do with the well-
documented importance of hope (Speck 1997). 'Buying time' is an important concept 
revealed in this research. It lends itself to further exploration in other research projects as 
perhaps one of the least named phenomena in end-of-life care. 
More Reflections on Money 
Leading on from the discussion on 'buying time' and the suggestions disseminating from 
the metaphorical associations of money, are those economically confronting suggestions 
of revenue generation which are discussed in detail in Chapter Five 'Money' (p. 145). 
The over-prescription of artificial nutritional support secondary to its easier availability 
does raise the possibility of the advantages of both revenue generation and cost 
containment. There are indeed numerous ways in which health care professionals could 
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reduce quantity of care without impairing quality. However, as with the previous 
suggestions of abusive feeding, proving such a practice would be very difficult. As the 
various narratives throughout chapter 'Money' teach us, there are many situations 
encompassing 'money' and artificial nutritional support, that is, whether money can be 
made or saved. In these complex situations, regardless of health care delivery service 
model or location, the developments of financial organisation of health care at large do 
not necessarily come equipped with their own ethical analysis. Just what this means for 
providers and consumers in medicine's new economics remains unclear. Yet while 
recognising that economics profoundly affects health care, it should be imperative that all 
providers can and should avoid compromising their patient's welfare in the name of 
generating revenue or even cutting costs. As Morreim (1995) reminds us, we can no 
longer speak of fidelity as a benign requirement that the health care provider refrain from 
exploitation of vulnerable patients in order to line his or her pocket with a little extra gold, 
or as a simplistic command — always to place the patient's interests above one's own. 
This predicament demands serious evaluation and further inquiry — both of which have 
not been attempted within the confines of this thesis. 
More Food for Thought 
As frequently mentioned throughout this research, via the narratives of the participants 
and the extensive literature, the act of providing food and drink is a duty, one proper to 
human nature, and enjoyed by the strict commands of religion as discussed in Chapter 
Six 'Culture' (p.170). The assurance of an intake adequate for nourishment is therefore a 
proper part of medical care, or as Dunstan (1996) claims '...the professional refinement of 
a common human obligation'. Sometimes there is a clear physiological duty to provide it 
via enteral or parenteral modes, when the body cannot take nourishment as in intensive 
or terminal care. Yet the narratives compel us to question this as a duty by prompting us 
to consider whether such a duty is absolute, one to be discharged without exception or 
regard to circumstance or consequence? Rather, the duty to 'feed' is ill explored in the 
literature and not necessarily absolute. The assumption of feeding as an absolute duty 
drawn from the narratives leads on to those discussions regarding withholding and 
withdrawing treatment under the rubric of 'palliation' and not abandonment. Thus, to 
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withdraw nutrition is not to abandon the patient, or to 'leave him to die'. It is to attune the 
treatment, the management and the planning to suit the patient's condition - not purely 
from the clinical perspective (thereby honouring the technological imperative), but most 
importantly from the holistic perspective embracing one's own wishes and needs. The 
duty of care therefore continues - exercised in palliative medicine, including relief of 
discomfort, pain, distress, until the body systems fail and the patient dies. For some, this 
is merely an argument in justification for passive euthanasia, but as Dunstan (1996:255) 
explains, 'Palliative care is active, skilled. It does not kill the patient; it serves his or her 
interest in dying a peaceful natural death'. When we explore the narratives in this thesis 
they compel us to re-examine feeding, not only as a contested clinical and cultural 
commodity, but as something which reminds us to ask 'for whom do we provide this 
intervention?' 
Inquiry into Possible Abuses 
The concept of treatment in such cases as being akin to abuse could possibly be 
paralleled with discussions on benefits versus burdens of aggressive therapies and their 
debilitating complications as mentioned in Chapter Three 'Principles' (p. 110). Yet in 
terms of questionable if not profoundly unethical financial gain, this situation is a 'stand 
alone' dilemma that demands further exploration and inquiry. How one goes about such 
inquiry is perplexing, and could possibly create another ethical dilemma in itself. Quite 
clearly, providing empirical proof of what have essentially been negative assumptions on 
behalf of the few participants who contributed to such discussion is outside of the 
research question. However, the issue is worthy of further research. 
Dissatisfaction with the System 
Attention is also needed considering the suggestion that medicine, if not health care 
entirely, may not be a satisfying or fulfilling vocation in recent times. According to the 
participants this appears to be associated with the advent of managed care, and its 
associated pitfalls. The fact that managed care companies are able to dictate to 
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providers what care (adequate or otherwise) can or cannot be provided 35 was of major 
concern and irritation for those participants commenting on the subject. This is 
supported by a relatively recent comment made in Australian Medicine (August 2000), 
where it is reported from Chicago that in the USA, physicians frustrated with the 
managed care system are retiring early, which is testimony of one particular participant's 
plan to retire from medicine prematurely and embark on a career in virtual medical 
training software design. According to this survey (conducted by Merit Hawkins, a 
Texas-based recruitment firm) 38% of doctors aged 50 or older plan to retire within one 
to three years. Another 16% said they planned to significantly reduce their practice or 
refuse new patients. The survey indicated dissatisfaction with managed care as the 
primary reason for quitting. Dissatisfaction was based on the inability to practice quality 
medicine. This is highlighted in the following example previously provided by a participant 
(Neurosurgeon USA). Regarding his patients undergoing laminectomy surgery, he 
explained that they could expect to suffer from footdrop or decubiti as a result of 
managed care companies not approving postoperative physical therapy: 
Unfortunately now it is common place for some of my patients to 
develop decubiti or footdrop — I mean, like it is accepted practice 
that following a complex laminectomy you get decubiti and, or 
footdrop. Now a couple of years ago that would be totally 
unacceptable, like bad practice. Now it is almost the norm.. .or a 
good example of 'adequate care' as opposed to 'optimal' 
(Neurosurgeon USA). 
This USA experience provides more than a cautionary tail for the Australian and UK 
situations. It helps us to recognise the power relations inherent in deciding not just what 
is quality but what constitutes 'ethical' in modern Western clinical settings. 
The Problem of Research 
Does the need to assess all implications for practice drawn from this research require 
further extensive inquiry? The immediate answer is that there are great difficulties in 
conducting socio-medical ethics research in most environments. Surely there are some 
35 As suggested by those participants commenting on their interactions with managed care companies regarding approval for 
treatments and reimbursement See Chapter Five 'Money (p. 155-156). 
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quantifiable aspects, yet much of the suggested inquiry drawn from this project deals with 
such intangibles as interprofessional relationships, doctor-patient-family-carer attitudes, 
family dislocation, and cultural variances. Moreover, the problem of making significant 
inquiry and comment on such matters are just as great in all health care systems as they 
are in any subset of system regardless of its geographical margins. Most significantly, the 
confronting aspects of 'death-talk' taboo, and the possible abuses as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. This does not mean that serious further inquiry is impossible, especially if it 
is directed at clearly identified issues. For example, the effectiveness of clinical ethics 
consultation services, or, the incidence of PEG insertion in end-stage patients. However, 
the collection of empirical data in these two examples alone poses some considerable 
difficulties regarding clinical rigor. In the case of clinical ethics consultation research in 
the critical care environment, only one study (North American) was located in a 
subsequent review of the literature. Schneiderman et al (2000) report that ethics 
consultations seem to be useful in resolving conflicts that may be inappropriately 
prolonging futile or unwanted treatments and are perceived to be beneficial. Slowther et 
al (2001) also remark that there has been little evaluation of clinical ethics support 
services either in the UK or in other countries with longer established services. This 
demonstrates not only a significant shortfall, but emphasises the need for further inquiry. 
The challenge here is to encourage such inquiry as credible research and not suggestive 
reportage. 
Reflections on Method and Meaning 
Some aspects of the methodology employed in this research certainly require critical 
reflection. This study began in an attempt to contribute to an understanding of the ethical 
issues associated with the provision of artificial nutritional support from a multidisciplinary 
perspective. What eventuated, by way of participant offering, was a far broader 
contribution on the utilisation of the life-sustaining technologies at large, with an 
emphasis on artificial nutritional support. This was certainly an advantage as the method 
elicited useful information including those unexpected findings such as the linkage 
between critical and palliative care. A method of study was sought that would allow, as 
Greene (1988) put it, `to break with the cotton wool, of habit, of mere routine, of 
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automation to seek alternative ways of being, to look for openings' (cited in Mun hall 
1994:247). This stemmed from a desire to employ other ways of knowing in order to gain 
insight into what was referred to in the literature as an 'ethical minefield' (Albert 1998:1). 
The wish to break away from the restrictions of traditional methods of inquiry led to a 
qualitative approach known as narrative ethics which allowed for the collection of 
personal stories with all the embellishment, richness and serendipity that these might 
encompass. The nature of this method is such that although commonalties can be 
asserted, there may be no such thing as a single meaning. There are instead, different 
vantage points, different stories, and different voices. 
The choice of narrative ethics research was an intentional choice, and it is timely to now 
reflect on the limitations and strengths of this choice. The eight major thematic headings 
of Principles, Death, Money, Culture, Dilemmas, Futility, Technology, and Responsibility 
are used as the basis for this reflection. The identification of themes is, at best, only ever 
a simplification of the whole, and is therefore perhaps inadequate when being used 
solely to interpret the issue under study. In this respect the researcher has enjoyed a 
certain methodological freedom in that participants' stories have not been reduced to 
abstract generalisations in deriving themes. The participants remain alive in the text, as 
their narratives and personal moments are intertwined throughout the entire body of this 
research. 
The various criticisms concerning data quality including the question of memory and 
truthful information have been accepted and acknowledged as potential shortfalls to 
qualitative research. Likewise, the recognition of researcher bias and accepting that 
despite all attempts to minimise such bias, it is understood that being totally detached 
from researcher bias is impossible. As Crotty reminds us, 'researchers cannot deny that 
they all come armed with prior knowledge, their own beliefs and judgement, 
preconceived ideas and theories, or personal and theoretical bias (1996:16). 
Utilising CAQDAS also requires a retrospective critique. Despite criticisms that such 
applications can alienate researchers from their data, it was found that the application 
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(ATLAS/ti) only enhanced this relationship by way of effective retrieval of information. 
Handling of the massive textual data was therefore enhanced by way of convenience. 
The burden of interpretation however, still remained a daunting task for the researcher. 
Therefore ATLAS/ti was primarily employed as a data management system and 
consequently had no bearing on the actual conclusions of the research. 
The participation of sharing and verifying narratives and the themes drawn for this 
research, was of particular significance to the participants in that they all spoke of how - 
helpful it had been to be able to tell of their experiences. It was as if this type of 
conversational opportunity had not been previously available to them for various reasons. 
Perhaps the telling of their stories had provided a sense of validation of experience for 
the 32 professionals who participated in this study, if not certainly for the researcher. At 
the broadest level, it was found that participants had points of view they could articulate, 
that these points of view could be categorised, and were influenced by both life 
experiences, (personal and professional) and key people. The participants were also 
changed by both the process of the in-depth interview, in that they thought about their 
answers as they listened to themselves engage in dialogue through the interview 
relationship. 
As this method employed purposive sampling of health care professionals, it is therefore 
a biased sample. Recipients of care were not part of this study. Thus, the findings 
reflect primarily the perceptions of providers and not of those on the receiving end of 
care. This raises an interesting methodological issue. At the onset of data collection it 
was the researcher's intention to include several recipients of artificial nutritional support. 
However, this plan was thwarted by the difficulties in locating actual survivors, as well as 
the need to address the sensitivities of long term EN/PN recipients with regard to difficult 
subject matter. It was therefore decided to fine-tune the sample to providers only. It 
could be argued that this shortchanges the research of valuable consumer information, 
however as this research is essentially multidisciplinary, its intention is to explore 
interprofessional perceptions. This does not discount the value of consumer perception. 
On the contrary, an exclusive exploration in to the perceptions of recipients of care 
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(including family and carers) would be prudent. As Swigart et a! (1996) remind us, health 
care providers need to understand that the way they view the life-support situation may 
be different from the way their patients, and those who love them, view the situation. 
This multidisciplinary/interprofessional ethics research is needed and as such, qualitative 
clinical ethics research is to be encouraged. As the renowned bioethicists Peter Singer, 
Edmund Pellegrino and Mark Siegler explain, within empirical research (both in ethics 
and generally), there is growing recognition that quantitative methods alone are 
inadequate (2001). Qualitative multidisciplinary research also enriches our grasp of the 
moral complexities of different professional views, and this entire research project is a 
confirmation of that supposition. 
Considering many of the phenomena examined by ethics researchers are deeply 
entwined into the fabric of professions, organisations and human lives, qualitative 
methods have begun to play an important role. Ongoing clinical ethics research of a 
qualitative nature however, faces the daunting challenge of being successfully 
recognised supported and funded. In the USA, most national funding agencies directly 
fund only a handful of operating grants and career awards for research into ethical 
issues. Similar funding schemes and opportunities for ethics research in the UK and 
Australia are much harder to identify. Therefore, the challenge remains for research into 
ethical issues as outlined in this project to be appropriately addressed by institutions and 
funding agencies around the world. 
The Last Minute Literature and Stolen Thunder 
Keeping abreast of all developments within the areas of ethics and artificial nutritional 
support, and end-of-life care, necessitated an ongoing review of the literature which 
proved tedious at times. This was especially apparent towards the final stages of writing 
up the research findings, which in turn called for what has been termed a 'last minute' 
review of the related literature. This was achieved by way of various literature searches 
up until the end of 2001, 36 when it was decided that an appropriate consideration of the 
36 These included specific subject searches in Medline, University Clinical School databases including Proquest Medical, and various 
intemet resources such as www.lastacts.oro; vommedical-library.org ; www.orowthhouse.ora: www.onlineethics.orq. 
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recent literature had been achieved. During such a review of the last minute literature, it 
was discovered that a number of articles had in fact preempted some of the findings of 
this research. In particular, a series on clinical ethics published in the Medical Journal of 
Australia. More specifically, those articles by Kerridge et al (2001 — August) and Kelly 
(2001 — November) all point to the same assertions made in the interpretation chapters 
regarding the employment of clinical ethics committees, and the role of end-of-life 
education for physicians respectively. Despite a feeling of having one's thunder stolen, it 
is also reassuring that the research findings are in line with the recent opinions of the 
experts, in Australia at least. 
Relevance of Research 
The timeliness of this research is obvious considering the onset of much recent 
discussion regarding end-of-life issues such as ongoing development of palliative care 
services and the prominence of the euthanasia debate in the public domain. Reference 
needs to be made here about the deliberate avoidance of any discussion on euthanasia 
due to the enormity of the polemic it would surely evoke — one not be confined within the 
bounds of this thesis. However some mention is necessary as to why such a deliberate 
omission has been made in all discussions throughout this research. Most importantly, 
'euthanasia' as a discussion point was never entered into by any of the 32 participants. It 
was as if the participants all shared the understanding that there is a significant gap 
between withholding and/or withdrawing treatment and directly killing. There is surely the 
danger, especially in the critical care setting, that decisions are made to withdraw or 
withhold treatment too early, or deliberately and wrongly aim to end a life by doing so. 
However that danger has always been present, and the tradition has expended much 
attention on where and how to draw the appropriate lines and proceed with the right 
intentions. Euthanasia utterly changes all that in that it is we, not nature, who kill, with 
medicine, according to Callahan (1994),becoming an institution that legitimates the 
taking as well as the saving of life. It is this stark contrast in understanding that explains 
the absence of the euthanasia debate in all discussions within this research. 
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The advent of institutional futility policies, the instigation of advance directives, the need 
for curriculum development in end-of-life education for health professionals, and the ever 
present 'death-talk taboo' all underpin the relevance of this research. The overall 
consensus that a monumental lack of communication between provider and recipient still 
exists surely warrants further research and inquiry into how this shortfall can be 
improved. The real challenge is ensuring that the results from any such research can 
actually be implemented into practice. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, end-of-life issues in both critical and palliative care offer a rich source of 
research challenges, and answers must be sought to a number of questions in order that 
we can improve the quality-of-life (and death), for patients in our care. It is also obvious 
that treatment decisions regarding the provision of artificial nutritional support, and the 
life-sustaining technologies collectively, will become increasingly complicated by financial 
concerns, and the possibilities of certain abuses. Both these areas deserve a certain 
vigilance by way of ongoing inquiry, systems review and audit. The mere suggestions of 
certain abuses and 'irresponsibilities' expose shortcomings in the practice of health care 
that in many ways 'opens up a can of worms'. It is via this very exposure, courtesy of the 
participants, that this research makes an original contribution to knowledge. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
In this thesis we have encountered the thoughts, points of view, experiences, and 
narratives of 32 professionals from varying health related disciplines in three different 
countries, and two markedly divergent different approaches to care delivery. These 
interviews occurred in light of an extensive review of the literature, which was followed by 
a detailed description of the methodology and its justification. The qualitative 
methodology revealed a total of eight major themes: Principles, Death, Money, Culture, 
Dilemmas, Futility, Technology, and Responsibility. These themes enable the 
management and exploration of the extensive text provided by interviews with the 
experts encountered in this research, leading to distinct discussion points. For example, 
we encountered the concept of 'buying time' in prolonging treatment for particular 
reasons; 'generating revenue' in fee for service medicine; 'food for thought' helping us to 
understand what should and should not constitute artificial nutritional support; and the 
`medicalization of death' in acknowledging the importance of supportive palliation. The 
discussion points were explored and examined in light the relevant literature, and 
recognising the gaps in this literature. Accordingly a variety of implications for the 
practice of health care were drawn from the interpretation chapters. Finally, a reflective 
discussion followed in an attempt to identify some of the many and varied suggestions 
encountered within the research. In light of this, a critique of the limitations of the 
methodology employed occurred, as well as a discussion of the relevance of this 
research to mainstream health care practices. So, let us explore some of the key 
insights and conclusions. 
Artificial Nutritional Support or Death and Dying? 
In many respects the outcomes of this research departed from distinct discussions on the 
provision of artificial nutritional support and encompassed wider discussions on death, 
dying and death care. The research participants introduced us to the concepts of 'death-
talk taboo', 'a good death', 'buying time' and 'palliative care in intensive care' - all of 
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which have been essential foci of this study. However, such an emphasis on death and 
dying as opposed to more discreet discussion regarding artificial nutritional support was 
derived from the highly publicised cases of withdrawal of tube feeding outlined in the 
literature review. 37 Recognising the expertise of the participants in this research, and 
the way in which they drew upon a variety of sources and clinical experience, much of 
this research has explored death, dying and the associated issues of ethical treatment 
decisions. 
The Cycle Emerges 
At the centre of the participants' narratives was the importance of patient-focused care. 
Whether the setting be aggressive critical care, palliative care or a home hospice 
environment, in caring for dying people, everything starts with the patient — including 
every aspect of communication, symptom relief or treatment provision. There is no doubt 
that as multidisciplinary professionals we all want to do our best. Yet often the challenges 
to care arise because we do not know how (or are ill-equipped) to approach the problem. 
Nowhere is this truer than in communication. A professional who feels ill-equipped or is 
inept at communication will become part of the problem, instead of part of the solution. 
One of the biggest lessons derived from this research is that of the importance of 
addressing shortfalls in 'honest communication', and to do so effectively and sensitively. 
Across the disciplines its is evident that much improvement is needed in this area which 
in the past has been considered as being of lesser importance in medicine's scientific 
gaze and technical focus. 
An integral part of optimising communication is found in demystifying death-talk, allowing 
for death-talk dialogue as part of the demedicalization of death-talk itself. If death is 
continually medicalized then the ultimate rite of passage will be replaced by a maze of 
medical ritual so that death, the natural end of life, will become the unnatural end of a 
succession of medical interventions. It does not have to be this way. As the discussions 
37  Those celebrated cases involving Karen Quinlan, Nancy Beth Cruzan, Tony Bland and Paul Brophy as discussed in Chapter Two 
'Reviewing the Literature' (p. 8-12). 
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on palliative care and critical care reveal, these two markedly different clinical 
orientations require a dramatic shift in attitudes and interventions if they are to deliver the 
best care for a variety of people. Whether in the ICU or elsewhere, hospitals and health 
care providers have an ethical obligation to provide settings that offer dignified, 
compassionate and skilled care. This includes death care. Knowing the limitations of 
medicine needs to coincide with an appreciation of professionals' abilities to change the 
focus of care, such as providing supportive rather than aggressive clinical care. The role 
of the health care provider therefore needs a closer analysis. 
The role of the health care provider at the end of life was eloquently explained by 
eminent American surgeon and author Dr Sherwin B. Nuland at a presentation entitled 
'Untying the Gordian Knot: A Medical and Ethical Analysis of Authority, Power and 
Responsibility with Regard to Nonbeneficial, Unreasonable and Futile Therapies' in Fort 
Worth, Texas on October 5th , 199938 — just days after all the data for this research was 
collected and transcribed. Nuland suggests that the end of life is like the closing act of a 
play in which the person who is dying has the leading role — or at least that is how it 
should be. Often the treating physician will assume a major part in this closing act 
Nuland offered this explanation: 
Often the treating physician will consider him or herself as a 
leading player in what is essentially the final act of a patient's 
life.. .like assuming they have a major role in a play when in fact 
they don't. It is not about them. It is about the patient. The 
patient has the starring role, not the doctor. You see this a lot in 
the ICU. It is time for the doctor, for the whole medical team to 
just stand back and let the leading actor(s) play out their final 
role (Nuland 1999). 
Yet standing back does not necessarily mean withdrawing from an active role. Health 
care professionals have a crucial role to play in creating optimal circumstances for the 
final role to occur. For example, in providing a supportive environment which is patient 
centred. This is far more than just standing back but helps to bring the patient's central 
=Sherwin B. Nuland M.D., Clinical Professor of Surgery, Yale School of Medicine, Fellow, Institute for Social and Policy Studies, Yale 
University. This lecture was a public convocation on health care ethics sponsored by Harris Methodist Fort Worth Biomedical Ethics 
Program. 
298 
role to the fore. Role clarification is therefore paramount in these situations. Nuland 
suggests that death should be given back to dying people and loved ones, just as birth 
was given back to women courtesy of the women's movement and midwifery. Nuland's 
description does suggest a reference to medical paternity explaining that doctors may 
think that they are actors in this drama '...but in many ways they are groundlings 
[sic]. ..who know nothing about death' (1999). In his description of this 'final act' scenario, 
the interpretation is offered in terms of determining treatments based on whose 
preferences, decisions, or wishes. Simply put, in end-of-life care, regardless of the 
setting, the patient's values, wants and needs should always carry more weight than 
those of the clinician. Death as an active process, therefore must not be permitted to be 
further disrupted by well-meant yet often misguided exercises in medical futility. Nuland 
further supports this view in his 1995 text 'How We Die' by explaining that decisions 
about continuation of treatment are influenced by the enthusiasm of the doctors who 
propose them: 
Commonly, the most accomplished of the specialists are also 
the most convinced and unyielding believers in biomedicine's 
ability to overcome the challenge presented by a pathological 
process close to claiming its victim. A family grasps at a straw 
that comes in the form of a statistic; what is offered as objective 
clinical reality is often the subjectivity of a devout disciple of the 
philosophy that death is an implacable enemy. To such warriors, 
even a temporary victory justifies the laying waste of the fields in 
which a dying man has cultivated his life (1999:265). 
Questioning whether such desperate struggles should be undertaken is the very basis for 
the 'medical futility' debate, or just questioning whether suffering is worth the 'success'. 
As 'groundlings', providers would do well to practice the Golden Rule39 and project 
themselves into the places of family and loved ones and re-examine their expectations of 
what may then appear to be desperate struggles and futile therapies. 
"'The Golden Rule is often referred to 'Do unto others as you would have done unto yourself. Within Judeo Christian circles . a 
formulation may be love your neighbour as yourself resting upon agape (selfless love). 
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Artificial nutritional support is a major component of conversations on medical futility. 
Despite it being caught up in the theoretical conversations on futility as one of a complex 
myriad of aggressive therapies, it carries with it a distinct socio-cultural confusion that 
lends itself to those difficult discussions of starvation, neglect, abuse and medical killing. 
A necessary component for honest communication between provider and recipient is 
clarifying what artificial nutritional support is, and what it is not. The informants also 
strongly suggested that the explanation of futile therapies demands the debunking of the 
death-talk taboo. This in turn necessitates the educational support of all those partaking 
in this dialogue. Consequently a cycle emerges. The cycle that is necessary to resolve 
the misunderstandings of treatment is the same cycle that will improve links between 
aggressive and supportive care. It is also the same cycle that supports truthful dialogue 
between all parties and raises their awareness of peoples' rights and responsibilities. It 
incorporates the imparting of knowledge and experience in thoughtful and sensitive 
ways, as well as defining those dubious areas which will always be contested spaces. 
The advantage of such a cycle — one that is underpinned by honest communication and 
education — is that people may move beyond a narrow medical gaze and appreciate and 
embrace the broader meanings and responsibilities of illness and treatment. 
Accordingly, the consideration of medical training is a vital outcome of this research. 
The professions however are not totally responsible. Yet encouraging a public dialogue 
about end-of-life care, dying and death is easier said than done. Many of us find it difficult 
to talk about such things. In this world of seemingly limitless medical options, good 
decision-making requires open communication among those who are seriously ill, their 
families and loved ones, and their health care providers. Yet such a dialogue is not 
necessarily too complex. We can prepare by taking a step that will ensure our 
participation in our own health decisions by talking — today. We can talk about our own 
end-of-life decisions with our families, friends, or just contemplate these realities 
ourselves. 
With the world's future doctors receiving their apprenticeship in a clinical setting, the 
challenge is therefore cast. Fischer (1992) warns that medical school textbooks must 
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address ethical problems in the context of health care decisions and not restrict 
themselves to pathophysiology and practical therapeutics alone. He argues that new 
areas of ethical evaluation have been raised by the desire of some individuals to pursue 
prolongation of their lives at high expense to society, such that other people are denied 
services because of limitation of available resources. This is to be compounded by the 
evidently inadequate emphasis placed on clinical ethics education as promulgated by this 
research. 
If we are to prepare health care providers to address all the needs of people and to know 
how to work with the health care system that recognises chronicity, terminal and serious 
illness as core clinical responsibilities, then that teaching must occur at least in part in the 
clinical setting. From the standpoint of the medical student (if not the junior doctor/intern 
or resident) if palliation and advance care planning are not taught during clinical rotations 
in the hospital, then they are by omission flagged as not important areas of competence. 
Such a deficiency in training needs addressing. 
Yet education is not solely to blame for such a shortfall. There are serious gaps in the 
delivery of good death care in both socialised and privatised health care delivery settings. 
In the USA for example, the Medicare Hospice Benefit requires patients to give up 
curative care and is limited to those with a prognosis of six months or less (Meier 2002). 
Therefore the 'system' as a whole needs careful and thoughtful reconsideration. 
Geographical Considerations 
Legal consequence was a key issue for those participants from the USA. They spoke of 
a lack of discussion and planning that resulted in a reluctance to make decisions in a 
health care system, which is terrified of litigation, and uncertain of its obligation to the 
technological imperative. Health professionals practising in other countries should take 
heed of this supposed American phenomenon. 
It is well accepted by both the literature and the various offerings contributed by the 
participants that the ethical issues surrounding the provision of artificial nutritional 
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support depend on whether this modality is considered as basic care (and therefore 
ethically obligatory) or medical care (and therefore required only in certain situations, 
depending on medical/therapeutic indications). This is not a new concept. However, this 
research demonstrates the complex variables that both influence and impact upon those 
decisions of who is to decide what is basic care and what constitutes medical care? 
These variables are further influenced and subsequently complicated by differences in 
health care disciplines, models of health care delivery, and to some extent, geographical 
or global demographics. Despite the international literary commentaries on this subject, 
there is by no means a global norm as to what is considered acceptable. 
Conclusion 
From the onset of this research project an open mind was maintained regarding the 
expected findings and outcomes. Some of these were predictable, others surprising if not 
completely serendipitous. A narrative ethics approach to this research topic permitted 
the exposure of 'real' practice and perception, compared with the 'idealist' found in many 
ethics texts, especially the principlist approach as garnered from the associated 
literature. The limitations of this 'idealist' approach to the complexities of clinical ethics, 
such as found in the provision of artificial nutritional support, is well documented 
throughout this research. The need for reform is not just to be found in Chapters Eleven 
and Twelve (Implications' and 'Reflections'). Aspects of the literature help to support the 
recognition of clinical ethics as a necessary discipline to be embraced by all health care 
providers. Clinical ethics is an evolving discipline worthy of substantial academic and 
clinical recognition. Such a gaze requires a critical appreciation of one's strengths and 
shortfalls. This can facilitate a recognition, and enactment of the cycle which governs the 
quality of care for the patient. 
If the cycle of responsibility advocated by this research is practiced, this will help to 
bridge the gap between hospital and hospice, acute, critical and palliative care. The 
result of such a collaboration of care should lead to care that is responsive to what the 
participants explain that people want from their health care system. This is: relief of 
suffering; avoidance of burden on and closer relationships with loved ones; sense of 
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control; avoidance of death prolonging treatment; an increased range of care options; 
increased insurance coverage for the need of seriously ill persons at home including 
professional interdisciplinary team care, personal care, prescription medications, durable 
medical equipment, bereavement support, and greater continuity between care settings. 
Of course in these times of economic rationalism these aims may be difficult to achieve. 
However, these properties of health care as described by the participants in this research 
should be heeded as the goals of high quality care, professional responsibility and 
consequent service modification. 
Ideally, as technology continues to advance and continually change the nature and focus 
of health care, we will continually need to assess, prepare and come to new terms with 
death and engage in such open discussion. As the late Reverend Charles Meyer 
declared: 
Now is the only time we have to discuss these issues; now is 
the only time we have to make our desires known, our wishes 
clear; now is the only time we have to plan for our dying, so that 
we might live, and live fully, from now until then (Meyer 
1997:59). 
This thesis commenced in seeking to explore the ethical dimensions to the provision of 
artificial nutritional support. As part of this we necessarily encountered the demands and 
complexities of end-of-life care. The wisdom of the research participants has helped to 
make the case not only for changes which will lead to the good death that we all seek, 
but that excellence in palliation has much to offer medical care in general as it struggles 
to provide holistic care which is patient-centred. In conclusion we might still ask if all 
patients should be aggressively treated with artificial nutritional support? This question 
can reasonably be answered by claiming that all patients should be received, respected 
and heard. The ethics of artificial nutritional support, if not all life-sustaining treatments 
are not an ethics of act only, but also of relationships between doctors, patients, and 
ultimately society. Accordingly, we discover that the ethical provision of artificial 
nutritional support is not so much about technology per se, but about that which is at the 
heart of ethics, that is, relationships, and how we are treated in those relationships. 
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APPENDIX 1 
STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Title of Project: 	Food For Thought: Ethics and Artificial Nutritional Support 
Chief Investiotors: 	Dr. Christopher Newell Senior Lecturer, University of Tasmania 
Ms. Sarah Breier 	Clinical Nurse Specialist, Royal Hobart Hospital 
1. I have read and understand the 'Information Sheet' for this study 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that the study involves the following procedures: 
/ will take part in an in-depth interview which will last approximately one hour. This will be by a second meeting 
to review the original interview transcript and discuss any issues that arise. 
4. I understand that there will be no physical discomfort associated with this research. 
5. I understand that all research data will be treated as confidential. 
6. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
7. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw at any time without prejudice. 
8. I agree that research data gathered for this investigation may be published provided that I cannot be identified 
as a subject. 
Name of 
subject 	  
Signature of 
subject 	 Date 	  
Statement by the Investigator: 
I have explained this project and the implications in it to this volunteer and I believe that the consent is informed and 
that he/she understands the implications of participation. 
Name of 
investigator 	  
Signature of 
investigator 	 Date 	  
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APPENDIX 2 
INFORMATION SHEET 
TITLE OF INVESTIGATION 
Food For Thought: Ethics and Artificial Nutritional Support 
NAME OF CHIEF INVESTIGATOR 
Dr. Christopher Newell 	Senior Lecturer, University of Tasmania. 	 Ph. 62267731 
Ms. Sarah Breier Clinical Nurse Specialist, Royal Hobart Hospital 	Ph. 62228218 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
To explore the issues in the provision of artificial nutritional support from a multidisciplinary 
perspective. 
This research project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, School of Medicine, University of Tasmania, Australia. 
CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OR OCCLUSION 
Participants who are health professionals will be those professionals practicing within the areas of: Bioethics, 
surgery, medicine, palliative care, nursing, pharmacy, health service management, dietetics and law. 
STUDY PROCEDURES 
You will be invited to participate in an in-depth interview of a semi-structured nature. This 
interview could possibly take up to one hour. During this interview you will be asked a series of 
questions around the subject of ethical provision of artificial nutritional support. This interview 
will be tape-recorded. After the interview, the researcher will organize to meet with you for a follow 
up interview to discuss findings from the first meeting, and to make sure that you agree with 
these. Your participation or otherwise will not have any impact upon any health care or treatment 
you receive. You are free to contact the researcher during this time if you have any concerns about 
the research. 
PAYMENT TO PARTICIPANTS 
Participants will not receive payment for taking part in this project. 
POSSIBILE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS 
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There are no risks envisaged in taking part in this research. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Your participation in this research will remain strictly confidential at all times. The tape-recorded 
interviews will not include your real name or any other identifiable information. All interview 
transcripts and tape recordings will be stored in a locked storage compartment for seven years. 
FREEDOM TO REFUSE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw from this research 
at any time without prejudice. 
CONCERNS OR COMPLAINTS 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the manner in which this research is being 
conducted, you may contact the Chair or Executive Officer of the University Ethics Committee: 
Chair 	 Dr Margaret Otlowski 	(03) 62267569 
Executive Officer 	 Ms Chris Hooper 	 (03) 62262763 
STATEMENT REGARDING APPROVAL 
This project has received ethical approval from the University Ethics Committee. 
RESULTS OF INVESITIGATION 
You will be informed of the overall results of the research at the end of the study. 
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APPENDIX 3 
The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas 
Institutional Review Board' 
IRB Form NR1: Application for Review of New Research Involving Human 
Subjects 
(Revised April 1999) 
litle of Research' 
Food for Thought: Ethics and Artificial Nutritional Support 
Sponsor' University of Tasmania, School of Medicine, Australia - (Tasmania Research 
Scholarship) 
Beth Mancini, MSN, RN, Senior Vice President 
 
   
Assurances of the Principal Investigator and Sub-investigators 
• To safeguard human subjects involved in this research, I agree to use procedures that conform to the policies 
of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas and the regulations of the Department of 
Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug Administration. 
▪ Unless it is necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazard to a human subject, I shall seek prior approval 
from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for substantive changes in the investigative procedures involving 
human subjects that may be called for during the research covered by this application. 
I shall agree to follow the advice of the IRB. 
I agree to report immediately to the IRB any unanticipated, life-threatening, or fatal complications with 
respect to human subjects. 
My signature certifies that I assure compliance with the ethical principles and institutional policies regarding 
the protection of human subjects in research as stated in Title 45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46 
(revised June 18,1991; reprinted April 2,1996) and the Multiple Project Assurance.' 
Assurances of Deportment and Collaborating Chairmen 
°The IRB reviews all research involving human subjects for Children's Medical Center of Dallas, Parkland Health 
& Hospital System, Texas Scottish Rite Hospital for Children, the University of Texas Southwestern Medical 
Center at Dallas, and Zale Lipshy University Hospital. The Board also reviews all research conducted at the 
Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas and the Veteran's Affairs Medical Center of Dallas for which a member of the 
faculty at UT Southwestern serves as principal investigator. 
'Title printed on the cover of the protocol, including the sponsor's protocol number, version, and date 
'Complete name of the organization(s) funding the research 
"Available as an electronic file at 5: \PUB \ FORMS \IRBFORMS. 
352 
I understand that responsibility for assessing the quality of research must be shared by both the department 
and the IR8. 
My signature certifies that I assure compliance with the ethical principles and institutional policies regarding 
the protection of human subjects in research as stated in Title 45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46 
(revised June 18,1991; reprinted April 2,1996) and the Multiple Project Assurance, and that I have reviewed 
the proposed research for the proper use of human subjects. 
This review encompassed experimental design, scientific merit, and accuracy of the proposed research. 
bate of Application 	August 19,1999 
Investigators' and Chairmen's Signatures 
Name (printed) Dept Degree Rank Phone Mail E-mail Signa 
Principal Investigator (PI)44 
Sarah 
Breier 
RN, BN, 
MN ' PhD (c) 
Visiting 
Doctoral 
Candidate 
817-451- 
8360 (h) 
C/- 5501 
W.Mayfield 
Arlington TX 
76016 
Breiersj@aol.com  
. 
(Faculty Sponsor)" 
Beth 
Mancini 
MSN, RN. 
 
Senior 
Vice 
President 
214-590- 
8001 
Bmanci@parknet.pm 
PROBLEM UNbER INVESTIGATION 
(1) Medical condition or scientific problem to be studied: Ethical perspectives of the provision of artificial 
nutritional support. A qualitative study.  
  
SUBJECTS 
(2) Specify all classes of subjects included in the research: 
Healthy Volunteers 
	
Patients 
	
Vulnerable Subjects 	 Other 
Medical students Outpatients Pregnant women 	 Other class: 
(explain below) 
X 	Center employees 	Inpatients 	 Cognitively impaired 
Minors (< 18 yrs) 	 Minors (< 18 yrs) 	Comatose 
Men 	 Men 	 Traumatized 
Women Women 	 Terminally ill 
Proband 	 Proband 	 Fetus (viable) 
44Investigator responsible for the global aspects of the research. The IRB acknowledges one PI for a study. 
45If the PI is not a member of the University faculty, a faculty member is required to serve as "faculty sponsor" 
of the research. Leave blank if the PI is a member of the University faculty. 
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Proband's family 	 Proband's family 	Fetus (non-viable) 
- 
3) Are all racial/ethnic groups included? 	 x 	yes 
no (explain in project summary) 
4) Will people unable to read English be enrolled? 	yes (answer 4A-C) 
X 	no (explain in project summary; omit 4A-C) 
(A) Specify other language(s): 
(B) Will a translator be available throughout the 	yes 
process of obtaining informed consent? 
	
no (explain in project summary) 
(C) Will a translated consent form document be 	yes 
available to subjects? 	 no 
(5) Age range (indicate whether months or years) 	 Center employees above 21 years of age 
(6) Estimated number of experimental subjects to be 
enrolled locally: 	 Approximately 8 - 12 participants employed within 
the Parkland Health (St Hospital System  
(7)Estimated number of control subjects to be 	 N/A 
enrolled locally (if applicable): 
(8)Expected time to completion of enrollment: 	 Two weeks from onset of recruitment 
PROCEDURES 
(9) Duration of each subject's participation:" 	Approximately 30 minutes 
(10) Will a placebo be used? 	 yes 
X 	no 
(11) Will subjects be randomized? 
	
yes 
x 	no 
DISCONTINUATION OF STUDY PROCEDURES 
46Duration of participation encompasses the period of any treatment or other study procedures plus follow-up 
(the total period during which study data are collected). 
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12) Specify all conditions for removal from study: 
Medical condition unchanged 
Medical condition worse 
Complications intolerable x 
lc Subject's voluntary withdrawal 
BENEFITS 
:13) For subjects? x 
(14) For others? x 
Investigator's decision 
Subject's failure to follow study procedures 
Completion of all study activities 
Closure of the study by the sponsor/FDA 
yes 
no 
yes 
no (explain in project summary) 
RISKS 
"Minima/ risk means that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated 
in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in 
daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or 
tests" (45 CFR 46). 
(15) Code each type of risk to subjects: 
0: no / minimal risk 
1: more than minimal risk 
physical harm 	0 	psychological harm 	0 	social harm 	0 	economic harm 
(16) Are subjects exposed to radiation? 	 yes (Radiation Safety Committee approval required) 
x 	no (omit A and B) 
(A) 	Purposes: Diagnostic: usual number of studies (standard care) 
Diagnostic: extra standard studies done solely for research purposes 
Diagnostic: studies unapproved by the FDA / not standard practice 
Therapeutic: standard treatments with radiation 
Therapeutic: unapproved radiation treatments 
(B) 	Source: 
 
X-rays 
Isotopes 
Pharmaceuticals 
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INCENTIVE 
:17) 	Will subjects be paid an incentive? 
 
yes (answer A) 
no (skip A) 
  
   
A) Is the incentive pro-rated if a subject 
withdraws early? 
 
yes (explain procedures below) 
  
no 
COSTS TO SUBJECTS 
(18) Will subjects be responsible for any 
of the costs related to the research? 
 
yes (explain below; specify amount) 
no (responsible only for costs of standard care) 
no (sponsor/investigator pays for all research costs) 
 
  
RECRUITMENT 
(19) Specify procedures for recruiting subjects: 
Investigators' patients 
Other patients 
Bulletin boards 
Public media47 
Letters to community organizations 
Letters to physicians in the Metroplex 
Proband 
Proband's physician 
Physicians of proband's family 
Other (specify below) 
RESEARCH PERSONNEL 
(20) 	Will investigators diagnose and treat 
	yes 
subjects?48 
	
no (patient's private or referring physician) 
'Approval of both the IRB and the Office of News and Publications required 
"Leave blank if research does not involve therapeutic intervention. 
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21) List all other personnel permitted to obtain 	N/A 
informed consent: 49 
22) Is there a conflict of interest between 	yes (explain below) 50 
any investigator and the sponsor? 	x 	no (none / unfunded research therefore inapplicable) 
(23) PERFORMANCE SITES 
Specify the sites where (1) study procedures will be conducted, (2) patients will be seen, 
and (3) resources (equipment, supplies, personnel, etc.) will be utilized. Indicate whether 
Form NR2 has been sent to the appropriate authority at the performance site. 
Performance Site 
	
Recruitment 	Resources 
	
Form NR2 
Aston Ambulatory Care Center 
:hildren's Medical Center of Dallas 
)allas County Mental Health 
5eneral Clinical Research Center 
Parkland Health & Hospital System 	x 	 Investigator's own 
resources only  
Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas 
Sprague Clinical Sciences Center 
St. Paul Medical Center 
Texas Scottish Rite Hospital for Children 
Veteran's Affairs Medical Center 
tale Lipshy University Hospital 
Other (specify below) 
sent 
(24) Other approvals needed: 
 
Environmental Health & Safety Committee 
Radiation Safety Committee 
IRB at the Veteran's Affairs Medical Center 
IRB at St. Paul Medical Center 
IRB at Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas 
  
  
  
  
"Names of personnel authorized to obtain informed consent who are not listed on page 2 of this form. 
Notification of the Office of Conflict of Interest required 
  
Grants Management (UT Southwestern) 
General Clinical Research Center 
Other (specify below) 
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25) Have all approvals been 
requested? 
 
yes 
no (explain below) 
 
COMMENTS: 
(4) Will people unable to read English be enrolled? - NO 
Researcher only speaks English 
(19) Recruitment of Participants: 
Various health care professionals from the disciplines of surgery, medicine, nursing, 
pharmacy and dietetics will approached to participate in this research. After explaining 
the nature of the research and obtaining verbal consent, participants will take part in a 
semi-structured in-depth interview lasting approximately 30 minutes at a mutually 
convenient location. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Texas Directive to Physicians and Family or Surrogates 
This is an important legal document known as an Advance Directive. It is designed to 
help you communicate your wishes about medical treatment at some time in the future 
when you are unable to make your wishes known because of illness or injury. These 
wishes are usually based on personal values. In particular, you may want to consider 
what burdens or hardships of treatment you would be willing to accept for a particular 
amount of benefit obtained if you were seriously ill. 
You are encouraged to discuss your values and wishes with your family or chosen 
spokesperson, as well as your physician. Your physician, other health care provider, or 
medical institution may provide you with various resources to assist you in completing 
your advance directive. Brief definitions are listed below and may aid you in your 
discussions and advance planning. Initial the treatment choices that best reflect your 
personal preferences. Provide a copy of your directive to your physician, usual 
hospital, and family or spokesperson. Consider a periodic review of the document. By 
periodic review, you can best assure that the directive reflects your preferences. 
In addition to this advance directive, Texas law provides for two other types of 
directives that can be important during a serious illness. These are the Medical Power 
of Attorney and the Out-of-Hospital Do-Not-Resuscitate Order. You may wish to 
discuss these with your physician, family, hospital representative, or other advisers. 
You may also wish to complete a directive related to the donation of organs and 
tissues. 
Directive 
	 , recognize that the best health care is 
based upon a partnership of trust and communication with my physician. My 
physician and I will make health care decisions together as long as I am of sound mind 
and able to make my wishes known. If there comes a time that I am unable to make 
medical decisions about myself because of illness or injury, I direct that the following 
treatment preferences be honored: 
If, in the judgement of my physician, I am suffering with a terminal condition from 
which I am expected to die within six months, even with available life-sustaining 
treatment provided in accordance with prevailing standards of medical care: 
I request that all treatments other than those needed to keep me comfortable be 
discontinued or withheld and my physician allow me to die as gently as possible; OR 
I request that I be kept alive in this terminal condition using available life-sustaining 
treatment. 
(This selection does not apply to Hospice care.) 
If, in the judgement of my physician. I am suffering with an irreversible condition so 
that I cannot care for myself or make decisions for myself and am expected to die 
without life-sustaining treatment provided in accordance with prevailing standards of 
medical care: 
I request that all treatments other than those needed to keep me comfortable be 
discontinued or withheld and my physician allow me to die as gently as possible; OR 
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I request that I be kept alive in this irreversible condition using available life-
sustaining treatment. (This selection does not apply to Hospice care.) 
Additional Requests: (After discussion with your physician, you may wish to 
consider listing particular treatments in this space that you do or do not want in 
specific circumstances, such as artificial nutrition and fluids, intravenous 
antibiotics, etc. Be sure to state whether you do or do not want the particular 
treatment.) After signing this directive, if my representative or I elect hospice 
care, I understand and agree that only those treatments needed to keep me 
comfortable would be provided and I would not be given available life-sustaining 
treatments. If I do not have a Medical Power of Attorney, and I am unable to 
make my wishes known, I designate the following person(s) to make treatment 
decisions with my physician compatible with my personal values: 
1. 
2. 
(If a Medical Power of Attorney has been executed, then an agent already 
has been named and you should not list additional names in this document.) 
If the above persons are not available, or if I have not designated a spokesperson, 
I understand that a spokesperson will be chosen for me, following standards 
specified in the laws of Texas. If, in the judgement of my physician, my death is 
imminent within minutes to hours, even with the use of all available medical 
treatment provided within the prevailing standard of care, I acknowledge 
that all treatments may be withheld or removed except those needed to maintain 
my comfort. I understand that under Texas law this directive has no effect if I 
have been diagnosed as pregnant. This directive will remain in effect until I 
revoke it. No other person may do so. 
Signed Date 	  
City, County and State of Residence 	  
Two witnesses must sign in the spaces below. 
Two competent adult witnesses must sign below, acknowledging the signature of 
the declarant. The witness designated as Witness (1) may not be a person 
designated to make a treatment decision for the patient and may not be related to 
the declarant by blood or marriage. This witness may not be entitled to any part of 
the estate and may not have a claim against the estate of the patient. This 
witness may not be the attending physician or an employee of the attending 
physician. If this witness is an employee of a health care facility in which the 
patient is being cared for, this witness may not be involved in providing direct 
patient care to the patient. This witness may not be an officer, director, partner, or 
business office employee of a health care facility in which the patient 
is being cared for or of any parent organization of the health care facility. 
Witness (1) 	 Witness (2) 	  
Definitions: 
"Artificial nutrition and hydration" means the provision of nutrients or fluids 
by a tube inserted in a vein, under the skin in the subcutaneous tissues, or in the 
stomach (gastrointestinal tract). 
"Irreversible condition" means a condition, injury, or illness: 
a. that may be treated, but is never cured; 
b. that leaves a person unable to care for or make decisions for the person's own 
self; and 
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c. that, without life-sustaining treatment provided in accordance with the 
prevailing standard of medical care is fatal. 
Explanation: Many serious illnesses such as cancer, failure of major organs 
(kidney, heart, liver, or lung), and serious brain disease such as Alzheimer's 
dementia may be considered irreversible early on. There is no cure, but the 
patient may be kept alive for prolonged periods of time if the patient receives life-
sustaining treatments. Late in the course of the same illness, the disease may be 
considered terminal when, even with treatment, the patient is expected to die. 
You may wish to consider which burdens of treatment you would be willing to 
accept in an effort to achieve a particular outcome. This is a very personal 
decision that you may wish to discuss with your physician, family, or other 
important persons in your life. 
"Life-sustaining treatment" means treatment that, based on reasonable medical 
judgement, sustains the life of a patient and without which the patient will die. 
The term includes both life-sustaining medications and artificial life support such 
as mechanical breathing machines, kidney dialysis treatment, and artificial 
hydration and nutrition. The term does not include the administration of pain 
management medication, the performance of a medical procedure necessary 
to provide comfort care, or any other medical care provided to alleviate a patient's 
pain. 
"Terminal condition" means an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, 
or illness that according to reasonable medical judgement will produce death 
within six months, even with available life-sustaining treatment provided in 
accordance with the prevailing standard of medical care. 
Explanation: Many serious illnesses may be considered irreversible early in the 
course of the illness, but they may not be considered terminal until the disease is 
fairly advanced. In thinking about terminal illness and its treatment, you again 
may wish to consider the relative benefits and burdens of treatment and discuss 
your wishes with your physician, family, or other important persons in your life. 
